Opinion
4-21-0405 4-21-0447
12-13-2021
In re K.G., a Minor The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Christopher G., Respondent-Appellant. In re K.G., a Minor The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Shannon G., Respondent-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Coles County No. 19JA66 Honorable Jonathan T. Braden, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
STEIGMANN JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment finding respondents unfit and terminating their parental rights.
¶ 2 Respondent father, Christopher G., and respondent mother, Shannon G., are the parents of KG. (born January 2018). In May 2021, the trial court found both respondents were unfit parents, and in June 2021, it found termination of respondents' parental rights would be in the minor child's best interest.
¶ 3 Respondents filed separate appeals, and this court consolidated the cases on its own motion.
¶ 4 Christopher argues the trial court erred by (1) failing to appoint counsel for him at the shelter care hearing and (2) finding the State made reasonable efforts at reunification. Both respondents argue the trial court's finding that respondents were unfit parents was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Shannon argues (1) the trial court's best interest determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence and (2) her counsel provided ineffective assistance.
¶ 5 We disagree and affirm.
¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 7 A. The Petition for Adjudication of Wardship and Shelter Care Hearing
¶ 8 In August 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging K.G. was a neglected minor whose environment was injurious to his welfare when in respondents' care because of their substance abuse. See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018). The State also alleged K.G. was in an injurious environment because (1) Christopher was a registered sex offender and (2) Shannon previously had her parental rights terminated regarding another of her children. See id. The State attached to its petition a notice of rights for respondents in juvenile court proceedings. See id. § 1-5(1).
¶ 9 That same day, despite the statutory requirement (see id. § 1-5; see also In re Adoption of K.L.P., 198 Ill.2d 448, 467, 763 N.E.2d 741, 752 (2002) ("By statute, the respondent parent's right to counsel attaches when the State files an action under the Juvenile Court Act.")), the trial court conducted a shelter care hearing, at which respondents personally appeared, without appointing counsel or even discussing it at all. (We note the court did provide respondents with a copy of the petition and ensured they had read it.) Following the State's presentation of evidence, the court found probable cause to believe (1) K.G. was neglected and (2) an immediate and urgent necessity existed to remove K.G. from his parents' care. The court admonished respondents that they were required to cooperate with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), comply with the terms of their service plans, and correct the conditions which required K.G. to be taken into care. The court also advised respondents in person that the next hearing would be a status hearing held on August 16, 2019, at 9 a.m. The court concluded the shelter care hearing by entering a written order placing temporary custody and guardianship of K.G. with the guardianship administrator of DCFS.
¶ 10 On August 16, 2019, Shannon personally appeared for the status hearing, but Christopher did not. The court noted that no attorneys had been appointed. Shannon requested counsel, and the court appointed an assistant public defender, who was present at the hearing, as her attorney.
¶ 11 B. The Adjudicatory Hearing
¶ 12 In September 2019, the trial court conducted the adjudicatory hearing. Neither of the respondents personally appeared. Shannon's counsel reported that she had not heard from Shannon and requested a continuance. The court denied that request and adjudicated K.G. a neglected minor over counsel's objection.
¶ 13 C. The Dispositional Hearing
¶ 14 In December 2019, the trial court conducted the dispositional hearing. Again, neither respondent personally appeared. The court noted that the dispositional hearing had been continued once already because Shannon was receiving inpatient drug treatment at that time. Shannon's counsel advised that she had not had contact with Shannon. When the court asked whether she was still in inpatient treatment, an unidentified DCFS worker reported that Shannon was not.
¶ 15 The court then adjudicated K.G. a ward of the court and found respondents unfit for reasons other than financial circumstances alone to care for K.G. It further found that it was in K.G.'s best interest to remain in the custody of DCFS and continue guardianship of K.G. with the guardianship administrator of DCFS.
¶ 16 D. The Termination Proceedings
¶ 17 In February 2021, the State filed a petition to terminate respondents' parental rights. Relevant to this appeal, the State alleged that respondents were unfit for failing to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor to the respondents during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect, specifically, between February 2020 and November 2020. 750 ILCS 50/1 (D) (m)(ii) (West 2018). (We note the State also listed several other grounds for unfitness, including failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest and failure to make reasonable efforts, which the trial court also found the State proved. However, as we explain later (infra ¶ 77), we address only reasonable progress.)
