Opinion
CV-202U239
08-29-2023
STEPHEN JOYCE and CINDA JOYCE, Plaintiffs, v. MARTINA M. SULLIVAN, Defendant.
Plaintiffs-Theodore Small, Esq. Defendant-Pro Se
Plaintiffs-Theodore Small, Esq. Defendant-Pro Se
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE THE ARBITRATION AWARD
MaryGay Kennedy, Justice
Before the Court is Defendant Martina M. Sullivan's Motion to Vacate the Arbitration Award. For the following reasons, the Court denies the Motion.
I. Background
On June 17,2021, Plaintiffs Stephen Joyce and Cinda Joyce ("the Joyces") filed the Complaint and Application to Compel Arbitration. After the Clerk entered a default against Ms. Sullivan for failure to plead, the Court entered default judgment on June 8, 2022. The Court ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration to resolve disputes relating to a boundary agreement recorded in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds in Book 30233, Page 157 ("the Boundary Agreement").
Arbitration proceeded before William Robitzek, Esq. ("the Arbitrator"), who made an award after hearing on July 1, 2023 ("the Award"). The issues before the Arbitrator were Ms. Sullivan's claims that the Boundary Agreement was invalid because of fraud and duress and that the Joyces had violated the terms of the Boundary Agreement.
In the Award, the Arbitrator discussed some of the protracted history of the dispute between the parties, which included a prior arbitration resulting in execution of the Boundary Agreement in 2012.
Ms. Sullivan alleged that the Joyces and their attorneys had made misrepresentations to her in the context of the prior litigation. She also alleged that they had omitted or concealed the fact that the Joyces had a relationship with an attorney at a firm with which the prior arbitrator was associated. The Arbitrator concluded that Ms. Sullivan did not demonstrate the elements of fraud. In particular, she had not proved damage from reliance on any of the alleged misrepresentations.
To induce Ms. Sullivan to sign the Boundary Agreement, the Joyces agreed to absolve her of legal fees ordered by the prior arbitrator. Ms. Sullivan was presented with various drafts of the Boundary Agreement throughout the parties' negotiations, which Ms. Sullivan found confusing. The Arbitrator concluded that, contrary to Ms. Sullivan's claims, these circumstances did not constitute duress.
Having concluded that Ms. Sullivan's fraud and duress claims were meritless, the Arbitrator proceeded to her claim that the Joyces had violated the terms of the Boundary Agreement. The Arbitrator determined that Ms. Sullivan failed to show the elements of trespass in connection with the Joyces' construction of a fence and maintenance of vegetation on what the Arbitrator interpreted to be the Joyces' property under the Boundary Agreement.
Ms. Sullivan also made arguments before the Arbitrator regarding her rights to an "old road." The Arbitrator interpreted the Boundary Agreement as governing the boundary between the parties' properties south of the "old road." He concluded that her arguments were outside of the scope of the Boundary Agreement.
Finally, the Arbitrator found that Ms. Sullivan demonstrated only tire "possibility" of damage to a maple tree on her property caused by the Joyces' gardening activities on their property, which did not entitle her to relief.
After finding that Ms. Sullivan had failed to prove any of her claims, the Arbitrator noted that, except for the trespass claim and claim regarding damage to the maple tree, all of Ms. Sullivan's claims could have been brought in the prior litigation. He concluded that they were, therefore, barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
The Award granted the Joyces their reasonable costs and fees associated with the arbitration, in an amount to be determined upon submission of an affidavit, Ms. Sullivan argues that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority. She also alleges that the Arbitrator exhibited partiality when he used the word "fraud" instead of "misrepresentation" and "false pretenses" to describe Ms. Sullivan's claims and when he concluded that certain of Ms. Sullivan's claims were barred by res judicata.
II. Legal Standard
The Maine Uniform Arbitration Act, 14 M.R.S. §§ 5927-5949 (2023), governs the courts' authority to confirm or vacate arbitration awards. 14 M.R.S. § 5938(1) provides that a court may vacate an arbitration award if:
A. The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
B. There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
C. The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
D. The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of section 5931, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party;
E. There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under section 5928 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; or
F. The award was not made within the time fixed therefor by the agreement or, if not so fixed, within such time as the court has ordered, and the party has not waived the objection.
