Opinion
No. 2008-CA-000038-MR.
February 27, 2009. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court, Honorable Phillip J. Shepherd, Judge, Action No. 07-CI-00814.
Jennifer A. Jones, Frankfort, Kentucky, Briefs for Appellant.
Michael M. Hirn, Louisville, Kentucky, Brief for Appellee.
Before: STUMBO and THOMPSON, Judges; GUIDUGLI, Senior Judge.
Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
OPINION
The Administrative Appeals Committee of the Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Retirement Systems (Board) appeals from the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court reversing its decision to deny Dorothy Casey retirement benefits for a four-month period following her reemployment. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
On June 9, 2005, Casey, an employee classified as a Secretary I for the Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS), met with Kentucky Retirement Systems (Retirement Systems) officials to discuss her retirement options. During the meeting, Casey was provided with documentation explaining the legal effect of her retirement and reemployment in state government. On September 1, 2005, after serving thirty-one years, Casey retired and began to receive retirement benefits.
Just over a month later, Casey was rehired by JCPS and classified as a Clerk I. On February 10, 2006, Retirement Systems notified Casey that her employment was in violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 61.637(13)(a), which operates to temporarily suspend retirement benefits to a retired member who is reemployed by the same employer, during the six-month period after her initial retirement, "in a position with the same principal duties" as the member's position upon retirement. Pursuant to KRS 61.637(13)(b), Retirement Systems requested her to repay all of the benefits she received from October 2005 through February 2006, totaling $9,136.36.
On March 2, 2006, Mildred Payne, the coordinator of Casey's employment division, sent Retirement Systems copies of Casey's two job descriptions, Secretary I and Clerk I. A few days later, Retirement Systems received two different job descriptions, which Robin Lovett, the CERS Clerk for JCPS, indicated were the official job descriptions approved by JCPS. Following a review of her job descriptions, Casey was notified that she was in violation of KRS 61.637(13)(a).
On July 20, 2006, an administrative hearing was conducted where the administrative record was admitted without exception. Casey testified that her positions, pre-retirement and post-retirement, were substantially different. She testified that a Clerk I has substantially reduced responsibilities as that of a Secretary I. Further, she testified that Secretary I was a Grade 4 position with an hourly wage of $16.95 and Clerk I was a Grade 3 position with an hourly wage of $11.69.
Additionally, Betty White, a former Clerk and Secretary I and Casey's former supervisor, testified that the two positions were different in their scope of authority and duties. White further testified that the Secretary I position carried more responsibilities than Clerk I. Retirement Systems did not present any witnesses but relied upon the administrative record, which included the two official job descriptions provided by Robin Lovett. After the hearing, although his findings of fact indicated that the two positions did not have the same principal duties, the hearing officer agreed with Retirement Systems that Casey was in violation of KRS 61.637(13)(a).
In his findings of facts, the hearing officer wrote, in pertinent part, the following:
The written job descriptions of record, along with the testimony at [the] hearing, plainly demonstrate that the scope of responsibility and independence of job performance are much greater for the Secretary I position than they are for the Clerk I position. As both positions are clerical and similar in nature there is a certain amount of overlap in their principal duties such as filing, typing, answering the phone, and operating standard office equipment. However, given the wide disparity in job responsibility and independence, it is clear that the principal duties of the two positions are not the same.
However, in his conclusions of law, the hearing officer wrote the following:
1. A finding by the undersigned that the Claimant [Casey] was not employed in a position (Clerk I) with the same principal duties as the position from which she retired (Secretary I) is not dispositive herein. Strictly interpreted, under KRS 61.637(13), all that need be found is that the systems determined the Claimant had been employed in a position with the same principal duties as the position from which she retired. In its wisdom, the legislature has granted the systems sole and exclusive discretion and authority in making that determination. There is no statutory provision for disputing this obstructed grant of authority.
