Opinion
Civil No. 03-5037 (JRT/FLN).
July 20, 2004
Alan W. Weinblatt and Maura J. Shuttleworth, WEINBLATT GAYLORD, PLC, and David Schultz, Hamline University, St. Paul, MN, for plaintiffs.
James A. Moore, Assistant City Attorney, OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY, Minneapolis, MN, for defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Phyllis Kahn, Mark Kaplan, Bert Black, Ann L. Berget, Pericles C. Caranicas, and Vernon Wetternach (collectively "plaintiffs") are residents of and registered voters in the city of Minneapolis. The defendants in this matter are Susanne Griffin, Director of Elections for the City of Minneapolis; the City of Minneapolis; and Minneapolis City Council members Paul Ostrow, Paul Zerby, Donald Samuels, Barbara Johnson, Natalie Johnson Lee, Dean Zimmerman, Lisa Goodman, Robert Lilligren, Gary Schiff, Daniel Niziolek, Scott Benson, Sandra Colvin-Roy, and Barret Lane (collectively "defendants").
Plaintiffs allege that the City Council redistricting scheme for the City of Minneapolis violates the United States and Minnesota Constitutions as well as several state and local laws. Both parties request summary judgment on all claims. For the following reasons, the Court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment in part and denies plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part. However, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion to certify questions to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
BACKGROUND
Under Minnesota law, legislative redistricting takes place every ten years, following completion of the decennial United States census. Minn. Const. art. 4, § 3 ("At its first session after each enumeration of the inhabitants of this state made by the authority of the United States, the legislature shall have the power to prescribe the bounds of congressional and legislative districts"). Minnesota law requires that municipal wards "be redistricted within 60 days after the legislature has been redistricted or at least 19 weeks before the state primary election in the year ending in two, whichever is first." Minn. Stat. § 204B.135, subd. 1 (2003).
The 2000 United States Census, released publicly in October 2001, determined the official population of Minneapolis to be 382,618 people. On March 19, 2002, the Minnesota Special Redistricting Panel adopted its final legislative redistricting plan, which was not appealed. See Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, 629 N.W.2d 98, 98 (Minn. 2001). Pursuant to the Minneapolis City Charter, a Minneapolis Redistricting Commission was named, which drew new municipal ward boundaries based on the 2000 Census. The finalized plan was filed with the City Clerk on April 18, 2002. Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 31; 32, Minneapolis City Charter Ch. 2, Sec. 3.
For simplicity's sake, the Court will refer to this plan and the boundaries and wards it created as the "new" plan, boundaries, and wards.
In 2001, City Council elections were held utilizing the municipal ward boundaries based on the 1990 Census. Pursuant to the Minneapolis City Charter, City Council members serve four-year terms of office, which they "may complete . . . notwithstanding changes in Ward boundaries." Minneapolis City Charter, Ch. 1, § 3(F), see also Minn. Stat § 205.84, subd 1. Therefore, the Council members elected in 2001 to represent old wards will serve until elections based on the new ward boundaries take place as scheduled in November 2005.
For simplicity's sake, the Court will refer to these boundaries and the wards they define as the "old" boundaries and wards.
Plaintiffs allege, and defendants do not dispute, that the "ideal ward population" is 29,432 people (i.e., 382,618 people divided by 13 municipal wards). Based on this number, plaintiffs claim that old wards 2, 4, and 6 are underrepresented because, based on the 2000 census, they now contain more than the ideal number of residents, while old wards 1, 11, 12, and 13 are overrepresented because they now have fewer than the ideal number of residents. Plaintiffs also allege that new wards 3 and 8 "currently have no resident City Council member." Finally, plaintiffs claim that Chapter 1, § 3(F) of the Charter, which provides that City Council members "may complete the term for which they are elected . . . notwithstanding changes in Ward boundaries," is unconstitutional.
According to plaintiffs, old ward 2 now contains 32,793 people (3,361 additional people), old ward 4 now contains 30,731 people (1,299 additional people), and old ward 6 now contains 33,364 people (3,932 additional people). .
According to plaintiffs, old ward 1 now contains 26,949 people (2,483 less people), old ward 11 now contains 26,838 people (2,594 less people), old ward 12 now contains 27,353 people (2,019 less people), and old ward 13 now contains 27,961 people (1,471 less people).
Plaintiffs' Complaint contains seven counts. Counts I and II allege violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts III and IV allege violations of Article I, § 2 and Article VII, § 1 of the Minnesota Constitution. Counts V and VI allege violations of Minnesota Statutes § 204B.135, subd. 1 and § 204B.14, subd. 1a. Finally, Count VII alleges a violation of Chapter 2, § 1 of the Minneapolis City Charter. Plaintiffs ask the Court to order the City of Minneapolis to hold new elections for City Council based on the new boundaries within a short time.
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not appropriate if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The moving party bears the burden of bringing forward sufficient evidence to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the record. Vette Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 612 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1980). However, the nonmoving party may not merely rest upon allegations or denials in its pleadings, but it must set forth specific facts by affidavits or otherwise showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2002).
II. COUNTS I AND II
Plaintiffs base their argument in the one-person-one-vote principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in a series of cases including Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In Reynolds, the Court examined the constitutionality of the apportionment scheme for the Alabama state legislature. The court began its analysis by recalling that "[t]he right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government." Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 556. The court "conclude[d] that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators. Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race or economic status." Id. at 556 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Alabama's apportionment scheme, which had been in place for over 60 years, could no longer be considered constitutional. Id. at 569. The Court recommended that redistricting take place on at least a decennial basis in order to "meet the minimal requirements for maintaining a reasonably current scheme of legislative representation." Id. at 583-84.
This principle was extended to local units of government in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). "[W]hen the State delegates lawmaking power to local government and provides for the election of local officials from districts specified by statute, ordinance, or local charter, it must insure that those qualified to vote have the right to an equally effective voice in the election process." 390 U.S. at 478.
Plaintiffs in this matter take the Reynolds holding a step further, arguing that once redistricting is complete, elections based on the new plan must be held within a relatively short period of time in order to complete the constitutional mandate.
Failure to hold timely elections following a decennial reapportionment dilutes the right to vote as effectively as would either an outright denial of the franchise or the continuing malapportionment of districts under the Reynolds one-person, one-vote standard. . . . If Reynolds and the Fourteenth Amendment are to have any meaning, surely it should be that the actual elections based upon the new census data and new ward lines must take place as soon as possible after the redistricting takes place.
Pl. Memo. in Support of SJ.
In Political Action Conference of Illinois v. Daley, 976 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1992), the Seventh Circuit considered an almost identical argument, and concluded that no constitutional violation had occurred and new elections were not required. The court in Political Action Conference of Illinois was asked to enjoin an impending aldermanic election in Chicago based on old census figures when new census figures were released 15 days before the election. The Seventh Circuit noted that the "critical question" was whether the election, although based on an old districting plan based on the previous decade's census data, remained valid under Reynolds. 976 F.2d at 340. Noting that Chicago's reapportionment procedure was not unreasonably delayed or irrationally related to the decennial census, the court concluded that " Reynolds' explicit language concerning the probable `imbalance' in the map toward the end of the decennial period demonstrates that Chicago's election represents no constitutional violation." Id. at 340. Thus, "[t]hat Chicago elects its aldermen to serve four-year terms causing a temporary delay in the implementation of the new census data every twenty years does not transform Illinois' scheme into an unconstitutional procedure." Id. at 339.
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the instant case from Political Action Conference of Illinois by pointing out that the Seventh Circuit was asked, and declined, to enjoin an already scheduled and in motion election in order to permit the election to be held at a later date under the new redistricting plan. The Court is not persuaded that this difference in timing is significant. In essence, the Seventh Circuit determined it unnecessary and inappropriate to prevent the creation of the very situation that is before this Court.
In this case, plaintiffs attempt to shift the focus of the argument to whether the length of the delay between the creation of the new districts and their first use is impermissibly and unconstitutionally long. However, the Court agrees with the Seventh Circuit's identification of the "critical question." Absent a finding that the 2001 elections were based on districts that were so unrepresentative as to be unconstitutional, it would be inappropriate for this Court to interfere in a process and arena that is left to the state and, more particularly, to the legislative branch of the state. However, as in Political Action Conference of Illinois, Minneapolis' 2001 elections were not the result of an impermissibly delayed redistricting schedule. Rather, they were based on a districting plan properly enacted following the 1990 census, in accordance with a rational state-wide redistricting schedule. Cf. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 711 (1964). Thus, although the 2001 elections would unquestionably have been closer to the representative ideal if they had used districts based on the 2000 census data, that this was not possible does not render the election so flawed as to require its invalidation.
The Court's conclusion is bolstered by significant authority recognizing that while the right to vote is of fundamental import, it is not absolute, and must be weighed against other concerns. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992) (citing Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 192 (1986)); see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577 ("So long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible."). Based on the United States Constitution's explicit provision that States may prescribe "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives," Art. I, § 4, cl. 1, the Supreme Court has recognized that states retain substantial authority to regulate their own elections. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that "as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process." Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 ( quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 834 (1995) ("The Elections Clause gives States authority to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.") (internal quotation omitted). The conduct and regulation of elections is the primary responsibility of the legislature, and courts only reluctantly intervene in a state's election process. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1977); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586.
In Reynolds, the Supreme Court recognized the need to balance the right to vote against other interests, noting that even where an apportionment scheme was found invalid, "under certain circumstances, such as where an impending election is imminent and a State's election machinery is already in progress, equitable considerations might justify a court in withholding the granting of immediately effective relief." Id. at 585.
In awarding or withholding immediate relief, a court is entitled to and should consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and . . . can reasonably endeavor to avoid a disruption of the election process which might result from requiring precipitate changes that could make unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to the requirements of the court's decree.Id. Although the previous elections unquestionably had been held using unconstitutionally unrepresentative districts, the Court declined to order immediate elections, preferring to allow the state to implement a new, constitutional plan and then schedule elections. Id. at 586-87.
Other courts have come to similar conclusions, even in situations arguably more egregious than the one at hand See, e.g., Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549 (1972) (state legislative elections based on concededly unconstitutional plan need not be invalidated or require immediate new elections); Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508 (3rd Cir. 1993) (redistricting resulting in assignment of state senator to represent entirely new district on other side of state for remaining two years of term does not violate equal protection or require immediate elections); French v. Boner, 963 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1992) (almost four year delay in implementing new districting plan does not violate equal protection or require immediate elections); Political Action Conference of Illinois v. Daley, 976 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Republican Party of Oregon v. Keisling, 959 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (redistricting resulting in two year temporary dilution of voting power that does not unduly burden a particular group does not violate the equal protection clause or require immediate elections); Mader v. Crowell, 498 F. Supp. 226 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (redistricting resulting in two year temporary disenfranchisement of some voters does not violate equal protection or require immediate elections); but see Panior v. Iberville Parish Sch. Bd., 498 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1974).
Cf. cases cited at footnote 9, infra.
In French v. Boner, 963 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1992), the court examined a situation very similar to that presently before this Court and, after balancing the competing interests, concluded that the city of Nashville was not constitutionally required to "rerun the elections held just after the new decennial census data became available in 1991 but before the old apportionment plan could be changed and a new one put into effect." 963 F.2d at 891. The court noted that "[v]alues other than mathematical equality in preserving majority rule are also at stake." Id. at 891. The court went on to observe that:
In order to maintain relative mathematical equality in a population constantly on the move, we would have to have short terms of office and annual census updates. Short terms would sacrifice the stability and experience in office that longer terms contribute. Refusal to honor the preference of state and local bodies for longer terms would increase the costs of elections for taxpayers and candidates and would make it more difficult for citizens of limited means to participate in local elective politics. If new elections were ordered here, the process would undermine the settled expectations that both voters and elected officials hold as a result of the election last year.Id. at 891-92.
The court concluded that "there must be some tolerance in the machinery of majority rule under the Equal Protection Clause in order to take into account the values outlined above, as well as the practicalities of the local electoral processes established by states and cities for their own self-government." Id. at 892.
In this case, the burden on the plaintiffs' right to vote amounts to a predictable and temporary delay in implementing new census figures that occurs once every twenty years and results in some voters being either somewhat under or over-represented for an approximately three-year period. In the present circumstances, plaintiffs represent that the old districts vary from the ideal by as much as 13%. As noted, the one-person-one-vote principle does not require mathematical precision. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577. The acceptable range of variance is wider at the state level than at the national level, id. at 578, and presumably wider still at the local level. Further, although the burden does not fall evenly on every voter, neither does it apply more heavily to a particular class of people than to others. While the Court does not consider this burden de minimus, neither is it severe. See also Sims v. Amos, 365 F. Supp. 215, 222 (M.D. Ala. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Wallace v. Sims, 415 U.S. 902 (1974) (discussion acceptable range of deviation in voting districts).
Ward 6's current population of 33,364 people is 3,932 people over the ideal resulting in 13.36% underrepresentation.
The Court balances this burden against the interests advanced by the City as justification for maintaining the law in question — the four-year term of office and election cycle for Minneapolis City Council Member. The State's interest in the stability and integrity of the election process has been recognized as a compelling interest. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 366 (1997); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 226 (1989) ("Maintaining a stable political system is, unquestionably, a compelling state interest.") (internal citation omitted); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583. At oral argument, the City cited precisely these reasons for upholding the current state of the law. The Supreme Court has observed that reasonable, non-discriminatory election regulations applied even-handedly will ordinarily be justified by the state's regulatory interests. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788 (footnote omitted).
The Court also considers the burden of implementing the relief sought by plaintiffs. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 585. At a minimum, the City would be forced to incur the extra cost of planning for and implementing an election on short notice. Of more concern to the Court, however, is the probability, recognized by plaintiffs at oral argument, that awarding plaintiffs the relief they seek in this instance would effectively require a similar action at least every 20 years when the current situation is repeated. It could require similar action every 10 years in order to ensure that new census data is incorporated and put into action as soon as possible, and could require more frequent action if Minnesota decides to redistrict on a more frequent schedule. As the Sixth Circuit noted, the only way to avoid such a problem would be to order the City to limit terms of office and the election cycle — a significant interference in the State's right to regulate its elections that would be inappropriate absent greater provocation. French v. Boner, 963 F.2d at 891-92.
After weighing the burden placed on the right to vote against the City's valid interests and the cost of the relief requested, the Court is of the opinion that "considerations of mathematical equality in representation or the presumption in favor of redistricting every ten years [do not] outweigh the considerations outlined above concerning the validity of four-year terms, the settled expectations of voters and elected officials, the costs of elections, and the need for stability and continuity of office." Id. at 892.
Plaintiffs urge the Court that two cases in particular require the relief they seek. Both are distinguishable. In Assembly of the State of California v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939 (Cal. 1982), the state legislature had passed reapportionment statutes revising the state's congressional, senate, and assembly districts, which the governor had signed into law. The chairman of the California Republican Party and the Republican National Committee petitioned to qualify each statute for a referendum vote. Members of the California Assembly brought suit attacking the referenda petitions and requesting the court to omit the referenda from the ballot.
The court permitted the referenda to go forward, and determined that the impending referenda operated as a stay on the efficacy of the statutes. Id. at 950. The court noted that "all parties agree[d] that the population changes revealed by the 1980 census demonstrate that the old districts contain population disparities that are clear violations of the state and federal Constitutions' one-person, one-vote mandate" and that the old Congressional districts had been repealed. Id. at 951. Thus, the state had no valid districts in effect, requiring the court to establish "some temporary districting scheme." The court noted that its options were limited to either the old, invalidated apportionment plan or the new, challenged plan because the upcoming election was near, substantial preliminary planning and programming had already been done using the challenged districts, and it was not feasible to implement an entirely new plan in the short time frame. Id. Further, the court hesitated to intrude on the state legislature's role any further than necessary. Id.
The court chose to use the new, challenged districts. In doing so, the court noted that the old plan only provided for 43 congressional districts, and that California was now entitled to elect 45 congressional representatives. Id. at 953. Further, the old districts contained "enormous" population differences, resulting in variances from the ideal of as much as 50%. Id. at 956. Additionally, the court noted its goal of disrupting the electoral process as little as possible and pointed out that if the new plans end up approved by the voters in the referenda, they would simply continue to be used, and no disruption of the electoral process would occur. Id. at 957-58. Finally, the court emphasized that reverting to the old plan, rather than using the new plan, would effectively permit 5% of the voters, through the referendum process, to delay constitutionally mandated reapportionment and insist on use of blatantly unconstitutional districts. Id. at 958-59.
In reaching this conclusion, the court discussed Reynolds, and asserted that allowing the old districts to be used again would be contrary to the Reynolds holding. Id. at 951-52, 955. However, the court by no means rested its decision exclusively on the Reynolds language regarding the decennial redistricting process. In fact, the California court also quotes approvingly the Reynolds language regarding fashioning an equitable remedy appropriate to the circumstances. Id. The particular factual circumstances of Deukmejian — in particular, the referendum power and the need to add two congressional seats, and the fact that granting plaintiffs' requested relief here would be more disruptive of the normal election process rather than less — make that case distinguishable from the instant situation.
In Reapportionment of the Sch. Dist. of the City of Pittsburgh v. Allegheny County Bd. of Elections, 488 A.2d 1106 (Penn. 1985), the court noted that "[t]he objections raised to the reapportionment plan under consideration were all premised upon an implied assumption that the incumbent school directors had a legal right to serve out their elective terms." 488 A.2d at 1106. The court then pointed out that "[t]here is no constitutional or statutory basis for this assumption." Id. That situation is in contrast to the present in that Minneapolis City Council members are explicitly granted the right to finish their terms. Minneapolis City Charter, Ch. 1, § 3(F); see also Minn. Stat. § 205.84, subd. 1.
All election laws burden, at least to some extent, the right to vote. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788. However, not every burden amounts to a constitutional violation. While the laws at issue in this case certainly burden the one-person-one-vote principle, given the propriety of the redistricting process, and in light of the state's valid interests and the costs of implementing the relief requested, the burden presented by the present circumstances is not so severe as to qualify as a Constitutional violation. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II is therefore denied. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on these counts is granted.
III. COUNT VII — MINNEAPOLIS CITY CHARTER
Chapter 2, § 1 of the Minneapolis City Charter provides in relevant part, "The City Council shall consist of one (1) council member from each ward to be elected by the voters of the respective wards." Plaintiffs allege that by failing to implement the Minneapolis ward boundaries created in 2002, defendants have violated requirements of Chapter 2, § 1. According to plaintiffs, new wards 3 and 8 do not have a current resident city council member while new wards 5 and 9 each have two resident city council members. Defendants respond that the new wards simply have not come into effect yet. The November 2001 election, held using "old" ward boundaries, was a valid election and the Council members elected in that election will continue to represent the districts from which they were elected until the end of their terms.
Plaintiffs rely heavily on In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution 1 E, 1982 Special Apportionment Session; Constitutionality Vel Non, 414 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1982). In that case, the Florida State Legislature jointly adopted a redistricting plan on April 7, 1982 using the 1980 census figures. Id. at 1044. However, the House and Senate disagreed over whether all state senators, who served four-year staggered terms, should stand for election in 1982 based on the new districts or whether only those senators whose terms regularly expired in 1982 should be required to run for election in the new districts while those elected in 1980 would be permitted to finish their terms and not run for election in a new district until 1984. Id. at 1045. Based on the Florida Constitution, the Florida Supreme Court found that all senators were required to stand for election in 1982 under the new apportionment plan, regardless of the effective truncation of half of their terms. Id. at 1050. The Court finds this case inapposite.
Article III, § 1 of the Florida Constitution provides that "[t]he legislative power of the state shall be vested in a legislature of the State of Florida, consisting of a senate composed of one senator elected from each senatorial district . . ." As plaintiffs point out, the Florida court relied on this language, which is similar to the Minneapolis charter language, in finding that following the reapportionment, senators elected by an old district could not be said to represent the new district in which they happened to reside. Id. at 1049.
However, the Florida court also relied explicitly on a number of other factors. First, the Florida Constitution expressly provides for truncation of senate terms following reapportionment. Article III, § 15(a) provides that senators shall be elected to four-year staggered terms, "except, at the election next following a reapportionment, some senators shall be elected for terms of two years when necessary to maintain staggered terms." The court emphasized "that the use of the phrase `at the election next following reapportionment' clearly indicates that the terms of even or odd districts may be truncated following an apportionment when the geographic lines and constituencies of the district are changed." Id. at 1050.
