Opinion
06-21-00149-CR
06-16-2022
LADADRIAN DEONTAE KING, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do Not Publish
Submitted: May 12, 2022
On Appeal from the 124th District Court Gregg County, Texas Trial Court No. 48189-B
Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and van Cleef, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JOSH R. MORRISS, III CHIEF JUSTICE
Key evidence at Ladadrian Deontae King's trial for murdering Henry Williams included a pre-death statement made by victim Williams and testimony from Natalie Kelley recounting statements made to her by her longtime friend and King's accused confederate, Decharlston Stanley. A Gregg County jury found King guilty of murdering Williams. The trial court sentenced King to fifty years in prison.
On appeal, King argues that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony as a dying declaration and admitting the co-defendant's out-of-court statement in violation of the Confrontation Clause. We affirm the trial court's judgment, because (1) admitting the hearsay testimony as a dying declaration was within the discretion of the trial court, and (2) Stanley's statements to Kelley were nontestimonial.
Carlton Drain, Williams's neighbor in Longview, Texas, testified to a confrontation between two individuals and Williams. Because Drain had macular degeneration and it was dark, he could not identify the individuals confronting Williams. Drain heard the two individuals arguing with Williams, after which he "heard gunshots" and heard Williams calling for help. Drain ran to Williams, who was bleeding and "hysterical." When Williams asked where he had been shot, Drain told him "all over." Drain saw that Williams had "a bunch" of gunshot wounds and that he was in "pretty bad shape," as he was moaning, in pain, and bleeding "pretty badly." Drain called 9-1-1, and emergency services arrived a few minutes later.
Paramedics and police officers who arrived at the scene confirmed that Williams had three gunshot wounds, two in the back and one in the arm. Officer Danny Isonhood of the
Longview Police Department (LPD) testified that he was trying to keep Williams calm because he was "distressed." Over King's objections, Isonhood testified that Williams said that "Black D" had shot him and that, based on Isonhood's prior experience with King, he believed King to be "Black D."
Officer Matt Prescott testified that Williams's voice was raspy and that he had trouble speaking and breathing, but he told the officers that he knew "who did this" and that it was "Black D and his partner." Prescott testified that he knew King to go by the nickname "Black D." Prescott affirmed that neither he nor Isonhood elicited the statements from Williams and that Williams volunteered the information himself With significant damage to internal organs, Williams died in the ambulance on the way to the hospital.
Two of the suspects in the case were King and Stanley. Detective Eric Harkins of the LPD confirmed that King and Stanley were documented members of a criminal street gang, TYB (Throwed Young Ballers), that Stanley was a known associate of King, and that King had the nickname "Black D." No one else in the area was known to use the nickname "Black D." Harkins and other officers testified that Williams had a history of conflict with TYB.
One of the other witnesses at trial, Natalie Kelley, testified that she and Stanley had been friends for many years. They relied on each other when "bad things happen[ed]." She testified that, in early October 2018, Stanley came to the hotel room she was living in at the time and asked for her help in treating the gunshot wound he had in his calf She provided what first aid she could and asked him about the circumstances of the gunshot. Over King's Confrontation Clause objection, she recounted Stanley's words that he was shot "[d]uring the murder of Henry Williams." He told her that he and "Black D" had both shot Williams. She did not know who "Black D" was.
(1) Admitting the Hearsay Testimony as a Dying Declaration Was Within the Discretion of the Trial Court
On appeal, King contends that the trial court erred by allowing the two officers to give hearsay testimony regarding Williams's statements identifying who shot him.
"'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by statute or these rules or by other rules prescribed pursuant to statutory authority." Tex. R. Evid. 802. However, Rule 804(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Evidence establishes an exception to the rule against hearsay for statements made by a declarant, who believes his death to be imminent, about its cause or circumstances. To satisfy this exception, it is not necessary that the declarant explicitly state that he believes he is dying. Thomas v. State, 699 S.W.2d 845, 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Najar v. State, 618 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Nor is it necessary that the declarant be told by another person that he is dying. Id. The declarant's state of mind can instead be inferred from the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the declarant's injuries, medical opinions stated to him, or the declarant's conduct. Id. Rule 804(b)(2) requires only "sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, that demonstrates that the declarant must have realized that he was at death's door at the time that he spoke" and allows that a "sense of impending death may be established in any satisfactory mode, including [the victim's] express words, [the victim's] conduct, the severity of [the victim's] wounds, the opinions of others stated to [the victim], or any other relevant circumstances." Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule by employing the abuse-of-discretion standard. See Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Mumphrey v. State, 155 S.W.3d 651, 657 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. ref d); Carter v. State, 150 S.W.3d 230, 241 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.). In other words, we will not reverse the trial court unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595; Carter, 150 S.W.3d at 241. A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision "was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree." Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595 (quoting Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)); Carter, 150 S.W.3d at 241.
King contends that there was insufficient evidence that Williams knew he was dying. We disagree. Although Williams was still standing when emergency services arrived, the evidence established that Williams had suffered severe injuries. Dr. Gulpreet Bowman, who performed Williams's autopsy, testified that Williams had been shot three times and that the gunshots had fractured four of Williams's ribs, injured his left lung, and perforated his diaphragm and liver. Bowman testified that Williams had suffered substantial blood loss. Williams's lung collapsed while he was in the ambulance on his way to the hospital. Williams was aware of the nature of his injuries, as Drain told him that he had been shot "all over." Williams knew that he needed emergency care because he asked for an ambulance, and he kept asking the officers when the ambulance would arrive. Williams's behavior showed agitation, strain, and worry, as Drain described Williams as hysterical, moaning, and in pain. Isonhood described Williams as "distressed," a paramedic agreed that Williams was "frantic," and Prescott testified that Williams had trouble speaking and breathing.
Williams did not specifically acknowledge that he was dying, and no one told him that he was dying. However, such strict evidence is not necessary, Thomas, 699 S.W.2d at 853, and "[u]nder the modern-day Rule 804(b)(2)," more emphasis is placed on "the severity of the injuries than the declarant's explicit words indicating knowledge of imminent death," Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 290. Here, Williams knew that he had been shot several times. Even though no explicit evidence demonstrated that he knew how severe his internal injuries were, he was frantic and hysterical, knew that he needed emergency help, and knew that he had difficulty speaking and breathing. This direct and circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the trial court to determine that Williams must have realized that he was at death's door. See id. at 290-91. Therefore, we find that the trial court was within its discretion to find that Williams's words were dying declarations and to admit his statements through Isonhood and Prescott. Accordingly, we overrule this point of error.
Because we find Williams's statements admissible as dying declarations, we need not address the remaining arguments raised in this point of error.
(2) Stanley's Statements to Kelley Were Nontestimonial
King also argues that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated when the trial court allowed Kelley to testify regarding statements Stanley made to her. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend.
VI. In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court wrote that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Accordingly, the Court held that testimonial hearsay is admissible under the Sixth Amendment only if the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Id. at 68. The Court did not give a comprehensive definition of testimonial hearsay but held that the term "applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed." Id. Therefore, "to implicate the Confrontation Clause, an out-of-court statement must (1) have been made by a witness absent from trial and (2) be testimonial in nature." Woodall v. State, 336 S.W.3d 634, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-52, 59). We employ a de novo review in determining "whether a statement is testimonial or non-testimonial." Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A statement is "testimonial" when circumstances objectively indicate it was taken for the primary purpose of "establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). "A document created solely for an 'evidentiary purpose[]' . . . made in aid of a police investigation . . . ranks as testimonial." Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 664 (2011).In early October 2018, Stanley came to the hotel room his long-time friend Kelley was living in at that time and asked for her help in treating the gunshot wound in his calf She gave what first aid she could. Over King's Confrontation-Clause objection, the trial court allowed Kelley to testify that Stanley told her that he had been shot "[d]uring the murder of Henry Williams." He told her that he and "Black D" had both shot Williams.
The issue is whether the statements Kelley testified to were testimonial in nature. To determine whether a statement is testimonial, a court should view the statement from the perspective of an objectively reasonable person standing in the declarant's shoes. See Wall, 184 S.W.3d at 743-44. The three general categories of statements that will typically be testimonial are (1) statements that are the functional equivalent of in-court testimony such as affidavits or custodial interrogation, (2) statements contained in formalized testimonial materials such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions, and (3) statements that are made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use later at trial. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. The primary focus in determining whether a statement is testimonial is on the objective purpose of the interview, not on the declarant's expectations. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822-23.
Testimonial statements tend to be more formal and more similar to trial testimony than nontestimonial statements. Sanchez v. State, 354 S.W.3d 476, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Casual remarks to an acquaintance are generally nontestimonial. Paul v. State, 419 S.W.3d 446, 455-56 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2012, pet. ref d). This applies even when the statements made to the acquaintance are admissions of involvement in criminal activity. Williams v. State, 606 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref'd). In Williams, a co-conspirator's statements about his criminal activity were held to be nontestimonial because the statements were made to his friend. Id. Similarly, statements describing the defendant's involvement in a murder were admissible over a Confrontation Clause objection because they were made to friends and fellow gang members at an informal gathering and were, therefore, nontestimonial statements. See Beltran v. State, No. 03-03-00599-CR, 2005 WL 171179, at *2 (Tex. App.- Austin Jan. 25, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Although unpublished cases have no precedential value, we may take guidance from them "as an aid in developing reasoning that may be employed." See Carrillo v. State, 98 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. ref'd).
King contends that there is insufficient evidence regarding the circumstances of the statements for the trial court to have determined them to be nontestimonial. In support of his argument, King relies on this Court's opinion in Moore v. State, where we held that a recorded police interview of the declarant was testimonial evidence because the declarant had just reported a domestic violence incident, she was read her Miranda rights, she knew she was being recorded, and the purpose of the interview was to create and record evidence for trial. Moore v. State, 169 S.W.3d 467, 472 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. ref'd). While the circumstances of the statements in this case are sparser, they are clear, and while the statements made in Moore followed various formalities as part of a criminal complaint, the statements here were made informally between friends.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The facts of this case are much more like those of Williams and Beltran than those of Moore. Here, the statements were made in an informal setting between long-time friends, when
Stanley showed up at Kelley's residence asking for help with a gunshot wound. The objective purpose of the statements was to provide the circumstances of how he had gotten shot. The statements were not made during a police interview or interrogation, and the statements were not made in an affidavit, deposition, or testimony. Nothing in those circumstances would lead a reasonable person to believe that Stanley's statements were made for an evidentiary purpose or to be available for use later at trial. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. They clearly were not the product of an ex parte examination of the sort condemned in Crawford. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Therefore, we find the statements to be nontestimonial. Accordingly, admitting the statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
We overrule this point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.