Opinion
F086322
08-17-2023
K.F., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY, Respondent; KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
K.F., pro. per., for Petitioner. Margo A. Raison, County Counsel, and Jennifer E. Feige, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ review. Super. Ct. No. JD144100-00 Christie Canales Norris, Judge.
K.F., pro. per., for Petitioner.
Margo A. Raison, County Counsel, and Jennifer E. Feige, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
No appearance for Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT [*]
Petitioner, K.F. (mother), in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ (California Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court's orders issued at a contested disposition hearing denying her reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her now 10-month-old son, Dominic F. (the child). Mother contends the court's orders were based on false and incomplete information, and she requests the court be directed to order reunification services to her or return the child to her custody. We find no error in the court's orders and deny the petition.
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
These dependency proceedings were initiated on December 7, 2022, when the Kern County Department of Human Services (department) received a referral alleging the child, at two months of age, was at risk of severe physical harm in the custody of father and mother due to severe physical abuse of the child's older sibling, L.F. There was concern the child was at risk based on L.F. suffering from skull fractures, subdural hematomas, retinal hemorrhages, clavicle fractures, rib fractures, femur fractures, and chronic bruising to the face as an infant.
The Sibling's Case
The sibling's case came to the attention of the Arizona Department of Child Safety (DCS) on June 16, 2021, when then four-month-old L.F. was transported to the hospital by ambulance after he started having seizures and became unresponsive. Law enforcement responded to the hospital after receiving a report that L.F. had a life-threatening brain bleed and skull fractures, which appeared to be the result of abuse. X-rays at the hospital revealed three skull fractures, a brain bleed, five rib fractures, bilateral clavicle fractures in different stages of healing, a "bucket handle" fracture of the right and left femur, fractured metatarsals in the right foot, and swelling in the spine.
Mother and father were interviewed by law enforcement during their investigation of suspected child abuse. The family recently moved to Arizona from another state because father was transferred by his employment. Father usually left home around 4:30 a.m. and returned home from work between 4:00 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. Mother planned to work from home. L.F. screamed for every diaper change when he was first born, and he only screamed for about half of his diaper changes as time went on. The parents began supplementing L.F.'s feedings with soy formula because mother's breast milk supply was declining.
L.F. started going to daycare on Thursday June 10, 2021, and he threw up at the daycare on Friday June 11, 2021. Mother believed L.F. was beginning to throw up because of her breast milk. On Saturday night, L.F. was up screaming all night due to constipation. L.F. was sleeping between mother and father because they were concerned he would choke on his vomit otherwise. Mother had never seen L.F. vomit like his most recent incidents of vomiting.
Mother picked L.F. up from the daycare on Monday June 14, 2021, because he was vomiting. On that same date, daycare workers made reports of child abuse after observing bruising on L.F.'s face and bottom. DCS and law enforcement did not observe any noticeable bruising when investigating on that date. Mother acknowledged that L.F. had a bruise and scratch on his bottom, but she did not know how they happened.
Mother took L.F. to urgent care on Tuesday morning for a fever. Later in the afternoon, L.F. was sent home from the hospital with instructions to be given Tylenol. On the afternoon of Wednesday, June 16, 2021, L.F. was feeling better and playing with his toys. The family went out for food that evening, and L.F. began to cry while they stood in line. Father took L.F. to their truck to change his diaper, and he noticed L.F. did not seem responsive as he laid him down. As father came back into the restaurant, he told mother that "something was not right with [L.F.]." Mother described L.F.'s breathing as labored and wheezing, and his eyes and head rolled back when father handed him to her. The parents called 911 and an ambulance arrived to transport L.F. to the hospital.
Mother suspected that L.F. was injured during his first day at the daycare. When informed that L.F. had older injuries, mother explained how she heard "popping sounds" while they held him under the armpits in a trip to Bakersfield in March 2021. She also believed L.F. had brittle bones because she could not explain his fractures. Both parents also recalled an incident where L.F. bumped his face on father's cheek, which caused a bruise the week before he started daycare. Father claimed L.F. fell out of his hands while he was showering a week earlier, but he caught L.F. with his hands. He also believed L.F. hit his head on a door jamb, but he could not recall the exact date.
