Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2464-14T3
02-09-2016
J.R. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Y.R., Defendant-Respondent.
J.R., appellant pro se. Respondent has not filed a brief.
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Alvarez and Ostrer. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket No. FV-13-683-13. J.R., appellant pro se. Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Plaintiff J.R., who has been self-represented throughout, appeals the December 19, 2014 dissolution of a final restraining order (FRO) under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. We reverse and remand for additional proceedings.
Defendant Y.R., who was also unrepresented before the Family Part judge, filed a motion to vacate the FRO, because plaintiff was "abusing this restraining order" as he had "never been afraid of [d]efendant[,]" and was "using the restraining order to try to justify custody[.]" Defendant gave no other reason for dissolution in her submission. It is not clear from the record if plaintiff filed written opposition to defendant's application.
It is also not clear from the record how, on the day of the hearing, the judge who heard the matter knew that the April 30, 2014 FRO was granted on a default basis. A copy of the FRO has not been provided on appeal; we presume he gleaned the information from that document.
The transcript J.R. provided on appeal begins with the words, "(Proceedings from 10:46 a.m. to 11:02 a.m. not transcribed herein, pursuant to request.)" Obviously, we do not know the nature of the omitted material.
During the course of the next ten minutes of the hearing, of which we do have a transcript, the judge unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the parties' disputes regarding holiday visitation with their child. The holiday visitation problems included Christmas. It is apparent that the parties had an acrimonious relationship.
Finally, the judge said:
THE COURT: Okay. Well, here -- let me address -- you know what? You know what?
I'm not going to address the holiday schedule then. I mean, you know, . . . you'll both continue to be back here over and over again, and at some point I'll just start sanctioning both of you. Because if you think I'm going to listen to the same thing over and over for frivolous applications[.]The judge and plaintiff engaged in an exchange regarding, to use the judge's words, plaintiff's use of the FRO "as a sword." The judge then directed defendant to file an order to show cause with family court staff in order to address the Christmas holiday, just a few days away.
This is a frivolous restraining order, your restraining order that you got was frivolous, and I'm dismissing both of them, because I find that that was gotten in default and there's -- you're not in fear of her. You both have to just follow --
The judge continued:
THE COURT: Okay. This [c]ourt just gave you the most reasonable proposal, which [defendant] is being very reasonable on, and you're being hard headed. It's real simple. Real simple. She said Christmas Eve. She'll drive to Elizabeth Christmas morning.
. . . .
Both restraining orders are dismissed. They are not necessary. This is just game playing. Restraining orders are when people are in fear of each other. You are just playing --- both playing games. They're
both dismissed.
When plaintiff attempted to object, the judge said, "you know what? File an appeal, because you're playing games with her[.]"
After the notice of appeal was filed, the judge, pursuant to Rule 1:6-2(f), supplied a brief written statement of reasons. Applying Carfagno v. Carfagno, 288 N.J. Super. 424, 433 (Ch. Div. 1995), the judge found that defendant had established a basis for dissolution of the FRO because it was entered on a default basis, plaintiff was not in fear of defendant, and neither party sought restraining orders in good faith.
While it is not clear from the record, the judge may have also dismissed defendant's FRO against plaintiff.
The certification submitted by defendant in support of her motion to dissolve the FRO was inadequate to explain either the parties' history relative to the FRO, or her reasons for seeking its dissolution. We see no sworn testimony from plaintiff explaining his reasons for objecting to the dismissal of the FRO.
Rule 1:7-4(a) requires a judge to "find the facts and state [his] conclusions of law . . . on every motion[.]" Yet other than his conclusion that the parties were not acting in good faith and that plaintiff was not in fear, the Family Part judge made no actual findings.
The judge lacked enough information to even make any findings of fact, much less to draw his somewhat subjective conclusions from the facts, such as that plaintiff was not in fear, or that neither party was acting in good faith. Although the judge in his written statement of reasons cited to Carfagno as a touchstone, his discussion was minimal.
We reiterate that factfinding is essential not only for the sake of fundamental fairness, but for meaningful appellate review. Ducey v. Ducey, 424 N.J. Super. 68, 74 (App. Div. 2012). After making findings of fact, a trial judge must thereafter engage in some legal analysis to anchor his or her conclusions of law. Ibid. In this case, no one was served by the hybrid event that occurred, neither a hearing nor oral argument. Testimony was not taken. Reasoned argument was not made.
Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings so that the issues can be fully developed in compliance with due process and Rule 1:7-4(a). Because of the scant record, we have no opinion as to whether dissolution is proper. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Reversed and remanded. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION