From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Kim v. Columbia Health Care, Inc.

Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two.
Nov 20, 2003
No. E033119 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003)

Opinion

E033119.

11-20-2003

JAMES H. KIM, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COLUMBIA HEALTH CARE, INC. et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Law Offices of Cohen & Kim, Robert W. Cohen and Michael D. Kim for Plaintiff and Appellant. Latham & Watkins, Joseph J. Wheeler and Jill M. Houlahan for Defendants and Respondents. James Kim (plaintiff) appeals from summary judgment in favor of defendants


Chino Community Hospital Corporation, Inc., West Anaheim Hospital L.P., and the Anaheim VHS Limited Partnership (defendants). We affirm the judgment.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Background Facts

Because this appeal arises from a summary judgment, we accept as true (1) the evidence about which there was no material dispute and (2) if there was a material dispute, the evidence favoring plaintiff. (Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 246, 251.)

In 1995, plaintiff was employed at Bellflower Medical Center. His job duties entailed marketing the facilities, services, and physicians of the medical center to the surrounding Korean communities.

In the spring of 1996, plaintiff met with Anthony Armada, Chief Executive Officer of defendant Chino Valley Medical Center (Chino Valley) to discuss the possibility of becoming employed to perform marketing duties for Chino Valley and defendant West Anaheim Hospital L.P. (West Anaheim). Plaintiff told Armada he needed a written employment offer to consider leaving Bellflower Medical Center.

There does not appear to be any dispute that Armada had authority to act for all defendants.

By letter dated May 21, 1996, Armada wrote to plaintiff offering him the position of Korean Program Manager for Chino Valley and West Anaheim. The letter stated: "The starting annual salary for the position will be $ 62,000, with benefits, as per the benefits structure for COLUMBIA facilities employee [sic]." The letter further stated: "Please respond with an acceptance letter regarding the specific [sic] of this offer and to confirm your start date for the position." The letter did not provide for any compensation other than the stated annual salary.

It appears the reference to "COLUMBIA" referred to Columbia Health Care, Inc., which apparently owned and operated Chino Valley and West Anaheim.

Plaintiff prepared an acceptance letter, dated May 22, 1996, and brought two copies of it to Armadas home on or about that date. The letter stated: "I am honored to accept your employment proposal (letter dated may [sic] 21, 1996) with the following requests: [¶] Title: Regional Director of Marketing. [¶] Expense: Average $1,000/mo. includes pager cost, cellular phone bill, business promotions, meals and entertainment. [¶] Incentives: 1.5 % of Gross Charges from generated business through Korean Communities. [¶] Tools: Macintosh Powerbook and compatible printer ($4,000.00) and basic office supplies. [¶] Auto: $500/mo. car allowance." The letter included a signature line for Armada, which was designated, "Acceptance Signature."

Plaintiff presented his May 22, 1996, acceptance letter to Armada, and he and Armada discussed the requests in the letter. While they were doing so, Armada was making handwritten notations on his copy of the letter. The notations consisted of the following: (1) adjacent to "Title," the notation "Program Manager"; (2) adjacent to "Expense," the notation "Expensed through program"; (3) adjacent to "Incentives," the notation "To be discussed w/ David Culberson & TA"; (4) adjacent to "Tools," the notation "Expense through program or capital budget"; and (5) adjacent to "Auto," the notation "mileage reimbursement for business related mileage."

Culberson was the chief executive officer of West Anaheim. It appears to be undisputed that "TA" referred to Armada.

According to plaintiff, Armada reviewed the letter and said something like, "I have to work out the details with — with David Culberson and — and so on," but did not say he had any problem meeting all of the conditions in the letter. Plaintiff and Armada then signed both copies of the letter, i.e., the copy bearing the handwritten notations and the "clean" copy with no notations.

The only copy of the letter in the record contains the handwritten notations. According to plaintiff, he took the clean copy home with him but has since been unable to find it.

