Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.LC023366, James R. Bascue, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Parker, Milliken, Clark, O’Hara & Samuelian, Larry G. Ivanjack and David K. Eldan for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of David H. Beyer and David H. Beyer for Defendants and Respondents.
ALDRICH, J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff James A. Kay, Jr. appeals from the post-judgment orders of the trial court that (1) on June 21, 2006, granted the motion of defendant Annedore Pick and her son Harold Pick for an offset credit of $294,000 in partial satisfaction of judgment and for a stay of the judgment sale of defendants’ residence, and that (2) on August 7, 2006, denied Kay’s motion for reconsideration of those rulings. We conclude on this convoluted record that the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the motion on June 21, 2006. Insofar as it reconsidered its ruling sua sponte, it did so in a manner that denied Kay a fair hearing. Accordingly, we reverse the orders of June 21, 2006, and August 7, 2006, with the result that the trial court’s order of April 27, 2006, is the court’s final order in this matter.
Pick’s son Harold owned much of the personalty at issue in this case.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Kay’s judgments against Pick and background
As of 2002, Kay held four judgments against the Picks totaling more than $400,000. These judgments have long since become final and unassailable by appeal. By March 2005, the total amount of all four judgments, including interest and costs, had ballooned to about $750,000. Kay reopened the case in April 2005 by moving for an order for the sale of Pick’s dwelling in Santa Monica to satisfy the judgment in case number LC023366. Pick opposed the sale arguing she had already paid Kay in excess of the amounts of the judgment because Kay had levied much of Picks’ property.
Kay obtained judgment in case number SC039723 on June 19, 1996; judgment in case number SC042164 on November 12, 1998; judgment in case number LC023366 on April 2, 1999; and judgment in case number BC200925 on February 2, 2001.
The trial court granted Kay’s application for an order for sale of Pick’s dwelling. Judgment was entered accordingly on September 20, 2005.
2. Pick’s October 2005 motion to compel Kay to acknowledge satisfaction of judgment
In October 2005, Pick moved to compel Kay to acknowledge satisfaction of judgment (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 724.050 & 724.110). Pick listed various sheriff’s seizures, commencing in 1996, that levied on certain of Pick’s realty and personalty in an effort to demonstrate that Kay had levied against property valued in excess of $600,000. Pick submitted Sheriff’s Department records showing writs of execution and sheriff’s returns on attachment/execution (sheriff’s returns). Of particular relevance to this appeal, Pick submitted sheriff’s documents showing a levy against Pick’s leasehold interest.
More specifically, Pick claimed that in October 1997, Kay“levied upon the leasehold interest which . . . Pick had in the Falcon Cablevision Building, on Saddle Peak. Its value was $100,000. Mr. Kay . . . never gave the Picks any credit for [that levy].” (Italics added.) Pick’s claim was supported by correspondence and three declarations indicating that Kay denied having received any payments against his judgments. Pick also filed the affidavit of Edwin L. Hall, managing partner of Saddle Peak Communications, who stated that “Saddle Peak Communications is the Lessor of that property to Falcon Cablevision . . . . [¶] Falcon [as lessee] has assigned its interest in the Lease Agreement to Harold and Ann Pick . . . .” (Italics added.)
Kay opposed Pick’s motion on procedural grounds. Kay argued, among other things, that Pick filed the motion in the wrong case and the wrong court and her evidence was inadequate. The trial court denied Pick’s motion without prejudice.
3. Pick’s February 2006 motion to compel partial satisfaction of judgment
After the trial court found that the four cases resulting in the four judgments against Pick were related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.330 (formerly rule 804) and Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Local Rules, rule 7.3(f) (see fn. 2, supra), Pick refiled “substantially the same” motion to compel partial satisfaction of judgment. She explained that her motion was being brought with respect to each of the four judgments. Therein, Pick reiterated that the sheriff had executed four seizures, including the one in October 1997 in which “Kay levied upon the leasehold interest which Ann Pick had in the Falcon Cablevision Building, on Saddle Peak. Its value was $100,000.” (Italics added.)
Kay replied by noting that Pick had not provided competent evidence that the seizures she cited were levies in casenumber LC023366, as the levies occurred in 1997, before the 1999 judgment in that case. Nor had Pick shown that the sheriff had sold any of the items levied at a sheriff’s sale or that proceeds from any such sale were forwarded to Kay so as to justify satisfaction of judgment.
The writs of execution were all issued in case SC039723, whereas the judgment in LC023366 was not entered until 1999, two years after the October 1977 levy.
The court denied Pick’s February 2006 motion. The court rejected much of Pick’s evidence and sustained Kay’s objections. Noting Pick had provided extensive evidence establishing that levies had occurred, the court found she failed to demonstrate that the sheriff had actually sold the levied items at auction or shown the amount the items were sold for. Additionally, the court agreed with Kay that the levies occurred for the most part before entry of judgment in three of the cases. The court did lift the stay of the sale of Pick’s dwelling and scheduled a status conference for April 2006 to monitor the sale of the residence.
4. Pick’s first reconsideration motion
In early 2006, Pick, in propria persona, filed a “motion for reconsideration pursuant section 657” of the Code of Civil Procedure, and for acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgments.
On April 27, 2006, the court denied Pick’s motion on the ground that Pick failed to comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 to provide new facts and to provide an affidavit. Nonetheless, the court allowed Pick to file a response to Kay’s opposition. The court vacated its order staying the sale of the dwelling and ordered the sale of the dwelling to go forward. Finally, the court notified Pick that her remedy was to file an appeal.
5. Pick’s second reconsideration motion
Instead of taking the court’s suggestion to file an appeal, Pick, again in propria persona, filed a second reconsideration motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 657 and moved for an order compelling acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment. This motion was based on Pick’s affidavit indicating that in 1995, the parties had entered into a settlement in case number LC023366 for a total of $50,000, plus interest. The purpose of her evidence, Pick asserted, was to demonstrate that the judgment in case number LC023366 had not been entered after the levies, but before. Attached was an unsigned stipulation for entry of judgment.
Pick also moved for stay of execution of judgment sale of her dwelling, to vacate the judgment, and for new trial on the issues of excessive damages and Kay’s fraud, all pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 473, 657, and 659. Pick argued, among other things, that notwithstanding the court’s earlier ruling denying Pick’s motion for offset credit based on the leasehold, the court had neglected in its April 2006 ruling to value her commercial leasehold interest in the Falcon Cablevision Building on Saddle Peak that was seized in October 1997. Pick valued that leasehold interest based on her assertion that as a sublessor, she expected to receive $2,500 in monthly rent, with about four years remaining on the lease, for an approximate value of $120,000 over the balance of the lease term. This property, she argued, did not have to be sold at a sheriff’s sale because the leases had already been seized and continued to produce income. Pick asked, “[w]as the court aware that the lease was sublet to commercial tenants and was returning a net monthly lease income of $2500.00 which [Kay] was now collecting?” Pick also noted that the court had neglected to credit her with the $12,275 it had apparently ordered in February 1998, based on her claim of exemption. Because of the court’s failure to credit Pick with these sums in partial satisfaction of the judgments, Pick argued that she was entitled to a new trial on the issue of excessive damages. Finally, Pick argued, until the judgment was amended, the sale of her home to satisfy the judgment should be stayed.
Kay’s opposition pointed up the procedural problems with Pick’s motion, namely, Pick’s failure to present new law or facts that had not, or could not have, been presented to the trial court before. Kay did concede that Pick was entitled to a $12,275 credit in case number SC039723.
6. The June 21, 2006, ruling on Pick’s second reconsideration motion
On June 21, 2006, the court tentatively denied Pick’s second reconsideration motion for lack of new facts, new law, or supporting affidavit. It also denied Pick’s motion to vacate judgment and for new trial on the issue of excessive damages and plaintiff’s fraud citing a lack of authority. The trial court denied Pick’s motion to stay execution of judgment sale of her property.
