Opinion
Nos. 05-05-00051-CR, 05-05-00052-CR
Opinion issued January 24, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F04-01504-Pi F04-01506-PI. Affirmed.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, WRIGHT, and MAZZANT.
OPINION
Edison Lee Jones appeals his convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated sexual assault. Appellant pleaded guilty to both charges and the jury assessed punishment at thirty years in prison for the aggravated robbery conviction and life for the aggravated sexual assault conviction. In two issues, he claims his pleas were involuntary and the trial court erred in admitting opinion testimony. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Factual Background
Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery and aggravated sexual assault of a seventy-eight year old woman. Each indictment alleged the use of a deadly weapon-a hammer-during the commission of the offense and contained an enhancement paragraph describing a prior felony offense-injury to a child. Appellant pleaded guilty to the offenses, pleaded true to the enhancement paragraphs, and chose to have the jury determine his punishment. On December 2, 2004, the jury assessed punishment at thirty years in prison for the aggravated robbery conviction and life in prison for aggravated sexual assault conviction. The trial court also entered deadly weapon findings.Discussion
In his first issue, appellant claims his guilty pleas were not intelligent admissions of guilt because, at trial, he could not remember the details of the offenses. At punishment, appellant testified that, during the hours preceding the robbery and sexual assault, he used cocaine and smoked marijuana soaked with PCP. The law is well settled that a guilty plea must be freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). The admonishments required by article 26.13(a) of the code of criminal procedure may be made either orally or in writing. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 26.13 (Vernon 2004); State v. Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). When the record reflects that a defendant was properly admonished, it presents a prima facie showing that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998); Soto v. State, 837 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.). The burden then shifts to the defendant to establish that, notwithstanding the statutory admonishments, he or she did not understand the consequences of the plea. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; Soto, 837 S.W.2d at 405. The record here includes the written plea agreements and judicial confessions. The plea papers, which appellant signed and acknowledged, show he received the proper written admonishments. The trial court also admonished appellant in open court regarding his right to a jury trial, the two offenses he was charged with, the punishment range for each offense, the enhancement paragraphs, and the plea paperwork. Appellant's answers to the court's questions clearly indicate he understood the charges against him and the plea papers he signed. The trial court's compliance with article 26.13 places the burden on appellant to show he entered the pleas without understanding the consequences of his actions and, thus, was harmed. Appellant argues that, since he could not remember the details of the offenses, he did not make an "intelligent admission of guilt," thus rendering the pleas involuntary. The issue is whether the record reflects that appellant understood the consequences of the pleas. The written and oral admonishments in the record clearly indicate he understood both the circumstances and consequences surrounding his pleas. Appellant has failed to establish that his pleas were involuntary. We resolve appellant's first issue against him. In his second issue, appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting into evidence testimony from a detective that appellant did not appear remorseful for his actions. During the sentencing phase of the trial, Detective Danny Muniz of the Dallas Police Department testified that he took a statement from appellant. The statement was admitted into evidence and then the following occurred:Q. [PROSECUTOR]: Detective Muniz — or Sergeant Muniz, when you talked to the defendant, did you talk to him about both offenses, the aggravated robbery at the laundromat as well as the aggravated robbery and the aggravated sexual assault case at Ms. Thomas' location?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he appear remorseful for those crimes at all?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'm going to object. Speculation.
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. [PROSECUTOR]: Did he show any emotion at all when he described those offenses to you?
A. No.
Q. Did he admit to those offenses?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he admit to all of the offenses?
A. Not the sexual assault.
Q. He denied the sexual assault?
A. Correct.We review a trial court's ruling admitting testimony under an abuse of discretion standard, meaning we will uphold the trial court's decision if it is within "the zone of reasonable disagreement." Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 153 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). The general rule is that a lay witness cannot testify as to what a person is thinking because the actual subjective mental state of an actor can never be based on personal knowledge. See Fairow v. State, 943 S.W.2d 895, 898-99 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). "[I]f the trial court determines that a proffered lay-witness opinion is an attempt to communicate the actual subjective mental state of the actor, the court should exclude the opinion because it could never be based on personal knowledge." Id. at 899. However, "[a]n opinion will satisfy the personal knowledge requirement if it is an interpretation of the witness's objective perception of events (i.e. his own senses or experience)." Id. "So, while a witness cannot possess personal knowledge of another's mental state, he may possess personal knowledge of facts from which an opinion regarding mental state may be drawn. The jury is then free to give as much or as little weight to the opinion as it sees fit." Id. Appellant argues that Detective Muniz's opinion testimony was not "capable of reasonably being formed from the events underlying the opinion" and therefore should have been excluded. See id. at 900. But Detective Muniz was asked if appellant "appear[ed] remorseful" not if appellant was remorseful. The prosecutor was asking for the detective's perception of what he saw in appellant's behavior that suggested remorse. The detective spoke to appellant about the offenses before he took appellant's statement and again while the statement was being recorded. Therefore, the detective was in a unique position to observe indications of appellant's mental state. The trial court could have reasonably concluded Detective Muniz's testimony was admissible. Consequently, there was no abuse of discretion. Appellant's second issue is overruled. We affirm the trial court's judgments.