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Kast v. Antonsson

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division
Apr 28, 2009
No. A122463 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2009)

Summary

In Kast v. Antonsson (A122463, Apr. 28, 2009 [nonpub. opn.]) (Kast III), appellant sought reversal of the trial court’s denial of her motion to remove a special master who had been appointed pursuant to a stipulation and subsequent order dated May 10, 2007.

Summary of this case from Kast v. Antonsson

Opinion


JOHN KAST, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANNA KARIN ANTONSSON, Defendant and Appellant. A122463 California Court of Appeal, First District, Fourth Division April 28, 2009

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

City and County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. 375647.

Ruvolo, P. J.

I. INTRODUCTION

In her three-page handwritten brief, appellant Anna Karin Antonsson, acting in propria persona, claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion to remove a special master (Special Master) appointed May 10, 2007, following the stipulation of the parties, including Ms. Antonsson, to the appointment. As in her previous two appeals, no basis exists for reversal because appellant fails to support her assertions of error with legal argument or analysis. Also, as to the merits of her motion, based on the limited record provided, it appears that the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying the motion. Consequently, we affirm.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

We begin by noting that appellant has recently appeared before this court on two separate occasions concerning this same case. In Kast v. Antonsson (A117115, Apr. 4, 2008 [nonpub. opn.]) (Kast I), we affirmed the trial court’s decision to award appellant’s former husband, respondent John Kast, presumed father status with respect to appellant’s daughter under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). We stated in Kast I that we were “compelled by law to affirm the trial court’s decision because of appellant’s failure to designate a record, identify any errors made by the trial court, and cite any law or authority supporting her allegations.” (Kast I at p. 1.)

In Kast v. Antonsson (A120914, Oct. 8, 2008 [nonpub. opn.]) (Kast II), appellant argued that the trial court erred “in refusing to order a child custody evaluation pursuant to Family Code section 3111, subdivision (a).” (Kast II at p. 1.) We affirmed, concluding that in briefing her second appeal, “appellant repeats the same errors she made in briefing Kast I. Appellant has presented arguments unsupported by authority or citations to the record.” (Kast II at p. 2.)

III. DISCUSSION

Once again, appellant brings an appeal without setting forth sufficient factual citations to the record, and absent any legal arguments and citations entitling her to the relief sought. While appellant makes clear that she is appealing the refusal of the Special Master to resign, and of the superior court to order her removal, appellant points to no order or action by the Special Master which she challenges. Instead, on appeal her comments are limited generally to complaints that the Special Master is “interfer[ing]” with her “ability to be a parent to my daughter,” and that there exist “serious communication problems between the Special Master and myself....”

As we said in Kast II, “[w]hen a party is challenging a judgment, that party has the burden of showing reversible error by appropriate reference to the record. (Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(a).) Furthermore, where a brief asserts a point without supporting authorities, the reviewing court “ ‘ “may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.” [Citation.]’ (In re Marriage of Schroeder (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1164.)” (Kast II at p. 2.)

Furthermore, we remind appellant again that under California law, “ ‘a litigant appearing in propria persona is generally held to the same restrictive rules and procedures as an attorney....’ (Kabbe v. Miller (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 93, 98; Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638-639.) Thus, appellant is not entitled to any special treatment because she is representing herself.” (Kast II at pp. 2-3.)

Because appellant has once again failed to support her assertions of error with necessary citations to the record and with reasoned legal argument or analysis, no basis exists for reversal of the order. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on that basis.

However, our own exploration of what record has been provided by appellant clearly reveals that the court acted within its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to remove the Special Master. The parties apparently entered into a Stipulation and Order re Appointment of Special Master on or about May 7, 2007, which was converted into a court order on May 10, 2007 (Stipulation). The parties were represented by counsel at the time of entering the Stipulation.

The Stipulation does not appear as part of the record on appeal, but a purported copy is included with appellant’s opening brief.

The Stipulation provides that the Special Master is to serve under Code of Civil Procedure section 638, “until resignation or written agreement of the parties, further order or [sic] the Court, or two years from the date of appointment, whichever first occurs.” As to removal, paragraph 24 of the Stipulation provides that the Special Master may be disqualified on any ground applicable to a judge, referee, or arbitrator. No claim has been made by appellant that there exists a ground for disqualification under this paragraph. Paragraphs 25 and 29 also provide for the removal of the Special Master by the court based upon grievances regarding the performance or actions of the Special Master, if those grievances cannot be resolved through a meet and confer procedure.

While appellant filed a motion to remove the Special Master, it does not appear that the meet and confer procedure required by the Stipulation was followed. There is a reference in her motion to an ex parte meeting between appellant and the Special Master, but it is entirely unclear what specific grievance or grievances were discussed, or that any effort was made to confer with respondent’s counsel concerning any “grievance.”

None of the pleadings relating to this motion are contained in the record on appeal. Appellant has included what purports to be a copy of her motion and handwritten reply with her opening brief, although respondent’s opposition, which is mentioned in appellant’s reply, is not included in the record before us.

At the hearing on appellant’s motion, appellant told the trial court she sought removal of the Special Master because the arrangement “interferes with my ability to be a parent to my daughter. That’s all I can say at this point.” The court asked appellant specifically what the Special Master had done that caused appellant to file the motion. In response, she complained about the frequency and circumstances under which she was allowed visitation with her daughter, although it is unclear to what extent issues relating to visitation were presented to the Special Master for adjudication, if at all. As expressed by appellant, the “bottom line” was that she would feel more comfortable using court mediators than in continuing with the Special Master.

The motion was opposed both by respondent and counsel for the minor. The latter addressed the motion, pointing out that minor’s counsel had filed papers indicating that she did not want to have the Special Master removed. Counsel noted that the minor “has a positive relationship with the [S]pecial [M]aster, and she’s played a very critical role at this point in managing the conflict and attempting to keep some of that conflict away from the minor.” For that reason, it would be in the minor’s best interest to have the Special Master “continue to play that role.”

No pleadings filed by counsel for the minor are included in the record, or included with appellant’s briefs.

The motion was denied by the court finding that appellant had failed to articulate an order or action taken by the Special Master that was improper. The court found nothing in the record indicating that the Special Master had in any way been derelict in the duties she agreed to undertake, or which might cause the court to have “concern” for her performance. The court also reminded appellant that, if she were unhappy with a decision by the Special Master, she could bring that matter to the court’s attention for review.

Even based on this partial record, it is abundantly clear that the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying appellant’s motion. Therefore, we affirm the order of the trial court.

IV. DISPOSITION

The order denying appellant’s motion to remove the Special Master is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent.

We concur: Sepulveda, J., Rivera, J.


Summaries of

Kast v. Antonsson

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division
Apr 28, 2009
No. A122463 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2009)

In Kast v. Antonsson (A122463, Apr. 28, 2009 [nonpub. opn.]) (Kast III), appellant sought reversal of the trial court’s denial of her motion to remove a special master who had been appointed pursuant to a stipulation and subsequent order dated May 10, 2007.

Summary of this case from Kast v. Antonsson
Case details for

Kast v. Antonsson

Case Details

Full title:JOHN KAST, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANNA KARIN ANTONSSON, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division

Date published: Apr 28, 2009

Citations

No. A122463 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2009)

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