Then, the court stated it had reviewed Pick’s evidence submitted with her motion to stay execution of the sale of her residence. Finding that Pick was entitled to a credit in the amount of $12,275 in case number SC039723, the court issued an amended order for sale of Pick’s dwelling reflecting that credit. The court ordered Kay (1) to ensure that a partial satisfaction of judgment in the amount of $12,275 was recorded and (2) to update any accrued interest to reflect the credit as of the date of that sale.
As for the leasehold interest, the trial court noted that neither party had cited authority concerning the levy of a leasehold interest. The court inquired about what effect the levy had, and whether Pick was entitled to a credit based on documents she attached.
Both parties argued through counsel that they had received nothing from the leasehold. No one could account for any lease revenue between the time the lease was levied in 1997 and the termination of the 10-year term in 2004. Pick’s attorney explained to the court that Pick was asking for an accounting of money that was received as the result of the levy. If no money was received, Pick’s counsel argued, then the court should make a determinate of the value of the lease as it existed when it was seized.
In Kay’s absence and without prior notice to him or his counsel, the court decided to take testimony about the value of the leasehold. Pick testified that she was a sublessor under that lease and had subtenants occupying the Falcon Cablevision Building leasehold who had been paying her about $3,500 per month in rent. She testified that when the sheriff seized the leasehold in October 1997, seven years remained on her ten-year sublease. Kay’s attorney responded that it was not Kay who seized the leasehold, but the sheriff; and it is the levying sheriff who would have collected the rents. Kay’s counsel described the procedure for levying realty as compared to personalty. As the hearing was in Law and Motion, Kay himself was not present and so his attorney was left to explain that he did not know why Kay decided, after the seizure in 1997, that the lease levied had no value.
At the close of the hearing, the court found that Pick had proved that the value of the levied sublease hold was $294,000. The court found had it not been for Kay’s levy –which took control of the leasehold away from Pick – the latter would have received the rental income and the parties would know where the money had gone. The court found that Kay failed to carry his burden to show what happened to the leasehold once the sheriff seized it. The court stated, “What Mr. Kay did with that levy is up to Mr. Kay.” The court ruled that $294,000 should be credited toward the judgment in case number LC023366, and ordered Kay to file an amended judgment reflecting this credit. The court vacated its signature on the order for sale of Pick’s dwelling and ordered that the dwelling not be sold at this time. Again, the court declared its willingness to entertain a reconsideration motion, this time from Kay about (1) whether the residence should be sold, and (2) whether Pick should be credited for the leasehold, and if so, how much.
7. Kay’s reconsideration motion
Following the trial court’s invitation, Kay moved for reconsideration of the June 21, 2006, order. With respect to the leasehold interest, Kay requested the court vacate the order that Pick receive a $294,000 credit against the judgment. He explained that (1) the seizure of the leasehold was never perfected according to the law, and (2) he had never received credit for any leasehold that was levied. Kay attached several documents showing the four levies in 1996 and 1997, most of which had already been presented to the trial court several times in connection with the various previous filings.
Kay also explained why he decided in 1998 not to sell the leasehold that had been levied. He submitted documents showing, first, that the sheriff levied on a leasehold interest and filed a sheriff’s return. However, the seizure was never recorded with the registry of deeds as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 700.015, and so it was never perfected. Second, Kay observed that Pick was the tenant under the lease that the sheriff purported to seize, with the result she was not entitled to income from it, but was obligated to pay money to the lessor, Saddle Peak Communications. Third, Kay declared he learned only after the October 1997 levy, that Pick did not have a 10-year lease with Saddle Peak Communications, but was simply a month-to-month tenant. Thus, the leasehold interest would have brought little, if any, value at a sheriff’s sale. Kay declared he chose not to proceed with a sale of the leasehold because any purchaser could be evicted by Saddle Peak Communications at any time on 30-day notice. Fourth, Kay explained, he did not know that Pick was a sublessor at the time of the October 1997 levy, and no one would pay at auction for the right to “ ‘step into the shoes’ ” of Pick because she was merely a month-to-month lessee. For these reasons, Kay declared, the sheriff did not sell Pick’s interest under the master lease at auction because Pick was a debtor under that lease, and Kay did not levy on Pick’s interest as sublessor because he did not know about it. Consequently, Kay never received any money from the seizure of any leasehold.
Along with the above documents, Kay filed a new declaration from Saddle Peak Communications Managing Partner, Edwin Hall. Hall explained that he too was unaware of any sublease under which Pick was the sublessor. Kay never became the lessee of the Saddle Peak Communications property nor did he step into Pick’s shoes as lessee by virtue of any action by the sheriff in enforcing a judgment. “Kay has never been a tenant of the Saddle Peak property or had any other connection to it.” Rather, Hall explained that Saddle Peak Communications terminated Pick’s tenancy for her failure to pay rent. In 1998, Saddle Peak Communications prepared to file an unlawful detainer action against Pick. Before filing that action, Hall negotiated with either Pick or Falcon for the termination of Pick’s tenancy. During those negotiations, Pick never claimed to have lost the lease, or that Kay had somehow become the new lessee.
Pick opposed Kay’s reconsideration motion on procedural grounds and argued that Kay’s motion lacked credibility. She reaffirmed the subtenancy but filed no lease. At the time of the levy, Pick asserted, Kay evicted her and she had no further contact with the then-tenants except to inform them that Kay was the new owner of the lease. Pick “assumed” that the subtenants would pay their rent to Kay.
The trial court denied Kay’s reconsideration motion for failure to meet the burden of proof required for granting it. It ruled that Kay was not deprived of a fair hearing prior to the June 21, 2006, ruling that Kay was seeking to have reconsidered. Kay filed this timely appeal.
CONTENTIONS
Kay contends that the trial court erred by (1) granting Pick’s second reconsideration motion of June 21, 2006, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 where Pick did not provide new facts to justify the motion; (2) denying Kay a fair hearing by failing to set a briefing schedule, only considering Pick’s evidence on the motion and precluding Kay from presenting his evidence; and (3) giving Pick a $294,000 credit based solely on the fact that the sheriff had levied on Pick’s tenancy.
DISCUSSION
1. The trial court’s June 21, 2006, ruling was reversible error
Pick’s second reconsideration motion was entitled “notice of motion for reconsideration pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure section] 657 and of motion and notice of motion and motion for order compelling an acknowledgement of a full or partial satisfaction of judgments pursuant to C.C.P. 724.050 and 724.110.” While Pick’s citation to Code of Civil Procedure section 657 suggests she was moving for a new trial, her motion was really for reconsideration. “The name of the motion is not controlling. The above requirements [of section 1008] apply to any motion that asks the judge to decide the same matter previously ruled on. [Citations.]” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2007) ¶ 9:324.1, p. 9(I)-118.) The court had been asked in at least two prior motions to establish the value of Pick’s leasehold interest that was levied in October 1997 and set the value off against Kay’s judgments. The court denied Pick’s various motions on the ground Pick had presented no new facts or law.
The trial court denied Kay’s reconsideration motion for the same reasons. That ruling is appeal able. (Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 477, fn. 2.)
Accordingly, Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 applies. Subdivision (a) of that section reads in material part: “When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, . . . any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Italics added.)
Subdivision (e) of section 1008 of the Code of Civil Procedure “specifies the court’s jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.” (Italics added.)
The trial court’s initial, tentative decision to deny Pick’s second reconsideration motion on June 21, 2006, was correct. As developed in the recitation of the facts above, the question of whether Pick was entitled to a partial satisfaction of judgment based on her “leasehold interest” that was levied in October 1997 was presented over the course of numerous motions, oppositions, and replies. Pick reiterated in each of her motions from October 2005, when she first moved to compel Kay to acknowledge satisfaction of the judgment, through her February 2006 motion to compel partial satisfaction of judgment and her two reconsideration motions, that the claimed offset was based on “the leasehold interest which . . . Pick had in the Falcon Cablevision Building, on Saddle Peak.” The motion was not based on new law. All of the documents representing the sheriff’s levies, especially the October 1997 seizure, and indeed most of the declarations in support of her second reconsideration motion had already been presented to the trial court at least once before by Pick in her earlier motions. Therefore, Pick’s second reconsideration motion contained no new facts as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a). The trial court had no authority to consider those facts that had been presented earlier because such matters were neither new nor different. (§ 1008, sub d. (e); see Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 9:330, p. 9(I)-122.)
Pick argues that her second reconsideration motion contained new evidence in that her previous motions were based on her interest in the Falcon Cablevision Building on Saddle Peak as a tenant, whereas her second reconsideration motion was based on her leasehold interest as sublessor. The fallacy in her argument is that each of Pick’s motions – her original motion for satisfaction of judgment as well as her two successive reconsideration motions – sought an offset credit for her “leasehold interest” in the same Falcon Cablevision Building that was levied by the sheriff on October 1997, as evidenced by the same sheriff’s returns. Regardless of the quantum of the leasehold interest, i.e., as tenant or as sublessor, Pick’s motions all sought credit for her leasehold interest. Hence, none of this evidence was new because it had already been presented to the trial court in Pick’s previous motions. (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005)135 Cal. App.4th 206, 208; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 9:329, p. 9(I)-121.) Furthermore, although Pick’s declaration submitted with her second reconsideration motion discussed a sublease apparently for the first time, a section 1008 motion is properly denied where based on evidence that could have been presented in the earlier motion. (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 212-213.) Pick had the burden to “offer some fact or circumstance not previously considered by the court. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 213.) Pick did not explain why the specific facts of her sublease could not have been presented to the trial court before when discussing her “leasehold interest in the Falcon Cablevision Building.” There being no new evidence, the trial court was utterly without jurisdiction to consider Pick’s second reconsideration motion at the June 21, 2006, hearing (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, sub d. (e)), and so it properly denied the motion.
We observe, however, that the trial court properly ruled that Pick was entitled to a credit of $12,275 in case number SC039723. Kay conceded this point and it appears that the trial court had overlooked this credit in its previous order.
Pick’s second reconsideration motion was premised on her assumption that the trial court had already ruled that Pick was entitled to an offset for the leasehold levied, and had merely omitted to value that offset. However, a review of the court’s repeated rulings shows that in denying each of Pick’s previous motions, the trial court had in fact denied her any offset for the leasehold with the result that its value was irrelevant. The court had not neglected in its earlier rulings to place a value on the leasehold, as she suggests.
Nonetheless, the trial court rethought its ruling. Our Supreme Court in Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, held that Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 prohibits a party from filing repetitive motions for the same relief. However, a trial “court may, on its own motion, reconsider a prior interim ruling it believes to be mistaken [citation]” (Farber v. Bay View Terrace Homeowners Assn. (2006) 141 Cal. App.4th 1007, 1015, italics added), provided it gives notice to the parties and a reasonable opportunity to solicit briefing and hold a hearing. (Le Francois v. Goel, supra, at p. 1108.)
In reconsidering its own ruling on June 21, 2006, the trial court inquired about the law of sheriff’s seizures, and took testimony about the value of Pick’s leasehold interest. Accordingly, Pick had the opportunity to testify about her unwritten, unrecorded sublease, and her assessment of the value of that sublease. But Kay had no notice or opportunity to counter this evidence. To make matters worse, the trial court placed on Kay the burden to explain what happened to the rents under the sublease. Yet, only Kay’s attorney was present at the Law and Motion hearing and counsel did not have the answer to this question. Counsel was understandably unprepared for this question given that the court had not notified the parties in advance that it would take oral evidence. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(a) & (b).) As the inevitable result, the court found that Kay failed to carry his burden to explain why he should not give Pick a credit for this sublease.
Apparently, in the interest of fairness to Kay, after ruling on the motion, the court invited him to file a motion for reconsideration. Kay’s ensuing reconsideration motion contained new evidence in the sense that it was evidence the court had not heard or seen before and that Kay’s attorney had been unable to present at the June 21, 2006, hearing. That evidence included Kay’s explanation for what happened to the rental income after the sheriff seized the leasehold. The motion also clarified some facts and discussed law that Pick had omitted. Kay demonstrated a dispute about whether Pick actually had a sublease. Kay presented facts supporting his explanation for why Pick should not receive a credit for the rents in direct response to the court’s earlier invitation. Still, the court denied Kay’s motion for failure to comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008.
The parties argue at length about whether Kay’s reconsideration motion was appeal able (see fn. 4, supra), whether the opposing party ever satisfied the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 in the various motions, and whether the trial court properly denied those motions. The court was certainly entitled on June 21, 2006, to reconsider its ruling denying Pick’s second reconsideration motion. (Le Francois v. Goel, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1096-1097.) But to protect the parties’ right to due process, the court should have first “give[n] the parties notice that it [would] do so and a reasonable opportunity to litigate the question.” (Ibid., italics added.) What is apparent is that based on the procedural posture of this case, Kay was denied a fair hearing on June 21, 2006, because the trial court did not forewarn the parties of its concerns and failed to solicit briefing or even notify the parties that it would take testimony. Although Kay’s later reconsideration motion was apparently designed to rectify this problem, in ruling that Kay did not meet the requirements of section 1008, the court erred because Kay did provide new evidence. This ruling only compounded the errors in the earlier ruling of June 21, 2006, denying Kay a fair hearing.
Stated differently, the trial court had no jurisdiction at the outset to consider Pick’s second reconsideration motion as the motion stated no new facts or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, sub d. (e).) Insofar as the court exercised its sua sponte power to reconsider its ruling in mid-hearing on June 21, 2006, it violated Kay’s due process right to notice and opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, the June 21, 2006, ruling granting Pick’s second motion for reconsideration must be reversed, along with its order staying sale of Pick’s dwelling.
At this Court’s request, the parties submitted extensive additional briefing about what, if any, instructions we should give the trial court upon remand. We have reviewed the briefing and analyzed the contentions therein. We conclude as follows:
The trial court properly denied Pick’s first motion for reconsideration filed in early 2006 and ruled on April 27, 2006. That first reconsideration motion stated no new evidence and hence did not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivisions (a) and (e). All of the documents Pick submitted in connection with her first reconsideration motion had already been presented to the trial court in connection with her original October 2005 motion to compel Kay to acknowledge satisfaction of judgment and with her February 2006 motion to compel partial satisfaction of judgment. Not only were the documents submitted in March 2006 not new evidence, but Pick provided no affidavit explaining her failure to make the showing that the evidence was new or could not have otherwise been presented. (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 135 Cal. App.4th at p. 208; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 9:329, p. 9(I)-121.) Where Pick’s first motion for reconsideration did not provide new evidence, the trial court had no authority to grant it (§ 1008, sub d. (e)), and hence properly denied it.
Subsequently, as discussed above, the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider Pick’s second motion for reconsideration on June 21, 2006, and hence properly denied that motion. Although the trial court had authority to reconsider its ruling, it did so in a manner that abridged Kay’s right to due process.
DISPOSITION
The orders entered on June 21, 2006, and August 7, 2006, are vacated in accordance with the view expressed herein, with the exception of that portion of the June 21, 2006, order to enter a partial satisfaction of judgment in the amount of $12,275. The trial court is ordered to enter partial satisfaction of judgment in the amount of $12,275 in case number SC039723. The court’s order of April 27, 2006, denying Pick’s motion for reconsideration and ordering the judgment sale of Pick’s dwelling is therefore the trial court’s final order in this matter. Each party to bear its own costs on appeal.
We concur: KLEIN, P. J., CROSKEY, J.