Neither parent could recall any incidents that could have caused L.F.'s fractures. However, mother had numerous photographs on her cell phone of bruises, bumps, and broken skin on various places of L.F.'s body and face on 11 dates from February 14, 2021, to June 7, 2021. The injuries included: bruises and scratches to the face and abdomen, bruising on the jugular notch, a bump, bruise and abrasion on his forehead at the hairline, minimal bruising under his eye, a blood spot under his tongue, a torn frenulum, and visible abrasions to his upper gums.
The daycare staff were also interviewed by law enforcement. L.F. had only been to the daycare for three days, and marks were observed on L.F.'s face during his tour of the daycare on Wednesday, June 9, 2021. The daycare staff noticed a scratch and bruise on his bottom while they changed his diaper on Monday, June 14, 2021. L.F. was described as lethargic on Friday and Monday, and he appeared to be favoring his right side when he slept on Monday morning. Daycare staff was concerned that L.F. was not reaching out and trying to touch things at his age. Mother sent a message to daycare staff after the parents were contacted by DCS on Monday.
Daycare staff explained that they wore gloves when changing diapers, which made it impossible for them to cause the scratch. One of the daycare workers described how she observed L.F. display symptoms consistent with an absenteeism seizure on his second day because he would startle when moved. The worker explained that a child having an absenteeism seizure appears to be staring off without other visible symptoms of a seizure. Another daycare worker was not present to be interviewed by law enforcement, but her only role was relieving the two workers during breaks so that one worker was not left alone to care for the infants.
Law enforcement and DCS consulted with one of the doctors from L.F.'s "Child At Risk Evaluation" team. Dr. Woolridge was unable to date L.F.'s skull fracture, but the brain bleeds that were likely associated with the skull fracture were described as acute. One of L.F.'s clavicle fractures was older and the other was acute. L.F.'s rib fractures were noted as "the only clearly older fractures." L.F.'s right femur fracture was acute, and his foot fracture was "age indeterminate." There was soft tissue damage around the internal carotid arteries of L.F.'s neck, and he was having seizures and strokes at the time of their meeting with Woolridge. The seizures were likely related to his brain bleed and the strokes were likely related to the soft tissue damage around the blood vessels of his neck.
Woolridge had concerns that L.F.'s trauma was nonaccidental in nature. Mother's reporting of clicking sounds in L.F.'s ribs caused Woolridge to believe the ribs were likely fractured during the trip to Bakersfield in March 2021. The injuries to L.F.'s cheek were not consistent with L.F. headbutting father. Woolridge reviewed video and pictures of L.F. from June 16, 2021, and he opined that L.F.'s severe head trauma occurred after the video and pictures were taken. He concluded that L.F.'s head trauma likely occurred during the diaper change in the truck at the restaurant because he would have been symptomatic almost immediately after suffering the injury. Woolridge also suggested that the skull fracture to the back of L.F.'s head was caused by his head being hit against something with padding on it because there was no obvious external bruising on the back of his head.
On June 25, 2021, DCS filed a petition regarding L.F., and he was placed into protective custody on June 29, 2021. DCS alleged that mother and father knew or reasonably should have known that another person caused L.F. to suffer a serious physical injury, and the Arizona court found that the allegations of the petition were true. Both parents entered a no contest plea, and L.F. was adjudicated as a dependent of the Arizona Superior Court in September 2021. In January 2022, DCS recommended that a plan of adoption be established for L.F. Both parents contested the adoption and requested a permanent plan of legal guardianship.
A progress report prepared by DCS, dated January 9, 2023, continued to recommend that the court approve the permanent case plan of adoption. L.F. had been placed with his maternal aunt and uncle in Bakersfield since July 23, 2021. Both parents were participating in visitation with L.F., and the visits were reported to go well. DCS recommended a plan of adoption due to their concerns that both parents were unable to recognize their role in the removal of L.F., and the parents continued to seek other explanations for his injuries besides nonaccidental trauma. At two years of age, L.F. was able to stand without taking steps, beginning to use his right arm more, and experiencing full body and head drop seizures. L.F. was enrolled in services through the Early Start Program Kern Regional Center, which consisted of speech, occupational, and physical therapy services.
