Opinion
CV166026603
03-15-2018
Kyle C. KLEWIN v. HIGHLAND HILLS APARTMENTS, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Calmar, J.
The defendants move to strike counts three through five of the plaintiff’s five-count second amended complaint on numerous grounds.
On May 15, 2017, the plaintiff, Klewin Construction, Inc. (KCI), filed a second amended complaint with exhibits against the defendants, alleging breach of contract and other causes of action. The plaintiff alleges the defendants, Highland Hills Apartments, LLC (Highland Hills) and A.R. Building Company, Inc. (A.R.), breached its contract with the plaintiff and hired away much of the plaintiff’s employees and subcontractors to complete a construction project in Rhode Island. On October 13, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to strike count three, tortious interference with contractual relations; count four, violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA); and count five, promissory estoppel, accompanied by a memorandum of law. On November 21, 2017, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, accompanied by exhibits. On December 13, 2017, the defendants filed a reply to the plaintiff’s memorandum of law. On December 18, 2017, the court heard oral argument at short calendar.
ACME Construction Specialties, Inc. was also a plaintiff, but was dismissed from this action.
The plaintiff filed its first complaint on April 4, 2016. The defendants filed a request to revise on June 23, 2016, to which the plaintiff objected. The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint on April 28, 2017, followed by a second amended complaint on May 15, 2017. The defendants did not object to the filing of the second amended complaint, making it operative.
DISCUSSION
" The proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is to make a motion to strike prior to trial." Gulack v. Gulack, 30 Conn.App. 305, 309, 620 A.2d 181 (1993). " The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). " In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). " A complaint includes all exhibits attached thereto." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tracy v. New Milford Public Schools, 101 Conn.App. 560, 566, 922 A.2d 280, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910, 931 A.2d 935 (2007). " [The court] [construes] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). " Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Practice Book § 10-39 allows a party to challenge the legal sufficiency of any prayer for relief.
A. Choice of Law
The defendants first argue Rhode Island law governs the motion to strike because § 13.1 of the contract contains a choice of law clause, providing: " The Contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located ..." Because the project was located in Rhode Island, the defendant argues Rhode Island law governs all disputes relating to the contract. The plaintiff argues the contract’s narrow language means Rhode Island law only covers the breach of contract claims, counts one and two, and Connecticut law governs the remaining claims.
" The threshold choice of law issue in Connecticut, as it is elsewhere, is whether there is an outcome determinative conflict between applicable laws of the states with a potential interest in the case. If not, there is no need to perform a choice of law analysis, and the law common to the jurisdiction should be applied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Roll-A-Cover, LLC, 131 Conn.App. 443, 465-66, 27 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 915, 33 A.3d 739 (2011). " When the applicable law of a foreign state is not shown to be otherwise, we presume it to be the same as our own." Walzer v. Walzer, 173 Conn. 62, 76, 376 A.2d 414 (1977).
In the present case, the defendants have only pointed to potentially conflicting laws as to count three, tortious interference with contractual relations. Because the defendants have not shown how Rhode Island law would conflict with Connecticut law regarding count four, CUTPA, and count five, promissory estoppel, Connecticut law will govern those claims. See id. ; see also Cohen v. Roll-A-Cover, LLC, supra, 131 Conn.App. 466 (" the defendants have failed to indicate in their appellate brief how the application of any other law would have conflicted with the provisions of CUTPA. Consequently, we determine that a choice of law analysis is inappropriate under these circumstances" ).
As for count three, tortious interference with contractual relations, Rhode Island law and Connecticut law are the same. This is a " false conflict whereby the controlling law of each jurisdiction is the same." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 798, 830 A.2d 752 (2003). " In such a case, the case ought to be decided under the law that is common to both states." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Haymond v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 45 Conn.Supp. 481, 488-89, 723 A.2d 821 (1997), aff’d, 247 Conn. 436, 723 A.2d 808 (1999). Accordingly, because the law is the same, Connecticut law will govern this count, and Connecticut law governs counts three, four, and five.
In Rhode Island, " No prevail on a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must establish " (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract; (3) his [or her] intentional interference; and (4) damages resulting therefrom." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bossian v. Anderson, 69 A.3d 869, 877 (R.I. 2013). " [A] plaintiff must show that the interference is not only intentional, but also improper." Id. Similarly, in Connecticut, " [a] claim for tortious interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to establish (1) the existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship, (2) the defendants’ knowledge of that relationship, (3) the defendants’ intent to interfere with the relationship, (4) the interference was tortious, and (5) a loss suffered by the plaintiff was caused by the tortious conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Loiselle v. Browning & Browning Real Estate, LLC, 147 Conn.App. 246, 259, 83 A.3d 608 (2013). " [T]he plaintiff must plead and prove at least some improper motive or improper means." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reyes v. Chetta, 143 Conn.App. 758, 764, 71 A.3d 1255 (2013).
B. Count Three
The defendants move to strike count three, tortious interference with contractual relations, of the plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because the complaint did not allege an improper purpose, tortious interference with contractual relations cannot occur in an at-will employment context, and the defendants were parties to the plaintiff’s agreements with its subcontractors. The defendants also move to strike the plaintiff’s prayer for relief, which requests exemplary damages, of count three on the ground that the plaintiff’s complaint does not sufficiently allege reckless conduct. The plaintiff responds, arguing the complaint sufficiently alleges an improper purpose, tortious interference with contractual relations can occur in employment at-will contexts, and the defendants were not parties to the plaintiff’s contracts with its subcontractors. The plaintiff further argues the prayer for relief can remain as the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges reckless conduct.
i. Improper Purpose
The defendants move to strike count three of the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege an improper purpose for a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations. The plaintiff responds, arguing the complaint sufficiently alleges an improper purpose.
" A claim for tortious interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to establish (1) the existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship, (2) the defendants’ knowledge of that relationship, (3) the defendants’ intent to interfere with the relationship, (4) the interference was tortious, and (5) a loss suffered by the plaintiff was caused by the tortious conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Loiselle v. Browning & Browning Real Estate, LLC, 147 Conn.App. 246, 259, 83 A.3d 608 (2013). " [T]he plaintiff must plead and prove at least some improper motive or improper means ... [F]or a plaintiff successfully to prosecute such an action it must prove that ... the defendant was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation or molestation ... or that the defendant acted maliciously ... In the context of a tortious interference claim, the term malice is meant not in the sense of ill will, but intentional interference without justification ... In other words, the [plaintiff] bears the burden of alleging and proving lack of justification on the part of the [defendant]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Reyes v. Chetta, 143 Conn.App. 758, 764, 71 A.3d 1255 (2013).
" The allegation that the defendant encouraged [the plaintiff’s former employee] to breach his employment contract and subsequently hired him as a permanent employee sufficiently alleges intentional interference without justification." Desrosier of Greenwich v. Shumway Capital Partners, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-05-4004621-S (May 30, 2006, Lewis, J.T.R.). Soliciting a plaintiff’s employees to use confidential information in breach of an agreement and soliciting those employees to recruit other employees in breach of the agreement are also acts that constitute tortious interference. Precision Computer Services, Inc. v. Zones, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-12-6031688-S (April 11, 2013, Sommer, J.).
In the present case, the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges an improper purpose, in the form of malice, for a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations. The plaintiff alleges the defendants were unfamiliar with construction projects in New England, lacked sufficient contacts to approach officials and quality subcontractors in southern New England, learned of and formed relationships with those people through negotiations with the plaintiff, formed a contract with the plaintiff, subsequently breached it supposedly due to a corporate structure issue, and immediately hired all of the plaintiff’s key employees and subcontractors. In short, the plaintiff’s complaint alleges the defendants employed all or most of the plaintiff’s employees and subcontractors, in violation of the plaintiff’s contracts with those individuals, after the defendants became familiar with the southern New England market. Such acts, taken as true, sufficiently constitute an improper purpose because the hiring away of a contracted party’s employees to avoid fulfilling one’s obligation under a contract or an agreement can be intentional interference without justification, thus malice, in that the defendants sought to remove the middle-man, the plaintiff, from the construction project. See Desrosier of Greenwich v. Shumway Capital Partners, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-05-4004621-S. Therefore, the defendants’ motion to strike count three of the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to sufficiently allege an improper purpose for a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations is denied.
ii. Tortious Interference with at-will Employment
The defendants move to strike count three of the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that the plaintiff cannot allege tortious interference with contractual relations in an employment at-will context, like the one here between the plaintiff and its subcontractors, because at-will parties may end the relationship at any time and for any reason. The plaintiff responds by arguing the defendant can and did tortuously interfere in an at-will employment relationship.
" In the absence of fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation, obstruction, molestation, or malicious acts, courts generally recognize no liability for inducing an employee not bound by an employment contract to move to a competitor." Electronic Associates, Inc. v. Automatic Equipment Development Corp., 185 Conn. 31, 34, 440 A.2d 249 (1981). Further, absent a restrictive covenant, former at-will employees may immediately and freely compete with their former employer. Town & Country Home & Homes Services, Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314, 317, 189 A.2d 390 (1963). Nevertheless, " the law not only does not restrict its protection to rights resting on enforceable contractual relationships, but it also forbids unjustifiable interference with any man’s right to pursue his lawful business or occupation and to secure to himself the earnings of his industry." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49 Conn.App. 152, 167, 714 A.2d 21, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 905, 720 A.2d 516 (1998); see also Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs of Northwest Indiana, 845 N.E.2d 130, 138 (Ind. 2006) (" an at-will employee must be able to expect that his continued employment depends on the will of his employer and not upon the whim of a third party interferer" [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
In the present case, contrary to the defendants’ argument, Connecticut law allows tortious interference with at-will employment, so long as there is evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation, obstruction, molestation, or malice. See Electronic Associates, Inc. v. Automatic Equipment Development Corp., supra, 185 Conn. 34. The plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges malice. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to strike count three, tortious interference, on the ground that tortious interference with contractual relations cannot occur in an employment at-will context is denied.
See Part B.i. of this memorandum.
iii. Parties to the Plaintiff’s Other Agreements
The defendants move to strike count three of the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that they could not tortiously interfere with the agreement between the plaintiff and its subcontractors because the defendants were third-party beneficiaries to those agreements. The plaintiff argues neither it nor its subcontractors intended the defendants to be third-party beneficiaries.
" [I]t is well-settled that the tort of interference with contractual relations only lies when a third party adversely affects the contractual relations of two other parties." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., supra, 49 Conn.App. 168. " The third party beneficiary doctrine provides that [a] third party beneficiary may enforce a contractual obligation without being in privity with the actual parties to the contract ... Therefore, a third party beneficiary who is not a named obligee in a given contract may sue the obligor for breach." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wykeham Rise, LLC v. Federer, 305 Conn. 448, 473, 52 A.3d 702 (2012). " Under the third party beneficiary doctrine, [the] ultimate test to be applied [in determining whether a person has a right of action as a third party beneficiary] is whether the intent of the parties to the contract was that the promisor should assume a direct obligation to the third party [beneficiary] ... [T]hat intent is to be determined from the terms of the contract read in the light of the circumstances attending its making, including the motives and purposes of the parties ... [I]t is not in all instances necessary that there be express language in the contract creating a direct obligation to the claimed third party beneficiary ..." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 474-75.
In Shoreline Care Ltd. Partnership v. Jansen & Rogan Consulting Engineers, P.C., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. X06-CV-94-0155982-S (June 20, 2001, McWeeny, J.), the court concluded that the plaintiff, the financier of the construction project, was not a third-party beneficiary to the defendant’s agreement with a subcontractor. The contract between the plaintiff and defendant stated: " [T]he Contractor shall require each Subcontractor, to the extent of the Work to be performed by the Subcontractor, to be bound to the Contractor by terms of the Contract Documents ..." (Internal quotation marks admitted.) Id. The contract further provided: " The Contract Documents shall not be construed to create a contractual relationship of any kind ... (2) between the Owner and the Subcontractor ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court reasoned the contract’s language clearly and unambiguously precluded a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the subcontractor, thus preventing the formation of a third-party beneficiary relationship. Id.
In the present case, the defendants were not third-party beneficiaries to the plaintiff’s agreements with its subcontractors. Section 1.1.2 of Document A201-2007, titled " General Conditions for the Contract for Construction," which was incorporated by reference into the main contract, provides in relevant part: " The Contract Documents shall not be constructed to create a contractual relationship of any kind ... (2) between the Owner and a subcontractor or a Sub-contractor ... or (4) between any persons or entities other than the Owner and the Contractor." Further, § 5.3 of that same form provides in relevant part: " [T]he Contractor shall require each Subcontractor ... to be bound to the Contractor by terms of the Contract Documents ..." This language closely mirrors the contract in Shoreline Care Ltd. Partnership v. Jansen & Rogan Consulting Engineers, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X06-CV-94-0155982-S. Accordingly, because that court concluded the owner of the project was not a third-party beneficiary based on similar unambiguous contract language, this Court does so here. Thus, because the defendants were not third-party beneficiaries to the agreements between the plaintiff and its employees and subcontractors, they could tortiously interfere with those agreements. Therefore, the defendants’ motion to strike count three, tortious interference, on the ground that they were third-party beneficiaries is denied.
Section 1.3 of Document 133-2009, the main contract, provides in relevant part: " For the Preconstruction Phase, Document A201-2007, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, shall apply only as specifically provided in this Agreement. For the Construction Phase, the general conditions of the contract shall be set forth in A201-2007, which document is incorporated herein by reference."
iv. Exemplary Damages
The defendants additionally move to strike the exemplary damages of count three of the plaintiff’s prayer for relief on the ground that the allegations therein do not rise to the level of recklessness required for exemplary damages. The plaintiff argues the defendants’ alleged reckless conduct warrants exemplary damages.
" To furnish a basis for recovery of such damages, the pleadings must allege and the evidence must show wanton or wilful malicious misconduct, and the language contained in the pleadings must be sufficiently explicit to inform the court and opposing counsel that such damages are being sought." Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 77, 485 A.2d 1305 (1985). " [I]n order to award punitive or exemplary damages, evidence must reveal a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 811, 614 A.2d 414 (1992). " Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct." Markey v. Santangelo, supra, 195 Conn. 78. " [T]he characteristic element of recklessness is the design to injure either actually entertained or to be implied from the conduct and circumstances." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. CALCO Construction & Development Co., 318 Conn. 847, 879, 124 A.3d 847 (2015).
In the present case, the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges reckless conduct by the defendants to warrant exemplary damages. The complaint alleges the defendants knew of the subcontractors the plaintiff hired, obtained the necessary information to complete the project on their own, and " terminated the contract without cause and immediately hired all of the [plaintiff’s] key employees and subcontractors to act as its own key employees and subcontractors on the Project." In other words, the defendants’ alleged interference occurred through " the ruse of contracting with [the plaintiff] to gain access" to information about the plaintiff’s employees and subcontractors. Such an allegation, taken as true, would show that the defendants had a reckless indifference to the plaintiff because the defendants sought to injure the plaintiff by hiring away its entire workforce or feign an interest in legitimately contracting with the plaintiff. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to strike exemplary damages for count three, tortious interference with contractual relations, of the plaintiff’s prayer for relief on the ground that the allegations do not rise to the level required for exemplary damages is denied.
C. Count Four
The defendants move to strike count four, CUTPA, of the plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that a CUTPA claim is unavailable in a breach of contract action and, even if it is, the plaintiff insufficiently pleaded that claim. The plaintiff argues it sufficiently alleged conduct that goes beyond the breach of contract claims and sufficiently pleaded its CUTPA claim.
General Statutes § 42-110b(a), CUTPA, provides: " No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." " [I]n determining whether a practice violates CUTPA we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the [F]ederal [T]rade [C]ommission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise- in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other businesspersons] ... All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Naples v. Keystone Building & Development Corp., 295 Conn. 214, 227-28, 990 A.2d 326 (2010). There is no " special requirement of pleading particularity connected with a CUTPA claim, over and above any other claim." Macomber v. Travelers Property & Casualty Corp., 261 Conn. 620, 644, 804 A.2d 180 (2002). " It is well settled that whether a defendant’s acts constitute ... deceptive or unfair trade practices under CUTPA, is a question of fact for the trier ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ulbrich v. Groth, 310 Conn. 375, 433, 78 A.3d 76 (2013).
