Opinion
Civil No. 99-44 (JRT/RLE).
February 21, 2001.
Michael Verbrick, GANT LAW FIRM, P.A., St. Paul, MN, for plaintiff.
Roger L. Rowlette, Jenell M. Matthews, JOHNSON LINDBERG, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for defendants.
Michael J. Ford, QUINLIVAN HUGHES, P.A., St. Cloud, MN, for defendant Karen Welch.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants defendants' motion.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of a custody dispute between plaintiff and her former husband, Jeff Kent. On February 3, 1997, Jeff Kent filed and received an Order for Protection (OFP) against plaintiff after the couple had an argument regarding their minor child, Cody Kent, who was then two and half years old. In addition to granting the OFP, Judge Timothy J. Baland, Todd County District Court, appointed Joan Dougherty as guardian ad litem (GAL) for Cody Kent. The GAL order directed Dougherty to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine temporary custody and visitation issues.
On February 18, 1997, a court hearing was held regarding the OFP. Judge Sally Ireland Robertson, Todd County District Court, Family Division, ordered Dougherty to conduct weekly supervised visitations between plaintiff and Cody to take place at the Todd County Social Services Visitation Room. Judge Robertson also ordered that an evaluation of plaintiff's emotional and mental health be conducted. Pursuant to Judge Robertson's February 18, 1997 order, Dougherty took the following actions in conducting her investigation: 1) supervised approximately 17 weekly, one- hour visits between plaintiff and Cody; 2) observed Cody in his father's home; 3) interviewed plaintiff, Jeff Kent and Cody; and 4) wrote letters on March 7, 1997 to Drs. Walker, Ryan, Freeman and Vosika, plaintiff's medical providers, requesting information regarding plaintiff's emotional and mental health.
On May 28, 1997, Dougherty wrote to Judge Robertson, updating her on the status of her investigation and requesting that she be discharged from her appointment for health reasons. By court order dated June 13, 1997, Dougherty's discharge request was granted and Dee Vee Beilke was appointed GAL for Cody Kent. This order directed Beilke to review the file and progress made by Dougherty and complete Dougherty's investigation as directed by the February 3, 1997 order.
On November 14, 1997, pursuant to a telephone conference between the parties, Judge Baland ordered that a custody study be commenced to develop recommendations as to the custody of Cody Kent. The order further provided that due to a potential conflict with local custody study specialists at Todd County Social Services, Todd County Social Services was to direct another individual or agency to conduct the study. On November 24, 1997, pursuant to Judge Baland's order, Todd County Social Services entered into an agreement with Karen Welch to perform the custody evaluation. Welch conducted the investigation as directed by the November 14, 1997 order. In her final report, Welch recommended that sole physical custody be awarded in favor of Jeff Kent with plaintiff receiving reasonable visitation.
A custody trial was held on May 13, 1998. Both Jeff Kent and plaintiff appeared at trial and each was represented by counsel. Beilke and Welch were also present and available to testify. At the conclusion of the trial, the parties agreed that the issues in the case would be submitted for decision following receipt of legal memoranda and proposed findings. On July 22, 1998, Judge Baland issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgment on Issue of Custody based on testimony introduced at trial, exhibits, including the reports of Welch and Beilke, and the memoranda and proposed findings submitted by counsel. From this record, the judge awarded physical custody of Cody to Jeff Kent, subject to plaintiff's right to reasonable visitation. The parties were granted joint legal custody.
Rather than appeal Judge Baland's decision in the state courts, plaintiff commenced this action in federal district court against defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that defendants violated plaintiff's constitutional right to custody and companionship of her child. Plaintiff also asserts several state law claims, including negligence, negligence per se, and defamation.
As basis for her suit, plaintiff claims that Dougherty and Welch acted with malice, recklessness and neglect in preparing their custody reports by including false and inaccurate information in their reports and failing to report materially relevant information favorable to plaintiff. This conduct, plaintiff maintains, culminated in their finding and recommending that Jeff Kent should receive sole physical custody of their son.
Technically, Dougherty never made a final recommendation concerning custody of plaintiff's son. The purpose of Dougherty's report to Judge Robertson was more of a status report than a final custody report.
Plaintiff's allegations include a claim that Welch fabricated statements concerning a family altercation. Plaintiff maintains she never told Welch that her father grabbed her by the throat or that plaintiff told her father she wanted to go "one on one" with him. According to plaintiff's affidavit, Welch also allegedly made false statements concerning plaintiff's history of emotional problems and that plaintiff made suicidal gestures in the presence of her children. Plaintiff also claims Welch failed to report to the judge that: 1) one of Cody Kent's uncles has prior convictions for rape and child molestation; 2) plaintiff was forced out of her home without any money and did not choose to live with her parents; and 3) several physicians who treated plaintiff made positive and favorable statements regarding plaintiff's emotional stability and ability to care for her children.
With regards to Dougherty's report, plaintiff alleges that Dougherty falsely reported information relating to reports from her physicians and erroneously stated that plaintiff decided to live with her parents when in fact she was forced out as a result of the OFP issued against her by Judge Baland.
Defendants move for summary judgment. For the reasons provided below, the Court finds that plaintiff's claim under § 1983 fails as a matter of law. The Court further finds that Dougherty and Welch are protected by quasi-judicial immunity and that Todd County is entitled to vicarious quasi-judicial immunity as to plaintiff's pendant state law claims. The Court accordingly grants defendants' motion for summary judgment.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment Ashall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.@ Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not appropriate if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id.
The moving party bears the burden of bringing forward sufficient evidence to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the record. See Vette Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 612 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1980). However, the nonmoving party may not merely rest upon allegations or denials in its pleadings, but it must set forth specific facts by affidavits or otherwise showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Burst v. Adolph Coors Co., 650 F.2d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 1981).
A. Dougherty and Welch
Plaintiff claims she was deprived of her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a result of Daugherty and Welch's conduct in preparing their custody reports. Although it is not entirely clear from either plaintiff's complaint or her response to defendants' motion for summary judgment whether plaintiff alleges a violation of procedural or substantive due process, the Court presumes, as it appears defendants did in their motion for summary judgment, that plaintiff alleges violations under both the procedural and substantive due process components of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Procedural Due Process
To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must prove that persons acting under color of state law deprived her "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Bahr v. Martin County, 771 F. Supp. 970, 974 (D. Minn. 1991). Dougherty and Welch concede that they were acting under color of state law in preparing their custody reports for Judge Baland, however, they deny that plaintiff was deprived of her procedural due process rights. To establish a procedural due process violation, plaintiff must demonstrate that: 1) she has a protected liberty or property interest at stake; and 2) she was deprived of such interest without due process of law. Marler v. Missouri State Bd. of Optometry, 102 F.3d 1453, 1456 (8th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff satisfies the first prong of the test by identifying a protected liberty interest in the custody of her child, however, the record clearly indicates that plaintiff received adequate due process before she was deprived of such interest.
With the aid of counsel, plaintiff had the opportunity to challenge defendants' reports and recommendations at a full custody and visitation trial before Judge Baland. At this hearing, plaintiff was entitled to present exhibits, reports, proposed findings, and testimony, which included the right to call and cross-examine witnesses. Plaintiff thus received an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Marler, 102 F.3d at 1456. There being no evidence in the record that remotely challenges the adequacy of the procedures plaintiff received at the state court level, plaintiff's procedural due process claim under § 1983 fails as a matter of law.
2. Substantive Due Process
To state a claim under the substantive component of the due process clause, the evidence must show that "the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n. 8 (1998). "The theory of substantive due process is properly reserved for the truly egregious and extraordinary cases, and it proscribes certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." Zakrzewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1012 (8th Cir. 1996). Section 1983 does not apply to negligent conduct of state officials. Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1009 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc); Feist v. Simonson, 222 F.3d 455, 459, n. 2 (8th Cir. 2000).
