Opinion
1:23-cv-00368 (MAD/TWD)
06-20-2023
DAYVID JIMENEZ, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF PATRICK A. RUSSO, et al. Defendants.
DAYVID JIMENEZ Buffalo Federal Detention Facility Plaintiff, Pro Se.
DAYVID JIMENEZ Buffalo Federal Detention Facility Plaintiff, Pro Se.
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
Tfierese Wiley Dancks United States Magistrate Judge.
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a complaint submitted by pro se plaintiff Dayvid Jimenez (“Plaintiff”) alleging defendants Sheriff Patrick A. Russo and Under-Sheriff P.J. Higgiti, Jr., (together “Defendants”) violated his civil rights. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff, who is currently in federal custody at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility (“BFDF”) in Batavia, New York, has not paid the filing fee for this action and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP application”). (Dkt. No. 3.) This action is related to Jimenez v. City of Cohoes, No. 1:22-cv-984 (MAD/TWD) (N.D.N.Y.) (“Jimenez I”), familiarity with which is assumed. (Dkt. No. 6.) Notably, on May 22, 2023, Plaintiff's complaint in Jimenez I was dismissed with prejudice and judgment was entered the same day. See Jimenez I, ECF Dkt. Nos. 24, 25.
By Order entered March 27, 2023, this case was administratively closed with an opportunity to comply with the filing fee requirement. (Dkt. No. 2.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed his IFP application and the inmate authorization form required in this District, and the Clerk reopened the matter and restored it to the Court's active docket. (Dkt. Nos. 3, 4, 5.)
I. IFP APPLICATION
A court may grant in forma pauperis status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Upon review, Plaintiff's IFP application demonstrates economic need. (Dkt. No. 3.) He also filed the inmate authorization form required in this District. (Dkt. No. 4.) Accordingly, Plaintiff's IFP application is granted.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see also Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
“An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). “A claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Id.
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 475; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all alterations, internal quotation marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted. See, e.g., Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (2d Cir. 2020).
In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. at 678-79. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
III. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges the following facts. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) From May 3, 2022, through June 3, 2022, he “was held as a prisoner” by Defendants in the Rensselaer County Correctional Facility (“RCCF”) located in Troy, New York, “pursuant to a[ ] Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Administrative Warrant.” Id. at 4. He “was processed as a criminal and became Inmate #44351” and was “imprisoned like the rest of the other people who were there for actually committing crimes.” Id. at 4. He wore a “prison uniform,” was “labeled” a criminal, and was “treated” and “addressed” as a prisoner. Id. at 7. “And yet, Plaintiff committed no crimes for such punishment.” Id. at 10. Instead, he was “placed in prison as a prisoner solely for immigration purposes.” Id. at 20.
Page references to documents identified by docket number are to the numbers assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system maintained by the Clerk's Office. Unless otherwise indicated, excerpts from the record are reproduced exactly as they appear in the original and errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected.
Plaintiff claims Defendants “authorized or granted permission for [DHS] to detain [him] in ‘their' facility without having committed a crime. For that, [D]efendants are liable for [P]laintiff's constitutional rights violations.” Id. at 20. The complaint references the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 22. As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $600,000.00 for each day incarcerated in the RCCF, along with injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 25. For a complete statement, reference is made to the complaint.
Additionally, and without permission from the Court, Plaintiff filed a letter motion and a “first supplement” to the complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 7, 8.) Plaintiff states, inter alia, “I am a detainee in [Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)] custody since May 3rd, 2022[,] after the City of Cohoes Police Department unlawfully arrested me in pursuant to a Administrative Warrant issued by DHS/ICE. I was then transported to [RCCF] after being processed by [DHS]. Sheriff Patrick A. Russo, chose to keep me detained without committing an offense or crime which that turned into a false arrest/false imprisonment.” (Dkt. No. 8-1 at 11-2.) See also Dayvid De Oliveira Jimenez v. Jeffrey Searles, No. 22-cv-960 (JLS) (W.D.N.Y.) ECF Dkt. No. 13 (dismissing Plaintiff's pro se habeas corpus petition challenging his continued detention in custody of the DHS at BFDF). Plaintiff remains in the custody of DHS-at the BFDF in Batavia, New York-pending his removal from the United States. (Dkt. No. 8 at 1-2.)
The Court has reviewed both documents. Moving forward, Plaintiff should refrain from filing documents in multiple cases (see Dkt. No. 7; Jimenez I, ECF Dkt. No. 21), and Plaintiff is advised that he may not attempt to amend his pleadings in a piecemeal manner. See L.R. 15.1. Further, inasmuch as Plaintiff's letter motion (Dkt. No. 7) requesting the Clerk to “remove or withdraw the Stay of Removal” that was filed in Jimenez I, which is now closed, the Court recommends that the Clerk be directed to terminate the duplicate letter motion filed in this action.
