Opinion
2341-21L
03-20-2023
STEVE ALAN KINGSLEY, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
ORDER AND DECISION
Emin Toro Judge
In this collection due process (CDP) case, petitioner, Steve Alan Kingsley, seeks review under 6330(d)(1) of a notice of determination by the Internal Revenue Service Independent Office of Appeals (IRS Appeals), dated December 22, 2020. That notice of determination sustained the filing of a Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing with respect to Mr. Kingsley's unpaid federal income tax liabilities for the 2012 and 2014 taxable years.
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code), Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, all regulation references are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest dollar.
Respondent, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, has moved for summary judgment under Rule 121, contending that the determination was proper as a matter of law. For the reasons described below, we will grant the Commissioner's Motion.
The Commissioner represents in his Motion that Mr. Kingsley paid his taxable year 2014 balance "in full" and that the balance is now "zero." Resp't's Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 28. The record supports these representations, and Mr. Kingsley has not argued otherwise. Accordingly, this case is now moot with respect to Mr. Kingsley's 2014 tax year, and we will not address that year further. See Greene-Thapedi v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 1, 7 (2006).
Background
The following facts are drawn from the parties' pleadings and the Commissioner's Motion papers, including the Declaration and Exhibits attached thereto. See Rule 121(b). They are stated solely for the purposes of deciding the Commissioner's Motion and not as findings of fact in this case. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff'd, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). Mr. Kingsley resided in Kansas when he filed his Petition.
I. Mr. Kingsley's 2012 Tax Year
In 2012, Mr. Kingsley and his ex-wife took distributions from their retirement accounts. Mr. Kingsley used some of the distributions to pay off the mortgage on the home they owned. Forms 1099-R, Distributions From Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance Contracts, etc., reporting the distributions were issued to Mr. Kingsley and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Mr. Kingsley and his ex-wife timely filed a joint income tax return for 2012 on Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return. They did not report the retirement distributions on the return. As a result, on October 20, 2014, the IRS issued them a notice of deficiency determining an income tax deficiency of $52,020 and a substantial understatement of tax penalty under section 6662 of $10,404.
Mr. Kingsley and his ex-wife did not pursue a deficiency proceeding in our Court, and the IRS subsequently assessed the deficiency, penalty, and interest against them. A Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters, for Mr. Kingsley's 2012 tax year shows that his outstanding liability for 2012 was $92,677 as of November 1, 2022.
II. The Commissioner's Collection Efforts and CDP Proceedings
A. Notice of Intent to Levy and CDP Hearing Request
The IRS issued Mr. Kingsley a Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing, dated June 18, 2019, that included his 2012 tax year.
After receiving the notice, Mr. Kingsley timely requested a CDP hearing by submitting Form 12153, Request for Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing (CDP Hearing Request) to the IRS. In the CDP Hearing Request, Mr. Kingsley checked a box indicating "I Cannot Pay Balance" and another box requesting a lien "Discharge." Mr. Kingsley also attached to the CDP Hearing Request a letter in which he proposed an "informal Offer in Compromise" of "50% of the 2012 tax debt" with his ex-wife "held responsible for the remaining 50%." Decl. of Darrell Price (Price Decl.) Ex. 4, at 4. Mr. Kingsley did not indicate that he was challenging his underlying liability for the 2012 tax year and did not request innocent spouse relief under section 6015.
B. CDP Hearing
1. Initial Evaluation of Mr. Kingsley's Case
Mr. Kingsley's CDP case was assigned to a settlement officer with the IRS Appeals office located in Phoenix, Arizona. The settlement officer reviewed the administrative file and verified that the proposed collection action complied with all applicable laws, regulations, and administrative procedures.
On November 5, 2019, the settlement officer mailed Mr. Kingsley a letter confirming receipt of his CDP Hearing Request and scheduling a conference call with him on December 10, 2019. This letter also informed Mr. Kingsley that he needed to submit a completed Form 656, Offer in Compromise, along with supporting documents to be considered for an offer-in-compromise.
On November 18, 2019, the settlement officer received from Mr. Kingsley a completed Form 656, a Form 433-A (OIC), Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals, and documentation supporting the Form 433-A. On Form 656, Mr. Kingsley checked a box indicating that he was requesting to compromise his 2012 tax year liability under "Doubt as to Collectibility" and proposed an offer amount of $26,000. Under "Explanation of Circumstances," Mr. Kingsley said "I am 55 years old with $39K in my retirement fund, I have a son getting married next May 2020, I have a daughter graduating college in May 2020 and my youngest son is a freshman in college." Price Decl. Ex. 15, at 5. He also said that his "ex wife [sic] is just as liable for her half of this debt." Price Decl. Ex. 15, at 5.
Upon receipt of Mr. Kingsley's proposed offer-in-compromise, the settlement officer forwarded it to the IRS's Brookhaven, New York, office for processing and consideration by an offer-in-compromise specialist (OIC specialist).
2. Conference Call with the Settlement Officer
On December 10, 2019, Mr. Kingsley participated in his scheduled conference call with the settlement officer. Relevant to this case, Mr. Kingsley and the settlement officer discussed collection alternatives and Mr. Kingsley's request for a lien discharge. Mr. Kingsley indicated that he wanted to pursue the offer-in-compromise. The settlement officer informed him that his offer-in-compromise had been forwarded to an OIC specialist for processing. Mr. Kingsley also indicated that he did not want a lien discharge because he rented and did not own a home.
3. Consideration of Offer-in-Compromise
Mr. Kingsley's offer-in-compromise was assigned to an OIC specialist. The OIC specialist requested that Mr. Kingsley provide additional information, and Mr. Kingsley complied. After reviewing the information, the OIC specialist mailed Mr. Kingsley a preliminary decision letter indicating that his offer-in-compromise was being rejected because he had the ability to pay the full amount of the liability within the time provided by law and his special circumstances did not amount to a hardship.
In reaching this determination, the OIC specialist prepared an "Offer in Compromise Financial Analysis Report," dated August 12, 2020, computing Mr. Kingsley's "Total Assets" and "Amount That Could Be Paid" based on his income and allowable expenses. The report shows Mr. Kingsley had "Total Net Monthly Income" of $2,634, which equaled Mr. Kingsley's "Total Monthly Income" of $8,200 minus his allowable monthly "Household Expenses" of $5,566. The OIC specialist multiplied $2,634 by 62 months to determine Mr. Kingsley's "Amount That Could Be Paid" of $163,308. The report also shows that Mr. Kingsley had "Total Assets" of $37,472 and a "Total Liability" at the time of the report of $90,228.
Following Mr. Kingsley's receipt of the preliminary decision letter, he appealed the OIC specialist's determination to the settlement officer. The settlement officer reviewed the information the OIC specialist had considered and prepared Form 14561, Income and Expense/Asset Equity Calculation Table setting forth his preliminary determinations concerning Mr. Kingsley's proposed offer-in-compromise. Form 14561 shows that Mr. Kingsley had monthly "Total Income" of $8,200 and monthly "Total Expenses" of $5,748. The settlement officer multiplied the difference of those two amounts ($2,452) by 62 months to arrive at a "Future Income Value (FIV) or Monthly Ability to Pay" of $152,024. The form also shows that Mr. Kingsley had a total asset value of $36,472.
The difference in Mr. Kingsley's monthly "Total Expenses" the settlement officer determined and his "Household Expenses" the OIC Specialist determined is the result of increased "Health Insurance Costs (Out-of-Pocket)" and "Current taxes" that the Form 14561 shows as accepted by the settlement officer.
The settlement officer called Mr. Kingsley and informed him that he agreed with the OIC specialist's determination to reject the offer-in-compromise request because Mr. Kingsley had the ability to pay the full amount of the 2012 tax year liability. During the call, the settlement officer proposed an installment agreement of $2,100 per month based on the information Mr. Kingsley provided. But Mr. Kingsley rejected the installment agreement and said that he could only afford to pay $500 per month or he would need to stop making retirement contributions and payments for his children's college and vehicle expenses. In response, the settlement officer informed Mr. Kingsley that these are not allowable expenses in determining his ability to pay. Mr. Kingsley asked why his ex-wife was not responsible for the 2012 tax year liability, in response to which the settlement officer explained that Mr. Kingsley's 2012 tax year was a joint liability with his ex-wife and that she was not a party to his CDP case.
After the call, the settlement officer prepared Form 14559, Appeals Offer in Compromise Rejection Memorandum, with his final determination rejecting Mr. Kingsley's offer-in-compromise. Form 14559 reflects reasonable collection potential of $200,780-equal to Mr. Kingsley's "Future Income Value (FIV) or Monthly Ability to Pay" of $163,308 plus his total asset value of $37,472 as shown on the form. This form also reflects an ability to pay of $2,634 per month calculated by subtracting allowed expenses from monthly income.
4. Notice of Determination
On December 22, 2020, the settlement officer sent Mr. Kingsley the notice of determination now on review before us. The notice determined that the proposed levy was appropriate, that "any applicable law or administrative procedure[s] were met," and that the "proposed levy action balances the efficient collection of taxes with the taxpayer's legitimate concern that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary." Price Decl. Ex. 1, at 3-5.
Regarding the collection alternatives, the notice of determination stated that Mr. Kingsley's proposed offer-in-compromise of $26,000 was rejected because he had "the ability to pay [his] liability in full within the time provided by law" and his "special circumstances [from Form 656] did not warrant a hardship." Price Decl. Ex. 1, at 4. The notice further stated that Mr. Kingsley was offered an installment agreement of $2,100 per month that he rejected because "[he] could not afford that payment." Id. The notice explained that Mr. Kingsley's retirement contributions and amounts he pays toward his children's college and vehicle expenses were not considered because they "are not considered allowable expenses." Id.
III. Tax Court Proceedings
Mr. Kingsley timely petitioned our Court for review of the notice of determination. His Petition alleges the following: (1) Mr. Kingsley is unable to pay the full amount of his remaining liability, (2) he cannot afford the installment agreement amount IRS Appeals offered as his expenses exceed those IRS Appeals allowed, (3) the installment agreement amount IRS Appeals proposed would cause "deeper debt" and would leave him with "nothing in retirement," and (4) his ex-wife should also be liable for the remaining liability. Pet. 2-4.
Mr. Kingsley attached a letter to his Petition in which he appears to seek an offer-in-compromise. In the letter, Mr. Kingsley acknowledges that he and his ex-wife "made a mistake on [their] 2012 return," but says that the installment agreement IRS Appeals offered would leave him "unable to deposit monies into [his] 401K." Pet. 3-4.
The Commissioner moved for summary judgment on November 30, 2022. By Order dated December 7, 2022, among other things, we directed Mr. Kingsley to file a response to the Commissioner's Motion.
On January 30, 2023, this case was called and recalled during the Court's Kansas City, Missouri, trial session. Mr. Kingsley appeared on his own behalf and was heard. Counsel for the Commissioner also appeared and was heard. At the hearing, Mr. Kingsley explained his position on the Commissioner's Motion. In essence, he maintained that the computations used in evaluating his proposed offer- in-compromise should have taken into account his retirement contributions as allowed expenses. He also stated that excluding retirement contributions from his allowed expenses will cause his marginal tax rate to go up at the end of each year, ultimately causing him to accrue greater tax debt. We asked Mr. Kingsley if he was requesting innocent spouse relief, and he indicated that he was not.
To date, Mr. Kingsley has not filed a written response to the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. We could enter a decision against him for that reason alone. See Rule 121(d); Mamadou v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-121, at *5. We will nevertheless consider the Commissioner's Motion and what we understand to be Mr. Kingsley's arguments on the merits.
Discussion
I. Summary Judgment Standard
The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite litigation and to avoid costly, time-consuming, and unnecessary trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). The Court may grant summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp., 98 T.C. at 520. In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, we construe factual materials and inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (here, Mr. Kingsley). Id. at 520. The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in his pleadings, but instead must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Rule 121(d); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); Sundstrand Corp., 98 T.C. at 520. If the nonmoving party fails to set forth such facts, the Court may enter a decision against that party, if appropriate. Rule 121(d).
II. Standard of Review
There is no dispute regarding Mr. Kingsley's underlying liability, so we review IRS Appeals' determination for abuse of discretion. Giamelli v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 107, 111 (2007); see also Cropper v. Commissioner, 826 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 2016), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2014-139. That is, we do not substitute our own judgment for that of IRS Appeals and decide de novo whether we would have reached the same determination. Rather, we decide whether IRS Appeals' determination is arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 320 (2005), aff'd, 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Estate of Duncan v. Commissioner, 890 F.3d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 2018), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2016-204; Keller v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 710, 716 (9th Cir. 2009), aff'g in part T.C. Memo. 2006-166.
Similarly, in reviewing collection alternatives, we do not independently review whether an alternative is acceptable. Thompson v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 173, 179 (2013) (citing Murphy, 125 T.C. at 320). "If the settlement officer followed all statutory and administrative guidelines and provided a reasoned, balanced decision, the Court will not reweigh the equities." Id.
III. Abuse of Discretion
In his Petition, Mr. Kingsley assigns error to the IRS's consideration of his proposed collection alternatives. Mr. Kingsley has conceded any other issues not raised in the Petition. See Rule 34(b).
A. Offer-in-Compromise
In general terms, an offer-in-compromise is an agreement between the IRS and a taxpayer to settle a tax liability for less than the full amount owed. See I.R.C. § 7122(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.71221(a); Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) 8.23.1.1.1(1) (Aug. 23, 2021). Offers-in-compromise are authorized by section 7122(a), which provides that the Secretary may compromise any civil or criminal case arising under the internal revenue laws. The decision whether to accept or reject an offer-in-compromise is left to the Secretary's discretion. Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 712 (9th Cir. 2006), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2004-13; see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(c)(1).
The provisions of the IRM can be instructive in understanding the IRS's interpretation of a statute, see Ginsburg v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 75, 87 (2006), and in ascertaining the procedures the IRS expects its employees to follow, see Wadleigh v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 280, 294 (2010). The IRM does not, however, have the force of law. See Marks v. Commissioner, 947 F.2d 983, 986 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1989-575; Vallone v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 794, 807 (1987).
1. Doubt as to Collectibility Generally
The Secretary may accept an offer-in-compromise on three grounds: (1) doubt as to liability, (2) doubt as to collectibility, and (3) the promotion of effective tax administration. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b). On the Form 656 Mr. Kingsley submitted during his CDP hearing, he requested an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to collectibility.
The Secretary may accept an offer-in-compromise based on a "doubt as to collectibility" when the taxpayer's assets and income render full collection unlikely. Id. § 301.7122-1(b)(2). Conversely, the Secretary may reject an offer-in-compromise when the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential exceeds the amount he proposes to pay. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 475, 486 (2011), aff'd, 502 Fed.Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
In general, an offer below the taxpayer's reasonable collection potential is rejected unless special circumstances justify acceptance of the offer. See Murphy, 125 T.C. at 309; Gustashaw v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-215, at *15-16; Mack v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-54, at *10; Rev. Proc. 2003-71, § 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517. Special circumstances include:
(1) circumstances demonstrating that the taxpayer would suffer economic hardship if the IRS were to collect from him an amount equal to the reasonable collection potential of the case or (2) if no demonstration of such suffering can be made, circumstances justifying acceptance of an amount less than the reasonable collection potential of the case based on public policy or equity considerations.Murphy, 125 T.C. at 309; see also IRM 5.8.4.2 (May 10, 2013). The special circumstances Mr. Kingsley identified in his CDP Hearing Request form relate to economic hardship, so our discussion of special circumstances is limited to that issue.
2. Mr. Kingsley's Offer-in-Compromise
In his Motion, the Commissioner argues that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the settlement officer did not abuse his discretion in rejecting Mr. Kingsley's proposed offer-in-compromise. We agree.
IRS Appeals does not abuse its discretion by rejecting an offer-in-compromise based on doubt as to collectibility when the offer falls short of a taxpayer's reasonable collection potential. Murphy, 125 T.C. at 321. During the CDP hearing, the settlement officer considered the information Mr. Kingsley submitted, as well as recommendation of the OIC specialist, and determined that Mr. Kingsley had a reasonable collection potential of $200,780, an amount considerably greater than his offer of $26,000.
Mr. Kingsley, however, argues that his actual expenses exceed those IRS Appeals considered. See Pet. 2. Mr. Kingsley appears to be referring to his retirement contributions and amounts he pays towards his adult children's college and vehicle expenses. Resp't's Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1, at 4. The Commissioner admits that these expenses were not included in the computations prepared during the CDP hearing. But, consistent with what the settlement officer told Mr. Kingsley, the Commissioner points out that the IRS's published guidance for calculating reasonable collection potential generally prohibits the consideration of such expenses. See IRM 5.8.5.22.1 (Oct. 22, 2010) (allowing consideration only of "necessary expenses," which are expenses "necessary for the production of income or for the health and welfare of the taxpayer's family"). And we have held that IRS Appeals does not abuse his discretion in following IRM guidelines to determine if an expense is allowable or not, see Alphson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-84, at *8-9; McClanahan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-161, 2008 WL 2550665, at *4; see also Thompson, 140 T.C. at 179-92, including with respect to the types of expenses at issue here, see Thompson, 140 T.C. at 190-92 (IRS Appeals did not abuse its discretion in disallowing payments toward children's college education); Aldridge v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-276, 2009 WL 4282048, at *7 (IRS Appeals did not abuse its discretion in disallowing retirement contributions). Mr. Kingsley does not contend, and the record does not suggest, that the expenses he describes are necessary expenses or that the settlement officer otherwise misapplied IRM guidelines in determining his ability to pay.
The IRM specifically addresses the types of expenses Mr. Kingsley describes. See, e.g., I.R.M. 5.8.5.10(2) (March 23, 2018) ("Contributions to voluntary retirement plans are not a necessary expenses."); I.R.M. 5.8.5.22.4 (Sept. 24, 2021) ("Expenses for dependents to attend colleges, universities, or private schools will not be allowed unless the dependents have special needs that cannot be met by public schools."); I.R.M. 5.8.5.22.3 (March 23, 2018) ("Transportation expenses are considered necessary when they are used by taxpayers and their families to provide for their health and welfare and/or the production of income.").
At the hearing before us, Mr. Kingsley also argued that the IRS's general cost of living allowances are too low. But the IRS's use of published national and local allowances for guidance is appropriate unless "such use would result in the taxpayer not having adequate means to provide for basic living expenses." I.R.C. § 7122(d)(2)(B); see Speltz v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 165, 179 (2005), aff'd, 454 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2006); Fernandez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-210, 2008 WL 4072108, at *4. And the record does not show that the reasonable collection potential the settlement officer determined would leave Mr. Kingsley unable to provide for his basic living expenses. As we have explained, the expenses Mr. Kingsley is concerned about-retirement contributions and payments to adult children for college and vehicles-are not basic living expenses under IRS guidance.