Plaintiff began working at Chino Valley in June 1996 and worked there for about six months. After that, he moved to West Anaheim, where he worked until June 2001. During those five years, plaintiff was not paid any incentive compensation.

In early 2001, plaintiff discussed the incentive compensation issue with David Culberson. Culberson said it was not possible to pay the compensation and denied that any incentive compensation was owed to plaintiff. In March 2001, plaintiff wrote a letter to Culberson stating more than $1.27 million in incentive compensation was due to him, because in five years his efforts had helped generate more than $85 million in gross charges.

Plaintiff and Culberson discussed the matter of incentive compensation again in or about May or June 2001. Culberson again said he could not pay the compensation. Plaintiff then resigned.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff brought this action in August 2001. His complaint alleged three causes of action: (1) for breach of contract, for not paying the incentive compensation; (2) for an accounting, to ascertain the amount of incentive compensation due to plaintiff; and (3) for fraud, on the basis that defendants promised to pay the incentive compensation but had no intention of doing so when they made the promise.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that defendants never agreed to plaintiffs proposal for incentive compensation, and therefore that proposal never became part of the parties contract. The court heard the matter in November 2002 and granted the motion in December 2002. It ruled that no contract was formed between the parties that included a promise to pay incentive compensation, because the parties had not agreed on the same thing in the same sense, and therefore the essential element of mutual assent was lacking. The court based its ruling on the handwritten notations to the May 22, 1996, acceptance letter and the conduct of the parties following the execution of the document.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Issue Presented and Applicable Legal Principles

"Summary judgment is proper where there is no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)" (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 501.) "There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, fn. omitted.)

The question in this case, as the trial court recognized, is whether the parties ever mutually assented to the incentive compensation proposal. "Mutual assent is a question of fact. [Citation.]" (Alexander v. Codemasters Group Limited (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 129, 141.) "A question of fact can become one of law, however, when only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the undisputed foundational facts. [Citation.]" (Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1583; see, e.g., Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 818 [question of existence of implied-in-fact contract could be decided as matter of law where facts were undisputed]; Federico v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1214 [same conclusion with respect to question of lack of negligence]; Kurinij v. Hanna & Morton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 853, 864 [same conclusion with respect to question of causation].) Thus, the court in this case could appropriately resolve the question of mutual assent on summary judgment if only one reasonable conclusion could be drawn from the undisputed evidence.

B. Analysis

For purposes of summary judgment, we must take as undisputed plaintiffs assertion that Armada signed the clean copy of the May 22, 1996, acceptance letter, which plaintiff was subsequently unable to locate, as well as the annotated copy, which is in the record. However, the fact Armada signed the clean copy did not, by itself, permit an inference that the parties mutually assented to plaintiffs incentive compensation proposal, for two reasons.

First, "multiple writings must be considered together when part of the same contract. [Citations.]" (Nish Noroian Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 726, 735.) There was no dispute that Armadas annotated copy of the May 22, 1996, acceptance letter was a part of the parties contract. In fact, plaintiff expressly alleged in his complaint that the annotated copy, which he attached to the complaint, was part of the contract. Thus, we may not view the clean copy in isolation, but must consider as well the handwritten notations on the other copy which both parties also signed.

The copy of the complaint in the record does not have the exhibit attached, but the courts comments at the summary judgment hearing and the parties briefs indicate the exhibit was the annotated copy, not the clean, one.

Plaintiff did not dispute that he signed the annotated copy of the agreement after Armada had written the notations.

Second, as a matter of summary judgment procedure, existence of a triable issue of fact cannot be predicated on evidence viewed in isolation. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c directs a court to consider "all of the evidence set forth in the papers . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); see also Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th 826, 843; Tchorbadjian v. Western Home Ins. Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1217.) Moreover, as the Supreme Court made clear in Aguilar, there can only be a triable issue of material fact if "the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion . . . ." (Aguilar, at p. 850, fn. omitted.) In effect, this standard means that to resist summary judgment a party must show there is substantial evidence to support a judgment in its favor.

It has long been recognized that a party cannot satisfy the substantial evidence standard by pointing to isolated evidence in its favor. As the Supreme Court has stated, a court in determining whether substantial evidence exists has a "duty to appraise the whole record." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 577.) A court cannot find substantial evidence based on "`isolated evidence torn from the context of the whole record" because, if it had examined the whole record, "`it might have found that a reasonable trier of fact could not have made the finding in issue." (Id. at pp. 577-578, quoting from Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error (1969) p. 27, fns. omitted.)

Accordingly, in determining whether the record discloses a triable issue we must consider the effect not only of the clean copy of the May 22, 1996, acceptance letter, but also the annotated copy. More specifically, we must consider the effect of the handwritten notation concerning the incentive compensation point — "To be discussed w/ David Culberson & TA." Plaintiffs position is that the phrase was simply an "internal" notation, not part of the "deal," which meant, in effect, "we agree to pay the incentive compensation but the internal details for generating the supporting documentation must be discussed with Culberson." Defendants position is that the notation was a material term of the agreement, not simply an internal notation, and meant "we cannot agree to pay the incentive compensation until the matter is discussed with Culberson."

Where a contract provision is reasonably susceptible to being interpreted in more than one way, extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of the provision. (Morey v. Vannucci (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.) Extrinsic evidence also is properly considered to assist the court in the threshold determination of whether the contract is reasonably susceptible of a particular meaning. "Even if a contract appears unambiguous on its face, a latent ambiguity may be exposed by extrinsic evidence which reveals more than one possible meaning to which the language of the contract is yet reasonably susceptible. [Citations.]" (Ibid.)

Where extrinsic evidence offered to interpret the language of a contract is conflicting, a jury question is presented. (Morey v. Vannucci , supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 904, 913.) Where, however, the extrinsic evidence is not in conflict, interpretation of the provision is a question of law: "`It is solely a judicial function to interpret a written contract unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence, even when conflicting inferences may be drawn from uncontroverted evidence. [Citation.]" (Hess v. Ford Motor Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 516, 527.) Extrinsic evidence that may be considered in interpreting a contractual provision includes "the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent acts and conduct of the parties. [Citations.]" (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 474; accord, De Anza Enterprises v. Johnson (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1315.)

As noted ante, the court in this case based its grant of summary judgment in part on extrinsic evidence, specifically the conduct of the parties following the execution of the May 22, 1996, acceptance letter. Our question, therefore, is whether the extrinsic evidence raised a triable issue as to which sides interpretation of the letter was correct. If it did, the court could not interpret the letter as a matter of law as not including a provision for incentive compensation.

In answering this question, we must observe "the general rule that manifested mutual assent rather than actual mental assent is the essential element in the formation of contracts . . . ." (Guzman v. Visalia Community Bank (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376.) This rule means that "the test of the true meaning of an acceptance or rejection is not what the party making it thought it meant or intended it to mean. Rather, the test is what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant. [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 1376-1377.)

Thus, for our purposes, the relevant question is which interpretation of the May 22, 1996, acceptance letter a reasonable person would adopt based on the objective evidence. Put another way, is there evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude defendants agreed to pay plaintiff the incentive compensation, notwithstanding the notation that the subject was "to be discussed" with Armada and Culberson?

1. Extrinsic evidence

It has been stated that "[t]he conduct of the parties after execution of the contract and before any controversy has arisen as to its effect affords the most reliable evidence of the parties intentions. [Citations.]" (Kennecott Corp. v. Union Oil Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1179,1189; see also United California Bank v. Maltzman (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 41, 49 [post-execution conduct "affords one of the most reliable means of determining the intent of the parties"]; Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 914, 936 [court "is required to give `great weight to the conduct of the parties in interpreting the instrument"].) Here, as the trial court ruled, the parties conduct after the execution of the May 22, 1996, acceptance letter points ineluctably to the conclusion that there was no agreement to pay incentive compensation.