As detailed therein, Dayvid De Oliveira Jimenez (A # 055-769-136) is a citizen of Brazil who entered the United States as a Lawful Permanent Resident on or about February 15, 2004. Dayvid De Oliveira Jimenez v. Jeffrey Searles, No. 22-cv-960 (JLS) (W.D.N.Y.) ECF Dkt. No. 13 at 1. On March 6, 2018, the Superior Court in Danielson, Connecticut convicted De Oliveira Jimenez of strangulation in the 2nd degree. Id. at 2. The court sentenced him to three years' imprisonment-suspended-and three years' probation. Id. DHS issued an arrest warrant for De Oliveira Jimenez on April 12, 2022. Id. On May 3, 2022, DHS issued a Notice of Custody Determination to De Oliveira Jimenez ordering that ICE detain him pending a final administrative hearing. Id. On May 11, 2022, DHS served De Oliveira Jimenez with a Notice to Appear, alleging that he was subject to removal pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)-as an alien convicted of a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year-and § 237(a)(2)(E)(i)-as an alien convicted of a crime of domestic violence. Id. DHS issued another Notice of Custody Determination on June 7, 2022-ordering that ICE continue to detain De Oliveira Jimenez pending a final administrative determination. Id. On August 25, 2022, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found De Oliveira Jimenez removable and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture. De Oliveria Jimenez appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and the BIA dismissed his appeal on January 25, 2023. Id. On February 10, 2023, De Oliveria Jimenez filed a Petition for Review (“PFR”) in the Second Circuit, challenging the BIA's dismissal of his appeal, and, on February 23, 2023, moved that court for a stay of removal pending adjudication of his PFR. Id. at 3. The Second Circuit has not ruled on that motion for a stay of removal. See id.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which establishes a cause of action for ‘the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990). To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct: (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law; and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Whalen v. Cty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997). To establish liability under the statute, a plaintiff must plead that each government official defendant violated the Constitution through that official's own individual actions. Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020). An official may not be held liable for constitutional violations simply because he held a high position of authority. Victory v. Pataki, 814 F.3d 47, 67 (2d Cir. 2016).
The Court liberally construes Plaintiff's forty-six page complaint and ten-page “first supplement to complaint” as asserting a false imprisonment claim against Defendants. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 8.) The remainder of the complaint is a rambling discussion, primarily consisting of legal excerpts, leaving the Court with “an adorned, the-defendant-harmed-me- accusation.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends dismissing Plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend.
A. Fourth Amendment
Liberally construed, Plaintiff asserts a false imprisonment claim against Defendants. A Section 1983 claim for false imprisonment is anchored in the Fourth Amendment right ‘to be free from unreasonable seizures.'” Iverson v. Annucci, No. 18-CV-0886, 2020 WL 1083152, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2020) (citing Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2007)). For Section 1983 purposes, “false imprisonment is merely a species of false arrest.” Bowman v. City of Middletown, 91 F.Supp.2d 644, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Singer v. Fulton Cty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995)). “In analyzing false imprisonment claims under Section 1983, the Second Circuit has generally looked to the law of the state in which the arrest occurred.” Aragon v. New York, No. 14-CV-9797 (ER), 2017 WL 2703562, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017) (citing Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 2006)).
“False imprisonment is simply an unlawful detention or confinement brought about by means of an arrest rather than in some other way and is in all other respects synonymous with false arrest.” Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 1999) (Glasser, J., dissenting). “False arrest and false imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of the latter.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).
To state a false arrest or false imprisonment claim under New York law, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement[,] and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.'” Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting McGowan v. United States, 825 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2016)). An arrest is privileged if it is based on probable cause. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.”); accord Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.”); Heyliger v. Peters, 771 Fed.Appx. 96, 97 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (Since “[a]n arrest is privileged if it is supported by probable cause,” the existence of probable cause to arrest “is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim.”).
Here, Plaintiff alleges he was arrested on May 3, 2022, and detained at the RCCF from May 3, 2022, through June 3, 2022, pursuant to an Administrative Warrant issued by DHS. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3, 41; Dkt. No. 8 at 1-2.) As such, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim is frivolous because a dispositive defense exits on the face of the complaint. See Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437.
This Court reached a similar result in Jimenez I, wherein Plaintiff also complained he was detained at the BFDF in Batavia, New York “as a result of what initiated as a [sic] assumed minor traffic violation . . . that turned into a false arrest/false imprisonment” on May 3, 2022, in the City of Cohoes. Jimenez I, ECF Dkt. No. 24 (alterations in original). There, it was inferred from Plaintiff's allegations that the arresting officers learned of his warrant upon checking the information he provided at the scene. Id. As the District Court explained, “[w]hen an officer learns from a computer database . . . that a person is the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant, probable cause exists to arrest that person.” Id. “Thus, to the extent Plaintiff still contends that his resulting arrest was unlawful, such claim is meritless because the outstanding warrant established probable cause.” Id. The same analysis applies in the case at bar.
