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characterizing the master's decision to disallow twenty percent of Kim's claimed deductions when calculating her adjusted gross income as "within her discretion"
Summary of this case from Faulkner v. GoldfussOpinion
Supreme Court No. S-11901 / 11971.
May 2, 2007.
Appeals from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Charles R. Pengilly, Judge, Superior Court No. 4FA-99-189.
K.F., pro se, Fairbanks. Lynn E. Levengood, MacDonald Levengood, PC, Fairbanks, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited for any proposition of law or as an example of the proper resolution of any issue.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. INTRODUCTION
K.F. and S.G. have been fighting over child support since their January 2000 divorce. We consolidated the parties' two pending appeals: in one case, K.F. challenges the modified child support awards for 2000, 2001, and 2002 issued by the superior court on remand from the parties' first appeal to this court; in the second case, K.F. appeals the superior court's child support awards for 2003, 2004, and from 2005 forward. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm all but one facet of the support orders.
Initials have been used throughout this opinion to protect the identity of the family members involved.
See K.F. v. S.G., 46 P.3d 993 (Alaska 2002).
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
K.F. and S.G. were married in 1995 and finalized their divorce in 2000. They have three children: a daughter born in 1988 (and adopted by S.G.) and two sons born in 1996 and 1998. K.F. has a child from a previous relationship; that child turned eighteen years old in January 2001.
Id. at 995.
Child Support Awards for 2000-2002
We first considered this matter when K.F. appealed the superior court's initial 2000 child support award, which required her to pay $288.39 per month. K.F. challenged the superior court's calculation of her support obligation because the court "(1) disallowed a deduction for depreciation [of K.F.'s rental properties]; (2) imputed as income to her the rental value of her apartment; (3) included as income child support she receives for a child of a previous marriage; (4) failed to make findings regarding her claimed deduction for net operating losses; and (5) miscalculated the percentage of time each parent has physical custody of the children."
Id. at 995-96.
Id. at 996.
We agreed with K.F. that the superior court had erred in denying her a deduction for depreciation of her rental property. The rule adopted by Hilderbrand v. Hilderbrand allowed such a deduction if the party could claim the deduction for tax purposes; here, the superior court did not find that K.F. was incapable of making that tax claim. We also held that the superior court erred in including as gross income the child support K.F. received for her child from a previous relationship and in reducing the deduction K.F. could make from her gross income under Civil Rule 90.3(a)(1)(C) for her other child support and alimony obligations.
Hilderbrand v. Hilderbrand, 962 P.2d 887 (Alaska 1998).
K.F., 46 P.3d at 997.
Id. at 997-98.
We rejected K.F.'s argument that the court should have made findings about her previously incurred net operating losses and held that because those losses do not reflect upon an obligor's ability to pay child support, the court could not deduct them from the obligor's income to calculate support. We also rejected K.F.'s argument that the superior court had unfairly imputed to her as income the fair rental value of the apartment where she lived rent-free and managed the property; the court had not allowed her to deduct her management expenses, but it also had not imputed any income to her reflecting the rental value of the apartment.
Id. at 998.
Id. at 997.
We vacated the child support order and remanded the case to the superior court to recalculate the award in light of the two errors we had identified: the superior court's treatment of the child support K.F. received from the father of one of her children; and the court's refusal to allow K.F. to deduct from her income the depreciation of her rental properties.
Id. at 1004.
On remand, the superior court referred the case to a master. The master held hearings over the course of six months and issued findings of fact and recommendations on the child support order in August 2004. The superior court adopted these findings and issued modified support awards for 2000, 2001, and 2002 on November 15, 2004. The court ordered K.F. to pay $372.02 per month for 2000, $973.27 per month for 2001, and $55.63 per month for 2002. K.F. challenges all three awards on substantive and procedural grounds.