The court also noted that the new apportionment plan not only changed the geographical districts, but also changed the districts from multi-member districts to single-member districts. Id. The court stated that such a major political change could constitute a "significant" "and even controlling, factor" requiring the court to deny holdover terms in favor of new elections of all senators even though multiple other courts have upheld holdover terms as merely temporary delays in enfranchisement justified by a desire to maintain continuity in political office. Id.
Numerous courts have found that permitting a staggered election cycle to continue unaltered following reapportionment caused, at most, a temporary disenfranchisement of voters that violates neither the equal protection clause nor any other constitutional provision and does not justify the massive intrusion into state political process that ordering new elections and truncating terms of office would constitute. See In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution 1 E, 414 So.2d 1040, 1047 (Fla. 1982) ( citing Mader v. Crowell, 498 F. Supp. 226 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); Ferrell v. Oklahoma ex rel. Hall, 339 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 406 U.S. 939 (1972); Legislature of the State of California v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6 (Cal. 1973) ; Twilley v. Stabler, 290 A.2d 636 (Del. 1972); Robinson v. Zapata Co., 350 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Carr v. Brazoria Co., 341 F. Supp. 155 (S.D. Tex 1972); Pate v. El Paso Co., 337 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Tex. 1970); Long v. Docking, 283 F. Supp. 539 (D. Kan. 1968); Stout v. Bottorff, 249 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Ind. 1965); Visnich v. Board of Educ., 37 Cal.App.3d 684, 112 Cal.Rptr. 469 (1974); Griswold v. County of San Diego, 32 Cal.App.3d 56, 107 Cal.Rptr. 845 (1973); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, No. 82SA6, 647 P.2d 191 (Colo. 1982); People v. Lavelle, 307 N.E.2d 115 (Ill. 1974); Selzer v. Synhorst, 113 N.W.2d 724 (Iowa 1962); Harris v. Shanahan, 387 P.2d 771 (Kan. 1963); Anggelis v. Land, 371 S.W.2d 857 (Ky.Ct.App. 1963); New Dem. Coalition v. Austin, 200 N.W.2d 749 (Mich.Ct.App. 1972); Barnett v. Boyle, 250 N.W.2d 635 (Neb. 1977); Yates v. Kelly, 274 A.2d 589 (N.J.Super.Ct. 1971); Marston v. Kline, 301 A.2d 393 (Penn. 1973)).
The instant case is distinguishable from the Florida case in that the Minneapolis charter does not explicitly provide for truncation of terms following reapportionment. On the contrary, Minneapolis Council Members are explicitly permitted to finish out their terms. Minneapolis City Charter, ch. 1, § 3(f); Minn. Stat. § 205.84. Further, the 2000 Minneapolis reapportionment did not institute a major political change as took place in Florida. Finally, permitting the Florida staggered election cycle to continue would have resulted in some senators serving new districts while others were serving old districts, potentially double representing some voters while leaving others without representation. The same is not true in this case, where all Council terms will end at the same time, and all members will be required to stand for election at the same time based on the new apportionment plan.
As was discussed previously, the 2001 election was not the result of an unreasonably delayed or otherwise unlawful redistricting process, and its results are valid. Reynolds recognized that there will inevitably be some degree of variation from the ideal district population towards the end of a redistricting cycle. The fact that completion of the redistricting process in 2002 made the precise contours of the district imbalances known does not render the 2001 election invalid. Nor does it somehow deprive the Council members elected in the 2001 election of their seats. The Council members elected in 2001 currently represent the residents of the old wards from which they were elected in 2001. Each will have the opportunity to run for election in 2005 as the Council member representing the new ward in which they reside at that time. The new wards, however, do not come into play until that election. That being so, the delay in holding elections based on the new wards does not constitute a violation of the City Charter. Therefore, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Count VII will be denied and defendants' will be granted.
IV. MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
As discussed in the introduction, plaintiffs contend that by failing to promptly implement the new ward boundaries, defendants have violated the Minnesota Constitution and several Minnesota statutes. As an alternative to direct relief, plaintiffs ask the Court to certify to the Minnesota Supreme Court those claims relating to the Minnesota Constitution and Minnesota statutes. More specifically, plaintiffs seek certification of the question of whether the Minnesota Constitution provides greater protection to the right to vote than does the United States Constitution such that failure to hold prompt elections following decennial redistricting violates (a) the Minnesota Constitution and/or (b) Minnesota Statutes §§ 204B.135, subd. 1 and 204B.14, subd. 1a. For the following reasons, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion for certification and will issue a certification order pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 480.065, subd. 5.
