Opinion
Civil Action 2:24 CV 583
06-18-2024
CHARLES DARNELL JONES, Plaintiff, v. NEW KENSINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendant.
The Honorable William S. Stickman United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Charles Darnell Jones (“Plaintiff') filed this action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when incarcerated as a pretrial detainee in the Westmoreland County Prison. Plaintiff asserts that his rights were violated during his arrest and prosecution on charges for theft, witness intimidation, disorderly conduct, and harassment. ECF Nos. 1-2, 10.
See Commonwealth v. Jones, No. CP-65-CR-0002367-2023 (CCP Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania) (https://uisportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-65-CR-0002367-2023&dnh=wDdenuQA%2BA8MFbcinBZ9cw%3D%3D); Commonwealth v. Jones, No. CP-65-CR-0002368-2023 (CCP Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania) (https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-65-CR-0002368-2023&dnh=EnsFs3V10fC90Xhq4Altxw%3D%3D).
Upon review of the Complaint and the supplement thereto, and pursuant to the screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs claims against Magisterial District Judge Jason Buczak, Magisterial District Judge Curtis Conway, Court of Common Pleas Judge Scott Mears, Assistant District Attorney Amanda M. Rubin, Assistant District Attorney Anthony S. Innamorelli, and Assistant District Attorney Samuel Beaver before service of the Complaint because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is also recommended that the Court dismiss without prejudice all claims asserted against Defendants Wade Diedrich, J. Manderino, and Michael Garafolo for failure to state a claim, dismiss Plaintiff's request to be released from custody as moot, and deny his request for injunctive relief in the form of a court order precluding criminal proceedings against him. Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts additional Section 1983 claims against the remaining defendants, it is recommended that the Court stay those claims pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007).
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that the underlying criminal charges against him were fabricated by the putative victim and then knowingly and falsely reported to prosecutors by New Kensington Police Officers Jerry M. Hobeck (“Hobeck”), John C. Hamm Jr. (“Hamm”), and Ben R. Michaels (“Michaels”) (collectively, the “Police Department Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that the Police Department Defendants failed to properly investigate the victim's claims because they failed to locate and secure surveillance video that would exonerate him, and then falsely reported that he engaged in criminal conduct. ECF No. 1-2 at 5. Plaintiff asserts that the violation of his rights by the Police Department Defendants was compounded by the conduct of Defendants Amanda M. Rubin, Anthony S. Innamorelli, Jr., and Samuel Beaver, who serve as Assistant District Attorneys on behalf of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. He alleges that these Defendants failed to independently investigate, locate, secure and produce exculpatory video evidence. Id.
Plaintiff also alleges that his rights were violated by Defendant Magisterial District Judge Curtis Conway because he conducted Plaintiffs preliminary hearing by video 81 days after his initial arrest, instead of within the 10 days he asserts is required by law. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Magisterial District Judge Jason Buczak violated his rights by denying Plaintiff s “right to go pro se” and by denying him the right to cross-examine the victim. He contends that these . judicial officers colluded with police and prosecutors to bring false charges against him. In addition, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Judge Scott Mears failed to order police and prosecutors to secure exculpatory evidence and therefore “violated his oath of office,” and ensured that the “malicious prosecution would be successful.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Mears also violated his rights by hiring Defendant Rubin “as his assistant mid case,” and by erroneously detaining Plaintiff as a parole violator. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff claims that the Public Defender's Office failed to adequately represent him against the charges because they failed to seek video evidence that he believes would exonerate him. Id. Upon the death of the appointed public defender, Plaintiff asserts his rights were violated because of delays resulting from the appointment of new counsel and the failure to timely complete discovery. That said, the Complaint does not identify the Public Defender's Office as a Defendant.
Finally, Plaintiff identifies Michael Garafolo, J. Manderino, and Wade Diedrich in the caption of the complaint as defendants. Id. at 2. However, the Complaint fails to allege any claims against these Defendants.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks an order requiring his release from custody, the cessation of all steps to arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate Plaintiff, the initiation of legal actions against all Defendants, and an award of compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 11.
Review of the publicly available state court dockets for each of Plaintiffs underlying charges reveals that he is now awaiting trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The PLRA permits courts to screen complaints filed by prisoners and dismiss them before they are served if the complaints fail to state a claim or are frivolous or malicious. See Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 2019). In screening complaints under the PLRA, courts utilize the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
A complaint must be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007). The court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Thus, the Court construes his factual allegations liberally. See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc, 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013).
C. DISCUSSION
1. Judicial Defendants
Plaintiffs claims against Magisterial District Judges Conway and Buczak and Court of Common Pleas Judge Mears arise from their roles presiding over Plaintiffs preliminary hearing and pretrial proceedings. Judges are entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights claims that are based on acts or omissions taken in their judicial capacity, so long as they do not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Harvey v. Loftus, 505 Fed.Appx. 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 30304 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (absolute judicial immunity attaches even if the act were done in furtherance of a conspiracy). An act is taken in a judge's judicial capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a judge[.]” Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). “Generally ... ‘where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.'” Figueroa v. Blackbum, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997)). Judges of general and limited jurisdiction, including magisterial district judges, are entitled to judicial immunity. Id. at 441 (concluding that magisterial district judges, even though they preside over courts of limited jurisdiction, are entitled to protections of judicial immunity); see also Evans v. Lorah, No. 20-22, 2020 WL 2813317, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 11, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 2793088 (W.D. Pa. May 29,2020) (dismissing pro se litigant's § 1983 claims against a former magisterial district judge on screening under § 1915(e)(2)(B) on the basis of judicial immunity).
Plaintiffs claims against the judicial defendants concern judicial determinations made throughout Plaintiffs preliminary hearing and pretrial proceedings. Plaintiff has not set forth any facts suggesting that any judicial defendant acted absent jurisdiction. Accordingly, Magisterial District Judges Conway and Buczak, and Judge Mears are entitled to absolute immunity. Evans, 2020 WL 2813317, at *3; see also Blackwell v. Middletown Borough Police Dept, Civ. A. No. 12825, 2012 WL 4033671, at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. May 30, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 4025956 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2012) (dismissing pro se plaintiffs claims against a magisterial district judge for failure to state a claim at screening because “judicial immunity ... expressly extends to Pennsylvania magisterial district court judges”) (citing Figueroa, 208 F.3d at 441); see also Youst v. Lancaster City Bureau Police Dep't, No. 20-3287, 2020 WL 6562073, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2020) (magisterial district judge was entitled to absolute immunity where the only allegations against her rose from “judicial determinations she made and an order she entered in the course of [the plaintiffs] criminal arraignment and [in] setting his bail”).
To the extent that Plaintiff challenges Judge Mears' employment of ADA Rubin, he fails to allege any facts as sufficient to support a plausible claim that his rights were in any way violated based on the timing or fact of such employment. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” by providing facts which “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”).
Because Plaintiffs claims against all judicial defendants are barred by judicial immunity, any attempt to amend would be futile. Thus, it is recommended that the Court dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs claims against the judicial defendants. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that leave to amend should generally be granted “only if amendment would be inequitable or futile.”).
2. Prosecutors Rubin, Innamorelli, and Beaver
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Rubin, Innamorelli, and Beaver violated his rights in the course of their duties as prosecutors by failing to investigate, locate, secure, and then produce exculpatory evidence. A prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from liability for actions taken in connection with judicial proceedings. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202,208 (3d Cir. 2008), aff'dsub. nom. Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2011). Absolute immunity attaches to the prosecutor's decision to initiate a prosecution and generally includes activities conducted in court, such as presenting evidence or legal arguments. See Imber v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,424 (1976).
Absolute immunity does not, however, apply “‘to administrative or investigatory action unrelated to initiating and conducting judicial proceedings.'” Weimer v. Cnty. of Fayette, 972 F.3d 177, 187 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Odd, 538 F.3d at 208). The Supreme Court of the United States has explained that: “[w]hen a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The court “focuses on the unique facts of each case” and carefully dissects the prosecutor's actions. Id. (citations omitted). That said, a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity with respect to such decisions even where “he acts without a good faith belief that any wrongdoing has occurred.” Id. Alleged deficiencies in a prosecutor's decisionmaking process are within the ambit of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Id. at 1461; See also Rose v. Bartie, 871 F.2d 331, 345 (3d Cir. 1989) (immunity attached despite prosecutor's failure to investigate before initiation of grand jury proceedings and lack of good faith belief that unlawful conduct occurred). Consequently, since Plaintiffs claims here relate to the prosecutorial decision to pursue charges and the alleged failure to perform an investigation to locate surveillance video that could exonerate him, Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity.
Amendment here would be futile. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Rubin, Innamorelli, and Beaver with prejudice.
3. Claims against Defendants Diedrich, Manderino, and Garafolo
It is recommended that the Court screen and dismiss Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Diedrich, Manderino, and Garafolo for lack of personal involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right. It is axiomatic plaintiff must show that each defendant was “personalfly] involvefd]” in depriving him of his rights. Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). Thus, each defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”). Without any specific allegations that a defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
Here, Plaintiff identifies Diedrich, Manderino, and Garafolo as Defendants in the caption of the Complaint but fails to plead facts alleging that these individuals participated in any alleged wrongful conduct. Accordingly, Diedrich, Manderino, and Garafolo should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
4, Request for Habeas Relief
In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks his release from pretrial confinement and dismissal of his unspecified pending criminal charges. A petition for writ of habeas corpus, rather than a civil rights action under Section 1983, is the proper means for an inmate to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff is challenging incarceration based on his pending criminal charges, he must pursue that claim in a separate habeas corpus action, and not in a civil rights action. The Court notes that Plaintiff currently has a habeas petition pending before Magistrate Judge Kezia O.L. Taylor. See Jones v. Attorney Gen., No. 24-470 (W.D. Pa.). In that action, the District Attorney of Westmoreland County has disclosed that Plaintiff was released from custody and is awaiting trial on the charges at issue in this civil rights action. ECF No. 15 at 2. Thus, Plaintiffs request for habeas relief should be dismissed as moot.
5. Claims against Officers Hobeck, Hamm, and Michaels
Plaintiffs remaining claims against Officers Hobeck, Hamm, and Michaels are best construed as alleging the violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court understands Plaintiff to assert Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution, and a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the alleged fabrication of evidence against him. Under the principles of Younger v. Harris, supra, the Court must abstain from consideration of these claims to avoid interfering in his pending state court criminal proceedings. See Malhan v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of State, 938 F.3d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Sprint Commc'ns, Inc, v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77-78 (2013) (“To promote comity between the national and state governments,” the Younger abstention doctrine “requires federal courts to abstain from deciding cases that would interfere with certain ongoing state proceedings.”).
When determining whether Younger abstention is proper, the court first must examine the underlying state court litigation to determine whether it falls into one of three categories of cases: (1) criminal prosecutions, (2) civil enforcement proceedings, and (3) civil proceedings involving orders in furtherance of the state courts' judicial function. See PDXN., Inc, v. Comm'r N.J. Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 882 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, 142 S.Ct. 69 (2021). Because Plaintiffs criminal prosecution is the underlying state court litigation here, the first stage of the analysis is met.
Next, “the court must consider three factors, whether: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in the state proceeding,” Deyo v. Eck, No. 23-1658, 2023 WL 6297478, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2023) (citing Malhan, 938 F.3d at 462-64 (in turn citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm, v. Garden State Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
The Younger requirements are met in this case. First, the publicly available dockets for Plaintiffs criminal cases indicate that the proceedings are still pending, and trial is or will be scheduled. “Second, the state proceedings implicate the important interest of enforcing the Commonwealth's criminal laws. Third, the criminal proceeding[s] provide [Plaintiff] an adequate opportunity to raise in the state forum all federal constitutional defenses to his prosecution.” Deyo, 2023 WL 6297478, at *14 (citing Jaffery v. Atl. Cnty. Prosecutor's Office, 695 Fed.Appx. 38, 4041 (3d Cir. 2017) (concluding Younger applied when “[t]here are ongoing state criminal proceedings in the Superior Court of New Jersey that are judicial in nature, the state proceedings implicate the important state interest in prosecuting criminal behavior, and the state proceedings provide Jaffery an opportunity to raise federal constitutional defenses to prosecution”)).
Thus, after consideration of the required Younger factors, the Court finds it is appropriate to abstain from considering Plaintiff's claims against Officers Hobeck, Hamm, and Michaels during the pendency of his state criminal proceedings. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 39394 (2007) (“If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before [they have] been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.”); McKinney v. Prosecutor Cnty. Prosecutor's Off, 612 Fed.Appx. 62, 66 (3d Cir. 2015) (acknowledging stay is the “proper course of action” where suit is timely brought but criminal proceedings have not yet concluded).
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court: (1) dismiss with prejudice all claims asserted against Magisterial District Judges Conway and Buczak and Court of Common Pleas Judge Mears based on absolute judicial immunity; (2) dismiss with prejudice all claims asserted against Assistant District Attorneys Rubin, Innamorelli, and Beaver based on prosecutorial immunity; (3) dismiss without prejudice all claims asserted against Defendants Diedrich, Manderino, and Garafolo for failure to state a claim; (4) dismiss Plaintiff s demand for habeas relief as moot; and (5) stay all claims against Officers Hobeck, Hamm, and Michaels pursuant to Younger. It is further recommended that Plaintiff be advised he may move to reopen this action as to all claims not dismissed with prejudice following resolution of his criminal cases.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties may file written objections within fourteen days, or seventeen days for unregistered ECF Users. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may respond to the objections within 14 days in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Respectfully submitted, Charles Darnell Jones
66324
Westmoreland County Prison
3000 S. Grande Blvd.
Greensburg, PA 15601