Opinion
11-P-313
03-30-2012
GAIL A. JONES & others v. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY & others.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiffs are a group of nonunion supervisory personnel employed by the defendant Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA). After the MBTA canceled an anticipated raise, the plaintiffs brought this action seeking to recover payment of the expected wage increase. A judge of the Superior Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and this appeal ensued.
We summarize the relevant facts from the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. See Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 143 (2006). The plaintiffs are 'at will' employees and do not have a written employment contract. The majority of the MBTA's employees belong to unions, and when they have received wage increases under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the MBTA usually gave similar raises to nonunion supervisory personnel.
There has never been a complete correlation between the raises received by union and nonunion employees. For example, from 1995 to 2005, union employees received a wage increase each year except in 2002, whereas nonunion employees received no increase in 1995, 1996, 1999, or 2002.
In 2006, the MBTA and the largest MBTA employee union were unable to agree on the terms of a new CBA, and the matter went to arbitration. The award entered in 2008, with the arbitrator concluding that union members were entitled to a certain percentage wage increase retroactive to 2006. After the award issued, the MBTA's general manager, Daniel Grabauskas, met with senior staff and stated that the wages of nonunion supervisory personnel would be increased by the same amount, also retroactively to 2006. The plaintiffs were not present at that meeting, but they learned about the wage increase through MBTA chief operating officer Richard Leary. The MBTA's human resources staff subsequently calculated and documented the amounts that nonunion personnel would receive as a wage increase equal to the union increase, including the back pay. In 2008, the plaintiffs received their first (and ultimately only) paychecks calculated at the increased pay rates. Soon thereafter the wage increase was criticized in the media and, as a result of a request by the chairman of the MBTA's board of directors, Grabauskas canceled the wage increase, including all retroactive payments.
Grabauskas's decision left in place only a smaller one-time prospective wage increase for nonunion employees earning $70,000 or less annually.
Relying on the doctrine expressed in Williston, Contracts § 8:13, at 304-308 (4th ed. 2008), the plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to the 'promised' wage increases as compensation for past services rendered at the MBTA's request. In ruling on the cross motions for summary judgment, the judge rejected this argument. She concluded that 'there was no promise or formal guarantee that the plaintiffs could have reasonably relied upon to the effect that their wages would be increased based on past services performed.' She further explained that
The plaintiffs' complaint also asserted an entitlement to payment under theories of equitable and promissory estoppel (count I) and a violation of the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148 (count III). These claims were not pursued and are not before us.
'even if there was a promise, the summary judgment record shows the promise was not based on recognition for past services, as required by Williston, but merely for fairness reasons. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a 'request' by the defendants. The plaintiffs are at-will employees deriving an agreed-upon salary from the [MBTA]. By their own admission, the plaintiffs had no formal knowledge that they were guaranteed an increased wage and there was no official long-standing practice of receiving increased wages annually, or in conjunction with union wage increases. The plaintiffs merely assumed they would receive a wage increase.'
On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the judge's conclusion that Grabauskas's announcement of a wage increase retroactive to July 1, 2006, did not constitute an enforceable promise, and they press their argument that the promise of a retroactive wage increase was supported by adequate consideration -- recognition for past services rendered at the MBTA's request -- and became irrevocable when the MBTA made its first payment.
We have reviewed the record de novo and affirm the grant of summary judgment for the defendants. Even if we were to assume that Grabauskas's announcement of a wage increase, followed by a one-time payment, constitutes a promise, the promise is unenforceable for lack of consideration. The rule enunciated in Williston on which the plaintiffs rely is not to the contrary. According to Williston, supra § 8:11, at 270-273, as aptly paraphrased by the judge, 'where an employee [was] compensated at an agreed rate[ ] while rendering service, and [their] employer later promise[d] [them] additional compensation for work [they] had already completed and been paid for,' that promise was without consideration and is unenforceable.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo to determine 'whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991).
Contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, the wages they were paid dating back to 2006 reflected an agreed rate under their at-will employment contracts.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Cypher, Vuono & Rubin, JJ.),