Opinion
96 Civ. 7865 (RPP)
February 7, 2003
Counsel for Plaintiff, Gregory Abbey, Esq., Brooklyn, NY.
Counsel for Defendants, Michael A. Cardozo, Commissioner, New York City Law Department, New York, NY.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Robert Kerman ("Plaintiff") moves, pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to correct the Court's judgment entered in favor of Defendants City of New York and William Crossan, ("Defendants") dated April 23, 2002, and to designate Plaintiff as the prevailing party on his claims of unlawful seizure and false imprisonment. Plaintiff also moves, pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for a new trial solely on the issue of damages. Defendant Crossan moves for judgment based on qualified immunity.
For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Rule 60 motion is granted, though mooted by the granting of Defendant Crossan's motion for qualified immunity; Plaintiff's Rule 50 motion is denied; and Defendant Crossan's motion for qualified immunity is granted. Judgment for Defendants shall not be disturbed.
Background
Plaintiff's claims arise out of an incident on October 20, 1995. At approximately 5 a.m. that morning, Plaintiff made a telephone call from a bar to his girlfriend, Phyllis Landau, in the course of which he suggested that he had purchased a gun and was going to shoot his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Morris Brozvosky, and then kill himself. (Trial Transcript at 107-08; 240.) Plaintiff who has suffered from a major depressive disorder for approximately thirty years (id. at 163), had had a number of drinks prior to that phone call and he had recently stopped taking his anti-depressant medication in preparation for entrance into a program where he would receive electroconvulsive shock therapy ("ECT"). (Id. at 103-7.) Later that morning, Ms. Landau telephoned Dr. Kevin Malone, the psychiatrist in charge of Plaintiff's ECT program, about her conversation with Plaintiff. (Id. at 233.) After hearing Ms. Landau recount her conversation with Plaintiff, Dr. Malone advised Ms. Landau to call 911. (Id. at 234.) Ms. Landau then called a 911 operator, informing the operator that Plaintiff was totally drunk, that he was out of his mind, that he had recently stopped taking his anti-depressant medication that he had been taking for the past 20 years, and that he had stated to Ms. Landau that he had bought a gun on the street. (Id. at 238-40). At trial, Ms. Landau testified that she told the 911 operator that she did not know if Plaintiff actually had a gun but believed that he did not. (Id. at 241-242.) Subsequently, police officers received a 911 radio call regarding Plaintiff stating that there was an "EDP with a gun" (emotionally disturbed person) at Plaintiff's apartment. (Id. at 276.)
A team of officers arrived on the scene under the supervision of Defendant Crossan, a Sergeant in the New York City Police Department. (Id. at 522.) The officers forced entry to Plaintiff's apartment after Plaintiff opened the door. (Id. at 119-20.) They found Plaintiff unclothed. (Id. at 122.) There were cat feces and kitty litter strewn on the floor in the hall where the officers entered. (Id. at 122.) Following the officers' arrival, Plaintiff was handcuffed while officers completed a search of the apartment for a gun. (Id. at 130-31.) Plaintiff's apartment was extremely unkempt and disorganized, cluttered by papers, magazines and unopened mail. (Id. at 504.) No weapon was found. (Id. at 543.) Meanwhile, an ambulance arrived at the address and Larry Pontrelli, a paramedic from Emergency Medical Services ("EMS"), (id. at 587), attempted to determine if Plaintiff required medical care. (Id. at 477; 579.) He made a visual examination, but Plaintiff refused to allow Pontrelli to complete a physical examination. (Id.) Pontrelli asked for the name of Plaintiff's psychiatrist, spoke to Dr. Malone and allowed Plaintiff to speak to Dr. Malone on the telephone. (Id. at 133-35.) Sometime after the search for the gun was completed, a decision was made by Defendant Crossan, as the supervising officer, that Plaintiff would be sent to the hospital for evaluation. (Id. at 620.) Pontrelli testified that although Defendant Crossan made the decision that Plaintiff should be evaluated at a hospital, Pontrelli, as an EMS officer, determined, and had the authority to determine, to what hospital Plaintiff should be taken. (Id. at 586.)