The Court holds that neither Welch nor Dougherty's conduct rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Plaintiff offers no evidence beyond her blanket allegations that defendants' conduct was reckless and malicious, that Dougherty or Welch acted with ill will, intent, or malice in preparing their custody reports. See Wallace v. Bryant School Dist., 46 F. Supp.2d 863, 865 (D. Ark. 1999) (granting summary judgment to plaintiff's § 1983 claim where non-moving party's only evidence to rebut motion consists of plaintiff's own affidavit which contains conclusory, self-serving statements); O'Bryan v. KTIV Television, 64 F.3d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir. 1995) (same).
Some of plaintiff's allegations are directly refuted by the record evidence before the Court. For instance, plaintiff claims Dougherty falsely and recklessly stated in her May 28, 1997 report that plaintiff failed to follow through with Dr. Walker's recommendation for therapy when, in fact, a June 21, 1997 letter from Dr. Breitenbucher informed Dougherty that plaintiff had attended several therapy sessions. However, the date of Dr. Breitenbucher's letter indicates that Dougherty was not in possession of that information at the time she prepared and submitted her report to Judge Robertson. Therefore, Dougherty's statement, which Dougherty expressly limited to her knowledge "as of [the date of the report]," was not false or inaccurate.
In any event, no harm resulted from Dougherty's statement because Dee Vee Beilke, Dougherty's replacement, included Dr. Breitenbucher's report, along with other favorable reports from Drs. Walker and Riedel, in her final report to Judge Baland. Therefore, Judge Baland, who made the final determination concerning physical custody of plaintiff's son, had possession of the information plaintiff claims was not included in Dougherty's report.
Plaintiff also claims that Welch falsely stated that plaintiff had a several year history of emotional problems. However, reports from various health professionals confirm the accuracy of Welch's statements. Additionally, Welch did not completely fail to include favorable information regarding plaintiff's current emotional stability. On page six of her report, in a section titled "Mental and Physical Health of All Individuals Involved," Welch reported that "[plaintiff's] primary therapist indicated that it appeared she was doing better."
Welch's statement that plaintiff made suicidal gestures or attempts "when the children were present" is somewhat misleading, however, the statement is not so egregious as to violate plaintiff's substantive due process rights. Moreover, if plaintiff was concerned how the statement might be interpreted or considered by Judge Baland, plaintiff had the opportunity to question Welch regarding the statement at the custody trial.
In the recommendation section of her report, Welch states that plaintiff "has had a several year history of emotional problems which include several suicidal gestures or attempts which has an effect on the children. These attempts or gestures were made when the children were present." Plaintiff interprets this statement to say, or at least strongly suggest, that plaintiff tried to commit suicide directly in front of her children. In her deposition, Welch explained that the phrase meant the children were present in the home at the time. Welch Depo. 82-83.
Welch's alleged failure to report that one of Cody's uncles was previously convicted of rape and child molestation is also insufficient to demonstrate a constitutional violation. Recent Eighth Circuit case law demonstrates that the standard required to establish an action for a substantive due process violation is high. S.S. v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In McMullen, an en banc Eighth Circuit held that the state's decision to return plaintiff to her father's custody despite their actual knowledge that the father regularly associated with a known pedophile (who subsequently assaulted plaintiff) did not rise to the level of egregiousness required to support a substantive due process violation. Id. at 963.
In this case, although Welch did not specifically mention any prior convictions in her report, Welch at least raised concerns about possible inappropriate behavior by one of Cody's uncles. As for Cody's other uncles, any one of whom plaintiff might be referring to concerning the prior convictions, there is no evidence in the record that any of them had regular contact with Cody.
On page five of her report, Welch expressly stated that plaintiff had "raised concerns about possible inappropriate behavior" by one of Cody's uncles.
Welch reported that "[Cody] has older uncles but he does not have contact with them."
Thus, even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Welch and Dougherty's conduct in preparing their custody reports was at most negligent. Merely negligent acts, however, are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (holding that "the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property"); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (holding that "the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials"). Therefore, plaintiff's § 1983 claim fails.
Plaintiff's § 1983 claim would fail even if Dougherty and Welch's conduct could be said to have been grossly negligent. See Feist v. Simonson, 222 F.3d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that "if the conduct arises only to the level of negligence or recklessness, the federal forum stands foreclosed to those who seek reparation for damage"); S.S. v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("We have held more than once that gross negligence `is not actionable . . . under § 1983.'") (quoting Sellers v. Baer, 28 F.3d 895, 902-03 (8th Cir. 1994)).
Even if plaintiff could state a claim under either the procedural or substantive due process components of the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff's claim would nevertheless be barred under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, as discussed later in this opinion.
B. Todd County
Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Todd County also fails. Under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, (1978), local governmental bodies, including counties, can be held liable under § 1983 only where a person's constitutional rights are violated pursuant to an official policy or custom. See id. at 690. Liability cannot be premised on theories of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See id. at 691. The evidence must also demonstrate that the alleged policy or custom is "the moving force behind the constitutional violation for liability to be established." Id. at 694.
In this case, plaintiff fails to identify any policy or custom adopted by Todd County that deprived plaintiff of her constitutional rights. The record is completely devoid of any allegations under § 1983 directly made towards Todd County. In her complaint, plaintiff's § 1983 claim focuses only on Dougherty and Welch and plaintiff's brief in response to this motion similarly fails to present any evidence relating to her § 1983 claim against Todd County. Therefore, plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Todd County also fails.
III. Plaintiff's Pendant State Law Claims
Having granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's sole federal claim, the Court must decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state law claims. Generally, pendant claims should be dismissed without prejudice if all the federal claims are dismissed before trial. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). The decision, however, is left to the discretion of the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (providing that "the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction") (emphasis added); see also Krispin v. May Dept. Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2000).
In this case, the parties have engaged in extensive discovery and motion practice, and the Court has invested substantial time in adjudicating the matter. Considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants mandate that the Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims. See Cossette v. Minnesota Power Light, 188 F.3d 964, 973 (8th Cir. 1999); Kuhn v. National Assoc. of Letter Carriers, Branch 5, 528 F.2d 767, 771 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1976).
Plaintiff raises three state law claims in her complaint: 1) negligence; 2) negligence per se; and 3) defamation. Defendants claim that these claims are barred by any one of the following immunity doctrines: 1) quasi-judicial immunity; 2) statutory discretionary immunity; or 3) official immunity. The Court finds Dougherty and Welch are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and Todd County is protected by vicarious quasi-judicial immunity.
A. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
1. Dougherty and Welch
As court-appointed officers, Dougherty and Welch contend they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and thus they are absolutely immune from suit for claims arising out of their custody investigations. Judicial immunity protects judicial officers from liability for acts performed within the scope of their judicial authority. See Linder v. Foster, 295 N.W. 299, 300 (Minn. 1940); Myers v. Price, 463 N.W.2d 773, 775 (Minn.Ct.App. 1991). Judicial immunity applies to determinations and acts in a judicial capacity "however erroneous or by whatever motives prompted." Linder, 295 N.W. at 300.
Because judicial immunity is intended to protect the judicial process, courts have extended the doctrine to persons "who are integral parts of that process." Myers v. Price, 463 N.W.2d at 775; Antoine v. Byers Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (explaining that courts extend judicial immunity to officials other than judges when their "judgments are `functional[ly] comparab[le]' to those of judges-that is, because they too, `exercise a discretionary judgment' as part of their function") (quoting Imbler v. Packtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n. 20 (1976)). Consequently, courts have extended this "quasi-judicial" immunity to court-appointed physicians and surgeons who prepare and submit evaluations relating to judicial proceedings, see Linder v. Foster, 295 N.W. 299, 301 (Minn. 1940), public defenders, see Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 775-76 (Minn. 1993), and probation officers who prepare pre-sentence investigation reports, see Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1986); Spaulding v. Nielson, 599 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Weseman v. Meeker County, 659 F. Supp. 1571, 1578 (D.Minn. 1987).
Significantly, court-appointed GALs and custody evaluators are among those quasi-judicial officers who qualify for absolute quasi-judicial immunity. In Tindell v. Rogosheske, 428 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1988), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a guardian ad litem is absolutely immune from liability for acts performed within the scope of that guardian's responsibilities. See id. at 387. In Zagaros v. Erickson, 558 N.W.2d 516 (Minn.Ct.App. 1997), the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered but declined to extend quasi-judicial immunity to non-court-appointed custody evaluators, thus limiting the doctrine to court-appointed individuals, like Welch. See id. at 523-24.
In this case, both Dougherty and Welch are protected by quasi- judicial immunity because both were appointed by the court to perform judicially-related functions concerning the custody trial of Cody Kent. By order dated February 3, 1997, Judge Baland expressly appointed Dougherty as GAL for Cody Kent and directed Dougherty to investigate and make recommendations concerning temporary custody and visitation issues. By order dated November 14, 1997, Judge Baland directed Todd County Social Services to retain another individual to perform the custody study due to a potential conflict with local custody specialists. Karen Welch was retained pursuant to that court order. Thus, as court- appointed officers, both Dougherty and Welch are protected by quasi-judicial immunity.
Plaintiff's claim that Welch was hired as an independent contractor by Todd County Social Services and is thus not entitled to immunity is without merit. While the issue of whether Welch was an independent contractor or employee of Todd County might be relevant for other types of immunity, the issue is not relevant for purposes of quasi-judicial immunity. Here, the issue is simply whether Welch was court-appointed to perform the custody evaluation. Although Judge Baland's November 14, 1997 order does not expressly mention Welch by name, the second paragraph of that order expressly provides that an "individual or agency that performs custody studies for Todd County Social Services when local staff has a conflict shall be directed to perform the custody study in this case." Welch was retained pursuant to this order and therefore, was court-appointed. Plaintiff's claim that Judge Baland only directed Todd County Social Services to conduct the study, after which the agency independently contracted out its services to Welch contradicts the plain language of the order.
Nevertheless, plaintiff offers three separate reasons why quasi-judicial immunity should not apply in this case. Specifically, plaintiff claims that the doctrine does not apply when a quasi-judicial officer: 1) fails to report materially relevant information; 2) includes false and inaccurate statements in her report for the court; or 3) acts outside the scope of her court-appointed duties. Taking each of these claims in turn, the Court finds that none of plaintiff's arguments deprive Dougherty and Welch of immunity.
Plaintiff relies on Johnson v. State, 536 N.W.2d 328 (Minn.Ct.App. 1995), and S.L.D. v. Krantz, 498 N.W.2d 47 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993), for the proposition that a failure to communicate relevant information deprives a quasi-judicial officer of his or her immunity. However, both cases are distinguishable from this case because neither defendant in Johnson or Krantz were court-appointed officers, as Welch and Dougherty are here, nor did their acts arise from their performance of judicially-related functions.
In addition to being factually dissimilar, neither case directly establishes that a quasi-judicial officer's failure to report information is a recognized exception to the judicial immunity doctrine. Indeed, the Krantz court never considered quasi-judicial immunity in its opinion. In Johnson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals briefly discussed quasi-judicial immunity. 536 N.W.2d at 335. However, the Court is not persuaded that the Johnson court's statement that "the doctrine is not applicable to the failure to communicate concerning [the released prisoner's] whereabouts, or the failure to timely request and issue a warrant" stands for the broader proposition now urged by plaintiff that a failure to report information deprives a quasi-judicial officer of immunity. Id. Other than this one statement from Johnson, which appears to be limited to its facts, plaintiff fails to cite any case that squarely holds that a quasi-judicial officer's failure to report information in the course of performing judicially-related functions is deprived of quasi-judicial immunity.