¶ 18 In March 2021, the trial court conducted a hearing that was originally scheduled to be the parental fitness portion of the termination hearing. Christopher was personally present for the first time since the shelter care hearing and stated he had never received notice of a hearing since the August 2019 shelter care hearing. The court reviewed the docket sheet and noted that Christopher was listed as present and gave testimony at the shelter care hearing. When the court asked whether Christopher remembered, he responded, "I think so."
¶ 19 The trial court then informed Christopher that he would have received notice of the next court date at that time. Christopher stated, "I mean, I'm not totally sure. I mean, I'm sure it [(notice)] was [given] if that's how it works." Christopher further stated he received notice of the termination hearing but not the petition to terminate.
¶ 20 The trial court then gave Christopher a copy of the petition to terminate, reviewed the allegations in the petition with him, and explained the termination process. The court also appointed counsel for Christopher and continued the hearing to a later date.
¶ 211. The Fitness Portion of the Termination Hearing
¶ 22 In May 2021, the trial court conducted the fitness portion of the termination hearing. Both respondents were present with counsel.
¶ 23 a. The State's Case: Mindy Waddell
¶ 24 Mindy Waddell testified that she had been a foster care case manager for One Hope United since May 2019 and was the caseworker for K.G. since K.G. came into care. Waddell described the reasons K.G. came into care as follows. DCFS conducted an investigation "in Springfield" into Christopher for (1) leaving with K.G. unsupervised while (2) being a registered sex offender. Waddell explained, "That was against the law at that time." The investigation also reported Christopher "was drinking more often and that he was abusing [K.G.]."
¶ 25 DCFS also conducted "a second investigation that came to Charleston." As part of that investigation, DCFS tried to provide intact family services to Shannon so K.G. could remain in her care. However, because Shannon "continued to fail drug screens at that time," K.G. was taken into protective custody.
¶ 26 i. Testimony Regarding Christopher
¶ 27 Waddell testified that she first got the case at the end of August 2019. In September 2019, she located Christopher in the Tennessee sex offender registry, but he was registered as homeless. Waddell then performed a "diligent search" and the only location she found was the Springfield address from the DCFS investigation. Waddell stated she mailed an integrated assessment to him in Springfield but he never returned it.
¶ 28 Waddell explained that a diligent search is a system that DCFS uses to locate parents and that system draws from a variety of sources, including court documents, utility bills, and the like. Waddell performed a new diligent search every six months but never located Christopher using that method.
¶ 29 After speaking with the "ACR [(administrative case review)] reviewer" in February 2021, Waddell searched the Illinois sex offender registry and found an address for Christopher. Waddell sent Christopher a letter and heard back from him in March 2021. Waddell testified that this was the first time she spoke with Christopher. They discussed the upcoming termination hearing and the service plan. Waddell told Christopher to complete an integrated assessment and that he was required to engage in services for domestic violence, substance abuse, mental health, and sex abuse counseling. Waddell testified she mailed Christopher a copy of the service plan at the end of April or early May 2021. Later in May 2021, she got confirmation that Christopher received the service plan.
¶ 30 Waddell spoke with one service provider in April or May of 2021 who said Christopher had completed sex abuse counseling. Waddell did not have any documentation to support the provider's statements. Waddell did not have any documentation to support that Christopher was engaged in or had completed any services. Waddell testified that to her knowledge Christopher never tried to contact her or One Hope United. As of the time of the parental fitness hearing, Christopher had never completed an integrated assessment.
¶ 31 On cross-examination, Waddell explained she began trying to locate Christopher in September 2019 for an integrated assessment "and then did a diligent search shortly after, but was unsuccessful." Waddell acknowledged she knew in September 2019 that Christopher was "a registered sex offender." She searched the Illinois and Tennessee sex offender registries in September 2019 in an attempt to find Christopher, but she only got results from Tennessee, where he was listed as homeless. Waddell stated she did not also search the Illinois sex offender registry because it was her understanding that the diligent search also searched that registry. Waddell explained that she reviewed the file with a supervisor in February 2021 because she did not know what else to do and her supervisor manually searched the Illinois sex offender registry.
