Joseph v. Johns

Full title: RONICTOR JOSEPH, Petitioner v. TRACY JOHNS, Warden, FCI-Loretto, Respondent

Court: United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

Date published: Oct 24, 2005

Civil Action No. 04-139J (W.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2005)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 04-139J.

October 24, 2005

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

LISA LENIHAN, Magistrate Judge

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the habeas petition filed by Petitioner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be dismissed.

REPORT

Through this Section 2241 petition, it appears that Ronictor Joseph (Petitioner) seeks to obtain credit against his federal sentence for time served in the custody of the former Immigration and Naturalization Services after he posted bond on a federal criminal charge. Because Petitioner's sentence has expired and he is no longer in the custody of the Respondent or even in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, and because he has been already been deported to Haiti, the present petition must be dismissed as moot.

A) Relevant Factual and Procedural History

Petitioner was arrested on January 17, 2002 on federal drug charges. He was held in the Federal Detention Center in Miami from January 18, 2002 until February 14, 2002. On February 14, 2002, Petitioner made bail on the federal drug charges. However, the INS had filed a detainer against Petitioner and upon his release from the Federal Detention Center, Petitioner was then detained in administrative custody by the INS pending a civil deportation determination. Petitioner remained in INS custody from February 15, 2002 until March 27, 2002 which Petitioner counts to be 42 days.

On April 2, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced by a guilty plea in the Southern District of Florida and ordered to serve 37 months of incarceration for importation of cocaine.

While incarcerated in FCI-Loretto, which is located in this District, Petitioner started to exhaust his administrative remedies as to the claim he presents in the instant Section 2241 petition, namely, that he was entitled to have the 42 days of time spent in the custody of the INS credited against his federal criminal sentence of 37 months. On July 2 or 3, 2003, Petitioner completed the exhaustion of his administrative remedies.

On April 19, 2004, Petitioner executed the current Section 2241 petition which he then filed in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Because Petitioner was incarcerated in this District and he was challenging the execution of his sentence, the Southern District Court, by order dated June 15, 2004, properly transferred the Section 2241 petition to this court.

This Court received the transferred case on June 22, 2004 and directed that the petition be served and that an answer be filed.

The answer was filed on March 15, 2005. Doc. 6. In that answer, the Respondent pointed out that on November 3, 2004, Petitioner was released from his sentence of incarceration and that furthermore, on February 10, 2005, Petitioner had been deported to Haiti. Doc. 6 at 2. Consequently, Respondent contended that the petition became moot.

B) Applicable legal principles

"A petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 attacks the execution of a sentence rather than its validity and must be filed in the district where the prisoner is confined." Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10^th Cir. 1996). As Petitioner was confined in this District at the time of the filing of this Section 2241 petition, the Section 2241 petition is properly brought in this court. Section 2241 of Title 28 provides in relevant part that the "writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."

C) Discussion

Essentially, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to credit for the period of time he was held in INS custody after he made bond on his federal criminal charges, which Petitioner calculated to be 42 days. In response, the Respondent argues that the petition is moot because Petitioner's sentence of incarceration has been completed and moreover he has been deported.

Essentially, this means that the Respondent has no authority over Petitioner any longer as his federal sentence of incarceration has fully expired and the Respondent is without power to correct any alleged error that occurred in the crediting of his federal sentence. The Court agrees that this case is moot.

"A case is moot when it is `impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever' to a prevailing party." In re Overland Park Financial Corp., 236 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10^th Cir. 2001) (quoting Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (some internal quotations omitted). See also Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11^th Cir. 2000) ("A case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). If events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of the ability to afford the plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief, then the case becomes moot and must be dismissed. De La Teja v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1357, 1362 (11^th Cir. 2003). "Any decision on the merits of a moot case or issue would be an impermissible advisory opinion." Florida Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, 225 F.3d at 1217.

By this action, Petitioner sought to have credits issued against his federal sentence, resulting in his speedier release.See Section 2241 Petition at p. 3 ¶ 7 and p. 6 at ¶ 8. However, because the Respondent has lost jurisdiction over Petitioner, the Respondent was thereby rendered unable to afford Petitioner any relief. Because no matter what order the District Court would issue to the Respondent, the Respondent, having no power over Petitioner, would be unable to effectuate any relief to Petitioner, the case is moot and must be dismissed. See Wilson v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 799 F.2d 591, 592 (9^th Cir. 1986) (holding that a case was moot because the named defendant could not be directed to do anything that would provide relief).

Even if the Respondent did have jurisdiction over Petitioner, the result would be the same. In his Section 2241 petition, what Petitioner essentially sought was release from his sentence of confinement in a speedier fashion. However, he has now already been released from that sentence. The court has no power to do anything to effectuate his speedier release given that he has already been released.

Where a party has obtained all the relief sought by the time a court comes to rule on a request for relief, the case becomes moot and should be dismissed. Lowe v. Duckworth, 663 F.2d 42, 43 (7^th Cir. 1981) ("When all the relief sought has been obtained, there no longer exists a live controversy, and the case must be dismissed as moot."). Accord Lowary v. Lexington Local Bd. of Educ., 854 F.2d 131, 133 (6^th Cir. 1988) ("If a party has already obtained all the relief sought on appeal, the case is moot and must be dismissed.") (citing DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1974)); Althridge v. Quiggs, 852 F.2d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("It seems clear that Athridge has obtained all the relief he is entitled to demand, and accordingly that his case is now moot.").¹ CONCLUSION

1 It would not appear that Petitioner needs a certificate of appealability in order to appeal the District Court's final order disposing of this case to the Court of Appeals. See United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Federal prisoner appeals from § 2241 proceedings, however, are not governed by 2253's certificate of appealability requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c) (1) (B) (applying the certificate of appealability requirement to federal prisoner appeals from `the final order in a proceeding under section 2255'); see also Sugarman v. Pitzer, 170 F.3d 1145, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (`We hold that a COA is not required for federal prisoner § 2241 appeals.')"); Moran v. Sondalle, 218 F.3d 647 (7^th Cir. 2000) (COA not required in a Section 2241 case involving federal prisoner).

In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b) (1) (B) (C), and Local Rule 72.1.4 B, the parties are allowed ten (10) days from the date of service to file written objections to this report. Any party opposing the objections shall have seven (7) days from the date of service of the objections to respond thereto. Failure to timely file objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.