Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2657-13T3
03-23-2015
SALIMA KANE and ABDUL KANE, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. KIM MALES (an employee of Mini U Storage); MINI U STORAGE, a Corporation in the State of California; DAHN CORPORATION, a Corporation in the State of California and the Parent Corporation of Mini U Storage, Defendants-Respondents.
Alfred C. Constants III argued the cause for appellants (Constants Law Offices, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Constants, on the briefs). David L. Burnett argued the cause for respondents (Daly, Lamastra & Cunningham, attorneys; Mr. Burnett, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Sabatino and Leone. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-6583-12. Alfred C. Constants III argued the cause for appellants (Constants Law Offices, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Constants, on the briefs). David L. Burnett argued the cause for respondents (Daly, Lamastra & Cunningham, attorneys; Mr. Burnett, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
This litigation arises out of collection measures taken by a lessor of self-storage containers after the accounts for two rented units became delinquent.
Plaintiffs, Salima Kane and her adult son Abdul Kane, appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, Mini U Storage ("MUS"), Dahn Corporation (the parent company of MUS), and Kim Males (an employee of MUS). The summary judgment order dismissed plaintiffs' claims for affirmative relief. Those claims alleged, among other things, that defendants had overcharged plaintiffs, wrongfully denied them access to their stored possessions after the accounts had become delinquent, and improperly confiscated and sold plaintiffs' possessions at auction.
The record establishes the following underlying chronology of events. Plaintiffs leased two storage containers in New Brunswick from MUS. They entered into separate written agreements with MUS, providing that plaintiffs would hold MUS harmless, that MUS had no liability for negligence, and that MUS's liability was otherwise limited to $100. The agreement also contained provisions that MUS had a lien on the goods stored there, and that if plaintiffs were thirty days or more delinquent with the rent, MUS could terminate their leases, deny them access to the premises, and remove and advertise the stored goods for sale at plaintiffs' expense after fourteen days' notice.
Defendants contend those contract provisions are all authorized by provisions within the Self-Service Storage Facility Act ("SSFA"). See N.J.S.A. 2A:44-189, -191(c)(3)-(5), -191(e)-(g). The rental agreements also provided that plaintiffs would not store property valued over $5000 without MUS's permission.
Eventually the rental charges on the two units became several months delinquent. On June 10, 2011, Salima Kane entered into a "One-time Payment Agreement" with MUS to pay $952.76, which was half of the then-existing balance of $1,905.52. The one-time agreement otherwise left the terms of the two rental agreements intact. In particular, the one-time agreement specified in "bulleted" language that:
• Acceptance of this payment is NOT a promise that [defendants] will agree to another payment of this type in the future.
• The amount paid today is not payment in full.
• There will be no access to the unit until the account is paid current.
• The terms and conditions of the original Rental Agreement have not been altered and will remain in effect.
• Account delinquency status will reset immediately and a fee will be added to the account as a result of this payment.
• Rent, Fees and Insurance (if applicable) will continue to accrue in accordance with the Rental Agreement.
[(Emphasis added).]
Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs again became delinquent on the rental charges. When the account continued to be overdue, MUS scheduled an auction for the sale of plaintiffs' possessions. On the eve of the auction, plaintiffs tendered a sum that was less than the amount owed, which MUS declined to accept. The auction went forward, and MUS recovered monies for the sold possessions. Plaintiffs received no proceeds from the auction, and only received back from defendants a box of miscellaneous unsold items, including an empty laptop bag.
In April 2012, plaintiff sued defendants alleging, among other things, negligence and breach of contract. Defendants denied liability, largely relying on the SSFA. During the course of discovery, defendants took Salima Kane's deposition and the parties exchanged documents and interrogatory responses. Plaintiffs' counsel chose not to depose Males or any other representative of defendants.
As the end of the discovery period neared, defendants moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs, at that point represented by new counsel, cross-moved for summary judgment, and also moved to amend the complaint to amplify their allegations.
After considering oral argument, Judge Frank M. Ciuffani granted summary judgment to defendants and denied plaintiffs' cross-motion and motion to amend.
With regard to plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint, Judge Ciuffani observed that the motion was "brought very late . . . on the eve of the discovery end date, and only weeks before trial." Consequently, the judge determined that "at this late date [granting leave to amend] would be prejudicial to [defendants]," and denied the motion.
Turning to the substance of the matter, Judge Ciuffani granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' affirmative claims. The judge did so principally because:
[d]efendants complied with the terms and conditions of the Rental Agreements and the notice requirements of the New Jersey Self-Storage Act [N. J.S.A. 2A:44-187 to -193]. Plaintiffs themselves breached the contract when they failed to pay rent on [a] timely basis and continued their delinquency for months thereafter despite repeated warnings about the lien and auction. In the end, the defendants provided the required Notice under the law and the Rental Agreements, and the contents were sold at auction when the plaintiffs still failed to pay their rent as required.
Even though he found no liability on the part of defendants, Judge Ciuffani addressed, apparently for sake of completeness, plaintiffs' claims for $150,000 in damages including unliquidated claims of emotional distress. Finding that the terms and conditions of the rental agreements were "clear and unambiguous," the judge determined that the damages must be capped at $5000 under his interpretation of one of the provisions of the rental agreements. The judge noted that plaintiffs themselves were unable to substantiate the value of the goods that had been stored and there was no evidence of a subsequent writing modifying the contractual agreements.
We note that defendants cited a different provision within the agreements, which they construe to impose a cap of only $100.
This appeal by plaintiffs ensued. Among other things, plaintiffs maintain that the rental agreements are unenforceable contracts of adhesion, that they were treated unfairly by Males, that there were genuine issues of material fact that warranted a trial, and that the court abused its discretion in disallowing their request to amend their complaint.
Having fully considered the arguments plaintiffs raise on appeal, we affirm the trial court's decision, substantially for the sound reasons set forth in Judge Ciuffani's written opinion dated January 9, 2014, except that we do not reach the issue of the cap on damages. We add only a few comments.
A trial court must grant a summary judgment motion if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c); see also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 529-30 (1995). "An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact." R. 4:46-2(c). If the evidence submitted on the motion "'is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,' the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment." Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 214 (1986)). On appeal from a trial court order granting or denying a summary judgment motion, we employ the same standards. W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229 (2012).
Applying these well-known standards here, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendants. Although certain aspects of the self-storage rental agreements used by MUS in this case may appear onerous on their face, the Legislature in the SSFA has declared such commonplace terms and conditions to be enforceable. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2A:44-189. The mere fact that the rental agreements are printed on form documents prepared by the lessor and appear to be take-it-or-leave it contracts of adhesion does not make them unenforceable. Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., L.L.C., 203 N.J. 286, 301 (2010).
Plaintiffs complain that they were denied access to their units after their accounts became delinquent and deprived of a chance to remove their most valuable possessions. However, they agreed to have their access so restricted under the terms of the June 2011 one-time payment agreement. The denial of access reasonably protects the lessor from a delinquent tenant removing his or her items from the units and leaving the lessor with no valuable property to auction to satisfy the debt.
Plaintiffs presented no competent evidence to the motion judge of ill will to sustain a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 182 N.J. 210, 225 (2004) ("The party claiming a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing must provide evidence sufficient to support a conclusion that the party alleged to have acted in bad faith has engaged in some conduct that denied the benefit of the bargain originally intended by the parties.") (citation omitted). Plaintiffs did not take Males' deposition to probe her state of mind and developed no proof in discovery that could reasonably support a circumstantial inference of malice.
Defendants were not legally obligated to accept plaintiffs' request to consolidate the two units when the second lease was signed. Nor was bad faith shown by defendants' refusal to accept a sum at the eleventh hour that was less than the outstanding balance when an auction was already scheduled and the accounts had been in arrears for many months. In fact, defendants' amenability to enter into the June 2011 "one-time" partial payment agreement is counter-evidence of plaintiffs' allegations of ill will. As a for-profit business, defendants were justified in not allowing this "one-time" act of forbearance to turn into an ongoing "multi-time" loss of their right to be paid on time.
We also agree with the motion judge that the insurance charges imposed pursuant to the contract, which were a minor portion of the overall debt, were neither excessive nor unfairly imposed.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint when the discovery period was on the verge of expiration. See In re Nov. 2, 2010 Gen. Election, 423 N.J. Super. 190, 209 (App. Div. 2011); see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.2.2 on R. 4:9-1 at 1549 (2015) (noting that the denial of a motion to amend is "sustainable when made on the eve of trial").
Since defendants' liability is unproven under the law and the facts, even when the record is viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, we need not address the question of the contractual cap on damages.
In sum, although we are mindful of plaintiffs' assertion that the confiscation and auction of their stored possessions resulted in their loss of several items of value or personal importance, that outcome was the unfortunate result of their own failure to make the agreed-upon rental payments when they were due. The trial court abided by the law in dismissing their complaint.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION