Opinion
Civil Action 22-83 J
01-24-2023
TERRANCE JUNOT, Petitioner, v. SHAWN FAULKNER, Warden, Respondent.
MARK. R. HORNAK, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ECF NO. 8
MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
II. REPORT
At the time of filing, Petitioner Terrance Junot ("Petitioner") was a federal prisoner held in the Federal Correctional Institution at Loretto ("FCI-Loretto") in Cresson, Pennsylvania. This case was initiated on May 25,2022 with the submission of Petitioner's self-styled "Petitioner under 28 U.S.C.§ 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody" (the "Petition"). ECF No. 1. After payment of the applicable filing fee, the Petition formally was filed on June 8,2022. ECF No. 8.
In the Petition, Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the form of application of Earned Time Credits under the First Step Act ("FSA") to his sentence, which allegedly would result in him becoming eligible for release. ECF No. 8 at 4-5. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2) and (3) (discussing prerelease custody and supervised release). 2
On September 22, 2022, Respondent submitted a "Notice of Suggestion of Mootness" ("Notice"), in which he argued that Petitioner's Earned Time Credits had been applied to his sentence, and that he had been released to home confinement on June 10, 2022. ECF No. 14 at 1. Respondent submitted two errata to the Notice, ECF Nos. 15 and 17, the latter of which was at this Court's direction, and which was served on Petitioner at his home address, ECF Nos. 16 and 17. The declaration and computer print-outs provided in support of the Notice simply indicate that Petitioner's sentence was recalculated, and that he was released pursuant to the FSA. ECF No. 17-1 at 2-3.
On September 23, 2022, this Court ordered Petitioner to respond to the Notice. ECF No. 18. As of this date, Petitioner has not complied with that order; nor has he filed anything else in this case.
A district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a litigant's failure to prosecute or to comply with an order of court. Guver v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429 (3d Cir. 1990). "Under our jurisprudence, the sanction of dismissal is reserved for those cases where the plaintiff has caused delay or engaged in contumacious conduct. Even then, it is also necessary for the district court to consider whether the ends of justice would be better served by a lesser sanction." Id
In Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit set forth six factors to be weighed when considering whether dismissal of a case as a sanction for failure to prosecute or to obey pretrial orders. They are: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an 3 analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id. at 868. These factors must be balanced in determining whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction, although not all need to weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal is warranted. Hicks v. Feeney, 850F.2dl52(3dCir. 1988).
Application of the Poulis factors is appropriate in the context of habeas cases as well as to civil rights actions. Harlacher v. Pennsylvania, No. 10-0267, 2010 WL 1462494, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 1445552 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2010) (applying Poulis to a habeas case). Consideration of the factors listed above is as follows.
(1) The extent of the party's personal responsibility
Petitioner is proceeding in this matter pro se, and is alone responsible for prosecuting this case and complying with orders of this Court.
(2) Prejudice to the adversary
Respondent has been served the Petition, and has put forth the argument that the Petition is moot. Petitioner has not responded thereto. However, the Petition is relatively new, and Respondent has not filed a formal Answer. Thus, while Respondent appears to have been unfairly prejudiced by Petitioner's failure to prosecute, that prejudice is minimal.
(3) A history of dilatoriness
Petitioner has refused to comply with a court order to respond to the argument that he has been released from federal custody and his Petition is now moot. This is sufficient evidence, in this Court's view, to indicate that Petitioner does not intend to proceed in this matter.
(4) Whether the party's conduct was willful or in bad faith
Petitioner has failed to comply with a court order directing him to respond to Respondent's Notice, in which Respondent argues that the Petition is moot because Petitioner has been released. 4
That Order and the Notice were served on Petitioner at his home address. The conclusion that Petitioner's conduct is willful is inescapable.
(5) Alternative sanctions
Petitioner currently is proceeding pro se, and there is no indication on the record that the imposition of costs or fees likely would be an effective sanction.
(6) Meritoriousness of the case
"A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Joseph v. Johns, No. 04-139J, 2005 WL 3447932, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2005), (quoting Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dept. of Health and Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1216 (11th Cir. 2000)), report and recommendation adopted, 2005 WL 3447933 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2005).
The evidence of record before this Court is that Petitioner was released to home confinement on June 10, 2022. ECF No. 17 at 1; ECF Nos. 17-1 - 17-3. However, it is unclear whether that moots the entire Petition. See ECF No. 8-2 at 1 (arguing for release directly to supervised release, not to home confinement). Further, the body of the Petition itself is unclear in that the relief requested by Petitioner is only the "immediate application of retroactive FSA Earned Time Credits and recomputation of [his] sentence and release date." ECF No. 8 at 10. Because Petitioner has not seen fit to comply with this Court's Order dated September 23, 2022, his opportunity to clarify this ambiguity has gone unrealized. This factor is neutral.
Four of the five Poulis factors weigh at least somewhat in favor of dismissal. But Petitioner's dilatory conduct has vexed this Court's ability to determine whether the Petition presents a live case or controversy. The result of Petitioner's dilatory behavior is that the first, 5 third, and fourth Poulis factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. Accordingly, dismissal is appropriate under Rule 41 (b) for failure to prosecute.
A certificate of appealability is not required for federal prisoners seeking relief under Section 2241. Muza v. Werlinger, 415 Fed.Appx. 355, 357 n.l (3d Cir. 2011). Therefore, it is not necessary to determine whether one should be issued here.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.