Not only was no incentive compensation ever paid at any time during the five years plaintiff was employed by defendant; plaintiff also admitted he never even requested such compensation in writing until shortly before he resigned. Moreover, plaintiff never received any of the other "requests" he made in the May 22, 1996, acceptance letter. Instead, he received what Armada had set forth in the handwritten notations to the letter.

First, plaintiff did not receive the job title of regional director of marketing as he had requested. Rather, his title was program director or program manager, in conformity with Armadas handwritten notation "Program Manager."

Plaintiff also did not receive a $500 per month car allowance as he had requested. Instead, he submitted an expense report and obtained reimbursement for actual mileage, in conformity with Armadas handwritten notation that plaintiff would receive "mileage reimbursement for business related mileage." Similarly, plaintiff did not receive a set amount for expenses, but again obtained reimbursement by submitting an expense report, in conformity with Armadas handwritten notation that plaintiffs business expenses would be "[e]xpensed through [the] program." Finally, plaintiff did not receive the Macintosh computer he had requested, but instead received a Toshiba laptop computer.

Notwithstanding this evidence, plaintiff contends the parties agreement was simply the printed portions of the May 22, 1996, acceptance letter; the handwritten notations were never part of the "deal" but were only internal notations by their author. To the contrary, the undisputed facts showed the handwritten notations were the deal. Plaintiff received what was promised in the notations, not what he requested in the printed portion of the document.

Plaintiff further argues that the matters addressed in the handwritten notations did not rise to the level of contract terms, because they addressed only such peripheral matters as how his job benefits would be handled administratively, not what those benefits would entail. Thus, plaintiff says, it did not matter to him what brand of computer he received as long as he got his computer, or what manner of mileage allowance he received as long as he was reimbursed.

Whether these variations made any difference to plaintiff is not the point. The point is that the handwritten notations, not the clean copy of the letter, dictated what the parties actually did. In view of that fact, plaintiffs assertion that the notations were never part of the "deal" because they added nothing to and detracted nothing from the meaning of the contract is simply not sustainable. That being the case, the only reasonable inference is that the parties agreement as to incentive compensation was, as the handwritten notation stated, that the matter would be discussed with Armada and Culberson. Because that inference was the only reasonable one, the court could resolve the issue as a matter of law.

Moreover, in view of the parties conduct, the phrase "to be discussed" cannot reasonably be interpreted to mean "subject only to discussion of how supporting documentation will be generated." If Armada had meant to say that, he would have written it. In every other case, he wrote exactly what defendants were willing to do, in specific detail. It is not reasonable to suppose he departed from that practice with respect to this one item, writing "to be discussed" when he really meant "granted."

By statute, "[w]here a contract is partly written and partly printed . . . , the written parts control the printed parts . . . ." (Civ. Code, § 1651.) This rule exists for a good reason: terms that the parties take the trouble to write into a printed agreement more accurately reflect their intentions than terms not specially inserted. Similarly, if Armada had intended the handwritten notations to have only internal significance, he would not have taken care to state specifically for each request what defendants were prepared to provide, and he would not have had plaintiff sign the document after the notations had been inserted.

Plaintiffs unilateral conduct only reinforced the conclusion there was no agreement to pay incentive compensation. Plaintiff did not dispute that he "represented to various people during his tenure at West Anaheim that Plaintiff worked only on a salary basis and not for any incentive compensation." Plaintiff attempted to avoid the effect of this admission by testifying he may have denied to third persons that his compensation included a bonus because he did not want to create a picture that he was "in it for the money." However, plaintiff could not thereby create a triable issue.

