Opinion
AP-22-12
09-15-2023
ORDER GRANTING JURY TRIAL REQUEST
Julia M. Lipez, Justice, Superior Court.
Defendant/Appellant Maine Avenue Auto Sales (MAAS) appeals from a small claims judgment of the District Court (Naie, J.) in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee Leslie Jones. MAAS seeks a jury trial de novo. For the following reasons, the court grants MAAS's request.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 26, 2021, Ms. Jones initiated a small claims action seeking judgment against MAAS in the amount of $6,000. She alleged that shortly after she took her car to MAAS for repairs, the car overheated.
The District Court held a hearing on March 15, 2022, at which both parties appeared. After hearing, the court concluded that Ms. Jones had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that MAAS improperly repaired her vehicle, causing it to overheat and sustain damage. The court awarded Ms. Jones $3,500 in damages.
In a notice of appeal filed April 14, 2022, MAAS requested a jury trial de novo and also alleged that the District Court made legal errors at the hearing. MAAS submitted an affidavit from Kevin Keene, owner of MAAS, in support of the jury trial demand.
Per M.R. Civ. P. 80L(c)(1), the Clerk of Court sent Vis. Jones a notice on May 14, 2022, informing her that she had 10 days to file any counteraffidavit. Ms. Jones did not avail herself of this opportunity, although on March 23, 2023, she filed a request for "pain and suffering" damages for herself and her children on the ground that MAAS's appeal was frivolous and an attempt to delay payment. The court construes this as a cross-appeal, the filing of which was untimely. See M.R.S.C.P. 11(a) (requiring a cross-appeal to be filed within 14 days of the date on which the first notice of appeal was filed). Ms. Jones's cross-appeal is therefore dismissed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The Superior Court has specific but limited appellate authority in small claims matters." Cote v. Vallee, 2019 ME 156, ¶ 9, 218 A.3d 1148; see 4 M.R.S. § 105(3)(B)(2); 14 M.R.S. § 7484-A(1); M.R.S.C.P. 11(d). If the defendant demands a jury trial and the court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial, then "the small claims judgment becomes a nullity" and the case will be tried to a jury pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80L. Ring v. Leighton, 2019 ME 8, ¶ 14, 200 A.3d 259; see M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(2); M.R. Civ. P. 80L(c)(2). "A defendant requesting a jury trial must file affidavits sufficient to 'set[ ] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to which there is a right to trial by jury.'" Ring, 2019 ME 8, ¶ 14, 200 A.3d 259 (quoting M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(2)). "A court's decision to allow the jury trial de novo demand or to dismiss the appeal is therefore very similar to a decision granting or denying a summary judgment." Goodell v. Andy's Barn, 518 A.2d 719, 720 &n. 1 (Me. 1986) (noting that the express terms of M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(2) require the defendant to file an affidavit that meets the requirements of M.R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
DISCUSSION
Here, the court concludes after review of the record and MAAS's affidavit, see M.R. Civ. P. 80L(c)(1), that a genuine issue of material fact exists. A central disputed fact in this case is whether the repairs performed by MAAS caused the car to overheat. Ms. Jones testified at the small claims hearing that shortly after she brought her vehicle into MAAS's shop for repairs to the clutch, the vehicle overheated, and she discovered that an engine wire was unplugged. The District Court credited her testimony. Kevin Keene, the owner of MAAS, testified that in repairing the clutch, his mechanics would not have worked with the engine. He has further submitted an affidavit attesting to that fact. A jury "must choose between [these] competing versions of the truth." Dyer v. Dep't of Transp., 2008 ME 106, ¶ 14, 951 A.2d 821 (quotation marks omitted). MAAS's request for a jury trial is therefore granted.
For this reason, the court need not address the District Court's purported legal errors.
The entry is:
Defendant's request for a jury trial de novo is GRANTED; the District Court's judgment of March 15, 2022, is VACATED; the Clerk is directed to schedule this matter for a trial management conference on October 2, 2023.
The clerk is directed to incorporate this order on the docket by reference pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).