But the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
III. Discussion
Ms. Sullivan brings her motion pursuant to paragraphs (B) and (C) of section 5938(1). The Joyces argue that Ms. Sullivan's motion is premature because, at the time of filing, the Arbitrator had not yet made an award of costs. Even assuming Ms. Sullivan's motion is not premature, the Court would deny it on the merits for the reasons discussed below.
Whether or not a dispute is arbitrable is a matter for the Court to decide. See 14 M.R.S. § 5928(1); Barrett v. McDonald Invs., Inc., 2005 ME 43, ¶ 14, 870 A.2d 146. The Court would note that it previously decided that the parties' dispute was arbitrable when it granted default judgment.
A. Whether the Arbitrator Exceeded his Authority
Ms. Sullivan argues that the Arbitrator erred in his interpretation of the Boundary Agreement and in concluding that Ms. Sullivan's consent to the terms of the Boundary Agreement was not induced by fraud or duress.
"The standard for determining whether an award exceeds an arbitrator's power... is an extremely narrow one. We will uphold an arbitrator's award if any rational construction of the Agreement could support the award." City of Lewiston v. Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n, IAF, Local No. 785, 629 A.2d 50,52 (Me. 1993) (citation omitted). "The burden of proving that the arbitrator exceeded his authority rests on . . . the party attacking the award." Id. at 53.
The Arbitrator did not exceed his authority. The Arbitrator, as asked, decided Ms. Sullivan's claims of fraud and duress, and interpreted the Boundary Agreement. The Court cannot say that any of his findings or conclusions were unreasonable or irrational.
B. Whether the Arbitrator Exhibited Partiality
Although Ms. Sullivan's motion is primarily focused on her argument that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority, she briefly argues that the Arbitrator exhibited partiality. She supports this argument only by pointing to his conclusion that Ms. Sullivan's fraud claims were barred by res judicata and his use of the word "fraud" to describe her claims of "misrepresentation" and "false pretenses." She makes no allegations regarding a conflict of interest, unfair treatment of the parties in the conduct of the proceedings, or similar circumstances that might evidence partiality. Deciding against a party on an issue is not, standing alone, evidence of partiality. Moreover, "fraud" is synonymous with "misrepresentation"-the Arbitrator's choice of one word over the other suggests nothing improper.
Because Ms. Sullivan has not alleged facts that, if true, could possibly support a finding of partiality, the Court determines that no evidentiary hearing is necessary. Cf. Concord Gen, Mui, Ins. Co. v. N. Assurance Co., 603 A.2d 470, 472 (Me. 1992) ("A party is not entitled to a testimonial hearing on a motion to vacate or to confirm an arbitration award in the absence of a showing that such a hearing will disclose relevant facts not otherwise before the court in affidavit form.").
As the Arbitrator correctly noted, the burden on a party claiming fraud is "high." To establish a claim of fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation, all five elements of fraud must be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) A party made a false representation,
(2) The representation was of a material fact,
(3) The representation was made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was true or false,
(4) The representation was made for the purpose of inducing another party to act in reliance upon it, and
(5) The other party justifiably relied upon the representation as true and acted upon it to the party's damage.Barr v. Dyke, 2012 ME 108, ¶ 16, 49 A.3d 1280.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Ms. Sullivan's Motion to Vacate the Arbitration Award. However, because the Arbitrator has not yet issued a final award with respect to costs, the Court will resubmit the matter to the Arbitrator for entry of an award of costs, after which either party may apply to the Court to confirm tire award pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 5937, See Hearst Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., N.Y. Branch, 584 A.2d 655, 659 (Me, 1991) (holding that Superior Court must resubmit matter to original arbitrator to complete an award which assigned liability but did not specify monetary obligation).
The entry is:
Defendant Martina M. Sullivan's Motion to Vacate the Arbitration Award is DENIED. The matter is resubmitted to the arbitrator, William Robitzek, Esq., for entry of an award of costs.
The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).