Opinion
A132238
10-14-2011
SACORY KNIGHT, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SOLANO COUNTY, Respondent; FAIRFIELD CITY ATTORNEY, et al. Real Parties in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCR274219)
Petitioner Sacory Knight, a defendant charged in Solano County Superior Court with possession and transportation of a controlled substance, challenges the trial court's denial of his motion for pretrial discovery of specified information contained in the arresting officer's personnel records. The Superior Court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that although the declaration supporting the motion disputed the officer's explanation of the facts establishing the legal basis for the traffic stop and subsequent search, it did not specify an alternative plausible scenario reflecting what petitioner claimed happened, in order to justify the discovery of the officer's personnel records. As explained below, we hold that the supporting declaration was sufficient, and therefore direct the trial court to conduct the requisite in camera review of the officer's personnel file in order to determine which documents, if any, should be provided to petitioner.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 23, 2010, the Solano County District Attorney filed an information charging petitioner with possession and transportation of a controlled substance, cocaine, and with one prior conviction for which petitioner served a prison" term within five years of committing the offenses charged in the information. Petitioner faces trial on those charges on October 25, 2011.
According to the police report on February 20, 2010 the arresting officer, Officer Gutierrez, observed petitioner driving a maroon Lexus with a nonfunctional brake light. The officer effected a traffic stop and approached the Lexus. While standing at the driver's side window, he smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from inside the vehicle. The officer determined that petitioner's license had been suspended the day before the traffic stop. When the officer confronted petitioner about the smell of marijuana, petitioner explained that he had recently smoked marijuana. Gutierrez's report indicated that after being informed that the officer intended to search petitioner's person and the vehicle, petitioner responded: " 'That's fine, you can search me.' " Searching petitioner, Gutierrez found a large amount of cash, later determined to be $1,020, in $20, $10, and $5 denominations. Gutierrez had petitioner sit on the curb while he searched the Lexus, finding "two large off-white substances that appeared to be cocaine" and tested positive as cocaine in a field test. After being Mirandized, petitioner denied the substance was rock cocaine, but conceded he might have dropped some cocaine in the car.
On March 16, 2011, petitioner filed a motion pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) for the discovery of Gutierrez's confidential police personnel records (Pitchess motion). Counsel's supporting declaration alleged that the officer had lied about three key facts: (1) that the tail light in the car petitioner was driving was broken; (2) that petitioner smelled of marijuana; and (3) that petitioner consented to a search of the vehicle. It also explained that Gutierrez's credibility was material to petitioner's case, so that other false reports filed by him would be relevant to petitioner's defense. Finding that the declaration supporting the Pitchess motion lacked the necessary alternative factual scenario, the Superior Court denied the motion without prejudice to petitioner's re-submitting it with a supplemental declaration. Because, in the court's view, the declaration supporting the motion lacked an adequate, plausible factual scenario, the court did not conduct an in camera review of Gutierrez's personnel file.
Specifically, the motion seeks: (1) verbatim copies of investigative reports regarding Officer Gutierrez's conduct while employed with the Fairfield Police Department; (2) names and contact information of individuals who have complained that Gutierrez has made false reports or fabricated charges or evidence; (3) names and contact information of individuals who have complained Gutierrez conducted illegal search and seizures and false arrests; (4) transcripts and recordings of statements taken in connection with investigations of reported incidents of false reports, illegal search and seizure, and fabrication of charges and/or evidence; (5) written records, statements, and reports taken in connection with such investigations; (6) records showing whether Gutierrez was ever disciplined for dishonesty or improper tactics; (7) records of Gutierrez's previous experience in law enforcement; and (8) names and contact information of persons contacted and interviewed in the course of the above investigations, the statements of those persons, the investigators' notes, and the outcome and conclusions of such investigations.
See p. 2, supra. Counsel's declaration disputes only that petitioner consented to the vehicle search.
Petitioner did not re-submit his motion to the Superior Court. Rather, on June 7, 2011, he filed a petition for a writ of mandate in this court. On June 10, 2011, we requested informal briefing and gave notice pursuant to Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180 (Palma) that, if appropriate, we might issue a peremptory writ in the first instance. Relying on the caption on the petition's cover page, which lists only the People of the State of California as the real party in interest, the court initially sent its request for informal opposition to the Attorney General, who declined to take a position in this matter and requested that we re-direct our request for opposition to the Fairfield Police Department. On June 14, 2011, we gave Palma notice, requested opposition from the Fairfield Police Department, and extended the deadlines to complete the informal briefing. On June 17, 2011, the City of Fairfield filed its preliminary opposition. We now issue the peremptory writ in the first instance, directing respondent Superior Court to conduct an in camera review of Officer Gutierrez's file to determine whether any disclosures are appropriate.
DISCUSSION
I. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Pre-trial appellate review of criminal discovery rulings is appropriate. (See People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 675, overruled on another ground in People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 181, fn. 2.) Our review of the grant or denial of a motion to access law enforcement personnel records is pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330.)
The City of Fairfield contends the petition should be summarily denied because it was not named as Party to this proceeding. We disagree. Although the City of Fairfield, on behalf of the Fairfield Police Department, litigated this matter in the trial court, the caption on the petitioner's cover lists only the People of the State of California as the real party in interest. However, the Fairfield City Attorney and the Fairfield Police Department were listed as real parties in interest on the inside petition caption and served with a copy of the petition. Thus, we conclude the City of Fairfield was effectively named and given notice of this proceeding. Accordingly, summary denial on the ground that the City of Fairfield was not a named party is not appropriate.