As noted ante, the fact that "conflicting inferences may be drawn from uncontroverted evidence" does not create a triable issue where the facts themselves are not in dispute. (Hess v. Ford Motor Co. , supra, 27 Cal.4th 516, 527, italics added.) Here, the fact was that plaintiff told people he worked on a straight salary basis. What inference should be drawn from that fact — i.e., whether plaintiffs statements indicated there was no promise to pay incentive compensation, or only reflected a coyness on plaintiffs part as he claimed — was a matter for the court, not a triable issue.

The trial court determined that, given the foregoing undisputed evidence that the parties consistently behaved as though there was no agreement to pay incentive compensation, the fact Armada signed the clean copy of the May 22, 1996, acceptance letter was not enough to raise a triable issue. This was not, as plaintiff contends, a case of the court impermissibly assuming the role of fact finder. Instead, the court merely discharged its duty to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact, viewing the evidence as a whole, could find in favor of plaintiff on the incentive compensation issue. In our view, the court correctly determined it could not and appropriately granted summary judgment.

2. Plaintiffs admissions

The court also appropriately could consider the significant variance between plaintiffs declaration in opposition to summary judgment and his prior testimony at his deposition. "In determining whether any triable issue of material fact exists, the trial court may, in its discretion, give great weight to admissions made in deposition and disregard contradictory and self-serving affidavits of the party. [Citations.]" (Preach v. Monter Rainbow (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1451.)

Plaintiffs declaration differed markedly from his deposition testimony on a number of key points. Plaintiff asserted in his declaration that on May 22, 1996, Armada "advised me that I would be paid 1.5 percent of the total gross charges generated through the Korean communities . . . ." However, as far as the record reflects, plaintiff never asserted at his deposition that Armada had told him he would be paid the 1.5 percent. Instead, when asked to reconstruct his conversation with Armada about the incentive request, plaintiff testified Armada told him he would have to talk to his accounting people and to Culberson to figure out how to do it. "So it was more that kind of a conversation, not, you know, Im going to pay you 1.5 percent, or Im not going to pay you 1.5 percent." (Italics added.)

Plaintiffs deposition testimony that Armada did not say "Im going to pay you 1.5 percent" is incompatible with his subsequent claim in his declaration that Armada said plaintiff would be paid the 1.5 percent. Plaintiffs deposition testimony that the conversation was "not, you know, Im going to pay you 1.5 percent, or Im not going to pay you 1.5 percent" indicates that, at best, the matter of the incentive compensation remained undecided at the time of his conversation with Armada, consistent with Armadas notation that the matter was "to be discussed" with Culberson.

Plaintiffs statements regarding his discussions with Culberson about the incentive compensation issue were similarly inconsistent. In his declaration, plaintiff asserted: "During the course of my employment, I had occasion to meet with Mr. David Culberson approximately one time every year, the CEO of West Anaheim Medical Center, to discuss that [sic] fact that I had not received my percentage of the hospitals gross charges. At each meeting, Mr. Culberson reiterated that I would be paid the monies owed to me . . . ."

At his deposition, however, plaintiff testified that although he had annual performance evaluations during which he met with Culberson, he did not mention the incentive compensation issue:

"Q. . . . And did you ever mention at any of your performance evaluation meetings that you believed that you were due incentive compensation that you had not been paid?

"A. No."

Plaintiff further testified that "until the last meeting that I had with David before he resigned, I dont think I ever set aside a time or to meet — to meet with him to specifically talk to him about — it was always — always after the meeting. So it was very general."

Again, plaintiffs testimony that he never mentioned the incentive compensation issue at the performance evaluation meetings, never set aside a time to meet with Culberson to "specifically talk to him," and had only "very general" discussions with Culberson, differs significantly from his assertion in his declaration that he met with Culberson approximately once a year, "to discuss that [sic] fact that I had not received my percentage of the hospitals gross charges."

While plaintiff is correct that a court cannot weigh conflicting evidence in ruling on a summary judgment motion, it does not follow that it is bound to give credence to statements of a party in a declaration when those statements conflict with admissions of the party at a deposition. In fact, as stated, in that situation the court must disregard the statements in the declaration. (Preach v. Monter Rainbow, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1451.) Given the significant discrepancies between plaintiffs declaration and his deposition testimony, the court was justified in crediting the latter over the former. Viewed in that manner, the evidence justified the court in concluding there was insufficient evidence of mutual assent to raise a triable issue.

3. Unsettled terms

Plaintiffs own admissions also make it clear that the parties failed to reach agreement on essential terms of the alleged promise to pay incentive compensation, so as to preclude any enforceable obligation to that effect. The requirement of mutual assent for the formation of a contract requires that the parties "assent to the same thing, in the same sense." (Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 358-359.) This means that "the failure to reach a meeting of the minds on all material points prevents the formation of a contract even though the parties have orally agreed upon some of the terms, or have taken some action related to the contract." (Id. at p. 359.)

There were a number of material points on which plaintiff readily conceded there was never any agreement. First, plaintiff testified at his deposition there was no agreement as to how the 1.5 percent incentive compensation would be calculated:

"Q. Did you and Tony reach any agreement about calculation of the 1.5 percent?

"A. No. It was something that I felt that he needed to do with his accounting and with his data processing or — or his people, but I was just giving him ideas as to whats the easy — easy — easiest way to do it. So I just kind of left it at that."

How the 1.5 percent was calculated was a major point, since it would directly affect the amount of compensation to be paid. The language plaintiff used in the May 22, 1996, acceptance letter to describe the incentive compensation — "1.5 % of Gross Charges from generated business through Korean Communities" — was ambiguous in the extreme. It did not explain how it was to be determined whether particular business came in "through" the Korean communities, or whether the business had been "generated" by plaintiff. If a resident of a Korean community came to one of the hospitals unsolicited, would plaintiff nevertheless receive a percentage of the charges for that patient, based on his general marketing efforts in the Korean community? The letter did not say.

At one point in his deposition, plaintiff asserted that he "probably" talked to Armada about the meaning of the phrase, "1.5 percent of gross charges from generated business through Korean communities." Plaintiff claimed he told Armada the gross charges would have to include "not only, you know, Korean doctors doing business and bringing their patient, but also the specialist, you know, the business that they refer to non-Korean specialist and the business that — that walks in without any physicians but they are Korean, you know." However, plaintiff admitted, "I dont remember the exact details as to what wording I used."

Furthermore, plaintiff did not claim there was an actual agreement as to the method of calculation. When asked directly what Armada said about the phrase in the letter and what it meant, plaintiff testified only that his "impression" was that Armada "didnt object to that" when plaintiff told him what he proposed to include as "gross charges."

Similarly, plaintiff admitted he did not have an agreement with anyone about how often he would be paid the 1.5 percent incentive compensation. In fact, he did not have a conversation with either Armada or Culberson about how often he would be paid the compensation. Speaking of his discussions with Armada, plaintiff testified: "I . . . dont think we got that far with that conversation, because he first had to figure out a way to, you know, come up with the number." Again, the frequency of payment was a material term that would have been addressed if the parties in fact intended to enter into a binding agreement for incentive compensation.

4. Conclusion

The undisputed extrinsic evidence, plaintiffs admissions at his deposition, and the lack of evidence of agreement on material terms all pointed to the same conclusion, i.e., that there was no mutual assent to plaintiffs request that he be paid incentive compensation. No contrary conclusion would have been reasonable under the circumstances. Notwithstanding the assumed existence of the signed clean copy of the May 22, 1996, acceptance letter, the court properly found no triable issue of fact and granted summary judgment to defendants.

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs on appeal.

We concur: RAMIREZ P.J., WARD J.


Summaries of

Kim v. Columbia Health Care, Inc.

Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two.
Nov 20, 2003
No. E033119 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003)
Case details for

Kim v. Columbia Health Care, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:JAMES H. KIM, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COLUMBIA HEALTH CARE, INC. et…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two.

Date published: Nov 20, 2003

Citations

No. E033119 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003)