Opinion
May 15, 2001.
Belkin Burden Wenig Goldman, L. L. P., New York City (Joseph Burden, Sherwin Belkin and Jay Berg of counsel), for appellant.
Grad Weinraub, L. L. P., New York City (Catharine A. Grad of counsel), for Carmelle Roy and others, respondents.
Before: Stanley Parness, P.J., William J. Davis, Lucindo Suarez, JJ.
Order entered January 8, 1999 (Laurie L. Lau, J.) affirmed, with $10 costs.
Section 26-511 (c)(9)(c)(i) of the Rent Stabilization Law excuses a landlord from offering a renewal lease "where the housing accommodation is owned by . . . [an] institution operated exclusively for charitable or educational purposes on a non-profit basis and . . . the tenant's initial tenancy commenced after the owner acquired the property . . ." (emphasis supplied). The legislative intent underlying the statute was to ameliorate prior caselaw which had permitted after-acquiring institutional landlords to evict unaffiliated tenants whose occupancy commenced prior to the institution's ownership (see, Trustees of Columbia University v. James, 127 Misc.2d 81, affd 123 A.D.2d 904). Reasonably construing the language of this remedial legislation, it is the entity which owns, operates and maintains the "housing accommodation" which should be considered the owner of the property for purposes of seeking an exemption from rent stabilization. Thus, contrary to the contention of petitioner Jewish Theological Seminary of America (JTSA) that its ownership of the land justifies eviction of these long-term, previously occupying stabilized tenants, JTSA was not the owner when the tenants commenced occupancy. Rather, the owner at that time was Emmess Associates, Inc. (Emmess), a for-profit stock corporation which undisputedly acquired the building in 1969 and transferred title back to JTSA in December 1982. Since the tenants' initial occupancies commencedprior to the time JTSA reacquired the building, JTSA may not declare the premises exempt and refuse to renew the tenants' leases.
JTSA's argument for the piercing of Emmess' corporate veil to reveal JTSA as the true owner of the building and housing accommodations is rejected. Piercing the corporate veil is a form of equitable relief outside the jurisdiction of Civil Court (19 West 45th Street Realty Co. v. Doram Electric Corp., 233 A.D.2d 184). Moreover, the doctrine is typically employed by a third party where abuse of the corporate form has resulted in a wrong or fraud requiring the intervention of a court of equity (Morris v. New York State Dept. of Taxation and Finance, 82 N.Y.2d 135, 140-142). These considerations are not present in the proceedings at hand. Were the issue properly before us, we would find that the record evidence compellingly establishes Emmess' independent existence, personality and purpose, such that any attempt to disregard it in JTSA's self-interest would be an unwarranted application of the piercing doctrine.