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Kim v. Maxey Training School

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Jun 14, 2001
Case No. 1:99-CV-917 (W.D. Mich. Jun. 14, 2001)

Opinion

Case No. 1:99-CV-917

June 14, 2001


OPINION


This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants' Motion.

On November 22, 1999, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint after he was discharged from employment with the Family Independence Agency's ("FIA") Maxey Boys Training School ("Maxey"). Plaintiff alleged discrimination based on national origin and race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). On February 2, 2000, Plaintiff's counsel filed a First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. L. 37.2202(1) ("ELCRA").

On April 21, 2000, the Court dismissed the State of Michigan as a Defendant.

Defendants argue that (1) Plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII and the ELCRA; (2) Plaintiff has failed to and is unable to rebut the legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions as articulated by Defendants; (3) immunity under the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's claims under the ELCRA; (4) the individually named Defendants are not liable under Title VII or the ELCRA; and (5) if Plaintiff's Title VII and ELCRA claims are dismissed, Plaintiff is not entitled to any damages for front pay or reinstatement.

Defendant Jacqueline Robinson died on October 24, 2000.

BACKGROUND

1. Plaintiff as a state of Michigan employee Plaintiff was employed as a youth specialist at Maxey from May 17, 1998, to July 30, 1998. Plaintiff specifically worked at the Sequoyah Center at Maxey, which provides rehabilitative services and programs for adjudicated male youths between the ages of 12 and 21. The Sequoyah Center, a subunit at Maxey, consists of 80 beds, including closed medium security and general treatment. The Sequoyah Center is set up by halls, each of which contain 20 youths, seven youth specialists, one to two shift supervisors, two group leaders or social workers, and one program manager.

Because Maxey is run by the FIA, all employees are state of Michigan employees. Employment for the state of Michigan is governed by article 11, section 5 of the Michigan Constitution, which ranks most positions, including Plaintiff's former position of youth specialist, as classified state service. Mich. Const. Art. 11, § 5. Article 11, section 4 gives the Civil Service Commission ("Commission") the power to "regulate all conditions of employment in the classified service." Id. As a result the Commission has established collective bargaining for certain positions in the classified state service category, and in this case, the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME") contract applied to the youth specialist classification. The AFSCME contract requires those employed as a youth specialist serve a six month probationary period before attaining status as a classified state employee. The probationary period allows a state agency to evaluate new employees as they perform their duties to ascertain their fitness for continued service.

A person appointed to a job that is classified state service who does not have status in the classified service at the time of appointment must satisfactorily complete a probationary period as a condition of continued employment. If a probationary employee does not satisfactorily complete the probationary period, an appointing authority may dismiss the probationary employee. In addition, the AFSCME contract states that probationary employees are not entitled to seniority.

2. July 17, 1998 and July 24, 1998

On July 17, 1998, Plaintiff was involved in restraining a youth. During the restraint, Plaintiff's supervisor witnessed Plaintiff using his feet to restrain the youth, and this led to Plaintiff's July 30, 1998 dismissal.

Maxey procedures require employees to first attempt to de-escalate a situation where a youth begins acting out. If this does not work, employees may request that other members of that youth's group (other youth) engage in a physical restraint of the youth. To do this, the group members put the youth on the floor and talk to him about the causes of his out-of-control behavior. Maxey prohibits any corporal punishment of a youth during the restraint procedure.

During the restraint on July 17, 1998, Plaintiff's supervisor observed Plaintiff place his foot on the restrained youth's buttocks in an effort to force the youth to remain on the floor. During the restraint, Plaintiff left his co-worker alone on the hall with 30 other youths, and he left the other youths alone. Plaintiff admits that he used his feet on the youth during the restraint.

In accordance with the AFSCME collective bargaining agreement, an investigatory conference regarding the restraint occurred. At this conference Plaintiff stated that he did not see a problem with using his feet, which he claims are just like using one's hands in his Korean culture. Plaintiff also stated that he would not put his feet on a youth in front of his supervisor.

Prior to this incident, Plaintiff had received training, including a training video instructing on the proper restraint procedure. Neither the training nor the video advocate using one's feet to restrain a youth. Neither was one's feet used in the demonstrations of an appropriate restraint.

On July 24, 1998, Plaintiff received a written reprimand because he fell asleep while at work on July 2, 1998.

3. Plaintiff's specific allegations

When Plaintiff began working at Maxey, he was introduced to the director. Plaintiff claims that the director, an African-American, ignored Plaintiff. Plaintiff also claims that the director was friendlier to other African-American employees that he was to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff further claims that he was often assigned to the hall no one else wanted to work, and he often worked double shifts and other overtime. Plaintiff claims that on July 17, 1998, only three staff members were working in his hall, as opposed to the usual four staff members. Plaintiff also makes notes of the fact that his instruction for restraining consisted of a one-hour video. Plaintiff claims that when he ordered the group to restrain the youth, the group started teasing and tickling the youth. Plaintiff also claims that one of his co-workers was not available to help him.

Plaintiff claims that at his disciplinary conference, his union representative began discussing the fact that Koreans had fought with blacks in Los Angeles with Plaintiff's African-American supervisor. Plaintiff states that his supervisor stated that Koreans treat African-Americans like slaves.

In an affidavit, Plaintiff's union representative states that he remembers Plaintiff's supervisor stating that Koreans treat African-Americans poorly.

Plaintiff claims that his discharge should be compared to the discipline received by three other employees. Plaintiff compares himself to (1) Yvette Gillespie, an African-American, who received a reprimand after she yelled and swore at a group of youths; (2) Steven Trotter, also an African-American, who was investigated for verbal and physical abuse of some youths, and as a result received a notice of formal counseling, which was written up as a reprimand; and (3) William White, an African-American, whose discipline is not evident from the record.

LEGAL STANDARDS Rule 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim up on which relief can be granted. . ." Rule 12(b) further states that "[i]f on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the [C]ourt, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."

In the instant case, both Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Response include documents not included in their pleadings. As such, the Court will dispose of the Motion as provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

Rule 56

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court will only consider the narrow question of whether there are "genuine issues as to any material fact and [whether] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A motion for summary judgment requires that the Court view the "`inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.'" Matsushita Electric Ind Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). The opponent, however, has the burden of showing that a "rational trier of fact [could] find for the non-moving party [or] that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of plaintiff's position[, however,] will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff's Claims Against Maxey and Individual Defendants

Defendants claim that the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity doctrine bars Plaintiff's ELCRA claims against Defendant Maxey. See generally, Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999); Freeman v. Michigan Dep't of State, 808 F.2d 1174, 1179 (6th Cir. 1987); Lewis v. Michigan Dep't of Corrs., No. 5-98CV-109, (W.D.Mich. Sept. 24, 1998). Defendants also claim that Plaintiff's ELCRA claims and Title VII claims against the Individual Defendants are barred because neither statute imposes individual liability on employees. See Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997) (Title VII); see also Meagher v. Wayne State Univ., et al., 222 Mich. App. 700 (1997) (ELCRA).

In his Response, Plaintiff "concedes" that the Eleventh Amendment bars his ELCRA claims against Maxey and the individual Defendants in the federal court. As a result, Plaintiff's ELCRA claims against Maxey and the individual Defendants are properly dismissed without prejudice because this Court has not reached a decision on the merits of this claim. See Wisconsin Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 392 (1998). Plaintiff also "concedes" that individual supervisors are not liable under Title VII. See Wathen, 115 F.3d 400.

Therefore, the Court need only address Plaintiff's Title VII claim against Defendant Maxey.

B. Discrimination under Title VII

Plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by a defendant. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination either by presenting direct evidence of intentional discrimination by Defendants, Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court, 825 F.2d 111, 114-15 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)), or by showing the existence of circumstantial evidence which creates an inference of discrimination, McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

Under the latter approach, Plaintiff must show that he (1) is a member of a protected group, (2) was subject to an adverse employment decision, (3) was qualified for the position, and (4) was replaced by a person outside of the protected class. See Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Chappell v. GTE Prods. Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 1986). In addition, Plaintiff may prove a prima facie case by showing that he was a protected class member treated adversely compared to a non-class member who engaged in identical conduct. See Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 581. Thus, the prima facie case focuses upon the primary factual inquiries of any disparate treatment case: "[whether] the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff," and whether the employer treats people less favorably than others because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (citations omitted).

Once Plaintiff has established a prima facie case creating a presumption that Defendants unlawfully discriminated against him, the burden shifts to Defendants to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff's dismissal. See Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981); Chappell, 803 F.2d at 265. If Defendants offer a legitimate reason, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the discrimination was a determinative factor in his termination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05. However, the ultimate burden of persuasion always remains with Plaintiff. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

The parties agree that as a Korean, Plaintiff is a member of a protected class, and he suffered an adverse employment decision, namely, termination. The Court will then determine whether Plaintiff was similarly situated to non-class members.

1. Similarly situated

To determine if disparate treatment has occurred, courts look to whether the class member is similarly situated to a non-class member. See Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 581. This means that Plaintiff must show that the "comparables" are similarly situated in all respects. See generally Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 858 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1988). To be considered similarly situated, the individuals with whom Plaintiff seeks to compare his treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor and have been subject to the same conduct without differentiating or mitigating circumstances. See Cox v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 751 F. Supp. 680, 691 (E.D.Mich. 1990) (citations omitted). This means that Plaintiff must be "nearly identical" to the individuals with whom he compares himself. See Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 (6th Cir. 1994).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was treated differently than Yvette Gillespie and William White although they allegedly engaged in conduct similar to that which led to Plaintiff's termination. In his Brief in Opposition to this Motion, Plaintiff compares himself with Steven Trotter. The Court does not find that Plaintiff is similarly situated to these three employees.