Pontrelli also contradicted Plaintiff's testimony that Defendant Crossan had taken the telephone out of Pontrelli's hand and hung up on Dr. Malone (tr. at 580; 137), that Defendant Crossan had told Plaintiff he would teach him lesson (id. at 581; 138), and that Defendant Crossan had pulled a towel off of Plaintiff's face. (Id. at 584; 143.)
On remand from the Court of Appeals, Kerman v. City of New York, et. al., 261 F.3d 229, (2d Cir. 2001), following an earlier trial on Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Crossan and other officers, this action was tried before a jury from April 15-19, 2002. At trial, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant Crossan had violated Plaintiff's federal civil rights by subjecting Plaintiff to excessive force, unlawful seizure, and by retaliating against Plaintiff for his exercise of his right to free speech. Plaintiff also claimed that Defendant Crossan falsely imprisoned him and intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him in violation of the law of the state of New York.
Plaintiff's claims were submitted to the jury on April 19, 2002 together with a verdict form approved by both sides' counsel. Following deliberations, the jury found in favor of Defendants on all questions relating to Plaintiff's claims of excessive force, retaliation for exercise of his right to free speech, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. With regard to Plaintiff's federal claim of unlawful seizure, the jury made the following findings:
2nd Claim: Fourth Amendment — Unlawful Seizure
3. Has Defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that probable cause existed to keep Plaintiff in custody after the search for the gun and cause him to be brought to the hospital?
Yes ___ No X
If you answered yes to question 3, proceed to question 5. In not, proceed to question 4.
4. Has Plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the continued custody of Plaintiff after the search for the gun was a proximate cause of injury to Plaintiff?
Yes ___ No X
(Verdict Form at 1.) The jury provided similar answers with regard to Plaintiff's claim of false imprisonment under state law. (Id. at 3.)
On the verdict form, the jury also considered the question of damages. The jury made the following findings:
15. What amount of damages do you find Plaintiff suffered as a result of the acts of Defendants?
$0
16. Do you wish to award nominal damages of $1 or less? You may only award nominal damages if you do not award compensatory damages under question 15.
Yes X No ___
17. Do you elect to exercise your discretion and award Plaintiff punitive damages?
Yes ___ No X
(Id. at 4.)
On April 23, 2002. the Court entered judgment for Defendants.
Discussion
A. Plaintiff's Rule 60 Motion
Plaintiff's motion, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60, asks this Court to correct its entry of judgment in favor of Defendants, and to designate Plaintiff as the prevailing party. Plaintiff contends that the Court erred in entering judgment for Defendants on all counts because he "prevailed on his federal claim of unlawful seizure ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and on his state law claim of unlawful imprisonment." (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion at 1.) Plaintiff argues that because "the jury found that [Sergeant] Crossan did not have probable cause to keep Kerman in custody after the officers completed the search for the gun, nor probable cause to take Kerman to the hospital" he has established a claim under § 1983. (Id.)
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002) states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, . . .
By the plain language of § 1983, a plaintiff seeking to recover under that statute must establish that (1) the acts of the defendant were committed by a person acting under color of state law; (2) that the acts of the defendant deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (3) that the acts of the defendant were a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. See also Hon. Leonard B. Sand, John S. Siffert, Walter P. Loughlin, Steven A. Reiss, Nancy Batterman, Modern Federal Jury Instructions, § 87.03 (2001). This Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants because the jury found that (1) Plaintiff had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the continued custody of Plaintiff after the search for the gun was a proximate cause of injury to Plaintiff and (2) Plaintiff had suffered no actual damages; and because Plaintiff's summation did not ask the jury for an award of nominal damages based solely on a deprivation of his Constitutional rights.
With regard to the second element, whether Defendant Crossan's acts deprived Plaintiff of his right to be free from unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the Court's charge, as reflected in the jury verdict sheet, stated that Defendant Crossan bore the burden of proving that probable cause existed to keep Plaintiff in custody and to have him brought to the hospital following the search for the gun. See Raysor v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 768 F.2d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1985).
Nonetheless, this Court has found precedent which does permit an award of nominal damages, and thus entry of judgment for the subject of a § 1983 violation, without proof that any injury was proximately caused by Defendants. The Supreme Court held in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) that "because of the importance . . . that procedural due process be observed," the "denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury."See also, United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 533 F.2d 823, 829-30 (3d Cir. 1976). It follows that section 1983 actions based on Fourth Amendment violations should also be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury. This Court, based on the reasoning that the jury had found that Defendants had not caused any injury to Plaintiff, erred in entering a judgment for Defendants with respect to the unlawful seizure and false imprisonment claims. Nonetheless, in light of this Court's granting of Defendant Crossan's motion for qualified immunity discussed below, the correction of this entry of judgment is unwarranted.
B. Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion
Based on his contention that he prevailed at trial on his claims of unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and false imprisonment in violation of state law, Plaintiff moves, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, for a new trial solely on the issue of actual damages. To grant Plaintiff's motion would constitute an overruling of the jury's finding of no damages which was supported adequately by evidence at trial consisting not only of the testimony of all of the police officers, but also of Plaintiff's hospital record. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) Thus, the jury could have rationally concluded that, although Defendant Crossan had not proved that he had adequate grounds to cause Plaintiff to be brought to the hospital, that decision was in Plaintiff's best interests and did not result in injury to him.
The jury found that Plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 1) Defendant Crossan, personally or through his subordinates, intentionally or recklessly subjected Plaintiff to excessive force after he was placed in handcuffs (Verdict Form at 1.); 2) Defendant Crossan retaliated against Plaintiff for exercise of his First Amendment rights (id. at 2); or 3) Defendant Crossan intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Plaintiff. Id. at 3. These findings were also adequately supported by the testimony at trial.
The hospital records, an exhibit that the jury specifically asked to review during deliberations (tr. at 780), show that Plaintiff was not in any physical distress upon his arrival at Bellevue Hospital. (See Pl. Exh. 1 at 1, 30-31) ("and in no apparent physical distress.") Plaintiff's hospital records from Bellevue also showed that Defendant Crossan's determination to send Plaintiff to a hospital for evaluation was not the cause of Plaintiff being held overnight at Bellevue. The doctors at Bellevue, following an interview with Plaintiff upon his arrival on October 20, 1995 and following telephone discussions with Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Brozvosky, and with the psychiatrist in charge of Plaintiff's experimental treatment at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital, Dr. Malone, determined (with Plaintiff's consent) to keep Plaintiff overnight for observation. (See id. at 2, 3, 29, 37, 39) ("contacted Dr. Brozvosky;" "case discussed with Dr. Malone and Dr. Brovosky;" Plaintiff "agreed to stay for reevaluation overnight.") Thus there is ample support in the hospital records for the jury's finding of no physical injury to Plaintiff, and that Defendant Crossan did not cause Plaintiff to be kept at the hospital, since that decision was made by the Bellevue doctors after consultation with both of Plaintiff's psychiatrists, and consented to by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1's pages are not numbered, so the Court has relied on its own count.
As for his imprisonment during the trip to the hospital for medical evaluation, the testimony of EMS paramedic Pontrelli was that it was necessary to take Plaintiff to the hospital on a gurney because Plaintiff, a 270-300 pound man (tr. at 142, 411), passively resisted going to the hospital. (Id. at 583.) Accordingly, the jury finding that Plaintiff suffered no actual damages as a result of Defendant Crossan's decision to send him to a hospital for evaluation is adequately supported by the evidence at trial. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial solely on the issue of damages is denied.
C. Defendant Crossan's Motion for Qualified Immunity
1. General Doctrine
The Second Circuit has clearly defined the purpose and contours of the doctrine of qualified immunity.