Mother and father completed parenting education programs, individual and couple's therapy, and psychological evaluations. Mother's evaluation noted concerns with" 'her ability to detect safety risks, given her own history of victimization,'" but she was assessed to have a good prognosis of reunification with L.F. The evaluation for father found that the results were undermined by his" 'defensive responding.'" Father's prognosis of reunification with L.F. was described as" 'fair to good,'" and he was likely to develop the ability to care for L.F. after a "few years" of constant education of L.F.'s unique needs for care. A decision on the permanent plan for L.F. was anticipated to occur in June 2023. Criminal proceedings involving both parents and arising from L.F.'s injuries were also anticipated to proceed to trial in September 2023.
The Child's Removal
On December 1, 2022, the department received a referral indicating father and mother had an open dependency case due to substantiated severe physical abuse of L.F. in Arizona. Mother moved to Kern County and gave birth to the child in September 2022. Father continued to live in Arizona, but he traveled to Bakersfield regularly to visit L.F. The department social worker spoke to the investigating detective in Arizona and a DCS social worker regarding the circumstances surrounding L.F.'s injuries. Mother refused to answer the door when the social worker made a visit to her home, and she declined to speak with the social worker.
The detective summarized their investigation of the June 2021 incident for the department social worker. The detective also reported that there was a previous incident in 2009, where the four-month-old child of a female friend sustained a skull fracture and brain bleed while in father's care. After the initial investigation of the four-month-old child's injuries, father apologized for lying to law enforcement in a letter. He claimed the other child hit his head on the headboard while his female friend was showering, and the female friend then found the child unresponsive. Mother was arrested for failing to protect L.F. due to the past injuries and trying to dissuade the investigation by accusing daycare staff. The detective did not believe father should be around any children.
On December 7, 2022, the child was taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant. The department filed an original petition alleging the child was described by section 300, subdivisions (a) and (j). The petition alleged the child was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by mother and father based upon the previous injuries to the child's sibling and the parents' inability to provide a reasonable explanation for the injuries.
The juvenile court conducted a conference call with the Arizona Superior Court to determine the appropriate court for jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act on December 14, 2022. The Arizona Superior Court declined jurisdiction, and the court proceeded to conduct a contested detention hearing. The court ordered the child detained and set a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing for February 1, 2023.
The department's jurisdiction report further detailed its investigation and included records from the sibling's dependency case. The records attached to the report included reports from law enforcement, medical records, and court records. The report recommended that the allegations in the original petition be found true. A contested jurisdiction hearing took place on March 27, 2023, after multiple continuances, and both mother and father testified. The juvenile court found all of the allegations of the petition true and continued the disposition hearing to April 11, 2023.
The department's disposition report recommended that both parents be denied services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) and the setting of a section 366.26 hearing. The child was placed with a nonrelative extended family member in Bakersfield. He was developmentally on target for his age with no medical issues noted. Mother was living with her parents in Bakersfield, and father recently moved to Bakersfield with the approval of the judge handling the criminal proceedings.
Mother did not understand why the child was removed from her care, and both parents claimed inaccurate information was provided by DCS in Arizona. Father reported completion of two anger management classes, two parenting classes, and a psychological evaluation for the sibling's case. Mother was participating in nurturing parenting and child neglect, physical abuse as a perpetrator, and learning to protect classes. Mother and father were participating in supervised visits, and they interacted appropriately and affectionately with the child.
The sibling's social worker from DCS reported that neither parent had taken responsibility for L.F.'s injuries, but mother recently accepted that the injuries could have happened while he was in their care. According to the DCS social worker, four medical doctors testified during the sibling's case indicating that L.F.'s injuries were consistent with nonaccidental trauma. The parents had no experts testify as to other potential causes during the sibling's case. Both parents still believed L.F.'s injuries were caused by the daycare or mishandling by doctors at the hospital.
