Opinion
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Argued and Submitted May 9, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, No. CV-93-00631-CRD; Carolyn R. Dimmick, District Judge, Presiding.
W.D.Wash.
AFFIRMED.
Before: LAY, d FERGUSON, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Third-party plaintiff health care providers ("HCP") appeal from the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the third-party union defendants (the "Union"), arguing that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to HCP's claim that the Union failed to prescreen seaman Paul Lowe before sending him to HCP for a pre-sign on physical examination, and this failure to follow Union "protocol" was both a breach of the Union's duty to HCP and a proximate cause of HCP's damages. We review de novo, see Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir.1996), and we affirm.
Regardless of whether the Union (or, as the Union urges, a Union affiliate) may have owed a duty to HCP to prescreen seaman applicants, there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the breach of any such duty was a proximate cause of HCP's potential liability to the vessel's owners and operators. HCP independently examined Lowe and knew that he suffered from a psychiatric disorder for which he was taking lithium carbonate; HCP consulted the SHIP Retention Standards Manual, which listed the use of lithium carbonate as a disqualifying condition for sea duty; yet HCP nevertheless certified Lowe as being medically fit for sea duty. We find no merit to any of HCP's arguments, and conclude that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the Union.
AFFIRMED.