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Jones v. Pierce

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Feb 6, 2012
No. A130580 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2012)

Opinion

A130580

02-06-2012

RICHARD JONES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALBERTINA PIERCE, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Dennis Stuart Pierce, Defendant and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Lake County Super. Ct. No. CV402825)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Richard Jones appeals in propria persona from a judgment of the Lake County Superior Court in favor of defendant Estate of Dennis Stuart Pierce, deceased, and Albertina Pierce as his successor in interest, following the trial court's grant of a nonsuit after plaintiff's presentation of his case. The court granted nonsuit in favor of defendants on the ground there was no evidence to establish that Dennis Stuart Pierce was driving the automobile that rear-ended plaintiff's vehicle, allegedly causing plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff contends the court erred in granting the nonsuit. We shall reverse the judgment of nonsuit, because a stipulation entered into by defendants, together with reasonable inferences drawn from that stipulation and from plaintiff's testimony provided substantial evidence from which a jury could determine that Pierce was the driver of the other automobile.

BACKGROUND

The case arises out of an automobile accident occurring April 16, 2005. Plaintiff was hit in the rear of his car by another vehicle. Plaintiff sued Pierce and in July 2007, an arbitrator awarded plaintiff, who was represented by an attorney, $13,035.67 damages against Pierce. Plaintiff did not accept the award, but sought a jury trial de novo in the superior court. Defendant Dennis Stuart Pierce died during the course of the litigation. Plaintiff amended his complaint to substitute the estate of Dennis Stuart Pierce and Albertina Pierce as successor in interest. Plaintiff represented himself at trial of the superior court action.

At the jury trial, plaintiff unsuccessfully tried to introduce the police report of the accident into evidence. The court sustained defense objections to the report based on hearsay, authentication, and lack of foundation. Nor did plaintiff succeed in his attempts to offer 14 other exhibits into evidence.

Testimony and a stipulation relevant to the issue of the driver's identity, occurred as follows:

Plaintiff testified that after the accident, he stepped out of his car and walked over to the car that had struck him. He described the driver of the other car as "catatonic. I mean, he was—he didn't say a word. He didn't look anywhere. He just looked like dead stare, blank stare right in front of him. And I assume it was shock. The

"MR. FULLERTON: Objection, Your Honor. The relevance to this.

"THE COURT: The relevance is what, Mr. Jones, to the issues?

"MR. JONES: I'm just describing the scene, Your Honor, that the other party was—was in shock. There was no way that I could communicate anything to him.

"THE COURT: Well, at this point, the objection is overruled. You can continue.

"MR. JONES: Okay. The driver of the other vehicle was in shock. The passenger of the other vehicle was elderly. And I'm not—with all due respect, I know his son's in the audience here, but she looked like a little old lady that was pretty beat up. I mean, I guess an air bag had deployed in her face. It had broken the windshield. And she was bleeding. I told—

"MR. FULLERTON: Objection, Your Honor. Again, relevance. The secondary impact has nothing to do with Mr. Jones.

"MR. JONES: Your Honor, the reason that I bring this up is because there was no communication with the other parties. There was no

"MR. FULLERTON: So stipulated.

"THE COURT: Well, then there's been an agreement—you offer a stipulation that there was no communication between the plaintiff at the scene and the other parties, the other parties being

"MR. FULLERTON: Mr. Pierce and Ms. Pierce.

"THE COURT: Okay. That's—you agree to that, then?

"MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: Okay. Wait a minute. Then the stipulation is an agreement of facts, and those facts that are encompassed within the stipulation, that the plaintiff didn't talk to either of the other parties at the scene, then that's a fact that's been agreed to. . . ." (Bolding added.)

Plaintiff also testified: "They took the other two injured people, that's the people that struck the car, the defendant and his wife, by gurney. They extracted them from the car and strapped them down onto whatever boards they do and took them away in the ambulance . . . But they were both in a very different state to me. I mean, like I said, I described the driver as being catatonic and not being able to communicate at all and the wife, Mrs. Albertina Pierce, as being, you know, bleeding profusely." (Bolding added.)

After plaintiff rested his case, defense counsel moved for a nonsuit under Code of Civil Procedure section 581c. Counsel moved for nonsuit on the "issue of liability." First, the defense moved for nonsuit on the ground that plaintiff "has not established through competent evidence that Dennis Stuart Pierce was operating the motor vehicle involved in the accident. There were specific questions on cross-examination. We established that . . . Mr. Jones never [made] the acquaintance of Mr. Pierce prior to the accident. There are no conversations between any driver of the Chevy Lumina [the vehicle that hit plaintiff's car] and Mr. Jones at the scene of the accident. Mr. Jones never met anyone he understood to be Mr. Pierce after the accident. And there was no other competent evidence offered, no eye witnesses were brought in, no deposition testimony was offered, no interrogatory answers were offered, no testimony of a police officer. . . . [B]asically, there's nothing for a jury to conclude that Dennis Stuart Pierce was operating this motor vehicle. The only thing that they can possibly do is infer merely from the fact that he was named in the law suit. It's not competent evidence. Mr. Jones has not met his burden on that regard." As a second basis for nonsuit, defense counsel asserted that plaintiff never saw the vehicle involved in the accident before impact and that he could not testify what caused the impact or whether the other driver was negligent in the circumstances.

"(a) Only after, and not before, the plaintiff has completed his or her opening statement, or after the presentation of his or her evidence in a trial by jury, the defendant, without waiving his or her right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a judgment of nonsuit." (Code Civ. Proc., § 581c.)

The trial court gave plaintiff an hour to think about what evidence had been presented that showed Dennis Stuart Pierce was driving the vehicle. Defense counsel stated he had other bases for nonsuit as to some elements of damage, but agreed to wait until the first bases were determined. (On this record, it does not appear that any other bases for nonsuit were argued or considered.) When court reconvened, plaintiff referred to documents he had not succeeded in introducing into evidence. The court denied the nonsuit brought on the basis of insufficient evidence of negligence, but granted the nonsuit brought on the ground there was no evidence to establish that the defendant, Dennis Stuart Pierce, was driving the car that hit plaintiff's car. The court had checked to see whether an admission had been made in the pleadings, but found only a general denial, so that all matters alleged in the complaint were denied. Accordingly, the court granted the motion for nonsuit.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved for reconsideration and the court denied the motion. Judgment was entered on September 24, 2010, and this timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

As reiterated by our Supreme Court in Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 291: "A defendant is entitled to a nonsuit if the trial court determines that, as a matter of law, the evidence presented by plaintiff is insufficient to permit a jury to find in his favor. [Citation.] 'In determining whether plaintiff's evidence is sufficient, the court may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. Instead, the evidence most favorable to plaintiff must be accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be disregarded. The court must give "to the plaintiff['s] evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, . . . indulging every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence in plaintiff['s] favor." ' [Citation.] A mere 'scintilla of evidence' does not create a conflict for the jury's resolution; 'there must be substantial evidence to create the necessary conflict.' [Citation.]

"In reviewing a grant of nonsuit, we are 'guided by the same rule requiring evaluation of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.' [Citation.] We will not sustain the judgment ' "unless interpreting the evidence most favorably to plaintiff's case and most strongly against the defendant and resolving all presumptions, inferences and doubts in favor of the plaintiff a judgment for the defendant is required as a matter of law." ' [Citations.]" (Nally v. Grace Community Church, supra, 47 Cal.3d 278, 291; accord, Sandoval v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Social Services (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1178, fn. 11; see also Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Mariners Mile Gateway, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1060 [de novo review of nonsuit order]; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2010) ¶ 8:159 at pp. 8-119 to 8-120.)

At the same time, we are mindful that, "[t]he rules governing the granting of a nonsuit . . . do not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of establishing the elements of his case. The plaintiff must therefore produce evidence which supports a logical inference in his favor and which does more than merely permit speculation or conjecture. [Citation.]" (Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402; accord, Lopez v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 675, 684-685 [what inferences can permissibly be drawn by the fact finder are questions of law for determination by the court as they may not be illogically or unreasonably drawn].)

We will normally consider only the grounds specified by defendant in support of the motion in the proceedings below. (Marvin v. Adams (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 956, 960; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs, supra, ¶ 8:159.2, p. 8-120.) B. Substantial Evidence That Dennis Stuart Pierce Was the Driver of the Vehicle That Hit Plaintiff's Car

Plaintiff contends, and we agree, that the evidence recited above provides substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude that Dennis Stuart Pierce was the driver of the automobile that hit plaintiff's car. Defendants seek to narrow the stipulation to include only that plaintiff never spoke with either of the other parties at the scene. However, in accordance with the standard of review for a nonsuit, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff here and we do not so narrowly construe it. The stipulation made and agreed to by Jones was that there was no communication between the plaintiff at the scene and the other parties, the other parties being—Mr. and Ms. Pierce. Arguably, counsel may have intended that "parties" not refer to the persons in the car at the scene, but solely to the defendant parties to the litigation. However, that was not what was said, and plaintiff and the jury could reasonably view the stipulation as establishing that Mr. and Mrs. Pierce were in the other vehicle. Plaintiff testified that the driver was not responding and that defendant's wife, Mrs. Pierce, was the passenger in that vehicle. In context, a reasonable inference may be drawn from the stipulation and from the plaintiff's testimony that both Mr. and Mrs. Pierce were in the car and that Mr. Pierce was driving.

Quoting Palmer v. City of Long Beach (1948) 33 Cal.2d 134, 144 (Palmer), defendants argue that "[s]tipulations must be given reasonable construction with a view to giving effect to the intent of the parties and 'the language used will not be so construed as to give it the effect of an admission of a fact obviously intended to be controverted, or the waiver of a right not plainly intended to be relinquished, . . .' [Citations.]" Our construction of the stipulation here comports with the admonition of Justice Traynor in Palmer that " 'It may be conceded that stipulations of fact, where no real controversy of fact appears, should be encouraged, and when entered into, should be strictly enforced. But there should be no sacrifice of substantial rights merely to subserve the constant importuning to speed up trials. The purpose of every trial is to examine into disputed facts. . . . Stipulations are ordinarily entered into for the purpose of avoiding delay, trouble or expense. As a general rule they should receive a fair and liberal construction, in harmony with the apparent intention of the parties and the spirit of justice, and in furtherance of fair trials upon the merits, rather than a narrow and technical one, calculated to defeat the purposes of their execution.' " (Id. at p. 144.)

Defendants further contend that even if the stipulation encompasses an agreement that Mr. and Mrs. Pierce were in the other car at the scene of the accident, it does not constitute substantial evidence that Dennis Stuart Pierce drove the vehicle that collided into plaintiff's, causing plaintiff injury. Although the stipulation itself did not establish that Dennis Stuart Pierce was the driver of the other vehicle, that evidence was supplemented by plaintiff's testimony that "defendant and his wife," the two occupants of the car that struck his, were extracted from their vehicle and transported to the hospital, that the driver of the car that struck his was a man, who was "catatonic" and that the driver's wife, Albertina Pierce, was the passenger in that car. This testimony and the stipulation that Mr. and Ms. Pierce were the occupants of the other car, together with reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, was adequate to provide a basis for the jury to determine that Dennis Stuart Pierce was driving the vehicle that collided with plaintiff's.

That plaintiff did not see the other car coming, and only saw its occupants immediately after impact, does not render the testimony or inferences reasonably drawn therefrom speculative or mere conjecture, as defendants maintain. In denying defendants' motion for nonsuit brought on the alternative ground that plaintiff had failed to prove negligence, the trial court properly concluded that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of negligence as the collision occurred from behind and there was no evidence plaintiff was doing anything wrong at the time.

We conclude the court erred in granting nonsuit on the ground that insufficient evidence was presented that Dennis Stuart Pierce was the driver of the automobile that struck plaintiff's car.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Plaintiff is awarded his costs on appeal.

Kline, P.J. We concur: Haerle, J. Lambden, J.


Summaries of

Jones v. Pierce

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Feb 6, 2012
No. A130580 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2012)
Case details for

Jones v. Pierce

Case Details

Full title:RICHARD JONES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALBERTINA PIERCE, Individually…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

Date published: Feb 6, 2012

Citations

No. A130580 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2012)

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