The department did not recommend reunification services for either parent because they had not taken responsibility for the severe physical abuse of L.F. or provided a plausible explanation for L.F.'s injuries. The report acknowledged that both parents established a bond with the child, but the department continued to believe that the parents' inability to explain the L.F.'s injuries placed the child at a continued risk of nonaccidental harm by the parents.
The contested disposition hearing began on May 11, 2023, with both mother and father present. The child's care provider testified that the child lived in her home since late December 2022. She also testified that the child recognized mother's voice during phone calls and appeared excited to visit with mother. The child was observed crying on occasion when mother placed him into the car seat after a visit. Both mother and the care provider were referred to as "mama" by the child. Mother provided supplies, clothes, and breast milk for the child as needed.
The care provider also noticed that the child appeared excited during his calls with father. On cross-examination, the care provider acknowledged that mother did not provide "great detail" regarding the reason the child was removed. Mother only explained that there were charges pending that had no real evidence to support them. The care provider was not aware of the extent of the injuries previously suffered by L.F., but mother told her that the injuries were not caused by mother or father. The aide responsible for supervising the parents' weekly visits testified that mother comforted the child appropriately and she did not have to intervene in mother's visits. Father's visits were described as appropriate, but he occasionally missed visits due to his work.
Mother testified that the child lived with her for the first two and one-half months of his life prior to removal. She had participated in classes to improve her parenting in both Arizona and California. Mother and father were currently living together, and father was around the child on occasion for the first two months of his life. Mother testified about the topics she was learning in her courses, and she applied the skills during her visitation. She wanted the child to either be returned to her home or have increased time in visitation with her.
On cross-examination, mother acknowledged photographing injuries on L.F. on several dates prior to his hospitalization. Mother had reviewed the various records from L.F.'s case, and she was aware of a report of injuries to another child who was in father's care in 2009. She testified that neither she nor father ever intentionally harmed L.F. She denied injuring L.F. Mother then testified that she "[had] not witnessed any reason to believe" that father injured L.F., and she had "only witnessed him as a safe person." Seeking further clarification, the juvenile court asked if it was possible that father could have been inappropriate with L.F. Mother responded, "I believe anything is possible."
Father testified that he was alone with the child prior to his removal, and he spent the night at mother's home at times. Father was aware of his ability to participate in classes that were part of a voluntary case plan through the department. He participated in therapy, parenting classes, and anger management classes through the sibling's case with DCS. Father testified that he did not believe his anger management course for DCS was necessary. He did not participate in any voluntary services for the department due to work conflicts.
In the event that services could be found that did not interfere with his work schedule, father claimed he would participate in them. He worked in multiple cities across California and either stayed in hotels or with mother's parents. Father was comfortable with the child being returned to mother if he was not provided reunification services. On cross-examination, father denied that he needed to complete anger management or physical abuse as a perpetrator. Father was no longer participating in therapy.
On May 24, 2023, the juvenile court allowed counsel to present argument before its ruling on the contested disposition. Both mother and father were present with appointed counsel. Mother's counsel argued that there was insufficient evidence that mother had actual knowledge of L.F.'s abuse to satisfy the bypass provision under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). In the alternative, she insisted that the court should find that family reunification services to mother were in the child's best interest despite the application of the section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) bypass provision. Mother also wanted the court to consider providing her family maintenance services.
Counsel for father joined in mother's argument and argued that family reunification services were in the child's best interest. Father also supported mother's request for family maintenance services. Counsel for the department and the child both urged the juvenile court to adopt the department's recommendation.
After hearing argument from counsel, the juvenile court ruled as follows:
"With (b)(6) applying, the court is supposed to make a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent. If that bypass provision applies, the court shall not order reunification services unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that reunification is in the best interest of the child. [¶] • - [¶] The parents have both testified that they have participated in many classes. Though the father indicated in his testimony anger management was not helpful. He does not need physical abuse as a perpetrator. Despite taking all those classes, neither parent has shown any insight into the physical abuse that [L.F.] suffered from them. We have blanket denials and no reasonable likelihood that this disposition will change. In a lot of sense, this case is very similar to In re A.E. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124. [¶] The denials and the refusals to see the facts that are in front of them leads this court to believe that this child would-is very likely to be abused."
