Opinion
S94A0712.
DECIDED NOVEMBER 14, 1994. RECONSIDERATION DENIED DECEMBER 20, 1994.
Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Etheridge.
William S. Richardson, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Rachelle L. Strausner, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Thomas Jones killed Sonya Brown and their unborn child. He was convicted of malice and felony murder, aggravated assault and feticide and given two concurrent life sentences. He appeals and we affirm.
Jones killed the victim on December 28, 1991. He was indicted by the Fulton County Grand Jury on November 13, 1992. On January 25, 1993, a jury convicted Jones of malice and felony murder, aggravated assault (two counts) and feticide. The trial court merged the felony murder and aggravated assault convictions with the malice murder conviction and gave Jones concurrent life sentences for malice murder and feticide. The court reporter certified the record on February 10, 1993. Jones' motion for new trial, filed on February 26, 1993, and amended July 26, 1993, was denied on January 7, 1994. Jones filed a timely notice of appeal, and the appeal was docketed in this court on February 14, 1994. His appeal was submitted or decision without oral argument on April 18, 1994.
1. Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's determination, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S.C. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).
2. The defendant contends the trial court erred by allowing the victim's mother, landlady, and friend to testify regarding the victim's statements about prior difficulties between the victim and the defendant. We disagree. The evidence met the requirements we set out in Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642 (2) (b) ( 409 S.E.2d 649) (1991) regarding the admissibility of evidence of prior difficulties between the defendant and the victim. See also Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 73, 75 (2) (b) ( 414 S.E.2d 470) (1992). The defendant correctly argues that the witnesses' testimony regarding prior difficulties was hearsay. However, the testimony was admissible under the "necessity" exception, OCGA § 24-3-1 (b). Roper v. State, 263 Ga. 201, 202 (2) ( 429 S.E.2d 668) (1993). The defendant's reliance on Jackson v. State, 256 Ga. 536, 537 (3) ( 350 S.E.2d 428) (1986) is misplaced, and we find no error in the admission of this testimony.
3. We find no error requiring reversal in the defendant's remaining enumerations. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
These enumerations were that the trial court erred in: restricting cross-examination of a state's witness; improperly instructing the jury on the issue of prior difficulties; allowing the state to present evidence of prior difficulties before it presented evidence on the indicted charges; failing to strike the testimony of a police officer; assisting the state in establishing the foundation for the admission of evidence; denying Jones' motion to remove a juror after contact with a state's witness; and failing to conduct individual voir dire of jurors following the district attorney's altercation with a defense witness.