As a result, the Court recommends Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment false imprisonment claim against Defendants be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applies only to the federal government, and not to state or municipal governments. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002). Plaintiff has not alleged any federal official violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Therefore, the Court recommends dismissing any Fifth Amendment claims asserted against Defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
C. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment prevents the government from treating incarcerated individuals with deliberate indifference. Coronet v. Decker, 449 F.Supp.3d 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976)). Though Plaintiff references the Eighth Amendment, it “does not apply to civil detainees.” See Coronel v. Decker, 449 F.Supp.3d 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Such individuals “have not been convicted of a crime and thus may not be punished in any manner-neither cruelly and unusually nor otherwise.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court has held, however, that “persons in civil detention deserve at least as much protection as those who are criminally incarcerated.” Charles, 925 F.3d at 82 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982). Thus, for federal civil detainees, those rights are recognized under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
For these reasons, the Court recommends dismissing any Eighth Amendment claims asserted against Defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
D. Fourteenth Amendment
To establish a violation of a right to substantive due process, a plaintiff must demonstrate the government action was “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” City of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998). Additionally, to establish a deliberate indifference claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must show the official “acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the [ ] detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Vides v. Wolf, No. 6:20-CV-06293, 2020 WL 3969368, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. July 14, 2020) (quoting Coronet, 449 F.Supp.3d at 284).
Here, Plaintiff does not raise issues that are customarily resolved by Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. Instead, he appears to challenge the fact of his confinement at the RCCF, and not the manner in which he was confined, which the Court addressed above as a part of the Fourth Amendment false imprisonment claim. In any event, the Court finds the complaint fails to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.
For example, pro se plaintiffs generally bring Fourteenth Amendment due process claims to challenge “excessive force,” “denial of adequate medical care,” “unconstitutional conditions of confinement unrelated to medical care,” and the “failure to protect.” Randle v. Alexander, 960 F.Supp.2d 457, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
The complaint also references the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision does not mandate identical treatment for each individual; rather, it requires that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985). Plaintiff asserts no facts suggesting Defendants discriminated against him based on his membership in a protected class. Nor does he allege that Defendants treated other similarly situated inmates who were detained pursuant to a DHS warrant differently than they treated him. Again, Plaintiff appears to challenge the fact he was detained pursuant to the DHS warrant, which was discussed as part of the Fourth Amendment claim.
For these reasons, the Court recommends dismissing any Fourteenth Amendment claims asserted against Defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
E. Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) “Section 1983 claims against municipal employees sued in their official capacity are treated as claims against the municipality itself.” Ortiz v. Wagstaff, 523 F.Supp.3d 347, 361 (W.D.N.Y. 2021). A municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 unless the challenged action was undertaken pursuant to a municipal policy, custom, or practice. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “Absent such a custom, policy, or usage, a municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis for the tort of its employee.” Id. “Monell does not provide a separate cause of action” to a Section 1983 plaintiff. Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006). Rather, “it extends liability to a municipal organization where that organization's failure to train, or the policies or customs that it has sanctioned, led to an independent constitutional violation.” Id. Thus, there can be no municipal liability under Monell in the absence of an underlying constitutional violation. See Morales v. City of New York, 752 F.3d 234, 238 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[H]aving properly dismissed [plaintiff's] underlying constitutional claims against the individual NYPD defendants, the District Court also properly dismissed his claim against the City and the NYPD for municipal liability under Monell.”)
Inasmuch as Plaintiff has not pled facts establishing an “underlying constitutional violation,” it necessarily follows that he has pled no cognizable claim against Defendants in their official capacities. See id. As such, the Court recommends dismissal of the complaint against Defendants in their official capacities for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
F. Human Rights
Lastly, the complaint makes a passing reference to the violation of Plaintiff's “Human Rights.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 23.) Plaintiff does not state the legal basis for this claim and the Court has discerned none.
G. Leave to Amend
Generally, a pro se complaint should not be dismissed “without giving leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999). An opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). Here, Plaintiff clearly takes issue of the fact he was held in the RCCF pursuant to the DHS administrative warrant. However, for reason stated herein, even when liberally construed, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Thus, the Court recommends the sua sponte dismissal of the complaint in its entirety.
Nevertheless, in deference to Plaintiff's pro se status and out of an abundance of caution, the Court recommends granting Plaintiff leave to amend to cure the deficiencies identified above to that extent he is able to do so.
The Court advises Plaintiff that should he be permitted to amend his complaint, any amended pleading he submits must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In any amended complaint, Plaintiff must clearly set forth facts that give rise to the claims, including the dates, times, and places of the alleged underlying acts, and each individual who committed each alleged wrongful act. Any amended complaint submitted by Plaintiff must set forth all of the claims he intends to assert against the defendants and must demonstrate that a case or controversy exists between the Plaintiff and the defendants which Plaintiff has a legal right to pursue and over which this Court has jurisdiction. “[C]omplaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning.” Hunt v. Budd, 895 F.Supp. 35, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). Finally, Plaintiff is informed that any such amended complaint will replace the existing complaint and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 3) is GRANTED; and it is further
Plaintiff should note that although his IFP application has been granted, he will still be required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs complaint be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that the Clerk be directed to terminate Plaintiffs letter motion (Dkt. No. 7), which was originally filed in and pertains to the related case, Jimenez v. City of Cohoes Police Department et al., No. 1:22-cv-00984 (MAD/TWD) (N.D.N.Y.); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec 'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).