A. Standard of Review
The choice of whether to certify a question to the Minnesota Supreme Court rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). Minnesota has adopted the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, which provides "[t]he supreme court of [Minnesota] may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States . . . if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this state." Minn. Stat. § 480.065, subd. 3.
B. Counts III and IV
Article I, section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution, Minnesota's Equal Protection clause, provides, "No member of this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof . . ." Article VII, § 1 provides, "Every person 18 years of age or more who has been a citizen of the United States for three months and who has resided in the precinct for 30 days preceding the election shall be entitled to vote in that precinct." Plaintiffs assert that this language indicates that the Minnesota Constitution affords greater protection of the right to vote than does the federal constitution and thus argue that prompt implementation of redistricting plans may be required by the Minnesota Constitution, even if not required under the United States Constitution.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has declared the right to vote to be a "fundamental and personal right essential to the preservation of self-government." State ex rel. South St. Paul v. Hetherington 61 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1953); Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer, 659 N.W.2d 724, 729-730 (Minn. 2003). In Women of the State of Minnesota v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated, "This court has long recognized that we may interpret the Minnesota Constitution to offer greater protection of individual rights than the U.S. Supreme Court has afforded under the federal constitution." 542 N.W.2d at 30 ( citing Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993); State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985)). Additionally, the Minnesota Supreme Court has applied a "more stringent standard of review as a matter of state law under our state constitutional equivalent to the equal protection clause" than is required under the United States Constitution. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991); see also Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 30; State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 798-799 (Minn. 1999); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Minn. 1990).
In Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993), the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the degree of protection afforded the right to education under the Minnesota Constitution. The court noted that the fact that the right to education was textually explicit in the Minnesota Constitution was a critical factor in its decision to find education a fundamental right deserving of greater protection under the Minnesota Constitution than is offered by the United States Constitution. Id. at 312-314. As described above, the right to vote is explicitly enshrined in the Minnesota Constitution. In light of this precedent and the foregoing discussion, it is possible that the right to vote guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution requires more of the City than does the United States Constitution.
That said, the Minnesota Supreme Court has explicitly counseled against easily or lightly finding the Minnesota Constitution to provide greater protection than does the United States Constitution. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 30; see also State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 798-800 (Minn. 1999) (discussing decisions not to extend greater protection under Minnesota Constitution). "It is a significant undertaking for any state court to hold that a state constitution offers broader protection than similar federal provisions, and it is certainly not sufficient to reject a [U.S.] Supreme Court opinion on the comparable federal clause merely because one prefers the opposite result." Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 30 (internal quotation omitted). The court looks at "circumstances attendant to this case, but unique to Minnesota, [its] precedents, and the inadequacy [it] find[s] in the federal status quo" in attempting to formulate the "better law" for Minnesota citizens. Id. at 30-31.
The three-year delay in implementation of the new districts that occurs as a result of the interplay between the redistricting schedule and the election schedule places a clear burden on the right to vote. While the Court has determined as a matter of federal law that that burden is out weighed by other considerations, a finding that the Minnesota Constitution provides a greater degree of protection to the right to vote could shift that calculus. The question of whether the Minnesota Constitution provides different or greater protections than does the United States Constitution is a weighty one that requires close consideration of Minnesota law and policy. These sensitive considerations are obviously within the particular expertise of the Minnesota Supreme Court. This Court hesitates to insert itself into such a uniquely state matter, particularly in light of the clear federal constitutional law on the subject, and will therefore grant plaintiffs' motion to certify Counts III and IV.
The situation presented by this case will not likely reappear for twenty years in the City of Minneapolis, but it is likely to reappear somewhere in Minnesota after each decennial census. In addition, the questions certified have potential ramifications for how other representative bodies, including the Minnesota Legislature, handle the redistricting process. It is appropriate that the Minnesota Supreme Court carefully review the issues presented by the certification.
C. Counts V and VI
Plaintiffs also allege that the City's failure to "implement" its 2002 redistricting plan by immediately conducting elections using the new boundaries violates the provisions of Minnesota Statutes §§ 204B.135, subd. 1, and 204B.14, subd. 1a.