It is also significant that when the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed Johnson, it never considered the applicability of quasi-judicial immunity its opinion. See Johnson v. State, 553 N.W.2d 40 (1996).
Plaintiff's claim that Dougherty and Welch's alleged false and inaccurate reporting of information in their reports deprive them of quasi-judicial immunity also fails. Weseman v. Meeker County, 659 F. Supp. 1571 (D.Minn. 1987), addresses this issue and establishes that allegations of inaccurate statements in reports submitted to and relied upon by judicial officers does not deprive a quasi-judicial officer of immunity. Id. at 1577-78. In Weseman, the plaintiff sued, among others, a probation officer who made recommendations to the court relating to plaintiff's custodial status. See id. at 1577. Plaintiff contended that the information Johnson disclosed to the court was false and misleading and therefore deprived defendant of immunity. See id. The court disagreed. It found that Johnson was conducting an adjudicative function in aid of the court's judicial function and therefore, the defendant was entitled to absolute immunity, plaintiff's claims of inaccurate reporting notwithstanding. See id. at 1578.
Like the probation officer in Weseman, Dougherty and Welch performed adjudicative functions in aid of the state court's judicial function concerning custody and visitation. Guardians ad litem and custody evaluators, like probation officers who prepare PSI reports, "`serve as the court's eyes and ears and must exercise discretion in conducting [their] investigation[s] and making [their] recommendations, without fear of subsequent civil liability.'" Id. at 1577-78 (quoting Crosby-Bey v. Jansson, 586 F. Supp. 96, 99 (D.D.C. 1984). Consequently, Dougherty and Welch are afforded absolute immunity, even when claims of malice and bad faith in investigating and preparing their reports are asserted against them. See Demoran, 781 F.2d at 158 (granting absolute immunity to probation officer despite claims of malice and bad faith in preparing PSI report).
Finally, Welch's decision to shred her notes relating to her custody evaluation does not strip her of quasi-judicial immunity. Plaintiff argues this act falls outside the scope of Welch's appointed duties and therefore she cannot be protected by judicial immunity. See Tindell, 428 N.W.2d at 378 (limiting absolute judicial immunity to acts within the scope of a quasi-judicial officer's responsibilities); Linder, 295 N.W. at 48 (same). There is no evidence in the record that either the court or Todd County Social Services required Welch to retain her notes. Furthermore, Welch did not dispense with her notes until six months after the custody trial was completed and her final report was submitted to the court. Additionally, Welch had the notes with her at the custody trial, therefore affording plaintiff the opportunity to subpoena her records or question Welch about them at that time.
Finding no basis upon which the doctrine does not apply, the Court holds that Dougherty and Welch are protected by quasi-judicial immunity.
2. Todd County
Todd County claims that it is immune from suit as Dougherty's employer. Under the doctrine of vicarious quasi-judicial immunity, a county "which employs an officer also enjoys the quasi-judicial immunity of that officer for the acts of that officer." Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish Cty., 829 P.2d 746, 746 (Wash. 1992); In re Scott County Master Docket, 618 F. Supp. 1534, 1575 (D.Minn. 1985); aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1987); Myers v. Price, 463 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Minn.Ct.App. 1991). For example, in Myers, the court granted immunity to a court-appointed therapist and her clinic/employer for actions taken in conjunction with that therapist's evaluations of children suspected of having been sexually abused. Myers, 463 N.W.2d at 776. As Dougherty's employer, Todd County is entitled to vicarious quasi-judicial immunity.
In summary, the Court holds that plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983. The Court further holds that the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity bars plaintiff's state law claims against defendants. The Court, accordingly, grants defendants' motion for summary judgment.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel and the entire file and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Docket No. 11] is GRANTED; and
2. Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.