" [T]he defendant’s actions of encouraging and soliciting an important member of the plaintiff’s staff to come into its employment to likely perform the same services that he was providing for the plaintiff are sufficient aggravating circumstances to render the defendant’s actions more than a mere breach of contract." Desrosier of Greenwich v. Shumway Capital Partners, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-05-4004621-S. " [I]t is well established that a breach of contract may, but does not necessarily, rise to the level of a CUTPA violation." Ulbrich v. Grath, supra, 310 Conn. 432. " Where the plaintiff alleges ... aggravating circumstances, beyond a mere breach of contract that may bring the case within the cigarette rule, the CUTPA claim may withstand a motion to strike." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pollock v. Panjabi, 47 Conn.Supp. 179, 197, 781 A.2d 518 (2000).
In the present case, the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently pleads a CUTPA claim. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleges the defendants not only breached the contract by unilaterally terminating its obligations to the plaintiff, but also using the parties’ relationship to obtain information from the plaintiff to complete the project without them. In other words, the defendants allegedly used the contract as a ruse to gain access to and hire the plaintiff’s employees and subcontractors to their own advantage and to the plaintiff’s disadvantage. Taking these allegations as true, such actions meet the unfair, dishonest, unscrupulous, unethical, and injurious practices that CUTPA prohibits. See Desrosier of Greenwich v. Shumway Capital Partners, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-05-4004621-S (alleged solicitation of employees deemed unscrupulous behavior). Further, because such actions constitute aggravating circumstances; see id. ; and because the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded those circumstances in its CUTPA claim, the CUTPA claim can remain with the breach of contract claim. See Ulbrich v. Groth, supra, 310 Conn. 432. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to strike count four, CUTPA, of the plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that a CUTPA claim is unavailable in a breach of contract action and that the plaintiff insufficiently pleaded that claim is denied.
D. Counts Three and Four
The defendants also move to strike counts three and four of the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that the economic loss doctrine bars those claims. The plaintiff argues the economic loss doctrine does not bar these claims.
" [T]he economic loss doctrine bars negligence claims that arise out of and are dependent on breach of contract claims that result only in economic loss." Ulbrich v. Groth, supra, 310 Conn. 410. Nevertheless, " the economic loss doctrine does not bar claims arising from a breach of contract ... when the plaintiff has alleged that the breach was accompanied by intentional, reckless, unethical or unscrupulous conduct." Id., 412. Tortious interference is an intentional tort. Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. CALCO Construction & Development Co., supra, 318 Conn. 868-69. Similarly, " the economic loss doctrine does not bar [Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act] claims arising from a breach of contract ... when the plaintiff has alleged that the breach was accompanied by intentional, reckless, unethical or unscrupulous conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. O & G Industries, Inc., 319 Conn. 641, 661 n.15, 126 A.3d 569 (2015).
In the present case, because the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges intentional conduct for count three, tortious interference, the economic loss doctrine does not bar the claim. Similarly, because the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges aggravating conduct for count four, CUTPA, the economic loss doctrine does not bar that claim. Therefore, the defendants’ motion to strike counts three and four on the ground that the economic loss doctrine bars these claims is denied.
See Part B of this memorandum.
See Part C of this memorandum.
E. Count Five
The defendants move to strike count five, promissory estoppel, on the ground that promissory estoppel cannot stand when a breach of contract claim exists. The plaintiff argues it may plead promissory estoppel as an alternative to the breach of contract claim.
" The doctrine of promissory estoppel serves as an alternative basis to enforce a contract in the absence of competing common-law considerations." Torringford Farms Ass’n., Inc. v. Torrington, 75 Conn.App. 570, 576, 816 A.2d 736, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 924, 823 A.2d 1217 (2003). " We have permitted a jury to consider in the alternative claims for breach of contract and for promissory estoppel when there is an issue of whether the agreement may be too indefinite to allow for contract formation." Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 33, 88-89, 873 A.2d 929 (2005); see also 300 State, LLC v. Hanafin, 140 Conn.App. 327, 331-32, 59 A.3d 287 (2013) (judgment rendered for plaintiff after court trial on separate claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit not reversible error " because the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to support the judgment under either count" ).
In the present case, the plaintiff pleads promissory estoppel as an alternative basis for recovery should it fail to prove its contract claim. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to strike count five on the ground that promissory estoppel cannot stand when a breach of contract claim exists is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendants’ motion to strike.