Opinion
E064479
03-17-2017
REY JORDAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. T.G.I. FRIDAYS, INC. et al., Defendants; NICHOLAS C. ROWLEY et al., Objectors and Appellants.
Nicholas C. Rowley, in pro. per. and for Objector and Appellant Courtney Rowley; and Bruno Nalu and Keith J. Bruno, for Objector and Appellant Nicholas C. Rowley.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIC1100955) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sunshine S. Sykes, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions. Nicholas C. Rowley, in pro. per. and for Objector and Appellant Courtney Rowley; and Bruno Nalu and Keith J. Bruno, for Objector and Appellant Nicholas C. Rowley.
I
INTRODUCTION
In this appeal, objectors and appellants, husband and wife trial lawyers Nicholas C. Rowley and Courtney Rowley (the Rowleys), the attorneys of record for plaintiff, Carmen Jordan, challenge the court's May 11, 2015 order imposing $1,500 in sanctions against both of them for their failure to appear in court on two dates: May 1, 2015, for a hearing on motions in limine, and May 8, 2015, the date set for trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 177.5.)
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
Section 177.5 authorizes a judicial officer to "impose reasonable money sanctions," not to exceed $1,500, for any violation of a lawful court order by a person, including a party's attorney, if the violation was "without good cause or substantial justification." Both section 177.5 and due process require the court to give the person to be sanctioned "notice and opportunity to be heard" regarding amount and basis of the proposed sanctions before the sanctions may be imposed. (§ 177.5, 2d par.; People v. Whitus (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 6.) The sanctions order must also be in writing and "recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order." (§ 177.5, 2d par.)
The Rowleys claim the $1,500 sanctions order must be reversed because it does not comply with section 177.5 in several respects. They argue: (1) they were not ordered to personally appear in court on either May 1 or 8, 2015, and thus violated no court order in failing to appear on either date; (2) the court violated their due process rights and section 177.5 in giving them only three days' notice, by mail, of the May 8 order to show cause (OSC) hearing on the sanctions order, though the May 8 OSC hearing was continued to May 11; (3) they demonstrated "good cause or substantial justification" for their failures to appear (§ 177.5); and (4) the sanctions order does not "recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order," as section 177.5 requires.
We affirm the May 11 order for sanctions to the extent it sanctions the Rowleys for their failure to appear in court pursuant to court order on May 8, 2015, the date set for trial. The Rowleys violated a February 9, 2015 court order in failing to appear on May 8, 2015, the date set for trial. We reverse the May 11 sanctions order, however, to the extent it sanctions the Rowleys for their failure to appear on May 1, 2015, the date scheduled for a hearing on the parties' motions in limine. Neither the February 9 order nor any other court order required the Rowleys to appear on May 1, 2015. Accordingly, no monetary sanctions can be imposed for the Rowleys' failure to appear on May 1. (§ 177.5.) Remand is necessary for the court to consider whether to impose $1,500 or a lesser amount of sanctions for the Rowleys' failure to appear on May 8.
By an order dated March 1, 2017, we denied the Rowleys' motion to dismiss the appeal, which was filed on February 28, 2017, long after the record on appeal was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule. 8.244(c); Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 982, 994, fn. 5. ["'After the record on appeal is filed, dismissal of the action based on abandonment or stipulation of the parties is discretionary rather than mandatory.'"] At oral argument on March 7, 2017, the Rowleys renewed their motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming the appeal is moot because they paid the $1,500 in sanctions and no longer wish to challenge the sanctions order on appeal.
We decline to dismiss the appeal as moot. "'A case is moot when the reviewing court cannot provide the parties with practical, effective relief. [Citation.] In such cases, the appeal generally should be dismissed. [Citation.] But even if a case is technically moot, the court has inherent power to decide it where the issues presented are important and of continuing [public] interest.' [Citation.]" (County of Riverside v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 20, 25, fn. 3.) Even if this appeal is technically moot, it is appropriate for this court to decide the issues raised on appeal because they involve important issues of public interest which are likely to recur. (Ibid.; Winikow v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 719, 724726.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2011, plaintiffs, Rey Jordan and Carmen Jordan, filed a complaint in propria persona against T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. and other defendants for the wrongful death of plaintiffs' son, Orlando Jordan, whom plaintiffs claimed was stabbed to death by an underage drinker at a T.G.I. Friday's, Inc.'s restaurant at the Galleria at Tyler mall in Riverside in January 2009. The Rowleys began representing plaintiffs when a third amended complaint was filed on March 15, 2014. The register of actions shows that, on May 15, 2014, the Law Offices of Attorney Keith Bruno, APC, became associated counsel for plaintiffs.
A fourth amended complaint was filed in June 2014. In December 2014, summary judgment in favor of T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. on the fourth amended complaint was granted, but the fourth amended complaint remained pending against other defendants.
The register of actions shows that a jury trial was to begin January 23, 2015, but the trial was trailed to January 30, then to February 3, 2015. On February 3, trial was "called for hearing," but neither of the Rowleys appeared. Attorney Keith Bruno (Mr. Bruno) appeared for plaintiff Rey Jordan. No appearance was made on behalf of plaintiff Carmen Jordan.
On January 30, plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion to continue the trial, and an ex parte hearing on the motion was set for February 2. On February 2, the Rowleys filed declarations in support of plaintiff Carmen Jordan's "Objection to Trial Proceeding." At the ex parte hearing on February 2, 2015, the court (Judge Sykes) denied plaintiffs' motion to continue the trial. There were no appearances "by or for" plaintiffs, including the Rowleys, at the February 2 ex parte hearing, but the defendants appeared through their counsel.
In court on February 3, the court ordered "[a]ll counsel in this matter . . . to meet and confer regarding available dates to set this matter for trial" and for motions in limine to be heard. On February 3, plaintiffs changed their attorneys of record from The Rowley Law Firm to Carpenter, Zuckerman & Rowley, LLP, and the court scheduled a trial setting conference (TSC) for February 9, 2015.
On January 30, 2015, defendants filed numerous motions in limine, and oppositions and replies were filed on February 2. On February 17, 2015, additional papers were filed concerning the motions in limine.
On February 3, 2015, the court ordered notice of the February 9, 2015 TSC to be given by Mr. Bruno, who appeared on February 3 on behalf of plaintiff Rey Jordan only. The clerk mailed notice of the court's February 3 minute order to Nicholas Rowley and The Rowley Law Firm on February 3.
At the February 9 TSC, Mr. Bruno appeared "via Court Call" for plaintiff Rey Jordan and "specially appeared" for plaintiff Carmen Jordan. Neither of the Rowleys appeared in court. The court set a jury trial for May 8, 2015 and ordered "[a]ll [c]ounsel of record and their clients" to appear in court for trial on May 8, 2015. (Italics added.) The court also scheduled a hearing on the parties' motions in limine for April 24, 2015. Pursuant to a stipulation and order filed on March 23, 2015, the April 24 hearing was continued to May 1, 2015.
On April 30, 2015, Mr. Rowley filed a "Notice of Unavailability" and a supporting declaration on behalf of plaintiff Carmen Jordan, stating that both he and Mrs. Rowley were engaged in trial in Modesto, California (Stanislaus County) in Tenaya Strand v. Memorial Medical Center et al., case No. 648369 (Strand), and had been ordered to trial on the Strand case on April 14, 2015. Mr. Rowley stated he expected the Strand trial to last four additional weeks beyond April 30, that is, through May 2015. Mr. Rowley thus claimed that both he and Mrs. Rowley were unable to attend the May 1 hearing on the motions in limine and were also unable to begin trial on May 8. By their Notice of Unavailability, the Rowleys purported to ask the court to continue both the May 1 hearing and the May 8 trial date. Mr. Rowley averred that the Strand case was "a birth injury case with preferential status."
On Friday, May 1, 2015, Mr. Bruno again appeared for plaintiff Rey Jordan and stated he was specially appearing "for the Rowleys" on behalf of plaintiff Carmen Jordan. On May 1, the court ruled on some of the motions in limine, reserved ruling on others, and denied plaintiff Carmen Jordan's request to continue the May 8 trial date as the Rowleys had requested pursuant to their Notice of Unavailability filed on April 30.
At the conclusion of the May 1 hearing, the court ordered the Rowleys to file and serve, no later than May 6, a declaration explaining when the Strand trial began, when it was expected to end, and "a detail of their subsequent trial schedules," in order to ensure that if the court were to continue the May 8 trial date, that would be the last continuance of the trial. The court also ordered the Rowleys to explain their May 1 nonappearance, given that the court clerk had called the Modesto court on May 1 and was told that the courtroom where the Rowleys were supposed to be in trial in the Strand case was dark on May 1. Mr. Bruno told the court he would advise the Rowleys of the court's May 1 order.
