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Julie P. v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division
Jul 28, 2008
No. A121777 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 2008)

Opinion


JULIE P., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SONOMA COUNTY, Respondent SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT et al., Real Parties in Interest. A121777 California Court of Appeal, First District, First Division July 28, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORT

Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. 2630-DEP

Marchiano, P.J.

By this petition for extraordinary writ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452), Julie P. challenges orders of the Sonoma County Superior Court, entered at the conclusion of the six-month review hearing (§§ 366, subd. (a)(1), 366.21, subd. (e)). The juvenile court terminated reunification services to Julie, and set a hearing to determine whether her parental rights to Edward should be terminated. (§ 366.26.)

Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

Julie contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it terminated reunification services. She implicitly contends that the orders of the juvenile court were not supported by substantial evidence. The record is otherwise. Accordingly, we will deny the petition.

Edward was three months old when he was detained after he was found with Julie as she wandered the streets on May 12, 2007, at 1:00 a.m., under the influence of methamphetamine. At the disposition hearing, reunification services were ordered for Julie when the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) withdrew its recommendation that no services be offered because of her prior failure to reunify with Edward’s older sibling (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(3)). Ordinarily, because of Edward’s age, reunification services would not exceed six months, from the time Edward entered foster care (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2)).

In this case that date is 60 days from his May 16, 2007 detention hearing, or July 15, 2007. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3).)

“When a child is removed from a parent’s custody, the juvenile court ordinarily must order child welfare services for the minor and the parent for the purpose of facilitating reunification of the family. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) For a child under three years of age at the time of removal . . . reunification services are presumptively limited to six months. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2).) The child’s status, and the question whether services should be extended for an additional period, must be reconsidered no less frequently than every six months. (§ 366, subd. (a)(1); Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1009 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 89, 116 P.3d 550].) The absolute maximum period for services is 18 months (§ 361.5, subd. (a)), provided the court determines at both a six-month review hearing and a 12-month review hearing that continuation of services is warranted (see § 366.21, subd. (e) [establishing procedures for the six-month review hearing]; id., subds. (f), (g) [establishing procedures for the 12-month review hearing]).” (Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 843 (Tonya M.).)

The six-month review hearing was originally scheduled for January 10, 2008; however, the matter was continued from time to time and was eventually tried May 12, 13 and 16, 2008, 12 months after Edward’s detention. One of the continuances was due to Julie’s delivery, prematurely, of another child. Throughout the delays, reunification services to Julie continued, exceeding the time period set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (a)(2). Therefore, by the time of the review hearing, the inquiry for the juvenile court was whether Julie was likely to reunify by July 15, 2008, 12 months from Edward’s entry into foster care. (Tonya M., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 840.)

That daughter, Mary Joe, is apparently also the subject of a dependency proceeding. The court in this case took judicial notice of Mary Joe’s file (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)); however, the parties here have not requested that we similarly judicially notice the file, nor have they referred to it other than to the fact that she is a dependant of the juvenile court.

Julie does not dispute the adequacy of the services ordered for her directed at her psychiatric condition, her drug addiction and her related inability to safely parent Edward. Instead, she argues that she complied with the elements of her case plan, was in fact making progress, and could have, with additional months of new individualized services, successfully reunified with Edward. She contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating services, and suggests that the court placed too much emphasis on her failure to disclose her pregnancy with Mary Joe.

In reviewing her claims, we are bound to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s rulings. (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) As relevant here, the following evidence was before the juvenile court. Public health nurse Zils, who qualified as an expert witness on the question whether Julie could safely parent Edward, had worked with Julie since December 2006. Zils had grave concerns about Julie’s abilities. Julie had not been cooperative with medical providers during Edward’s prenatal care and birth, putting him at risk by refusing induced labor when he was overdue, and refusing to discuss her medications with hospital staff. After his birth, during a visit by Zils, Julie failed or was unable to recognize the child’s hunger.

Zils and social worker Hall had great difficulty convincing Julie to participate in the Drug Abuse Alternatives Center perinatal program, notwithstanding that she was told of the value of the program to her needs and that it would increase her chances of reunification with Edward. Julie did not enroll in the program until several months after Zils initially recommended it.

Zils was very concerned with Julie’s statement that she should never have left the house with Edward the night of his detention. Zils took this as an indication that Julie would “isolate” if Edward lived with her, failing to take him for appropriate medical treatment and putting her own interests ahead of those of the child. Zils also concluded that Julie simply wasn’t “taking in” the information needed to successfully and safely parent Edward.

Notably, Julie never stated that she should not have taken methamphetamine while caring for Edward.

Julie never revealed her pregnancy with Mary Joe to Zils, nor to any of her other providers. And she failed to get prenatal care during the pregnancy. Mary Joe’s birth was premature. The issues surrounding the pregnancy confirmed Zils’s opinions about Julie’s tendency to isolate. Zils unconditionally expressed her expert opinion that Julie could not safely parent a child.

Social worker Hall worked with Julie since June 2007. Her reports were in evidence. In her six-month review report, Hall explained Julie’s failure to comply with the portion of her case plan requiring her to cooperate with referrals, sign consents, and keep the social worker apprised of changes in her circumstances. Julie refused to sign, or delayed at length in signing, releases for Edward’s health care, and releases of her own records relevant to her progress at reunification, notably, records of her visits with her psychologist. After Mary Joe’s birth, Julie told Hall that she had known she was pregnant, but concealed the fact because she was afraid the Department would remove the child—demonstrating her pattern of making poor decisions based on her own fears rather than her children’s needs.

Dr. Speicher performed a psychological evaluation of Julie. Her report was in evidence, and she testified at the hearing consistent with the report. She concluded that Julie was unlikely to be able to safely parent an infant. She was not honest with herself, and failed to understand the extent of her problems and their impact on her ability to parent. She was “blatantly not honest about her drug use.” Julie’s failure to obtain prenatal care for Mary Joe demonstrated “a lack of understanding about what it means to be pregnant and the care that’s required. I mean, that has a direct impact on her ability to parent. [¶] And if she can’t take the precautions that are necessary during a pregnancy, then she’s demonstrating a lack of understanding about what is required to be a parent.”

Dr. Speicher further explained that even if Julie did everything in her case plan for another six to 12 months she could not safely parent Edward.

Ms. McAdam, Julie’s therapist, testified on Julie’s behalf, explaining that Julie was making good progress in therapy. Although Julie was referred by the Department, Julie did not allow her to disclose anything beyond her general progress and attendance with social worker Hall. None of her work with Julie concerned parenting. She had no opinion whether Julie had the ability to parent Edward.

Julie testified that she believed she could parent Edward.

The cases relied upon by Julie (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519 [unflattering label of personality disorder only ground for decision where no evidence children at risk]; Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738 [conclusory opinions that mother had not “ ‘internalized’ ” what she had learned]; In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282 [teenager removed because of corporal punishment; no evidence to support conclusion return unsafe]) are not helpful to her. Here, factually specific expert testimony, corroborated by Julie’s own actions, amply supports the juvenile court’s orders.

We notified the parties when we issued our order to show cause and set this cause for oral argument that we would determine it on the merits. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; § 366.26, subd. (l) [precluding petitioner from challenging the orders terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a section 366.26 hearing]; Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888; Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024.)

The petition for extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. The section 366.26 hearing is set for September 4, 2008. Therefore, this opinion is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(3).)

We conc Stein, Swager, J.


Summaries of

Julie P. v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division
Jul 28, 2008
No. A121777 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 2008)
Case details for

Julie P. v. Superior Court

Case Details

Full title:JULIE P., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SONOMA COUNTY, Respondent

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division

Date published: Jul 28, 2008

Citations

No. A121777 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 2008)