2. The Kentucky Retirement Systems has met its burden herein by the preponderance of the evidence and properly suspended the Claimant's retirement benefits pursuant to KRS 61.637. According[ly], it is hereby recommended that the Claimant's Claim for Administrative Review pursuant to KRS Chapter 61 et seq. be DENIED.
Subsequently, on April 30, 2007, the Board rejected the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its final order, the Board wrote that:
It is the conclusion of the Board that the Claimant's principal duties in her pre-retirement position (Secretary I) were the same principal duties as were required in her post-retirement position (Clerk I). The Kentucky Retirement Systems has met its burden herein by the preponderance of the evidence and thus properly suspended the Claimant's retirement benefits pursuant to KRS 61.637. Consequently, the Claimant did violate KRS 61.637 when she retired as a Secretary I on September 1, 2005 and was subsequently reemployed as a Clerk I on October 10, 2005.
The Board then ordered Casey to reimburse the Retirement Systems $9,136.36, which constituted the benefits she received during the suspension period. On May 24, 2007, Casey filed a petition for judicial review of the Board's order suspending her benefits. Following her appeal, the Franklin Circuit Court reversed the Board by ruling that Casey's two positions did not have the same principal duties. This appeal followed.
The Board's sole contention is that the trial court misinterpreted KRS 61.637(13)(a) when it concluded that Casey's positions of Secretary I and Clerk I were not positions with the same principal duties. Due to this misinterpretation, the Board contends that the trial court's judgment must be reversed. We disagree.
On appellate review, this Court must apply the substantial evidence standard of review applicable to decisions of administrative agencies. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Kentucky, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Ky. 2002). When applying this standard, an agency's findings of fact must be accepted as binding if they are supported by substantial evidence. Id. "Substantial evidence is defined as `evidence of substance and relative consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable [persons].'" Id. at 579. If substantial evidence is established, a court must then determine whether or not the agency has correctly applied the law. Id. at 578.
After reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court that the Board misapplied KRS 61.637(13)(a) when it temporarily suspended Casey's retirement benefits. KRS 61.637(13) provides that:
If the retirement system determines that the retired member has been employed in a position with the same principal duties [emphasis added] as the position from which the member retired:
(a) The member's retirement allowance shall be suspended during the period that begins on the month in which the member is reemployed and ends six (6) months after the member's termination.
In determining whether Casey's positions have "the same principal duties," we engage in statutory interpretation which is a matter of law. Commonwealth v. Garnett, 8 S.W.3d 573, 575 (Ky.App. 1999). Pursuant to the purpose of statutory construction, an appellate court must ascertain the intent of the legislature based on the terms of the statute. Kipling v. City of White Plains, 80 S.W.3d 776, 785 (Ky.App. 2001).
From the evidence in the record, Casey's Secretary I position required her to assume a great deal of responsibility with minimal supervision. This position was the primary confidential support position in its employment unit. This position was required to communicate on behalf of its employment unit and maintain office files and internal reports. Although required to perform general clerical tasks, the Secretary I position was required to operate in an independent manner and was an integral part of its employment unit.
On the other hand, the Clerk I position required her to primarily perform routine and standard clerical duties. Essentially, a Clerk I is an office aide responsible for assisting in the completion of standard and routine office tasks. Unlike a Secretary I, a Clerk I does not communicate on behalf of an employment unit, does not create filing systems or establish internal reports, does not provide the primary confidential clerical support for an employment unit, and does not work independently or with minimal supervision.
Although the Board found that the two positions were essentially clerical in nature and, thus, the same, this characterization oversimplifies the distinction between the duties of the two positions. Under the Board's reasoning, any position required to do a fair sum of clerical work would come within the same classification. This unduly restrictive reading of the statute cannot be harmonized with the intent of the legislature. To the contrary, we agree with the trial court that these two positions are not interchangeable and do not have the same principal duties. Therefore, based on the evidence in the record, Casey's reemployment as a Clerk I was not violative of KRS 61.637(13)(a).
For the foregoing reasons, the Franklin Circuit Court's judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.