Opinion
18-71218
10-25-2022
FRANCIS STANLEY JO, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted October 21, 2022 San Francisco, California
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals No. A099-958-545
Before: HAWKINS, BEA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Francis Stanley Jo petitions for review of the decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") to deny his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, see Cui v. Garland, 13 F.4th 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2021), we deny the petition for review.
1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen on the ground that Jo failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions in Indonesia. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (materiality requirement). The BIA determined that Jo's new evidence "seemingly manifests a continuance of the ongoing and sometimes volatile circumstances . . . that gave rise to" his original claim. This determination is a reasonable interpretation of the record, which reflects that discrimination and tensions against ethnic Chinese and religious minorities are longstanding.
2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen on the ground that Jo failed to demonstrate materially changed personal circumstances. The BIA previously determined that various incidents-a security guard who called Jo ethnic slurs, Muslims harassing Jo's mother, and robberies by unidentified individuals-"[did] not establish that [Jo] was targeted specifically apart from others in his disfavored groups of Chinese or Buddhists." See Halim v. Holder, 590 F.3d 971, 978 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[E]ven where an applicant has shown membership in a disfavored group, he or she must still present some evidence of individualized risk."). In denying the motion to reopen, the BIA reasonably concluded that Jo's new evidence-"that his mother was the victim of a crime for which she suffered minor injuries"-was unlikely to change the result. Unlike the cases on which Jo relies, the BIA considered the previous record evidence in light of Jo's membership in disfavored groups. See Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding "no indication that the BIA applied the disfavored-group analysis to [the petitioner's] case"); Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2014) (faulting the BIA for "fail[ing] to assess . . . evidence that treatment of Christians in Indonesia had deteriorated" merely because the asylum applicant converted to Christianity after the final order of removal).
3. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen as to Jo's claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA previously found that Jo failed to show "that he more likely than not would face torture, by or with the acquiescence . . . of a public official." See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Jo's new evidence showed that Indonesian police prosecuted acts of violence against minorities, even though in some places "insufficient protections . . . continued as problems." The BIA reasonably concluded that this evidence did not change the result. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that "general ineffectiveness" in preventing crime is insufficient to show acquiescence (citing Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2013))).
PETITION DENIED.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).