Opinion
A-13740 0309
02-08-2023
WILLIAM MATTHEW KARRON, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Alex Engeriser, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Kenai, Trial Court No. 3KN-18-01016 CR, Jason M. Gist, Judge.
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Alex Engeriser, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
William Matthew Karron was convicted, based on his guilty plea, of third-degree assault after he repeatedly punched his girlfriend's twenty-one-year-old son, Zane Bush, at his girlfriend's apartment.
AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(B).
On appeal, Karron argues that the superior court's designation of his crime as one involving domestic violence was clearly erroneous. We disagree. Under Alaska law, a crime of domestic violence includes a crime against another person under AS 11.41 (e.g., third-degree assault) if the offense was committed "by a household member against another household member." Alaska law further defines "household members" as, inter alia, adults who live together or who have lived together.
AS 18.66.990(3)(A).
AS 18.66.990(5)(B).
Here, the court found that Karron and Zane were household members at the time of the assault. At an evidentiary hearing, Jennifer Bush (Karron's girlfriend and Zane's mother) testified that she and Karron had previously been living together in a car and in motels, and that she and Karron moved into the apartment a few weeks before the assault. Karron testified that he intended to live with Jennifer and that he had moved his bed and clothing into her apartment (but he asserted they were not living together at the time of the assault). The court also heard testimony that Zane lived with his father for part of the time and with Jennifer at other times. Given Jennifer's testimony that she and Karron lived together, and the additional testimony that Zane lived with Jennifer part of the time, we cannot say that the court's finding that Karron and Zane were household members was clearly erroneous.
Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823, 834 (Alaska App. 1982), modified on reh'g, 665 P.2d 30 (Alaska. App. 1983).
We note that Karron's contrary argument relies in large part on his assertion that the court should not have given Jennifer's testimony "much weight" because (according to Karron) Jennifer was biased and hostile. But "[i]t is the function of the trial court, not [the appellate court] to judge witnesses' credibility and to weigh conflicting evidence."
Knutson v. Knutson, 973 P.2d 596, 599-600 (Alaska 1999).
Karron alternatively claims that even if he and Zane were technically "household members," we should nonetheless refuse to classify his offense as one involving domestic violence. But when the term "domestic violence" is used in Alaska's sentencing statutes, it has the meaning given in AS 18.66.990.
Similarly, Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e) provides: "In a case in which the defendant is convicted of an offense listed in AS 18.66.990(3) and the prosecution claims at sentencing that the offense is a crime involving domestic violence, the written judgment must set forth whether the offense is a crime involving domestic violence as defined in AS 18.66.990(3) and (5)."
Karron does not dispute that he was convicted of assault in violation of AS 11.41, nor does he dispute that such an offense is listed in AS 18.66.990(3). Instead, he claims that applying AS 18.66.990(3) and (5) to this case would produce a "strange result." Specifically, he argues that applying this statute "would mean that an individual who commits certain offenses against the visiting adult child of an adult roommate will have committed a crime involving domestic violence even if the visit is brief and the adult child and roommate have no prior relationship."
But as we have just explained, the court found that Zane was not briefly visiting the apartment; he lived there on a week-on, week-off schedule. And when the legislature enacted AS 18.66.990, it expanded the categories of persons who would qualify as a victim of domestic violence in order to provide legal protections to all persons who were rendered particularly vulnerable by virtue of their relationship with their abuser. Classifying Karron's assault of his live-in girlfriend's young adult son as a crime of domestic violence is wholly consistent with the statutory scheme created by the legislature.
See Anderson v. State, 436 P.3d 1071, 1077, 1079 (Alaska App. 2018).
We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.