On Tuesday, May 4, 2015, the court, on its own motion, set an OSC hearing on May 8, 2015, regarding whether $1,500 in money sanctions should not be imposed on the Rowleys for their failure to appear on May 1, and ordered the Rowleys to appear on May 8. On May 4, the clerk mailed notice of the May 8 OSC hearing to The Rowley Law Firm and to Carpenter, Zuckerman & Rowley, LLP.
On Friday, May 8, 2015, neither of the Rowleys appeared in court, despite the February 9 order directing "[a]ll [c]ounsel of record" to personally appear for trial on May 8, 2015. The register of actions shows that Attorney Henry Peacor specially appeared for plaintiff Carmen Jordan and that plaintiff Rey Jordan was represented by both Mr. Bruno of Carpenter, Zukerman & Rowley, LLP and by Angela Bruno of the Law Offices of Keith Bruno APC.
After discussing numerous trial issues with counsel, the court turned to the scheduled OSC hearing. The court noted that the Rowleys had not filed a declaration explaining their failure to appear in court on either May 1 or May 8, as the court had ordered the Rowleys to do by May 6. Mr. Bruno told the court that Mr. Rowley was going to be in court "bright and early" on Monday, May 11, to try the case. Mr. Bruno explained it was his understanding that the court wanted the Rowleys to file a declaration by May 6 only if the Rowleys would be unavailable to try the case on May 8. The court responded that its purpose in ordering the Rowleys to file a declaration by May 6 was to give the Rowleys "the opportunity to explain why their declaration of unavailability [filed on April 30] indicated that they were in trial and unavailable when, in fact, they weren't in trial and unavailable." The court said it had been given "no legitimate explanation" for the Rowleys' unavailability on either May 1 or May 8 "other than them being at some sort of conference when they were ordered to appear today [May 8]." The court noted that the Rowleys had never appeared in the case. The court also expressed concern that it had excluded a lot of evidence in ruling on the motions in limine and wanted to be certain that the Rowleys were aware of those rulings and said "nothing inappropriate" during opening statements.
On May 8, the court imposed $1,500 in joint sanctions on the Rowleys, payable by June 8, 2015. The court set another OSC regarding sanctions for 9:30 a.m. on Monday, May 11, 2015; ordered the Rowleys to appear on May 11; and further ordered the Rowleys to submit "a declaration re non-appearances" by May 11.
At 9:30 a.m. on Monday, May 11, once again, neither of the Rowleys were present in court and neither of them had filed a declaration explaining their failures to appear on May 1 or May 8. Mr. Bruno appeared for plaintiff Rey Jordan and Angelo Bruno appeared for "plaintiffs." Regarding the May 11 OSC, Mr. Bruno explained that the Rowleys were on their way to court; their plane had been delayed by bad weather; they had prepared and reviewed, but had not yet signed, a declaration explaining their May 1 and May 8 failures to appear; and they would sign the declaration as soon as they arrived in court. The court said it appeared that "the Rowleys have not taken this case seriously. They have not been acting appropriately whatsoever and respecting this Court's time as well as their own client's time and . . . interest because they continuously failed to appear. They have yet to appear in this courtroom [on] one single occasion . . . ."
Around 9:50 a.m. on May 11, 20 minutes after the OSC hearing was to begin, Mr. Rowley arrived in court and explained that his chartered plane was delayed due to bad weather and that his May 11 declaration explained both his and Mrs. Rowley's failures to appear in court on May 1 and May 8. In his May 11 declaration, Mr. Rowley explained that the Strand case settled late during the day on May 1, but the Rowleys were not in trial on the Strand case on April 30 or May 1, contrary to what Mr. Rowley represented in his April 30 declaration. Mr. Rowley told the court that he did not sign his April 30 declaration and it should not have been filed because it "was not entirely accurate" and "didn't explain everything," though nothing in the declaration was "untrue." In his April 30 declaration, Mr. Rowley described himself and Mrs. Rowley as "trial counsel for Plaintiff Carmen Jordan."
Contrary to the statements in his April 30 declaration that he and Mrs. Rowley were in trial on the Strand case on April 30 and May 1, Mr. Rowley averred in his May 11 declaration that the judge on the Strand case allowed the Rowleys to attend a trial lawyers' conference in Iowa on April 30 and May 1, and Mr. Rowley was to be a presenter at the conference. The May 1 date for the motions in limine "did not work" for Mr. Rowley because of the Strand trial and because of the trial lawyers' conference in Iowa. Mr. Rowley explained that he and Mrs. Rowley "were able to stay in Iowa longer" after the Strand case settled on May 1. All six of the Rowleys' children, who lived in Iowa, were ill, and for that reason the Rowleys did not return to Northern California until Thursday, May 7. The Rowleys decided to stay in Calistoga through the Mother's Day weekend, May 9 and 10, rather than appear for trial on May 8, even though the Strand case had settled on May 1.
Mr. Rowley noted that the Rowleys had never received any notice requiring their personal appearance on May 1. He claimed they did not appear in court on May 1 "not out of disrespect or a lack of caring," but because they believed Mr. Bruno, with whom Mr. Rowley had tried cases, was able to handle the motions in limine for both plaintiffs. Mr. Rowley also noted that, on May 1, the court said nothing about setting an OSC hearing on May 8 or 11, and the court clerk only sent notice of the May 8 OSC hearing by mail on May 4. Mr. Bruno did not receive the clerk's notice of the May 8 OSC hearing until Thursday, May 7.
Regarding the May 8 trial date, Mr. Rowley understood from speaking with Mr. Bruno that the court would be referring the parties to mediation on May 8, or to another mandatory settlement conference, and trial would not begin until Monday, May 11. Mr. Rowley represented that Mrs. Rowley was not present in court on May 11 because she was caring for the Rowleys' seven-month-old son.
On May 11, the court indicated it had read Mr. Rowley's and Mr. Bruno's declarations. The court vacated its May 8 sanctions order, but then reimposed the $1,500 in sanctions against the Rowleys for their failure to appear in court on May 1 and May 8. Trial commenced on May 11, immediately after the OSC hearing. At trial, Mr. Bruno represented plaintiff Rey Jordan and Mr. Rowley represented plaintiff Carmen Jordan. Mrs. Rowley did not appear for trial.
On May 21, 2015, Mr. Rowley filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 11 sanctions order. The parties waived their right to a hearing, and on July 10, 2015, the court denied the motion. On September 2, 2015, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant Michael Castillo only for $16 million. On September 17, 2015, the Rowleys filed a notice of appeal challenging the May 11, 2015 sanctions order. (§ 904.1, subd. (b).)
III
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 177.5 provides, in pertinent part: "A judicial officer shall have the power to impose reasonable money sanctions, not to exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), notwithstanding any other provision of law, payable to the court, for any violation of a lawful court order by a person, done without good cause or substantial justification. . . . For the purposes of this section, the term 'person' includes a witness, a party, a party's attorney, or both. [¶] Sanctions pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except . . . on the court's own motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing sanctions shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order."
Courts have aptly summarized the requirements for imposing a valid sanctions order under section 177.5 as follows: "'"Due process, as well as the statute itself, requires that a person against whom Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 sanctions may be imposed be given adequate notice that such sanctions are being considered, notice as to what act or omission of the individual is the basis for the proposed sanctions, and an objective hearing at which the person is permitted to address the lawfulness of the order, the existence of the violation, and the absence of good cause or substantial justification for the violation."'" (People v. Whitus, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 6; People v. Hundal (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 965, 970.)
We apply the deferential abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a sanctions order under section 177.5. (People v. Whitus, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 6 ["'The imposition of monetary sanctions under section 177.5 "'is within the discretion of the trial court. That discretion must be exercised in a reasonable manner with one of the statutorily authorized purposes in mind and must be guided by existing legal standards as adapted to the current circumstances.'"' [Citation.]"].) A court abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions if the factual findings underlying the court's sanctions order are unsupported by substantial evidence. (Conservatorship of Becerra (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1481-1482.) B. The Rowleys Violated the February 9 Order in Failing to Appear on May 8, But No Court Order Required the Rowleys to Appear on May 1
The Rowleys claim the May 11 2015 order imposing $1,500 in sanctions against them must be reversed because no court order required them to appear in court on either May 1 or May 8, 2015. The Rowleys are correct that no court order required the Rowleys to appear on May 1 for the hearing on the motions in limine.
By its February 9 order at the TSC, the court set a hearing on motions in limine for April 24. The April 24 date was continued to May 1, pursuant to a stipulation and order filed on March 23. Nothing in the record indicates that the February 9 order or the March 23 stipulation and order required any particular counsel, including the Rowleys, to appear for the May 1 hearing. As noted, Mr. Bruno appeared on May 1 and argued the motions in limine on behalf of both plaintiffs.
The record does not include the March 23, 2015 stipulation and order.
The Rowleys are incorrect, however, in claiming that no court order required them to appear in court on May 8. The February 9 order set a jury trial on May 8, expressly required "[a]ll [c]ounsel of record" to appear on May 8, and prohibited special appearances by any counsel on May 8. Further, the May 8 trial date was never continued. The Rowleys were "counsel of record" and trial counsel for plaintiff Carmen Jordan. By their Notice of Unavailability and Mr. Rowley's supporting declaration filed on April 30, the Rowleys represented they were "trial counsel" for plaintiff Carmen Jordan, and asked the court to continue the May 1 and May 8 dates. The Rowleys violated the February 9 order in failing to appear on May 8.
Though the Rowleys did not include a copy of the February 9, 2015 minute order in designating the record on appeal (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.121), the register of actions shows, and the Rowleys concede, that at the TSC on February 9 the court set a jury trial on May 8 and ordered "[a]ll [c]ounsel of record" to appear at trial on May 8. Further, the May 8 trial date was never continued.
The Rowleys maintain that Carpenter, Zuckerman & Rowley, LLP was "[c]ounsel of record" for plaintiff Carmen Jordan on May 8 and, therefore, the February 9 order allowed any attorney associated with the Carpenter firm, including Mr. Peacor, to appear on May 8 on behalf of plaintiff Carmen Jordan. The Rowleys are mistaken. Though the Carpenter firm was the law firm of record for plaintiff Carmen Jordan on February 9 through May 8, the Rowleys were "trial counsel" and counsel of record for plaintiff Carmen Jordan. As experienced trial counsel and as trial counsel for plaintiff Carmen Jordan in particular, the Rowleys should have understood that the February 9 order required their personal appearance on May 8, and that Mr. Peacor could not specially appear for them. C. The Rowleys Were Given Sufficient Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard Regarding the May 11 Sanctions Order
As noted, the February 9 order prohibited special appearances on May 8, but both the May 8 minute order and the register of actions shows that Mr. Peacor "specially appear[ed]" for plaintiff Carmen Jordan on May 8. The Rowleys claim the record is mistaken to the extent it indicates that Mr. Peacor "specially appear[ed]" on May 8, but the record does not support this claim. The record does not include a reporter's transcript of any counsel entering their appearances on May 8. Instead, the reporter's transcript of the May 8 proceedings begins with the court saying "Back on the record in T.G.I. Fridays. . . ." --------
The Rowleys also claim the court violated section 177.5 and their due process rights in failing to give them sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard before the court imposed the $1,500 in sanctions on May 11. Again, we disagree.
Section 177.5 and due process require that a person to be sanctioned under section 177.5 be given "notice and opportunity to be heard" before sanctions may be imposed under the statute. (People v. Whitus, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 6; People v. Hundal, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 970.) On Tuesday, May 4, the court scheduled an OSC regarding sanctions for Friday, May 8, following the Rowleys' failure to appear on Friday, May 1. Notice of the May 8 OSC hearing was sent to the Rowleys by mail on May 4. On May 8, the court imposed $1,500 in sanctions for the Rowleys' failures to appear on May 1 and May 8, but set a further OSC regarding the same sanctions for Monday, May 11, at 9:30 a.m.
On Monday, May 11, Mr. Bruno and Mr. Rowley were present in court and signed and filed declarations explaining the Rowleys' failure to appear on May 8. Mr. Rowley appeared at the May 11 OSC hearing around 20 minutes late, but the court read his and Mr. Bruno's declarations and gave Mr. Rowley an opportunity to explain his and Mrs. Rowley's failures to appear on May 1 and May 8. On this record, we cannot imagine what other evidence the Rowleys could have offered on or before May 11 that they did not offer at the May 11 OSC hearing. The Rowleys were not denied fair notice or an opportunity to be heard before the sanctions were imposed on May 11. (Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 970, 976-977.) D. The Rowleys Did Not Demonstrate "Sufficient Justification or Excuse" for Their Failure to Appear on May 8 (§ 177 .5)
The Rowleys claim they demonstrated sufficient justification and excuse for their failure to appear on May 8 because, on May 5, the court notified Mr. Bruno by e-mail that the parties would be referred to mediation on May 8, and both Mr. Bruno and Mr. Rowley understood that trial would not begin until Monday, May 11. This argument is superfluous and shows contempt for the court's orders. (See People v. Whitus, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th Supp. at pp. 11-14 [discussing duties of attorneys to maintain respectful attitude toward the court].)
