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Khalil v. Droste

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division
Aug 8, 2023
No. G061273 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2023)

Opinion

G061273

08-08-2023

SUHAIL HUSSAIN KHALIL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RAJIA K. DROSTE, Defendant and Respondent.

Suhail Hussain Khalil, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Alan J. Droste and Alan J. Droste for Defendant and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 30-2021-01222344, Kim R. Hubbard, Judge. Affirmed. Appellant's motions to augment the record on appeal and to file an exhibit under seal are denied.

Suhail Hussain Khalil, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Alan J. Droste and Alan J. Droste for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

O'LEARY, P. J.

Suhail Hussain Khalil challenges the trial court's award of attorney fees to his sister, Rajia K. Droste, after he unsuccessfully sought an elder-abuse protective order against her under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.03. He claims Droste was not a prevailing party and thus was not eligible for fees. Because Khalil has forfeited any contention that the court erred in denying a protective order and because it is beyond dispute that Droste prevailed on Khalil's petition, we affirm.

Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

FACTS

In 2021, Khalil petitioned for an elder-abuse protective order against Droste under section 15657.03. He alleged Droste had fraudulently obtained a power of attorney from their father and engaged in various forms of misconduct against the father by attempting to "displace" him and force the sale of his home against his wishes. Among other relief, Khalil asked that the trial court issue a "'cease and desist[] order,'" revoke the power of attorney, rescind certain transfer deeds, and prohibit Droste from attempting to relocate the father.

Droste opposed the petition. She noted that she had sued Khalil pursuant to the father's power of attorney for Khalil's financial abuse of the father and that a probate matter was pending involving the family trust the father had established. She argued that through his petition, Khalil was attempting to interfere with this pending litigation.

At a hearing on the petition, the trial court told Khalil that his petition was "brought for an improper purpose" because he could not "restrain people from proceeding with legal action." Khalil said he understood but that his father was "not a willing participant" in litigation initiated by Droste. Similar exchanges recurred a few more times, with the court explaining that Khalil may have other recourse but that a protective order could not provide the relief he sought. Khalil expressed that he understood but continued to make various claims regarding Droste's conduct. Ultimately, the court denied the petition. Droste later filed a motion for attorney fees under section 15657.03, subdivision (t). The trial court concluded she was a prevailing party eligible for attorney fees and awarded her $1,200. Khalil appealed.

The trial court's minute order stated the petition was "off calendar" but noted that Droste could seek attorney fees and costs. In legal effect, the petition was denied. (Lavine v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1024, fn. 4 ["The court's formal disposition of this motion was to order it 'off calendar' . . ., but in legal effect this ruling constituted a denial of the motion for injunction"].)

Although Khalil's notice of appeal expressly designated only the trial court's order awarding Droste attorney fees, it included various contentions relating to the merits of his petition, indicating his intent to preserve a challenge to the court's denial of a protective order. (See In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261, 272 ["'[I]t is, and has been, the law of this state that notices of appeal are to be liberally construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced'"].) It is undisputed that the parties' father passed away during the pendency of this litigation.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Khalil challenges the trial court's award of attorney fees to Droste, arguing she should not have been deemed a prevailing party because she had committed elder abuse. Under section 15657.03, subdivision (t), the "prevailing party" in an action for an elder-abuse protective order may be awarded attorney fees. Whether a litigant is a prevailing party for purposes of a statute authorizing a fee award is "analyzed . . . on a practical level." (Heather Farms Homeowners Assn. v. Robinson (1994)

21 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1574; see id. at pp. 1573-1574 [surveying cases dealing with fee awards under Civ. Code, §§ 55 &3250 and Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, and holding that similar analysis applies under Civ. Code, § 1354.].) "Generally, the trial court's determination of the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney fees is an exercise of discretion, which should not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. [Citation.] But the determination of the legal basis for an attorney fee award is subject to independent review. [Citation.]" (Kim v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 170, 176.)

Khalil's argument that Droste should not have been deemed a prevailing party because she had committed elder-abuse misses the point. Droste was the prevailing party because Khalil had obtained no relief in his action against her. (Heather Farms Homeowners Assn. v. Robinson, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574; cf. Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876 ["when a defendant defeats recovery by the plaintiff on the only contract claim in the action, the defendant is the party prevailing on the contract under [Civ. Code § ] 1717 as a matter of law"].) To the extent Khalil asserts the trial court erred by denying a protective order, he has forfeited his contention. The court terminated the proceeding based on its conclusion that the relief Khalil sought- precluding Droste from engaging in certain litigation-was not available on a petition for an elder-abuse protective order. Khalil fails to address the court's ground for denying him relief and thus cannot establish error in the court's ruling. (People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1237 [appellant's failure to address all grounds for trial court's ruling forfeits appellate claim].)

We deny Khalil's motions to augment the record on appeal, as the documents he seeks to include are immaterial to this appeal. (See Holland v. Jones (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 378, 382, fn. 1 [denying augmentation with irrelevant documents].) His motion to file an exhibit under seal is likewise denied.

DISPOSITION

The trial court's order is affirmed. Droste is awarded costs on appeal.

WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, J. MOTOIKE, J.


Summaries of

Khalil v. Droste

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division
Aug 8, 2023
No. G061273 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2023)
Case details for

Khalil v. Droste

Case Details

Full title:SUHAIL HUSSAIN KHALIL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RAJIA K. DROSTE…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division

Date published: Aug 8, 2023

Citations

No. G061273 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2023)