The juvenile court went on to cite the legislative goal of providing timely stability and permanence for the child. It also made note of the severe physical abuse of L.F. with documented injuries at different stages of healing. The court also referenced a statement from Woolridge that L.F. would have been symptomatic almost immediately from the injury suffered at the restaurant. Mother's own documentation of several injuries to L.F.'s face, beginning as early as 11 days old, were described as "eye-opening." It also explained the injuries observed by the daycare workers who, "indicated to the police that they work in pairs and that nobody-that both pairs had noted the bruising and injuries to the child and became alarmed and notified Arizona CPS." The court highlighted that, "[t]he parents have heard all of [the] testimony, ... all of the facts, all of the documentation, their position remains unchanged." In a discussion regarding mother and father's credibility, the court noted, "Additionally, when they had testified regarding the shower incidents and possible explanations at juris, I did not find that testimony to be credible. Again, we have the medical experts that ruled out those possibilities. There was nothing extraordinary found in his medical record that made him more prone to these injuries. The parents have never been honest with law enforcement's] investigation regarding [L.F.] in Arizona or in Kern County. [¶] And we also have that incident with [father] in 2009 where a four-month old had suffered a skull fracture and [father] provided an apology letter for lying.
"Despite all of this evidence and despite all of the testimony, and even considering the mother has great visits with [the child] and the visits are largely positive, there is no evidence that this court can point to that would show that reunification could lead to adequate protection of this child, and that there is no evidence that reunification services would be in this child's best interest. [¶] There is no-the record-there is no evidence to suggest that reunification services would be effective in modifying the parents' behavior in the future. They've taken numerous classes and nothing has changed. In light of their blanket denials, there is no evidence to believe that further services would prevent the parents from carrying out the same abuse, physical-severe physical abuse and inflicting similar or worse injuries in the future. For those reasons, the court ... follow[s] the recommendations in the disposition report."
DISCUSSION
Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review
As a general rule, when a child is removed from parental custody under the dependency laws, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification services to "the child and the child's mother and statutorily presumed father" (§ 361.5, subd. (a)). However, it is also the "intent of the Legislature, especially with regard to young children, . . . that the dependency process proceed with deliberate speed and without undue delay." (Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.) Thus, the statutory scheme recognizes that there are cases in which the delay attributable to the provision of reunification services would be more detrimental to the child than discounting the competing goal of family preservation. (Ibid.) Specifically, section 361.5, subdivision (b), exempts from reunification services "those parents who are unlikely to benefit" from such services or for whom reunification efforts are likely to be" 'fruitless.'" (In re JoshuaM. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 470, 470.)
The statutory sections authorizing denial of reunification services are sometimes referred to as "bypass" provisions. (Melissa R. v. Superior Court (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 816, 821.) In the present case, the juvenile court denied reunification services to the parents based on subdivision (b)(6)(A) of section 361.5.
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6)(A) permits the denial of reunification services where the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child was adjudicated a dependent pursuant to any subdivision of section 300 as a result of severe physical harm to the child or a sibling of the child caused by a parent and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the parent. "[S]evere physical harm" under the statute, as relevant here, may be based on, but is not limited to, "deliberate and serious injury inflicted to or on a child's body or the body of a sibling . . . by an act or omission of the parent or guardian, or of another individual . . . with the consent of the parent ._" (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(C).)
In determining whether reunification services would benefit a child, the juvenile court must consider a list of factors enumerated in subdivision (i) of section 361.5: (1) the specific act or omission comprising the severe physical harm inflicted on the child, the child's sibling or half sibling; (2) the circumstances under which the abuse or harm was inflicted on the child, the child's sibling or half sibling; (3) the severity of the emotional trauma suffered by the child, the child's sibling or half sibling; (4) any history of abuse of other children by the offending parent; (5) the likelihood that the child may be safely returned to the care of the offending parent within 12 months with no continued supervision; and (6) whether or not the child desires to be reunified with the offending parent.
Once it has been determined that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) applies,"' "the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental resources. [Citation.]" '" (In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227;accord, In re A.G. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 276, 281.) Thus, under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2), "[t]he court shall not order reunification for a parent . . . described in [section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6)] unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child." (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) "The burden is on the parent to . . . show that reunification would serve the best interests of the child." (William B., at p. 1227; accord, In re A.G., at p. 281.)