II. THE SUPPORTING DECLARATION IS SUFFICIENT TO MERIT AN IN CAMERA REVIEW OF THE OFFICER'S PERSONNEL FILE
The Pitchess procedure seeks to balance the peace officer's right to confidentiality against the defendant's right to obtain all the information that is pertinent to his defense. (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1039.) Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019 (Warrick) summarizes the legislative enactments relating to the Pitchess procedure:
To initiate discovery, the defendant must file a motion supported by affidavits showing 'good cause for the discovery,' first by demonstrating the materiality of the information to the pending litigation, and second by 'stating upon reasonable belief that the police agency has the records or information at issue. [Citation omitted.] . . . [¶] If the trial court finds good cause for the discovery, it reviews the pertinent documents in chambers and discloses only that information falling within the statutorily defined standards of relevance. [Citations omitted.] [¶] . . . [¶] [A] showing of good cause requires a defendant seeking Pitchess discovery to establish not only a logical link between the defense proposed and the pending charge, but also to articulate how the discovery being sought would support such a defense or how it would impeach the officer's version of events. [¶] . . . [¶] To show good cause . . . defense counsel's declaration in support of a Pitchess motion must propose a defense or defenses to the pending charges. . . . [¶] Counsel's affidavit must also describe a factual scenario supporting the claimed officer misconduct. That factual scenario, depending on the circumstances of the case, may consist of a denial of the facts asserted in the police report.(Id. at pp. 1019, 1021, 1024-1025.)
To support the proposition that in some cases a simple denial of the facts asserted in the police report satisfies the requirement to articulate the alternate factual scenario, the Warrick court cites People v. Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410 (Hustead). (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1025.) In Hustead the Court of Appeal found that the defendant had met his burden to justify an in camera inspection of the officer's personnel file regarding evidence of dishonesty. There the counsel's declaration alleged that the officer made material misstatements regarding what he saw, including making false claims that the defendant was driving dangerously. It stated that the defendant denied driving as the officer described and claimed that he had taken a different route than the officer alleged. Hustead's counsel further alleged that a material and substantial issue in the trial would be the character, habits, customs and credibility of the officers. The Hustead court found, "These allegations were sufficient to establish a plausible factual foundation for an allegation that the officer made false accusations in his report. It demonstrated that appellant's defense would be that he did not drive in the manner suggested by the police report and therefore the charges against him were not justified." (Hustead, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 417.)
In the case pending before us counsel's declaration parallels the declaration at issue in Hustead. It states, in pertinent part: "I am informed and believe that Officer Gutierrez wrote a false report in the instant case. Specifically, he claimed in the police report that Sacory Knight's brake light was not functioning, that Sacory Knight smelled of marijuana, and that Sacory Knight consented to a vehicle search. However, I am informed and believe based on discussions with my client that the police report and those statements contained within it are false and untruthful." The declaration also states, "I am informed and believe and thereupon allege that a material and substantial issue in the trial of defendant's case will be the character, habits, customs, and credibility of Officer Gutierrez, thereby making information regarding other false reports extremely relevant to SACORY KNIGHT's defense. Officer Gutierrez's credibility is especially important because he is the only witness to the alleged events of the instant case."
Thus, the declaration at issue here meets the requirements for a declaration as discussed in Warrick. It establishes a " 'plausible' factual foundation," and articulates how the discovery being sought would support the proposed defense. The City of Fairfield attempts to distinguish Hustead on the ground that counsel's declaration there was more specific than the one at issue here. But the declarations make comparably specific allegations. Here, the plausible foundation is simply that the officer lied about the broken brake light, the smell of marijuana, and whether petitioner consented to a search in order to justify the traffic stop, search, and arrest. The Pitchess motion seeks specific material that would document the officer's alleged propensity to lie and falsify information to conduct searches and make arrests. Nothing more is required here in order to establish good cause for the court to conduct an in camera review of the personnel file. (See Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 681684 [holding that confidential information regarding police officers' alleged habitual or customary use of force or violence to extract involuntary confessions was discoverable pursuant to Pitchess procedure where it was alleged defendant's confession had been coerced, in part, by threats of violence].)
A " 'plausible' factual foundation" simply means a "scenario of officer misconduct . . . that might or could have occurred." (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1026.) It does not mean it is likely the alleged misconduct occurred.
There are, of course, other matters that must be satisfied to entitle a moving party to have the court conduct an in camera review of a confidential personnel file. For example, the defendant must allege a reasonable belief that the police agency has the records being sought. (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019.) There must be a showing that the requested discovery will support the proposed defense. (Id. at p. 1027.) Here, though, the only disputed issue is whether petitioner has articulated a specific and plausible factual scenario of police misconduct.
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CONCLUSION
This case squarely falls under the principles articulated in Warrick and Hustead. Thus, the accelerated Palma procedure (see Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171) is appropriate because "petitioner's entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue . . . ." (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; see also Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240-1241.)
Petitioner seeks, in part, that we "direct respondent court to issue a new order granting Petitioner's motion for discovery of the above described documents . . . ." Such a broad order would be inappropriate. We have not reviewed the documents to determine their relevance; in any case, the trial court must first be afforded an opportunity to conduct that review and make the appropriate determinations.
Thus, let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding respondent Superior Court to vacate its order denying petitioner's request for an in camera review of Officer Gutierrez's personnel file and to undertake the requested in camera review. The trial court remains free to determine in the first instance which documents and information contained in that file, if any, should be disclosed to petitioner. This decision is final as to this court immediately upon filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(3).)
McGuiness, P.J. We concur: Pollak, J. Jenkins, J.