The federal doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from suits against them in their individual capacity for money damages where "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). A right whose existence is indicated by prior case law with "reasonable specificity" is "clearly defined" within the meaning of this doctrine. See, e.g., Jermosen v. Smith, 945 F.2d 547, 550 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 962, 112 S.Ct. 1565, 118 L.Ed.2d 211 (1992).In re State Police Litigation, et al. v. Forst, et al., 88 F.2d 111, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1996).
Where summary judgment is inappropriate, and the case proceeds to trial, the defense of qualified immunity may be presented to the jury or may be decided by the court in a motion for judgment as a matter of law.Blissett v. Coughlin, III, 66 F.2d 531, 538 (2d Cir. 1995). See also, Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1076 (1995).
A qualified immunity defense is established if (a) the defendants' action did not violate clearly established law or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law.Kent v. Katz, 312 F.3d 568, 573 (2d. Cir. 2002).
2. Defendant Crossan's Action Did Not Violate Clearly Established Law
The clearly established law for alleged violations of constitutional rights is determined by examining precedent of the Supreme Court and the Circuit in which the alleged violation occurred. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 616-17 (1999); Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2002). Since the jury found that Plaintiff had not shown that he had been subjected to excessive force after he was placed in handcuffs or that Defendant Crossan had retaliated against Plaintiff for exercise of his First Amendment rights, the sole issue here is whether it was reasonable for Defendant Crossan to keep Plaintiff in custody and send him to the hospital for evaluation. The Court has been referred to no Supreme Court or Second Circuit authority which states on what grounds a police officer may determine to place an emotionally disturbed person in custody and send him to the hospital for evaluation nor have we found any such authority setting forth what considerations a police officer should take into account in making such a determination. The only Second Circuit case this Court has found that deals with a similar issue is Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1993) in which the plaintiff charged doctors with violating his constitutional rights by involuntarily hospitalizing him for psychiatric care. In Glass, the court determined that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because their decision was objectively reasonable in finding that plaintiff was dangerous in the due process and Fourth Amendment analyses. Id. at 58.
The court did not define "dangerousness" beyond the plaintiff's specific actions in the case. The court found that based on two reports that plaintiff had threatened an individual with a gun, observations of plaintiff's behavior, as "hostile, guarded, angry suspicious, uncooperative, and paranoid" and his "extensive psychiatric history," it was objectively reasonable for the defendants' to conclude that plaintiff was dangerous in the due process and Fourth Amendment contexts. Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1993).
In this case, Defendant Crossan, a police officer, determined to place Plaintiff in custody and send him to the hospital for an evaluation by doctors as to whether he should be held for observation. Although a police officer is trained on what constitutes grounds for searches and arrests of persons suspected of criminal activity, and can and should be held liable for unwarranted searches and arrests in view of the clearly established law, police officers do not have training in psychiatry, nor are they trained in identifying the nature and extent of mental disorders. What findings an officer should make before sending a person under psychiatric care to the hospital for evaluation by doctors as to whether "the individual constitutes a danger to himself or others" had not been established in 1995. Plaintiff has cited no authority to suggest that Defendant acted in violation of existing federal law. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617 ("Petitioners have not brought to our attention any cases or controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident which clearly established the rule on which they seek to rely, nor have they identified a consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions were lawful.") The Court's research has not found that such federal authority exists.
Furthermore, one of a police officer's responsibilities under New York law is to see that persons suspected of needing psychiatric care are sent to the hospital for evaluation. New York Mental Hygiene law, § 9.41, states in pertinent part that "any . . . police officer may take into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others." Here, it is unrebutted that the police officers in Defendant Crossan's command knew that Plaintiff was in psychiatric care (one called Dr. Brozvosky's number and left a message). (Tr. at 127-28.) The filthy conditions in Plaintiff's apartment, as testified to by the officers and admitted by Plaintiff, as well as Plaintiff's conduct, including his refusal to respond to questions or to allow a complete physical examination to be taken by EMS paramedic, Pontrelli, were evidence that Plaintiff might not be able to care for himself. Cf. Higgins v. City of Oneonta, 208 A.D.2d 1067, 617 N.Y.S.2d 566, 568 (1994) (police officers taking plaintiff into custody pursuant to § 9.41 was privileged; did not require proof that the person presents an immediate danger to himself or to others).
Lastly, § 9.59 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law provides that "any police officers . . . who are taking into custody and transporting a person to a hospital . . . shall not be liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by such person . . . unless it is established that such injuries . . . [were] caused by gross negligence." Defendant Crossan's actions do not rise to the level of gross negligence, i.e. reckless disregard or intentional wrongdoing. See e.g., Woody v. Astoria General Hospital, 264 A.D.2d 318, 319, 694 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1999).
As regards acts of reckless or intentional wrongdoing, the jury in this case found that Plaintiff did not prove the following: that Defendant Crossan intentionally or recklessly subjected Plaintiff to excess force after he was placed in handcuffs (Verdict Form at 1); that Defendant Crossan was motivated or substantially caused by Plaintiff's exercise of his free speech rights to cause Plaintiff to be brought to the hospital, to cause Plaintiff to be brought to Bellevue Hospital rather than Columbia-Presbyterian Hospital or Roosevelt Hospital, to keep Plaintiff naked while in his apartment, to refuse to allow Plaintiff to medicate his cat, or to use unnecessary or excessive force on Plaintiff after he was in custody (id. at 2); or that Defendant Crossan's conduct amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 3.) The jury declined to award punitive damages. (Id. at 4.)
3. Objective Reasonableness
Although the jury found that Plaintiff had not proved any of his claims of excessive force or acts of retaliation against Plaintiff, the jury did find that Defendant had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that probable cause existed to keep Plaintiff in custody and cause him to be brought to the hospital. That finding is understandable in view of Defendant Crossan's inability to remember most details of this 1995 incident. Nonetheless, there is sufficient evidence in the record to show that Defendant Crossan is entitled to qualified immunity, especially considering a police officer's lack of training in identifying the nature and extent of mental disorders. Accordingly, Defendant Crossan's actions, in light of the undisputed facts in evidence, pass the test of objective reasonableness laid down in Harlow and Kent. In a similar vein, the Fourth Circuit conducts an objective reasonableness test in the absence of probable cause in the context of involuntary detentions by police officers for psychiatric evaluations. See e.g., Gooden v. Howard County Maryland, 954 F.2d 960, 969 (4th Cir. 1992); S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, Maryland, 134 F.3d 260, 267-68 (4th Cir. 1998). The evidence presented in this case likewise passes the Fourth Circuit's test for objective reasonableness in the context of a police officer's inability to make psychiatric evaluations.
Plaintiff argues that this Court should not even consider a qualified immunity defense because Defendants did not pursue or prove the defense at trial, and thereby waived it. Plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive. The issue of qualified immunity may be raised at various stages in a proceeding, including "in a motion for judgment as a matter of law after the jury has rendered a verdict." Iacobucci v. Boulter, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7010, *13 (D. Mass. 1997) aff'd, 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999). See also, Blisset v. Coughlin, III, 66 F.3d 531, 538 (2d Cir. 1995). Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has the burden of raising the issue in the answer and adequately developing the issues in pretrial proceedings or at trial.See e.g., In re State Police Litigation, 88 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 1996); Blisset, 66 F.3d at 538. Defendants raised the issue of qualified immunity in both their answer and the pretrial order to which Plaintiff stipulated. Defendants also pressed the issue of qualified immunity during the jury deliberations at the first trial of this case. Defendants argued and preserved the issue of qualified immunity during this trial (tr. at 465), and made an application for a judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 at the close of its case, on which this Court reserved decision. (Id. at 666.) Upon return of the jury's verdict and entry of Judgment in favor of Defendants, Defendants, having won, were not in a position to renew their application for judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity. The current motion, in answer to Plaintiff's motion for a new trial solely on the issue of damages, is therefore proper.