2. Was Plaintiff Similarly Situated to Gillespie, White or Trotter?

According to Plaintiff, Yvette Gillespie bumped into a youth and knocked over a table. Plaintiff, however, did not see these actions and relies on another employee for this information. According to an Unusual Incident Report that was filed, Gillespie raised her voice to a youth, "flipped a few items off of a table," and left the room. Any contact with a youth apparently happened when Gillespie was leaving the room. Gillespie received a reprimand for losing control.

Gillespie's actions are not similar to Plaintiff's. Gillespie's incident did not involve intentional physical contact with a youth. In addition, Gillespie was not in the process of restraining a youth when the alleged physical contact occurred. Furthermore, Gillespie's contact did not involve the use of her feet on a youth. On the other hand, Plaintiff intentionally placed his feet on the youth in an attempt to restrain him, and Plaintiff did this even though he was not trained to restrain this way. Also, Plaintiff's actions were witnessed by his supervisor, but Gillespie's actions were not. Moreover, Plaintiff had been found asleep on the job before this incident occurred, whereas the record does not indicate any such occurrence regarding Gillespie. As a result, Plaintiff is not similarly situated to Gillespie.

Although Plaintiff does not mention William White in his Brief, he does mention William White in his Complaint. Therefore, the Court will look at any similarities between Plaintiff and White. According to a entry in Maxey's log book, White somehow touched a youth with his feet. Although this is similar to the action Plaintiff took, White's situation is not similar to Plaintiff's situation. White was a program manager and not in the same classification as Plaintiff. In addition, White was not on probationary status, nor was he in a limited term appointment when he committed the acts that Plaintiff claims are similar to his own conduct. This alone destroys any argument that Plaintiff and White are similarly situated. Because Plaintiff was a probationary employee, Defendant FIA was able to evaluate him during his probationary period and terminate him if he did not successfully complete his probationary period. White was not subject to the same procedure because he was not a probationary employee. In addition, the record does not indicate that White was attempting to restrain a youth. Therefore, White and Plaintiff are not similarly situated.

Plaintiff also compares himself to Steven Trotter, who received a written formal counseling for engaging in inappropriate behavior while restraining a youth. According to the record, Trotter allegedly kicked a youth's foot in effort to move that foot. The manager who prepared a report of the situation stated that the "preponderance of the evidence" indicates that Trotter "may have verbally, emotionally, and physically abuse[d] several youths. . . ." The manager then suggested a five to seven day suspension without pay or a written reprimand. Instead, Trotter received the written formal counseling worded as though it were a reprimand.

Although Trotter was accused of inappropriate physical touching of a youth during a restraint, Trotter and Plaintiff are not similarly situated. Trotter was not a probationary employee but had attained status in the classified civil service. Because of this seniority, Maxey was required to use progressive discipline by first putting Trotter on notice that he was required to abide by the rules and regulations governing restraint procedures. Trotter also reported to a different supervisor than the one to which Plaintiff reported. In addition, Trotter's supervisor did not witness Trotter's alleged inappropriate behavior, but Plaintiff's supervisor did witness his inappropriate behavior. Furthermore, Plaintiff admitted to the improper use of his foot, whereas Trotter made no such admissions. These different facts keep Plaintiff from being "similarly situated" to Trotter.

In short, Plaintiff has not proven that he was similarly situated to the employees to whom he compares himself, nor will Plaintiff be able to prove this. Therefore, his Title VII claim must be dismissed with prejudice.

C. Plaintiff's Claim for Damages

Because Plaintiff's Title VII and ELCRA claims must be dismissed, his damages claim relying on his Title VII and ELCRA claims must also be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is clear that he has not made a showing that he was similarly situated to any of the employees to which he compares himself, which is an element essential to his Title VII claim. Therefore, the Court dismisses this claim and Plaintiff's damages claim relying on his Title VII claim.

The Court also dismisses, without prejudice, Plaintiff's ELCRA claim against Defendant Maxey and the individual Defendants. The Court further dismisses Plaintiff's damages claim in reliance on his ELCRA claim.

An Order consistent with this Opinion will follow.

ORDER

In accordance with the Opinion entered this day;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 42) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Title VII claim is DISMISSED with PREJUDICE against all Defendants.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's damages claim in reliance on his Title VII claim is DISMISSED against all Defendants.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's claim under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act is DISMISSED without PREJUDICE against all Defendants.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's damages claim in reliance on his Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act claims is DISMISSED against all Defendants.


Summaries of

Kim v. Maxey Training School

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Jun 14, 2001
Case No. 1:99-CV-917 (W.D. Mich. Jun. 14, 2001)
Case details for

Kim v. Maxey Training School

Case Details

Full title:Gwanjum KIM, Plaintiff, v. MAXEY TRAINING SCHOOL, FAMILY INDEPENDENCE…

Court:United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

Date published: Jun 14, 2001

Citations

Case No. 1:99-CV-917 (W.D. Mich. Jun. 14, 2001)