In light of the foregoing, we find that the settlement officer did not abuse his discretion in rejecting Mr. Kingsley's proposed offer-in-compromise, which was far below the reasonable collection potential IRS Appeals calculated. See Johnson, 136 T.C. at 486.
B. Installment Agreement
Section 6159 authorizes the Secretary to enter into an installment agreement with a taxpayer. Thompson, 140 T.C. at 179. The Secretary's decision to accept an installment agreement is discretionary. Id. As with offers-in-compromise, therefore, we do not "recalculate a taxpayer's ability to pay nor substitute [our] judgment for that of the settlement officer." Boulware v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-080, at *29. And again, "if the settlement officer followed all statutory and administrative guidelines and provided a reasoned, balanced decision, the Court will not reweigh the equities." Thompson, 140 T.C. at 179; see also Boulware, T.C. Memo. 2014-080, at *20.
Despite determining that Mr. Kingsley had an ability to pay of $2,634, the settlement officer offered him an installment agreement with a monthly payment of $2,100. Mr. Kingsley rejected the agreement. That of course was his right, but we see no abuse of discretion by the settlement officer.
Mr. Kingsley argues that the installment agreement was too expensive, that it would leave him without the ability to contribute to his retirement, and that it would cause him to go into more debt. And Mr. Kingsley again asserts that the settlement officer should have considered his retirement contributions and amounts he pays towards his adult children's college and vehicle expenses in determining his ability to pay.
These arguments fail for the reasons we have already discussed. Mr. Kingsley does not dispute that the settlement officer adhered to the IRS's published national and local allowances in computing his ability to make monthly payments, and the additional expenses Mr. Kingsley identifies generally are not allowable for purposes of those computations. Thus, the settlement officer did not abuse his discretion when he declined to consider them.
For installment agreements, the IRM permits consideration of certain additional expenses (called "conditional expenses") if the tax will be paid in full by installment agreement within 6 years. See IRM 5.8.5.23 (Sept. 30, 2013); see Thompson, 140 T.C. at 179-80. But Mr. Kingsley contends that he is unable to meet that requirement, which would entail payments along the lines of those proposed by the settlement officer.
C. Joint and Several Liability
Finally, we address Mr. Kingsley's argument, made both during his CDP hearing and to our Court, that it is unfair for the IRS to collect the full amount of the 2012 tax liability from him alone. While we understand Mr. Kingsley's views on this point, spouses who file joint income tax returns are jointly and severally liable for the tax due for that year. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3). As a result, the IRS is free to collect from either spouse the entire amount of tax, regardless of how much income the particular spouse earned. Thomas v. Commissioner, No. 12982-20, 160 T.C. No. 4, slip op. at 4 (2023). In light of the applicable law, the IRS's decision to pursue Mr. Kingsley rather his ex-wife for their joint liability was not an abuse of discretion.
A taxpayer who so requests may be relieved from joint and several liability under section 6015 (innocent spouse relief). We gave Mr. Kingsley the opportunity to make such a request, but he chose not to do so.
In view of the foregoing and upon due consideration, we conclude that no material facts are in dispute and the Commissioner is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
We note that Mr. Kingsley is free to submit to the IRS at any time, for its consideration, a new request for a collection alternative in the form of an offer-in-compromise or an installment agreement supported by any necessary, updated financial information.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that so much of this case as relates to the Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Actions Under IRS Sections 6320 or 6330, dated December 22, 2020, addressing petitioner's 2014 taxable year is dismissed as moot. It is further
ORDERED that so much of respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 30, 2022, as relates to petitioner's 2014 taxable year is denied as moot. It is further
ORDERED that so much of respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 30, 2022, as relates to petitioner's 2012 taxable year is granted. It is further
ORDERED AND DECIDED that the Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Actions Under IRC Sections 6320 or 6330, dated December 22, 2020, upon which this case is based is sustained in so far as it relates to petitioner's 2012 taxable year.