Minnesota Statute § 204B.135, subdivision 1 provides:
A city that elects its council members by wards may not redistrict those wards before the legislature has been redistricted in a year ending in one or two. The wards must be redistricted within 60 days after the legislature has been redistricted or at least 19 weeks before the state primary election in the year ending in two whichever is first.
Minnesota Statute § 204B.14, subdivision 1a defines the time requirements for redistricting plans. Section 204B.14, subdivision 1a provides:
It is the intention of the legislature to complete congressional and legislative redistricting activities in time to permit counties and municipalities to begin the process of reestablishing precinct boundaries as soon as possible after the adoption of the congressional and legislative redistricting plans but in no case later than 25 weeks before the state primary election in the year ending in two.
Plaintiffs contend that the plain language of the statutes requires adoption of the municipal ward boundaries in a timely fashion and thus necessarily implies that timely implementation is also required. Recalling familiar canons of statutory construction, plaintiffs argue that the legislature must have intended to require rapid implementation of redistricting plans because requiring prompt redistricting while permitting delayed implementation would be absurd and unreasonable, and would render the redistricting timelines superfluous.
Defendants respond that the statutes are carefully, and intentionally, limited to "redistricting" and do not address the timing or implementation of elections after completion of redistricting. Defendants also point out that Minn. Stat. § 205.84, subd. 1 explicitly recognizes that ". . . a change of ward boundaries does not disqualify a council member from serving the remainder of a term," and Minn. Stat. § 412.02, subd. 1 prescribes four-year terms for council members of certain statutory cities. Therefore, they argue, the legislature is clearly aware of the interplay between redistricting and election cycles, knows that it has the authority to require elections, and has declined to do so.
The Court is not aware of any precedent interpreting these statutes as they relate to the issues in this case. Were the Court to base a decision solely on the federal right to vote, it likely would conclude that these statutes do not mandate anything more than does the United States Constitution. Thus, while the right to vote is of unquestioned importance, a temporary delay in its implementation would not justify either the disruption of the electoral process occasioned by the relief sought or a federal court's intrusion into the state legislative arena. However, as noted above, there is a reasonable possibility that the Minnesota Constitution requires that greater protection be provided to the right to vote. A binding determination that the Minnesota Constitution provides an added degree of protection to the right to vote than does the federal Constitution would bolster plaintiffs' argument considerably and, in all likelihood, be determinative of the question. Therefore, the Court also grants plaintiffs' motion to certify Counts V and VI.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 19] is DENIED as to Counts I, II, and VII;
2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 16] is GRANTED as to Counts I, II, and VII;
3. Counts I, II, and VII of the Complaint [Docket No. 1] are DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Questions to the Minnesota Supreme Court [Docket No. 26] is GRANTED. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 480.065, subd. 3, the following question will be certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court:
Does the Minnesota Constitution provide greater protection to the right to vote than does the United States Constitution such that failure to hold prompt elections following decennial redistricting violates (a) the Minnesota Constitution and/or (b) Minnesota Statutes §§ 204B.135, subd. 1 and 204B.14, subd. 1a?
An order of certification will follow.
Minn. Stat. § 480.065, subd. 6(a)(2) requires that the Order of Certification to include "the facts relevant to the question, showing fully the nature of the controversy out of which the question arose." Subdivision 6(b) further states that `[i]f the parties cannot agree upon a statement of facts, the certifying court shall determine the relevant facts and state them as a part of its certification order."
Accordingly, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall MEET and CONFER regarding a proposed statement of facts for the certification order, understanding that the Court intends to submit to the Minnesota Supreme Court at a minimum, the facts set forth in this Memorandum Opinion and Order. The parties shall, on or before August 20, 2004, FILE with the Court either (1) an agreed, joint statement of facts or (2) a statement of agreed-upon facts together with separate submissions of additional facts upon which the parties cannot agree or (3) separate proposed statements of facts. All statements of facts submitted to the Court shall be supported by citations to the record. There will be no opportunity for responses to the proposed statements of fact.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts III, IV, V, and VI and all further proceedings in this matter, except as directed above, are STAYED pending response from the Minnesota Supreme Court and further order of this Court.