¶ 32 Waddell also stated (1) she had good communication with Christopher's case aide and (2) since March 2021, Waddell had given Christopher the information regarding what services he needed to attend.
¶ 33 ii. Testimony Regarding Shannon
¶ 34 Waddell testified she met Shannon in October 2019 when she conducted an integrated assessment. Waddell then formed a service plan and later reviewed that plan with Shannon at Shannon's home. Shannon was primarily recommended to complete substance abuse and mental health services. Shannon was later required to engage in domestic violence services in December 2020, based on an incident with her paramour in July 2020.
¶ 35 Regarding substance abuse, Waddell stated Shannon was unsuccessfully discharged several times, including once from an inpatient provider in Decatur and multiple times from another outpatient provider (she was discharged from the outpatient provider for failing to attend group meetings and appointments). Shannon did not complete substance abuse services between February and November 2020. She was currently in substance abuse treatment, which she started in December 2020. Waddell then testified that she remembered Shannon did complete treatment at a residential facility sometime between March and April 2020, but Shannon did not attend follow-up outpatient appointments.
¶ 36 Waddell reported Shannon was drug tested and" [a] lot of them would come back negative for all substances, but that did not coincide with what she was telling me." Shannon reported using marijuana but still tested negative. Waddell was concerned Shannon was "doctoring" her tests because they were inconsistent with her self-reporting. However, even after speaking with Shannon about these concerns, Waddell did not have any evidence that was the case. Waddell stated that Shannon missed some drug tests between February and November 2020 but attended others and was negative for all substances. Drug testing was not available between March and July 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
¶ 37 Regarding mental health services, Waddell testified Shannon was unsuccessfully discharged from mental health services through LifeLinks shortly after a June 2020 permanency review hearing. According to Waddell, Shannon attended and was unsuccessfully discharged from LifeLinks "three or four" times over the life of the case.
¶ 38 Waddell stated that she spoke with Shannon several times about the importance of completing services and Shannon understood. Shannon never expressed that she was unwilling to engage in services. Shannon told Waddell that she was attending and would complete services but still missed appointments. Because Waddell believed some of the missed appointments occurred because of a lack of transportation, she informed Shannon that One Hope United would help with transportation and provided "Dial-A-Ride tokens so that she could try and make it to those appointments." Waddell believed Shannon did use those tokens "a few times" but was still unsuccessfully discharged.
¶ 39 Regarding visits with K.G., Waddell testified Shannon attended visits between February and November 2020 and the visits went well. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, in person visits occurred biweekly and virtual visits were offered on the off weeks. Shannon did miss some visits during the nine-month period and tried to contact the foster parents directly to get visits, but she did not try to arrange visits through Waddell.
¶ 40 Waddell commented that since March 2021, Shannon had been making much better and more consistent efforts to comply with services. Throughout the life of the case, Shannon generally maintained regular contact with Waddell. During the nine-month period, Shannon missed a few scheduled calls for case review, but she attended a majority of them. Shannon frequently asked if she still had time to complete services. Waddell would encourage her to complete services and, until very recently, tell her there was still time.
¶ 41 On cross-examination, Waddell testified that she estimated Shannon missed "a handful of" visits during the nine-month period. Waddell agreed that Shannon attended most of her visits and those visits went well. Waddell stated Shannon's last failed drug screen was in January 2020, although "there may have been [a failed screen] in July of 2020." Waddell acknowledged she received from Shannon a certificate of completion of inpatient drug services in April 2020. However, Waddell reiterated Shannon did not pursue the outpatient treatment that followed.
¶ 42 Waddell further acknowledged receiving letters from a mental health service provider, which demonstrated Shannon was engaged in treatment in October 2020 through January 2021. Waddell testified that Shannon engaged in domestic violence services between December 2020 and February 2021. Waddell acknowledged that Shannon began those services before they were formally added to her service plan.
¶ 43 The State rested.
¶ 44 b. Christopher's Case
¶ 45 i. Louis Bell
¶ 46 Christopher called Louis Bell, his brother, to testify on his behalf. Bell testified that he maintained a friendship with Shannon through text messages. Christopher's counsel showed Bell a printout of a text conversation between Bell and Shannon from June 2020. Bell acknowledged that, in that conversation, Shannon informed Bell that the court had terminated Christopher's parental rights. Bell testified that he relayed that information to Christopher that same day or the day after. When asked why Bell had such a conversation with Shannon, Bell answered, "She was keeping me updated like when she was going to court, you know, hey Chris needs to be here at this court date, stuff like that. Sometimes he didn't have a vehicle, sometimes he did."
¶ 47 On cross-examination, Bell testified that Christopher seemed very upset when he found out his rights were terminated. Bell stated that in 2020, Christopher and Shannon were going through divorce proceedings and sometimes Shannon would say Christopher needed to show up. Bell stated he could not recall whether he was aware that Christopher and Shannon had other court proceedings going on. Bell agreed that he understood what Shannon meant when she said Christopher's parental rights had been terminated and it appeared to Bell that Christopher also understood.
¶ 48 ii. Christopher
¶ 49 Christopher testified that K.G. had lived with him from the day K.G. was born in January 2018 until he was taken into temporary custody in August 2019. Christopher stated that he was the sole caretaker of K.G. while Shannon was in prison. (We note Christopher later testified that Shannon went to prison in July 2018, but it is unclear when she was released or why she was in prison.) Christopher acknowledged that he appeared at the shelter care hearing in August 2019 and did not appear at another court hearing until March 2021.
¶ 50 Christopher testified he learned in June 2020 from Bell that his parental rights had been terminated. Christopher acknowledged he did not contact DCFS to make sure the information was accurate and instead felt there "was nothing else [he] could do" because of his sex offender status and DCFS's involvement since Shannon's incarceration. Christopher stated that DCFS became involved in part because of his sex offender status and they had put an intact family service plan in place. Christopher acknowledged he violated that plan by taking K.G. to Charleston without a DCFS supervisor present.
¶ 51 Christopher testified he had since completed sex offender treatment in Jacksonville, Illinois. Christopher stated he lived in Tennessee in the fall of 2019 for about two months before returning to Illinois. Christopher registered as a sex offender in Illinois in December 2019 and had consistently updated his address since that time.
¶ 52 Christopher stated he realized his rights had not been terminated in March 2021 when he received a letter from DCFS notifying him of an upcoming termination hearing. Christopher appeared in court on the date of the hearing, requested appointed counsel, and got a service plan from Waddell. Christopher stated he had contacted all of the necessary service agencies in the Springfield area, which was where he was currently living.
¶ 53 Christopher testified he attempted to stay aware of how K.G. was doing by communicating with Bell. Bell was in contact with Shannon, and he forwarded Christopher updates, photos, and videos of K.G.
¶ 54 On cross-examination, Christopher agreed that he made contact with a DCFS caseworker at the August 2019 shelter care hearing. Christopher attempted to contact that person after he heard his rights were terminated in June 2020 but was not able to get ahold of her. According to Christopher, the DCFS contact told him that she was just an investigator and not the assigned caseworker.
¶ 55 Christopher again acknowledged he attended the August 2019 shelter care hearing and received notice of the next court date. Christopher further admitted that he did not appear at any court proceedings until March 2021. The State asked why Christopher failed to show up for court, given that he testified that he loved and was previously the sole caretaker of K.G. Christopher explained he had been involved with DCFS on three prior occasions because of his sex offender status and, although he "won [those] indications," Christopher "freaked out" and "didn't know what to do." Christopher also stated he did not have a vehicle to attend court hearings. Christopher regretted not contacting DCFS for transportation or other information.
¶ 56 Christopher rested. Shannon did not present any evidence.
¶ 57 c. The Trial Court's Ruling
¶ 58 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that the State had proved the allegations regarding reasonable progress. (As we earlier noted (supra ¶ 17), the State also alleged, and the court concluded, that respondents were unfit for other reasons, including failure to make reasonable efforts.) Regarding Christopher, the court concluded Christopher "made no efforts" and "made no progress during that nine-month period." The court noted that Christopher was aware that the proceedings were ongoing and found that travel difficulties and sex offender status were "no excuse."
¶ 59 Regarding Shannon, the trial court noted that she completed residential substance abuse treatment and domestic violence services. However, the court found Shannon failed to complete (1) mental health counseling and (2) outpatient substance abuse treatment. Overall, the court concluded that Shannon had not made reasonable efforts or progress during the nine-month period of February to November 2020. The court further noted that the case had been pending for 650 days and believed that if it gave Shannon another opportunity, the case would still be ongoing for another two to three years. Accordingly, the trial court found respondent parents, Christopher and Shannon, were unfit parents within the meaning of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2018)). (We note the trial court also found respondents were unfit parents on other grounds alleged by the State, including, for example, the failure to make reasonable progress.)
¶ 60 2. The Best-Interest Portion of the Termination Hearing
¶ 61 In June 2021, the trial court conducted the best-interest portion of the termination hearing. Both respondents appeared.
¶ 62 Kayla Simmons testified she and her husband were K.G.'s foster parents and K.G. had lived with them since October 2020. Simmons explained she had five foster children living with her, the oldest was 12 years old and K.G. was the youngest at 3. Simmons stated they planned on adopting all of the children if able. The Simmonses were financially stable and were already in the process of adopting three of the foster children, who were biologically related and were eligible for adoption.
¶ 63 Simmons testified that K.G. had his own room at the house and that it was filled with his favorite toys. K.G. got along well with all of the other children but particularly well with the oldest. K.G. had been attending a local preschool every day since October 2020. K.G. was happy, healthy, smart, and well-integrated into the family. He called the Simmonses "mommy and daddy" and the other children "brother and sister." Simmons described their family as "tight-knit" and stated she did not have any concerns about adopting all the children at the same time because she came from a large family and had always wanted a large family of her own.
¶ 64 Prior to closing arguments, the trial judge disclosed that he had met Mr. Simmons, who was present in the courtroom, within the past year because Mr. Simmons coached his son's soccer team. The court stated it did not know Mr. Simmons was involved in the case and never discussed anything related to the case with him. The court then asked if any party "wanted to make any sort of motion based on that disclosure," and the parties stated they did not.
¶ 65 After closing arguments, the trial court ruled as follows:
"The uncontested testimony the Court has heard today is that [K.G.] has been living in the home since I believe October, so roughly nine months.
[K.G.] is happy, healthy, smart. He's bonded with his siblings that he calls his brothers and sisters; he's bonded with his parents that he calls mom and dad and I find the State has met their burden by a preponderance of the evidence.
It is in the best interest of [K.G.] that the motion for termination of parental rights be granted."
¶ 66 Both respondents appealed, and this court consolidated the cases.
¶ 67 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 68 Christopher argues the trial court erred by (1) failing to appoint counsel for him at the shelter care hearing and (2) finding the State made reasonable efforts at reunification. Both respondents argue the trial court's finding that respondents were unfit parents was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Shannon also argues the trial court's best interest determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence and her counsel provided ineffective assistance. We disagree and affirm.
¶ 69 A. Counsel at the Shelter Care Hearing
¶ 70 Christopher first argues that the trial court's order should be reversed because he was denied his statutory right to counsel at the shelter care hearing. We conclude we lack jurisdiction over this claim.
¶ 71 The dispositional order in a case alleging neglect is a final and appealable order. In re Zariyah A., 2017 IL App (1st) 170971, ¶ 65, 93 N.E.3d 695. Failure to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of its entry deprives the appellate court jurisdiction over issues addressed therein. In re Ja. P., 2021 IL App (2d) 210257, ¶ 23. This is true even with regard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the adjudicatory phase of proceedings. Id. ¶ 24. Because Christopher did not appeal the dispositional order, we lack jurisdiction to hear his claims of error concerning the shelter care hearing.
¶ 72 Even were we to consider those claims, it does not appear Christopher was prejudiced. Specifically, Christopher does not argue that the trial court erred by placing temporary custody of K.G. with the guardianship administrator of DCFS. Instead, he claims that had counsel been appointed for him at that time, he would not have failed to appear at any of the subsequent hearings and would have received a copy of the service plan.
¶ 73 However, Christopher repeatedly acknowledged at various times in open court that he received actual notice of the next hearing date after the shelter care hearing. Shannon appeared at that hearing, and the trial court appointed counsel for her. Despite being in touch with Shannon and persons at DCFS, Christopher did not appear and made no effort to learn of the next hearing date. Christopher's failure to appear at subsequent hearings is his fault, not the fault of the trial court for failing to appoint counsel at the first possible moment.
¶ 74 We emphasize that we do not condone the actions of the trial court here. Parents have a statutory right to be represented by counsel at all stages of proceedings, and that right attaches immediately at the time the State files an action under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-5 (West 2018)). K.L.P., 198 Ill.2d at 467, 763 N.E.2d at 752. Although the record indicates respondents received at the shelter care hearing a written copy of the "Notice of Rights" required by section 1-5(1) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2018)), the trial court did not verbally inform respondents of their right to counsel or ask if they desired counsel. We have noted the denial of counsel at the shelter care hearing is "particularly troubling" (In re Austin D., 358 Ill.App.3d 277, 285, 831 N.E.2d 1215, 1220 (2005)), and we emphatically remind trial courts that they should always inform parents at shelter care hearings of the right to counsel and appoint counsel if requested.
¶ 75 We further emphasize that the State, as the petitioner, has an obligation to protect the record and ensure that parents receive the protections to which they are entitled under the Act. If a trial court, for whatever reason, fails to provide a statutorily required right to a respondent, it is the State's duty to so inform the court and request that the error be corrected.
¶ 76 B. The Fitness Determinations
¶ 77 Respondents argue the trial court's findings that the State proved various grounds of unfitness-that is, among others, failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest and failure to make reasonable efforts (supra ¶ 17)-by clear and convincing evidence in each case were against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, we need not address all of the court's findings because it is well settled that" [b] ecause each of the statutory grounds of unfitness is independent, the trial court's finding may be affirmed where the evidence supports a finding of unfitness as to any one of the alleged grounds." In re Adoption of P.J.H., 2019 IL App (5th) 190089, ¶ 11, 143 N.E.3d 805. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the court's findings that respondents failed to make reasonable progress within the applicable nine-month period were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we discuss only those findings.
¶ 78 1. The Applicable Law
¶ 79 The State must prove unfitness as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 (D) (West 2018)) by clear and convincing evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 28, 115 N.E.3d 102. Section 1(D) (m) (ii) of the Adoption Act defines an unfit person as a parent who fails to make "reasonable progress toward the return of the child" during any nine-month period following an adjudication of neglect or abuse. 750 ILCS 50/1 (D) (m) (ii) (West 2018). Reasonable progress is an objective review of the steps the parent has taken toward the goal of reunification and examines the demonstrability and quality of those steps. In re Ta. T., 2021 IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 51. Reasonable progress exists when the trial court can conclude that, in the near future, it will be able to order the children returned to parental custody. (Emphasis in original.) Id.
¶ 80 A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility determinations that the trial court is in the best position to make. In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21, 77 N.E.3d 69. A trial court's finding of parental unfitness will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. N. G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Id.
¶ 81 2. This Case
¶ 82 a. Christopher
¶ 83 Here, the State presented evidence that Christopher failed to complete any of his services. The trial court noted that Christopher was aware that the proceedings were ongoing but "showed no interest after the shelter care hearing." The court admonished Christopher at the conclusion of the shelter care hearing that he was required to cooperate with DCFS or he risked termination of his parental rights. The trial court's finding that Christopher failed to make reasonable progress was well supported by the evidence.
¶ 84 Christopher also argues the trial court erred by finding DCFS made reasonable ef- forts at reunification. Christopher forfeited this argument by not making it in the trial court. He further forfeited the argument on appeal by failing to cite any authority to demonstrate the trial court was required to make such a finding as part of the fitness portion of the termination proceedings. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018).
¶ 85 b. Shannon
¶ 86 Regarding Shannon, the trial court acknowledged that she completed residential substance abuse treatment and domestic violence services. However, she failed to complete (1) mental health counseling and (2) outpatient substance abuse treatment. Waddell testified that she repeatedly emphasized to Shannon the importance of completing services and encouraged her to attend. Shannon understood and frequently asked Waddell if she still had time to complete services. Critically, the court noted that the case had been pending for 650 days and it believed that if it gave Shannon another opportunity, the case would still be ongoing for another two to three years. Because the trial court found that Shannon's progress was not of such a quality that K.G. could be returned to Shannon's home in the near future, we conclude (1) its determination that Shannon failed to make reasonable progress was supported by the evidence and (2) the opposite conclusion was not clearly apparent.
¶ 87 C. K.G.'s Best Interest
¶ 88 Shannon argues the trial court's finding that it was in K.G.'s best interest to terminate her parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
¶ 89 1. The Applicable Law
¶ 90 Following a finding of parental unfitness, the focus shifts to the child. In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 69, 145 N.E.3d 605. At the best-interest hearing, "the parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "The issue is no longer whether parental rights can be terminated; the issue is whether, in light of the child's needs, parental rights should be terminated." (Emphases in original.) Id. "The trial court must give full and serious consideration to the child's best interests." Id.
¶ 91 When considering whether termination is in the child's best interest, a trial court must consider, within the context of the child's age and developmental needs, the following factors:
"(1) the child's physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child's identity; (3) the child's familial, cultural[, ] and religious background and ties; (4) the child's sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least[-]disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child's wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child's community ties; (7) the child's need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to care for the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 70. See also 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018).
¶ 92 "At the best-interest hearing, the State must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the minor's best interest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71. "This court accords trial court decisions in termination proceedings great deference because the trial court is in a better position to see the witnesses and judge their credibility." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 93 2. This Case
¶ 94 In this case, the trial court's findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court considered and rejected Shannon's argument that K.G. had not lived with the Simmonses long enough for the court to conclude it was in his best interest to terminate her parental rights. K.G. had spent the past nine-months in his current placement and was already bonded with the family, referring to them as mom, dad, brothers, and sisters. The court found K.G. was "happy, healthy, [and] smart" living where he was, and Simmons's testimony supports that finding. The record demonstrates the trial court considered the totality of the circumstances, and we conclude the court's finding that it was in K.G.'s best interest to terminate Shannon's parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 95 D. Effective Assistance
¶ 96 Last, Shannon argues she was denied her statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel. See 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2020).
¶ 97 The Illinois Supreme Court recently reiterated that parents have a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel in termination proceedings. In re Br. M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 42. Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance is reviewed under the familiar two-prong standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Br. M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 43. "Thus, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a parent must show that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for the error, the result of the proceedings would have been different." In re Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶ 79, 168 N.E.3d 210.
¶ 98 Here, Shannon argues her counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to call Shannon as a witness at either the fitness portion or the best interest portion of the termination proceedings and (2) failing to object to the conflict disclosed by the trial court.
¶ 99 Shannon suggests she could have testified about her efforts to engage in services. However, the trial court found she was unfit for failing to make reasonable progress, which is an objective standard not dependent on a parent's efforts. Shannon did not dispute Waddell's testimony that she failed to engage in outpatient drug treatment, failed drug screens during the nine-month period, and repeatedly engaged and then was unsuccessfully discharged from mental health services. Based on the record, counsel was able to challenge Waddell's testimony without risking a cross-examination of Shannon by the State that may have demonstrated how little progress Shannon had, in fact, made.
¶ 100 Regarding the best interest hearing, Shannon asserts her testimony could have shown her love for K.G. and the strength of their relationship. However, the trial court based its findings on how well K.G. was doing in his current placement and how bonded he was with the family, who were willing to offer permanency through adoption. Waddell testified at the fitness portion of the hearing that Shannon mostly attended visits and they went well. However, Shannon had in person visits merely bi-weekly since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. It is difficult to see how Shannon could have demonstrated a strong enough bond to K.G. to prevent termination of her rights, and Shannon does not offer any further explanation of what her testimony would have been or how it would have changed the outcome.
¶ 101 Shannon also contends her counsel should have asked the trial court to recuse itself after the disclosure of a social connection to the foster father. A trial judge's decision regarding recusal is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Barth v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 228 Ill.2d 163, 175, 886 N.E.2d 976, 983 (2008). The trial court's disclosure in this case revealed-at most-a tenuous connection to the foster father.
¶ 102 The trial court did not realize that Mr. Simmons was involved in the case until the best interest hearing, had only met Mr. Simmons earlier that year (the hearing was conducted in June 2021), and had never discussed anything about K.G. or the case with him. The court clearly thought recusal was not necessary because it asked the parties if they wished to make any motions based on the disclosure instead of recusing itself. Shannon does not argue the judge should have been substituted for cause, nor do we see any basis in the record for such an argument.
¶ 103 In short, we conclude Shannon has not made a showing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 104 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 105 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 106 Affirmed.