Opinion
18-2399-cv
09-13-2019
Appearing for Appellant: Robert W. Johnson, pro se, Bronx, N.Y. Appearing for Appellee: Susan D. Baird, Christopher Connolly, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, N.Y.
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the 13th day of September, two thousand nineteen. Present: RALPH K. WINTER, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. Appearing for Appellant: Robert W. Johnson, pro se, Bronx, N.Y. Appearing for Appellee: Susan D. Baird, Christopher Connolly, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, N.Y. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Moses, M.J.).
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Robert W. Johnson appeals from the July 31, 2018 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Moses, M.J.), granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings made by Defendant-Appellee Commissioner of Social Security. Johnson filed his action to seek judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), of the Commissioner's final determination denying his application for Supplemental Security Income. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.
The district court held that substantial evidence supported the conclusion of the administrative law judge ("ALJ") that Johnson was not entitled to benefits. On appeal, Johnson primarily argues, in sum and substance, that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's determinations that Johnson had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") for light work with certain limitations and that such jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy.
This Court reviews "a district court's judgment on the pleadings de novo." Jasinski v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2003). When the district court upholds a benefits determination by the Commissioner, this Court conducts a de novo review of the administrative record "to determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard." Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The substantial evidence standard is "a very deferential standard of review—even more so than the clearly erroneous standard," and means that "once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise." Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the certified administrative record and relevant law reveals no error in the district court's conclusions that the ALJ's RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ appropriately relied on the testimony of the vocational expert to determine that Johnson could perform work in the national economy. We therefore affirm for substantially the same reasons the district court provided in its thorough July 31, 2018 opinion and order. Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 17-CV-5598 (BCM), 2018 WL 3650162, at *15-18 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2018).
We have considered the remainder of Johnson's arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk