Opinion
11-P-944
03-12-2012
JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. PATRICIA ELLEN FLAHERTY, executrix.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered in an interpleader action brought by John Hancock Life Insurance Company (Hancock) under Mass.R.Civ.P. 22, 365 Mass. 767 (1974). A Superior Court judge allowed Hancock's motion to deposit funds available under a life insurance policy with the court. Thereafter, another judge entered judgment and allowed Hancock's application for fees and costs in the amount of about $10,000 (about half the amount requested), to be paid from the funds on deposit. Patricia Ellen Flaherty, executrix of the estate of Denise Condon (Flaherty), one of the impleaded defendants, has appealed from that portion of the judgment awarding fees and costs to Hancock.
2 The judgment was entered as a final judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 365 Mass. 820 (1974), on John Hancock Life Insurance Company's motion; the entry of this judgment concluded Hancock's involvement. As of the date the judgment entered, January 25, 2011, the proceeds of the policy had not been distributed.
Hancock's predecessor-in-interest issued a life insurance policy to the decedent in the amount of approximately $200,000. The decedent, James V. Mazzarella, named as a beneficiary his daughter, Gina Mazzarella. A few days before the decedent died, Flaherty alleges, the decedent changed his beneficiary designation to Denise Marie Condon and Marlene Cerrone. The decedent apparently did not provide the change of beneficiary forms to Hancock before his death. After his death, Flaherty, on behalf of Condon's estate, presented Hancock with the purported change of beneficiary forms and demanded payment under the policy. Mazzarella also demanded payment under the policy.
Hancock, admitting that payment was due under the life insurance policy, eventually filed an interpleader action in Federal Court. Upon learning that Mazzarella resided in Massachusetts, thereby destroying diversity, Hancock voluntarily dismissed the Federal action and filed the present interpleader action under rule 22. The Hancock interpleader named the possible beneficiaries. As a consequence of the competing demands for payment, Hancock requested leave to deposit the funds into the court. Flaherty filed an opposition to the deposit of the funds. As noted, Hancock deposited the net proceeds -- around $195,000 -- into the Superior Court.
Hancock then filed a motion for fees and costs, seeking payment of about $20,000 from the funds on deposit. Again Flaherty filed an opposition. The judge reduced Hancock's requested fees -- basically by the amounts incurred in filing the voluntarily dismissed Federal action -- for the reasons 'suggested in the [defendant's] submission.'
In this appeal, Flaherty argues that Hancock is not entitled to fees because the so-called 'American rule' prohibits an award of attorney's fees. In the context of a rule 22 interpleader action, Flaherty's position is simply wrong. See Chartrand v. Chartrand, 295 Mass. 293, 297 (1936) (judge retains discretion to award attorney's fees and costs to the stakeholder in an interpleader action). See also, e.g., Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Sampson, 556 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 2009); Smith & Zobel, Rules Practice § 22.5, at 328 (2d ed. 1996). We discern no abuse of discretion in the fees allowed to Hancock in connection with the interpleader action. Flaherty's opposition on this ground is frivolous.
Beyond the foregoing, Flaherty complains that this court should 'scrutinize' the Hancock fee award independently and determine a different amount. However, Flaherty does not identify any improperly awarded amounts or specifically mention anything that should be cut. From all that we can intuit from the vagaries in the brief submitted, Flaherty seems to believe that Hancock should have ignored the competing demands of three beneficiaries and simply paid Condon's estate alone. Yet nothing of record would warrant that singular payout action by Hancock in derogation of the competing claims of the other potential beneficiaries.
Hancock seeks an award of its appellate attorney's fees and costs. That request is allowed. Hancock may submit a petition for appellate attorney's fees to this court in the manner prescribed in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10-11 (2004), within twenty days of date of the rescript. Flaherty may respond to the petition within twenty days of said filing. Any fees imposed shall be the responsibility of Flaherty.
The portion of the judgment awarding attorney's fees and costs is affirmed.
By the Court (Kantrowitz, Berry & Vuono, JJ.),