Child Support Awards for 2003, 2004, and 2005 Forward
K.F. moved to modify the existing custody order and adjust child support in January 2003 because the couple's daughter had chosen to leave S.G.'s home and live full-time with K.F. The couple's two sons continued to split their time sixty-five percent with their father and thirty-five percent with their mother. The court granted K.F.'s motion to modify the custody order in November 2003, but made no decisions on child support until February 2005; in the meantime, the parties challenged each others' calculations and fought over disclosing financial documentation until they finally reached a settlement in January 2005. To make child support awards for 2003, 2004, and 2005 and forward, the superior court eventually received child support guidelines affidavits in early 2005 from each party for each year. Neither party requested a hearing, and the court issued child support orders conforming to S.G.'s calculations for all three years based on the affidavits. The court ordered K.F. to pay $183 per month for 2003 and $394.14 per month for 2004. For 2005, the court set K.F.'s monthly support obligation at $630.99 until June 2006 when the couple's daughter turned eighteen; after that K.F.'s obligation increased to $1,385.57 per month.
K.F. now challenges the superior court's orders for all three years on legal and factual grounds.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a child support award for abuse of discretion. We will find an abuse of discretion only when, "based on a review of the whole record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." The superior court presumptively does not abuse its discretion when it awards child support based on Civil Rule 90.3. "The proper method of calculating child support is a question of law, which we review de novo, adopting the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy." The superior court's determination of the parties' net incomes is a question of fact we review for clear error. B. Appeal from Remand Proceedings Concerning the 2000, 2001, and 2002 Awards
Id. at 996.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Coghill v. Coghill, 836 P.2d 921, 924 (Alaska 1992); accord Alaska Civil Rule 90.3, Commentary VI ("Absent the [exception for unusual circumstances], the [exception for high income], or the [exception for low income], the rule presumes that support calculated under 90.3(a) or (b) does not result in manifest injustice.").
K.F., 46 P.3d at 996 n. 3 (citing Spott v. Spott, 17 P.3d 52, 55 (Alaska 2001)).
Gallant v. Gallant, 945 P.2d 795, 800 (Alaska 1997).
K.F. challenges many facets of the child support orders issued for 2000, 2001, and 2002. Before we address K.F.'s specific concerns, we observe that the superior court eventually calculated that K.F. owed $372.02 per month in 2000; $973.27 per month in 2001; and $55.63 per month in 2002. K.F.'s own ideal calculations, with all conflicts and questions resolved in her favor, identify her support obligation as $67.81 per month in 2000, and S.G.'s obligation as $184.22 per month in 2001 and $38.57 per month in 2002.
1. The superior court did not engage in impermissible retroactive modification.
During the first evidentiary hearing before Master Alicemary L. Closuit, K.F. raised the issue of how the parties' income should be calculated. K.F. argued that the court was required to use the parties' 1999 incomes to calculate awards for 2000-2002 because any other approach would be retroactive modification of the existing support award. Master Closuit advocated a year-by-year approach using the known figures for the parties' actual earnings, and stated that there was no issue of retroactive modification because the supreme court had vacated the initial child support order that K.F. had appealed. The parties stipulated to allow the superior court to decide as a matter of law which method of calculation was proper and postponed further evidentiary hearings before Master Closuit. The parties briefed the issue to the superior court. Master Closuit issued an order in September 2003 recommending that the court calculate the awards using actual income for each year. In October 2003 Superior Court Judge Charles R. Pengilly issued an order adopting Master Closuit's recommendation.
K.F. now renews her argument that the court's year-by-year calculation amounted to retroactive modification. In her brief to the superior court on this issue, K.F. argued that calculating support entirely anew was only proper if no final child support order was in effect. On appeal, K.F. argues that the court should not have abandoned the 1999 predictive calculation without a motion to modify. But this court vacated the original 2000 child support order, meaning that no final child support order was in effect when the superior court chose to rely on year-by-year actual income information rather than the 1999 predictive calculation; there was therefore nothing the parties could move to modify. Alaska law strives to arrive at a child support obligation that best reflects the actual circumstances of the parties; an artificial adherence to the 1999 income information, when actual circumstances for each year were known, would not fulfill this goal. Here, the year-by-year calculations were considerably more accurate, because K.F.'s eldest child turned eighteen years old in January of 2001. This change of circumstances had the effect of raising K.F.'s child support obligation to her other three children. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the support orders using actual data for each year rather than applying the 1999 data to all years in question. Our resolution of this issue moots K.F.'s claim that the superior court erred in its calculations using the 1999 data.
See, e.g., Bailey v. Bailey, 63 P.3d 259, 262 n. 1 (Alaska 2003); Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371, 382 (Alaska 1996).
2. The superior court properly adopted the master's findings.
After her appeal to this court, K.F. filed a motion in the superior court to appoint a special master to calculate child support "pursuant to the Supreme Court's remand of May 10, 2002, . . . for the period from January 19, 2000 forward." The superior court appointed Master Closuit and the master held hearings over the course of six days in 2004. Master Closuit issued extensive findings of fact and recommended specific levels of child support. The superior court, after allowing the parties the opportunity to object to the findings and offer corrections, adopted those findings and recommendations without alteration. "The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court."
K.F. now argues that the superior court failed to issue adequate findings because it did not specify which of the master's "conflicting options" or "peripheral findings" the court adopted. The master's findings of fact listed several contingency child support calculations to cover three scenarios, and explained what assumptions would support each method of calculation: calculating support excluding K.F.'s rental losses entirely; calculating support for 2000-2002 using only 1999 data; and calculating support for 2000-2002 using year-by-year data. The master unambiguously recommended that the superior court adopt Exhibit C, which used the third approach. When the superior court followed this recommendation, the parties could easily infer that the superior court had rejected both S.G.'s argument about excluding K.F.'s rental losses entirely (Exhibit A figures) and K.F.'s argument about using only 1999 data to predict child support (Exhibit B figures). For these reasons, the findings supporting the child support order are adequate.
3. The master did not err in failing to recuse herself.
K.F. twice requested during the hearings that the master recuse herself. The master refused the first time because K.F. offered no reason for the request; K.F. did not follow up the request by filing a motion for recusal with the superior court. K.F. made a second request for recusal after the master made oral findings about the false testimony and document K.F. produced at a hearing. K.F. again did not file a recusal motion with the superior court. The master assessed her own potential partiality and decided she was capable of fairly deciding the matter.
See AS 22.20.020.
If K.F. wanted independent review of the master's refusal to recuse herself, it was incumbent on K.F., under AS 22.20.020(c), to request that the presiding judge of the next higher court appoint another judge to reexamine her recusal request. K.F. made no such request. She later informed the master that her decision not to follow up on the recusal request was tactical. Furthermore, K.F. had an opportunity to contest the issue in the superior court by objecting to the master's findings and recommendations, which described K.F.'s recusal requests, disclosed that the master had denied the requests, and expressed the master's belief that she had been fair in deciding the matter. K.F. filed no objection on these points, and the superior court's subsequent adoption of the findings and recommendations establishes that the court agreed with the master's confidence in her ability to be fair. The master did not abuse her discretion in failing to recuse herself. 4. The court did not err in its obstruction finding.
See Coffey v. State, 585 P.2d 514, 525 (Alaska 1978).
K.F. based her demand for recusal primarily on allegedly erroneous findings concerning her credibility that Master Closuit had made, both in this case and in another proceeding involving domestic violence issues. We have previously recognized that adequate grounds for disqualification cannot be established merely by showing that a judge has committed legal errors or formed views concerning a party's credibility while presiding over a past or present case involving the party. See Coffey, 585 P.2d at 525.
K.F. argues that the master erred in finding that K.F. obstructed the discovery process. She also argues that the master improperly shifted the "burden of proof" to her. We review discovery orders under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.
Coulson v. Marsh McLennan, Inc., 973 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Alaska 1999).
During the discovery process, S.G. moved to compel K.F. to produce supporting documentation for her Rule 90.3 figures and calculations. K.F. opposed this motion, claiming that she had provided four boxes of supporting material to S.G.'s counsel several months earlier. At the hearing on S.G.'s motion, the master characterized the situation as a miscommunication as to what was expected of each party: K.F. had met with S.G.'s financial expert as she had said she would, but had not been prepared as the expert had requested and did not make copies of documents for him, so the expert had spent all of his allotted time helping K.F. organize her boxes of supporting documentation. The master explained that her only question was, "[H]ow is this going to happen so that [S.G.'s expert] gets the information he needs in the most expeditious fashion possible?" The master emphasized: "Again, [K.F.], I want you to understand, I am not finding that you did anything malicious. Nor am I finding at this point in time that you are attempting to hide anything. But if we don't cooperate this time and get it done in a fashion that is somewhat expeditious, there's going to be more testimony like this and another hearing like this. And again, that adds to the cost of this litigation." The court then ordered K.F. to meet with S.G.'s expert with counsel for both parties present, so that it would be "equally burdensome" for both parties if either were unprepared. This solution to the discovery problem was not an unreasonable shifting of the burden of production to K.F.; the master did not abuse her discretion.
The master later reinterpreted the discovery miscommunication as obstruction after K.F. offered a false document as evidence. The master stated: "[K.F.], you convinced me at the time of the last hearing that you were not being truthful with the court. In fact, it cast [doubt] on my prior belief that there were merely misunderstandings on your part that was [sic] causing difficulties with discovery. In fact, I have reason to believe now and it will be a part of the findings as a matter of fact that your actions in this case have not been that of a person [who was] trying to provide discovery but were deliberately obstructive." In other words, the master initially gave K.F. the benefit of the doubt, and only after K.F. had shown herself to be untrustworthy did the master reconsider. Moreover, the master later withdrew the obstruction finding and imposed no monetary or procedural sanctions on K.F. K.F. has not explained how she was harmed by the master's "implication of obstruction" in her findings. The master did not err or abuse her discretion in handling this issue.
5. The court did not err in finding fraud or perjury.
K.F. challenges the master's finding that K.F. perjured herself while testifying and submitted a fraudulent document to the court as evidence.
At one of the evidentiary hearings, K.F. testified that she had been purchasing the rental property situated at 602 Manley in North Pole through a lease purchase agreement during 2000 and did not receive the deed to the property until June or July 2001. K.F. explained that, according to IRS rules, she could have been claiming expenses for the Manley property during 2000 because she was responsible for the mortgage payments, repairs, and utilities under the lease purchase agreement, but she did not claim them on her taxes. By this testimony, K.F. was laying a foundation to explain why she was claiming more expenses in her Rule 90.3 calculations than she had on her taxes, and, more specifically, why she was claiming expenses for 2000 and half of 2001 on a property she was living in for part of the time and the deed to which she did not have until June 2001.
In examining K.F. when she testified before Master Closuit, K.F.'s trial counsel sought to portray K.F.'s alleged practice of underclaiming of expenses on her taxes as providing good cause not to rely on her tax records as reflecting her real income:
Q: In terms of the Manley Street property, did you ever, were there items that you could have claimed that you didn't?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. So if the Court is looking towards an accurate reflection of your total income that should be included as well [as] other expenses that you had that weren't claimed on your taxes?
A: Sure.
. . . .
Q: So at that time, you had a[n] equitable interest in the property, but not title interest?
A: I guess so.
Q: Okay, but you were still responsible for paying those taxes regardless of whose name was on the bill?
A: Sure, I'm the one who was paying the money, but I didn't . . . claim it on my taxes.
Q: Okay . . . but you could have? Is that true?
A: I should have, yes.
Q: Okay. So again that's another example of you under claiming your expenses?
The first day the lease purchase agreement came up in K.F.'s testimony, she could not find the written agreement, but stated that she would produce it for the court. The next day K.F. offered a document she identified as the lease purchase agreement. S.G.'s counsel questioned K.F. about the appearance of an extra line on the photocopy of the agreement above K.F.'s brother's signature; S.G.'s counsel suggested that K.F. had cut the signature from another document and photocopied it onto the agreement. K.F. offered no clear explanation. At his first opportunity, K.F.'s counsel requested a continuance and in the following days K.F. submitted her written consent to her counsel's withdrawal, stating that "[t]he basis for this consent is that evidence, including testimony regarding Exhibit 10 [the lease purchase agreement] and Exhibit 10 itself, was presented at the May 14, 2004, continued evidentiary hearing that could have the tendency to mislead or create confusion for the court."
At the next hearing, the master stated that K.F. had perjured herself during the previous hearing. When K.F. questioned the master's basis for this finding, the master cited the content of K.F.'s testimony, K.F.'s demeanor, and the document itself. Reviewing the whole story of how the court came to find that K.F. had perjured herself, we find sufficient evidence to support the master's finding.
6. The court did not err in disallowing a percentage of K.F.'s expenses.
Citing K.F.'s damaged credibility and the impossibility of proving every item claimed, the master reduced K.F.'s claimed rental losses by twenty percent. K.F. challenges this categorical reduction as unsupported by the evidence.
Gordon Cooper, S.G.'s financial expert, reviewed K.F.'s income tax filings for the years 2000-2002 to assess her real estate rental deductions; Cooper stated that "[K.F.] became increasingly aggressive in claiming rental expense deductions over the three years at issue," and concluded that "many of [K.F.]'s rental expenses do not meet the ordinary and necessary requirement, and that her taxable income would increase substantially if she were audited by the Internal Revenue Service."
Explaining his report at an evidentiary hearing, Cooper testified that 60% of K.F.'s claimed expenses for the year 2000 would be challengeable. For the year 2001, Cooper estimated that 40% of the expenses for one rental property were not legitimate, found only 45% of K.F.'s claimed expenses on a second property to be allowable, and found 100% of the expenses claimed on the third rental property to be questionable because there was no documentation for any of them. For 2002 Cooper would have disallowed at least 30% of K.F.'s deductions on the Manley property and all of her expenses relating to her personal use of the Bridgewater duplex, where she had occupied half the property for the entire year. Cooper also challenged K.F.'s deduction of credit card interest in 2002 because she had provided no proof that the credit card had been used for rental business purposes. Cooper challenged K.F.'s expenses during all three years as either lacking documentation or being the kind of expenses that should be capitalized, or spread out over several years.
While Cooper's report and testimony gave the master good reason to disallow some expenses, the master appears to have arrived at the twenty percent figure as a compromise. The master specifically asked Cooper what percentage of K.F.'s aggregated expenses for the three years he found to be not allowable. Cooper twice declined to answer the question, insisting that he could not make that precise an assessment without doing "a detailed analysis of every single line item on the tax return." Evidently recognizing the impracticality of embarking on a line-by-line analysis of K.F.'s voluminous records, the master chose instead to adopt a conservative estimate of disallowed expenses — an estimate considerably lower than any figure Cooper had cited.
In our view, given K.F.'s history of unforthcoming responses to requests for pre-hearing discovery as well as the obvious need to rely on evidence limited by time and expense, the master acted within her discretion in choosing a conservative estimate for the unjustified expenses, rather than attempting to establish the precise amount. 7. The court did not err in imputing income.
K.F. argues that Master Closuit improperly allowed S.G. to revive the issue of imputing income to K.F. for the value of the apartment owned by her brother where she lived rent free. The master's proposed child support orders include in K.F.'s gross income calculation $9,000 during 2000 and $6,000 during 2001 for "apartment provided by brother." Contrary to K.F.'s argument that the supreme court opinion resolved the issue, this court specifically declined to rule on the merits of S.G.'s claim that the value of K.F.'s rent-free apartment should factor into her total income. Master Closuit heard evidence from both parties on the issue: K.F. testified that the monthly rental value of the apartment was $1,000.
K.F., 46 P.3d at 997.
The commentary to Alaska Civil Rule 90.3 includes in its listing of types of income "perquisites or in-kind compensation to the extent that they are significant and reduce living expenses." The master did not err in including the value of K.F.'s apartment in her total income.
8. The court did not err in including gains from the sale of rental property in K.F.'s net rental income calculation.
K.F. submitted Rule 90.3 affidavits that included capital gains K.F. enjoyed in 2001 from the sale of the Manley rental property. She claims that including the capital gains was an error committed by her expert that she did not catch at trial; she explained the error in her objections to the master's findings, but the superior court adopted the figures she originally submitted. According to Rule 90.3, capital gains are to be included as income to the extent they represent a regular source of income. But K.F.'s expert included the gains from the 2001 sale of rental property in his calculation of K.F.'s net rental income. She had claimed rental losses of $47,703.91; the $21,025 she gained from the sale of one of her rental properties was factored into her overall business and rental activity calculation to find net rental losses of $28,029.69 (before the twenty percent deduction). While one-time capital gains are not to be included in income calculations, the master properly included the proceeds from the sale of the Manley rental property as one component of K.F.'s yearly rental activities.
9. Did the court err in failing to verify challenged child care costs?
K.F. argues that the court allowed S.G. to claim child care costs without proper documentation. K.F. filed an objection to S.G.'s child care documentation and requested proof of the total amount S.G. paid for child care in 2002. S.G. replied by supplementing his child care costs exhibit with receipts to prove the entire amount he paid in child care costs in 2002. The master ordered that unless the parties notified the court that a hearing was still necessary on the issue, it would consider the issue resolved by S.G.'s supplementary documentation. K.F. never requested a hearing on the matter and never filed another written objection. To the extent S.G.'s supplemental documentation failed to satisfy her, it was incumbent on K.F. to pursue the issue. The court did not abuse its discretion in accepting S.G.'s documentation of his claimed child care costs.
10. Did the court err in adopting findings/assumptions that conflict with the record?
K.F. argues that the evidence does not support various of the master's findings. She first objects to findings relating to the parties' financial practices during their marriage, calling S.G.'s testimony into question. At the root of K.F.'s objection to these findings is a challenge to the weight the master chose to give S.G.'s testimony. In her briefing on this point, K.F. fails to explain why it would have been clearly erroneous for the master to credit S.G.'s testimony; nor does K.F. explain how the testimony would have caused actual prejudice, even if it was erroneously credited. K.F.'s other objections to specific findings similarly fail to establish that the contested findings are unsupported, but rather voice disagreement with how the master chose to interpret the evidence. Since issues of testimonial credibility lie exclusively within the discretion of the trial court, K.F. has not shown these findings to be clearly erroneous.
C. Appeal of the Child Support Awards for 2003, 2004, and 2005 Forward
1. The superior court had reason to rely on S.G.'s affidavits over K.F.'s.
K.F. argues that the superior court erred in using S.G.'s affidavits as the basis for its child support orders, without making specific findings and holding a hearing to settle differences between the parties' affidavits. Child support orders are factual determinations applying the Rule 90.3 methodology. The superior court presumptively does not abuse its discretion when it awards child support according to Rule 90.3. To the extent that any dispute existed as to the figures to be plugged into the Rule 90.3 calculations, the dispute involved the same issues addressed by the master in establishing the 2000-2002 child support awards. The superior court was not required to enter new findings replicating the master's decisions — especially because neither party requested a hearing. Only where the superior court departed from the master's decision was the court required to offer some explanation.
See, e.g., Coghill v. Coghill, 836 P.2d 921, 924 (Alaska 1992).
2. A remand is necessary to allow further consideration of the deductions K.F. claimed for rental losses incurred from 2003 forward.
The superior court disallowed K.F.'s deductions of net rental losses from her income. This was contrary to the position taken by the master in calculating the 2000-2002 child support obligations. In establishing K.F.'s deductions, Master Closuit scrutinized K.F.'s claimed expenses to ensure that her net rental losses reflected expenses she actually incurred each year instead of payments she made for improvements that would increase her equity in the properties. The deductions allowed by the master in 2000-2002 have not been challenged on appeal by S.G. And we see no indication that K.F.'s rental activities changed significantly after 2002. In the absence of specific findings explaining why the superior court altered the master's earlier determinations, we see no basis for the court's decision to reject the rental expenses in the later years. Accordingly, we remand for the superior court to reconsider its ruling on K.F.'s rental expenses from 2003 forward and direct the court to enter appropriate findings if it concludes that deductions for those expenses should be denied altogether or altered from the deductions allowed by the master for 2000-2002. 3. The superior court did not err in issuing child support orders for 2003 and 2004 as "nunc pro tunc."
Since the corresponding deductions allowed for 2000-2002 have not been challenged, there appears to be no need to reconsider the allowances for those years.
The superior court issued two child support orders in March 2005 covering 2003 and 2004. At the end of the order covering 2003, the court added to the form language the line: "This Order is effective January 1, 2003, through December 31, 2003, nunc pro tunc." The 2004 order uses the same language in stating that the order is effective from January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2004. K.F. argues that the "nunc pro tunc verbiage . . . is an inherently improper legal function for the facts of the case." Alaska courts commonly issue support orders nunc pro tunc, or "now for then," to reflect the fact that an order for support for a year that has already past must be considered to have gone into effect during that year. Here, the issue of modifying the parties' child support obligations was before the court as of January 2003, and the support is owed for the time covered by the support order. Accordingly, the court did not err in entering the nunc pro tunc order.
4. The issue of potential error in the superior court's plan to offset S.G.'s car debt against K.F.'s child support debt is not ripe for decision.
Under the couple's property division on divorce, S.G. was required to make payments on a debt that was secured by a van awarded to K.F. K.F. was the primary obligor on the loan, so when S.G. stopped making payments, it reflected poorly on K.F.'s credit. K.F. sought a judgment from the superior court in her favor for the amount S.G. owed on the debt. K.F. also asked for permission to sell the van and receive credit for the amount she still owed on the loan without any offset for the child support she owed S.G. The court entered an order allowing her to sell the van, but refused to issue a judgment in her favor. At a hearing on the issue, the court stated that it would set off the amount S.G. owed against any child support K.F. owed and enter one net judgment "[o]nce the accounting is all done." K.F. then sold the van, but the record provides no indication that she filed anything further with the court to establish the amount of her claim. Because this issue appears to remain unresolved, K.F.'s claim of error in granting an offset is premature and not ripe for decision.
5. The superior court did not err in requiring K.F. to pay for health insurance.
The superior court's child support orders require both K.F. and S.G. to purchase medical insurance for the children through their respective employers. The children receive medical benefits from the United States Air Force through K.F., a member of the Air National Guard. The child support orders properly credit K.F. with the extra money she must pay to obtain benefits for the children through the Air Force. But the orders also state that S.G. must obtain medical coverage for the children through his employer, Seekins Ford. The premium is higher on this policy, so it not only negates the credit K.F. was to receive for her Air Force premium payments, but results in K.F.'s support obligation to S.G. being increased.
Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(d)(1) provides that the court "shall consider whether the children are eligible for services through . . . any entity . . . before ordering the obligor to provide health care coverage through insurance or other means." K.F. argues that the rule precludes the court from ordering her to supplement S.G.'s premium payments through his employer because the children are already covered under K.F.'s military benefits. But Rule 90.3 is not so inflexible: the court must consider potential sources of medical coverage for the children, but it is not barred from creating an order that provides for more coverage. The court heard evidence that K.F.'s status at the Air National Guard fluctuated between part-and full-time, with the children receiving coverage only when K.F. was a full-time employee. K.F. proposed to fill the gaps with Denali Kid Care, a public assistance program. The court had discretion to order the parties to share the cost of providing redundant health insurance to cover the gaps.
IV. CONCLUSION
We REMAND for further proceedings to determine K.F.'s allowable rental expenses for 2003-2005. We AFFIRM the remainder of the child support awards for 2000 through 2005 and forward.