The Rowleys did not demonstrate sufficient justification or excuse for their failure to appear on May 8. The May 8 trial date was never continued, and the February 9 order requiring the Rowleys' appearance at trial on May 8 was never modified.
The entire record shows the Rowleys simply unilaterally decided not to appear on May 8, not because they were still in trial on the Strand case—they were not—but because they wanted to spend Friday, May 8, and the Mother's Day weekend of May 9 and 10 in Northern California and Calistoga, and they did not believe their appearance on May 8 was necessary or important, despite the February 9 order. The Rowleys simply took it upon themselves to disregard the court's lawful February 9 order to appear on May 8.
The record also shows the Rowleys had contempt for the court's orders and were intent on deciding for themselves which of the court orders they would follow. In his April 30 declaration, Mr. Rowley told the court that he and Mrs. Rowley were in trial on the Strand case in Modesto on April 30 and May 1, when in fact they were not in trial on the Strand case on those dates. On May 11, Mr. Rowley recanted his April 30 declaration and told the court he did not sign that declaration, though nothing in it was "untrue." Mr. Rowley then told the court he "was engaged in Modesto . . . until last Monday on a case," contrary to the statements he made in his May 11 declaration that he left Modesto on April 30 to travel to Iowa for a trial lawyer's conference. Given the inconsistencies in Mr. Rowley's representations to the court, the court could have reasonably discredited everything Mr. Rowley said about his whereabouts on April 30, May 1, and May 8.
In any event, though no sanctions can be imposed on the Rowleys for their failure to appear on May 1 because no court order required their appearance on May 1 (§ 177.5), the Rowleys presented no justification or excuse whatsoever for their failure to appear on May 8. By their own admission, the Rowleys did not appear on May 8 for purely personal reasons and because they did not think their May 8 appearance was important—not because they were otherwise engaged in trial. The entire record shows the Rowleys' contempt for the court's February 9 order. The court had ample reason to impose sanctions against the Rowleys for their failure to appear on May 8. E. The Lack of a Written Sanctions Order is Not Prejudicial
Lastly, the Rowleys claim the court's May 11 sanctions order, as reflected in the court's May 11 minute order, lacks the detail and specificity required by section 177.5. Section 177.5 requires that an order imposing sanctions be in writing and "recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order." The purpose of requiring a detailed, written sanctions order is twofold: to "'fulfill the "rudiments" of due process required for governmental imposition of a penalty upon an attorney or party—both for due process' own, constitutional sake and to ensure that the power conferred by [section 177.5] will not be abused. [Citations.] Moreover, in some cases the court's recitation will be an invaluable aid to a reviewing court determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions. [Citation.]'" (Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 977.)
The record does not include a written sanctions order, and it appears that the court did not issue a written sanctions order. However, the court's May 11 minute order states that the court imposed "[s]anctions in [the] amount of $1,500" on the Rowleys, payable on or before June 11, 2015, and the reporter's transcript of the May 11 OSC hearing shows that the $1,500 in sanctions was imposed for the Rowleys' failures to appear on May 1 and May 8. Additionally, the entire record shows "the conduct or circumstances justifying the [sanctions] order." (§ 177.5.) As explained, the record also shows that the court was eminently justified in imposing sanctions against the Rowleys for their failure to appear on May 8. Any error in failing to issue a written sanctions order "recit[ing] in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order" was not prejudicial to the Rowleys. (§ 475 [nonprejudicial defects in proceedings are disregarded].)
IV
DISPOSITION
The May 11, 2015 order imposing $1,500 in sanctions against Attorneys Nicholas C. Rowley and Courtney Rowley is reversed to the extent it includes sanctions for the Rowleys' failure to appear in court on May 1, 2015, but the order is affirmed to the extent it includes sanctions for the Rowleys' failure to appear on May 8, 2015.
The matter is remanded with directions to the trial court to consider whether to impose $1,500 or a lesser amount of monetary sanctions for the Rowleys' failure to appear in court on May 8, 2015, only. On remand, the Rowleys are to be given advance notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the proposed amount and factual basis of the court's proposed monetary sanctions for their failure to appear on May 8. (§ 177.5.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. HOLLENHORST
J.