Opinion
CIVIL 2:19-cv-03343-SAL-MGB
11-18-2020
Joshua Jeter #314407, Plaintiff, v. Frank Musier, S. Marshall, Stanley Terry K. McCurry, Dewayne Campbell, Willie Briscoe, Rodesia Taylor, Officer James, Joshua McCrary And Joseph Stevens, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDAN BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action against South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) correctional officers Frank Musier, S. Marshall, Stanley Terry, K. McCurry, Dewayne Campbell, Willie Briscoe, Rodesia Taylor, Officer James, Joshua McCrary, and Joseph Stephens (collectively, “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 109.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in this case were referred to the undersigned for consideration. For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a state inmate housed at McCormick Correctional Institute in McCormick, South Carolina. On July 29, 2016, Plaintiff alleges that a stabbing occurred in his dormitory wing of the prison. The stabbing occurred at approximately 3:40 PM. (Dkt. No. 109-4 at 2.) Following the stabbing, guards locked down the dorm by directing inmates into their cells. (Id.) At this time, Plaintiff proceeded to the dorm from a cafeteria. (Dkt. No. 50 at 4.) Plaintiff asserts that this was approximately at 4:10 PM. (Dkt. No. 112 at 3.) As Plaintiff walked towards the dorm, he observed at least six officers; Plaintiff states he specifically observed Defendants Musier, Marshall, McCurry, Campbell, Briscoe, Taylor, McCrary, and Stevens sitting on benches in the dorm. (Dkt. Nos. 109-4 at 2, Dkt. No. 50 at 7.) The officers were approximately twenty-four feet away from Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 109-4 at 10.) Then, suddenly, an inmate hiding in a kitchen attached to the cafeteria stabbed Plaintiff “out of the blue.” (Dkt. Nos. 50 at 7, 109-4 at 7.) Plaintiff was stabbed three to four times, sustaining wounds in his neck and back. (Dkt. No. 50 at 6.) Plaintiff subsequently fled the scene and came into contact with Defendant Campbell, who observed Plaintiff's wounds. (Dkt. No. 109-9.)
Plaintiff filed this action on September 7, 2018 in the Richland County, South Carolina Court of Common Pleas. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) Defendants removed the action to federal court on November 27, 2019. (Id.). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 17, 2020. (Dkt. No. 50.) In the amended complaint, Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights for failing to protect him and prevent the stabbing. (Dkt. No. 50 at 4.) Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment0F rights. (Id.)
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states; “the plaintiff 8th and 14th Amendment Rights were violated (ie failure to protect also supervisor liability).” (Dkt. No. 50 at 4.)(errors in original) Because Plaintiff was a state prisoner during the events at issue and not a pre-trial detainee, his allegations of deliberate indifference and failure to protect implicate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, not the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of due process. Bowman v. Ozmint, No. 0:08-2517-PMD-PJG, 2009 WL 3065180, at *12 (D.S.C. Sept. 22, 2009), aff'd, 369 Fed.Appx. 416 (4th Cir. 2010); (“[A]s Bowman is a state prisoner and not a pre-trial detainee, his allegations of deliberate indifference and failure to protect implicate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment . . . not the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of due process.”); see also Heyward v. Price, No. 6:18-CV-00150-JMC, 2019 WL 1416880, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-6460 (4th Cir. April 10, 2019) (“Although Plaintiff has alleged a violation of rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, he is a convicted prisoner and, therefore, only the Eighth Amendment is relevant to the court's analysis. “); James v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. CIV.A. 3:08-664-HFF-JRM, 2009 WL 1147994, at *4 (D.S.C. Apr. 27, 2009) (“Defendants have analyzed Plaintiff's claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff, however, appears to have been a convicted inmate at the time of the alleged incidents such that his claims are properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment.”). Furthermore, to state a supervisor liability claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed ‘a pervasive and unreasonable risk' of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices, '; and (3) that there was an ‘affirmative causal link' between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing cases). To the extent Plaintiff is trying to allege supervisory liability, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence to support such a claim.
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 16, 2020, seeking dismissal of this action in its entirety. (Dkt. No. 109.) The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that the Court should grant their motion on the basis that: (1) Plaintiff's failure to protect claims fail because he cannot show that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference; and (2) the Court should dismiss Defendants Taylor, Stevens, Marshall, and Briscoe because they were not present at the time of Plaintiff's stabbing. The undersigned will consider these arguments in turn.
Plaintiff brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute provides a vehicle through which litigants can bring an action against public officials for depriving them of Constitutional rights. The statute reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this §, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West).
1. Eighth Amendment Claim and Deliberate Indifference
Defendants argue that they were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's stabbing, because they were present in Plaintiff's dorm to secure it and had no knowledge of Plaintiff's impending attack. (Dkt. No. 109-1 at 4.) In response, Plaintiff asserts that his dorm had a reputation for violence, and the dorm should have been completely locked down by the time he passed through it. (Dkt. No. 112 at 3.)
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In applying the Amendment to prison conditions, the Amendment creates a duty for prison officials to take “reasonable measures” to ensure the safety of prisoners. Cox v. Quinn, 828 F.3d 227, 235 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). More specifically, prison officials “have a specific ‘duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.'” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833.). Not every injury translates into liability; in order to state a successful failure to protect claim, an inmate must show that the injury was sufficiently serious, and that the prison officials in question acted with at “‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.'” Odom v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.). Prison officials possess the requisite state of mind when they act with deliberate indifference. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-3 (1991).
Deliberate indifference is present when an official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. Deliberate indifference requires “‘more than mere negligence,' but ‘less than acts or omissions [done] for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.'” Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.) Plaintiffs can prove knowledge by showing that a risk was “‘so obvious that it had to have been known.'” Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 361 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 136). However, “‘prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.'” Marin v. Williams, No. 2:19-CV-01270-DCC, 2020 WL 6281535, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 2020) (quoting Farmer, 544 U.S. at 844)). Furthermore, “an officer who responds reasonably to a danger facing an inmate is not liable under a deliberate indifference standard, even if the officer could have taken additional precautions but did not.” Id. (citing Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422, 428 (4th Cir. 2006)).
Here, there is no dispute about the seriousness of Plaintiff's injuries. Rather, the question is whether Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. The evidence shows that the risk of Plaintiff's stabbing was not obvious. Defendants were acting to secure Plaintiff's dorm and were in the process of removing inmates from it when Plaintiff was stabbed. (Dkt. No. 100-4 at 2.) Furthermore, as Plaintiff testified at his deposition, he only noticed his assailant after the assailant stabbed him “out of the blue.” (Dkt. No. 100-4 at 7-8.) Plaintiff also offers no evidence to support his claim that his dorm had a reputation for dangerousness. Therefore, it appears that the surprise attack was not obvious, and Defendants therefore would not have necessarily known about it. Furthermore, the evidence shows that following the earlier stabbing, at least six SCDC officers were present in Plaintiff's dorm. (Dkt. No. 100-4 at 9.) Plaintiff testified that Defendants “[were] in the process of locking down” the dorm, attempting to secure the area and place all prisoners in their cells. (Dkt. No. 100-4 at 2.) Plaintiff further testified that it appeared “[m]ostly everybody was locked down” at the time of the stabbing. (Dkt. No. 100-4 at 3.) It therefore appears that even if Defendants knew of the risk of Plaintiff's stabbing, they responded reasonably to it by attempting to lock down Plaintiff's dorm following the 3:40 PM stabbing and by maintaining an officer presence in the dorm. Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's rights. The undersigned recommends the Court grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
2. Defendants' Personal Participation
Furthermore, Defendants argue that Defendants Marshall, Briscoe, Taylor, and Stevens should be dismissed from this matter as there is no evidence they personally participated in Plaintiff's stabbing.1F (Dkt. No. 109-1 at 7.) Specifically, they argue that scan in/ scan out records from the prison show that they were not present. (Id.) In response, Plaintiff asserts that “video footage” will prove that Defendants were present in Plaintiff's dorm during the stabbing, and that electronic scanners were not implemented as a means of checking SCDC employees in and out until after the stabbing. (Dkt. No. 112 at 5.)
Defendants Musier, Terry, McCurry, Campbell, James, and McCrary do not dispute their presence at the scene of the stabbing.
In § 1983 cases, defendants who are being sued in their individual capacities must have had personal participation in the action that caused a plaintiff's injuries. Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Here, Defendants provide the Court with sworn affidavits detailing the whereabouts of Defendants Marshall, Briscoe, Taylor, and Stevens on the day of Plaintiff's stabbing. Kathleen Epting, an SCDC Human Resources Specialist in charge of employee records, stated that based upon scan in/out records, Defendants Taylor, Stevens, and Marshall were not working at McCormick Correctional Institution on the date of the stabbing. (Dkt. No. 109-10.) Taylor conformed in a separate affidavit that she was not at McCormick Correctional Institution on the date of the stabbing. (Dkt. No. 109-11.) Furthermore, Defendant Brisco stated that he was not in Plaintiff's dorm when the stabbing occurred. (Dkt. No. 109-12.) However, Plaintiff provides2F“declarations” from other inmates, indicating that these Defendants were present for the stabbing. (Dkt. No. 112-1.) There is therefore a dispute of fact as to the presence of these Defendants at the scene of Plaintiff's stabbing. However, such a dispute of fact on the issue of personal participation does not defeat summary judgment. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence of what each Defendant did to participate in the stabbing, other than the fact that they were present in the dorm and seated on benches.3F As discussed infra, this does not create a dispute of fact as to deliberate indifference. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in Defendants' favor.
While Plaintiff does allude to video footage and asserts that scanners were not in use when the stabbing occurred, these claims are unsubstantiated. Plaintiff has introduced no video footage into evidence, nor does he provide evidence about scanners beyond conclusory statements saying they did not exist at the prison in 2016.
To the extent that Plaintiff argues that the Defendants participated in his stabbing by failing to protect him, the undersigned has evaluated Plaintiff's failure to protect claim and recommended it be dismissed as meritless. See infra.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 109) be GRANTED and this action be dismissed with prejudice.
The undersigned notes that Plaintiff provides the Court with an “objection” to Defendants' Motion. (Dkt. No. 112-1 at 3.) Plaintiff states that: 1) Defendants should not have included Plaintiff's disciplinary record as an exhibit to their Motion; 2) Defendants did not include the full transcript of his deposition; 3) the time of his stabbing is incorrect; 4) Defendants did not include a picture of Plaintiff's injuries; and 5) Defendants are “lying” about not being present on the scene of the stabbing. (Id. at 3-4.) As to Plaintiff's assertions regarding Defendants' exhibits, the undersigned notes that this does not create a dispute of fact regarding deliberate indifference. Furthermore, the undersigned has evaluated Plaintiff's claims about who was present at the scene of the stabbing. See infra. Regarding Plaintiff's assertion about his deposition, the undersigned notes that Defendants provided a complete copy of Plaintiff's deposition to the Court on November 15, 2020. (Dkt. No. 116.) The undersigned has reviewed and considered all of Plaintiff's deposition.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.