On a challenge to the juvenile court's denial of reunification services, we apply the substantial evidence standard. We do so bearing in mind that the court's decision must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654.)
The Extraordinary Writ Petition
As a general proposition, a juvenile court's rulings are presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) A parent seeking review of the court's orders from the setting hearing must, as mother did here, file an extraordinary writ petition in this court on Judicial Council form JV-825 to initiate writ proceedings. The purpose of such petitions is to allow the appellate court to achieve a substantive and meritorious review of the court's findings and orders issued at the setting hearing in advance of the section 366.26 hearing. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(4)(A).)
Rule 8.452 sets forth the content requirements for an extraordinary writ petition. It requires the petitioner to set forth legal arguments with citation to the appellate record. (Rule 8.452(b).) In keeping with the dictate of rule 8.452(a)(1), we liberally construe writ petitions in favor of their adequacy recognizing that a parent representing himself or herself is not trained in the law. In this case, mother's petition claims the juvenile court erred on the grounds that, "The order was granted based upon false and incomplete information. This judge continuously blindly supported [the department] and failed to uphold an accurate record." (Capitalization omitted.)
Mother also requests a stay because the section 366.26 hearing was "ordered by ignoring the lack of reasonable efforts and abusing its discretion and authority." (Capitalization omitted.)
Mother's petition does not comply with the requirements of rule 8.452 in that it did not include a memorandum containing a summary of significant facts, citation to the record, or argument and citation to authority supporting the points raised. (Rule 8.452(b)(1)-(3).) Because her petition does not technically comport with the content requirements of rule 8.452, the department urges this court to dismiss the petition as facially inadequate. We decline to do so in this case. Rather, we will liberally construe the petition as a challenge to the juvenile court's finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification with mother.
In considering whether the provision of reunification services would benefit the child in cases where the circumstances of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6)(A) apply, the court must consider any information it deems relevant, including the specific act constituting the severe physical harm inflicted, the circumstances of the infliction of the abuse or harm, the severity of the emotional trauma suffered by the child victim, any history of child abuse by the parent, the likelihood of safely reunifying with no supervision within 12 months and the desires of the child regarding reunification with the parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (i).)
On this record, there was ample evidence to support the court's bypass determination. The child's sibling suffered severe injuries that were inflicted over a period of time while in the care of mother and father. Mother took photographs of numerous injuries of the child in the weeks leading up to his suffering of severe head trauma, but she took no protective actions on behalf of the child. Instead, mother continued to plead ignorance to the actual cause of the child's serious injuries, which involved fractures in various stages of healing, and she continued to blame daycare workers that provided care for L.F. for only three days. Mother's purported bond with the child, who was removed at two months of age, is not as compelling as the real risk that would be posed to the child if returned to mother's care.
Mother's failure to even recognize the possibility that L.F.'s injuries occurred while in the care of father or herself demonstrates a real risk that the child would suffer similar harm. Despite mother's efforts, there was still a "very real concern for the risk of recidivism." (Deborah S. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 741, 751.) "[A]n abusive parent's risk of recidivism is not necessarily limited to a child who was the parent's previous victim. The parent may very well pose a serious threat to his or her other children. The Legislature appears to have recognized this sad circumstance in its drafting of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6)." (Ibid.) The overwhelming evidence that was provided by the department regarding the abuse suffered by L.F. while in the care of mother and father was more than sufficient for the juvenile court to conclude that failure to reunify would not be detrimental to the child.
In sum, none of the factors the juvenile court should consider listed in section 361.5, subdivision (i), stated above, favors mother. Based on the facts of this case, each of the factors must be resolved in favor of denying reunification services. Under such circumstances, we can find no fault with the court's rejection of mother's claimed ignorance of the abuse in the weeks prior to L.F.'s removal. (See In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 200 [" 'Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court.' "].)
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. The request for a stay of the section 366.26 hearing is also denied. This court's opinion is final forthwith as to this court pursuant to rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).
[*] Before Poochigian, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Meehan, J.