The elements of the New York state claim for false imprisonment are the same as those for a federal claim of unlawful seizure, and thus the same test of objective reasonableness for the purposes of qualified immunity analysis applies.
In this case, the issue is whether it was not unreasonable for a police officer in 1995 to have believed that he should have placed Plaintiff in custody and sent him to a hospital for evaluation by doctors. The Court will disregard, since the tenor of Plaintiff's testimony was to the contrary, both Defendant Crossan's testimony that Plaintiff was screaming and yelling, was incoherent and would not calm down (tr. at 536, 562-63), and the corroborating testimony of the other police officers. (Id. at 260-61, 279, 283, 449-450.) Nevertheless, there is no dispute that Defendant Crossan and his fellow police officers ascertained that Plaintiff was under psychiatric care and was conducting himself in a manner that was likely to result in serious harm to himself and others. They had received a 911 radio message that there was an emotionally disturbed person inside Plaintiff's apartment who was armed with a gun. (Id. at 276, 446.) Soon after placing Plaintiff in custody, the officers became aware that Plaintiff was under psychiatric care and tried to get in touch with his treating psychiatrist. (Id. at 127, 414-15.) Plaintiff testified that he was asked the name and telephone number of his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Brozvosky, and he heard an officer try to telephone him directly and leave a message for him. (Id. at 127-28.) Two officers testified that they heard Defendant Crossan or another officer on the telephone with a doctor. (Id. at 285, 414-15.) In addition, EMS paramedic Pontrelli asked Plaintiff who his psychiatrist was, and spoke to Dr. Malone who was preparing Plaintiff for electroconvulsive shock therapy. (Id. at 133-35.) Although the police were unable to find a gun, there remained the possibility that one had been successfully hidden.
Furthermore, there were signs that Plaintiff was unable to care for himself. Plaintiff admitted he was "wearing nothing" and was "covered in kitty litter" when Defendant Crossan entered the apartment. (Id. at 122.) Defendant Crossan would have had the opportunity to observe "the kitty litter and cat feces all over the foyer." (Id.) Defendant Crossan observed that Plaintiff was naked. (Id. at 546.) Furthermore, as the Plaintiff himself testified, Plaintiff's apartment was "messy, very disorganized" with papers and lots of unopened mail on the table, clothing on the backs of chairs, and magazines, newspapers and a bag of cans on the floor. (Id. at 504.) The condition of the apartment was corroborated by testimony from the police officers who stated that the apartment was very disorganized and in disarray, (id. at 259) and was filthy with feces and urine and stunk (id. at 283, 454-55).
Plaintiff admitted that he had recently reported to his treating psychiatrist that his apartment was "unimaginably filthy." (Tr. at 504).
Furthermore, as Pontrelli testified, Plaintiff would not allow him to take a complete physical examination of Plaintiff. (Id. at 579; 477). Faced with this evidence and considering the fact that Plaintiff may have hidden a gun on the premises, it was not objectively unreasonable for Defendant Crossan to decide to send Plaintiff to the hospital for evaluation by doctors.
The alternative of leaving Plaintiff on the premises would have left Defendant Crossan open to the claim. if Plaintiff thereafter endangered himself or others, that Defendant Crossan had left a person with an undetermined psychiatric illness in a messy, very disorganized apartment knowing that a gun may have been successfully hidden therein. "A policeman's lot is not a happy one." The Pirates of Penzance, Gilbert Sullivan.
Accordingly, a) because Defendant Crossan's actions did not violate clearly established law and b) because it was objectively reasonable for Defendant Crossan to believe that his action did not violate existing law, Defendant Crossan is entitled to qualified immunity, and his motion is granted.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) is granted, though mooted by the granting of Defendant Crossan's motion for qualified immunity, Plaintiff's motion for a new trial solely on the issue of damages is denied, and Defendant Crossan's motion for judgment based on qualified immunity is granted. Accordingly, judgment for Defendants shall not be disturbed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.