Opinion
S.F. 24392
12-10-1982
, 654 P.2d 745 In re JERALD C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HIRAM G., Defendant and Appellant.
In re JERALD C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
HIRAM G., Defendant and Appellant.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Dec. 10, 1982.
For Opinion Rehearing, See 201 Cal. Rptr. 342, 678 p. 2d 917.
Kaus, J., filed concurring and dissenting opinion, in which Reynoso, J., joined.
Richardson, J., dissented and filed opinion.
Terry A. Green and Dreyer, Shulman, Dubbin, Kraft & Green, San Jose, for defendant and appellant.
Selby Brown, Jr., County Counsel, and Debra L. Cauble, Deputy County Counsel, San Jose, for plaintiff and respondent.
Donald L. Clark, County Counsel, San Diego, Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Arlene Prater, Deputy County Counsel, San Diego, as amici curiae for plaintiff and respondent.
BROUSSARD, Associate Justice.
The father of Jerald C., a minor, appeals from an order requiring reimbursement to the County of Santa Clara for the costs of the care and support of Jerald while in custody.
Jerald was declared a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and was placed in custody at juvenile hall and boys ranch. He was subsequently committed to the California Youth Authority. The county sought reimbursement under the provisions of section 903 at the rate of $265 per month for juvenile hall and boys ranch custody for periods prior to September 1980, at the rate of $33 per day for 33 days in juvenile hall in October and November 1980, and at the rate of $25 per month for the subsequent commitment to the California Youth Authority. After a hearing, appellant was ordered to pay the above amounts at the rate of $100 per month.
Section 903 provides: "The father, mother, spouse, or other person liable for the support of a minor person, the estates of such persons, and the estate of such minor person, shall be liable for the cost of his care, support, and maintenance in any county institution in which he is placed, detained, or committed pursuant to the order of the juvenile court, or for the cost to the county in which the juvenile court making the order is located, of his care, support, and maintenance in any other place in which he is placed, detained, or committed pursuant to the order of the juvenile court. The liability of such persons (in this article called relatives) and estates shall be a joint and several liability."
Statutes requiring responsible relatives to reimburse governmental agencies for support have been sustained against claims of denial of equal protection. In Swoap v. Superior Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 490, 111 Cal.Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840, this court upheld statutes requiring responsible adult children to support needy or poor elderly parents and providing that the children must reimburse the state for support provided by it to the parents. Pointing out that a long tradition of law and a measureless history of societal custom had established the duty of adult children to support their poor parents, the court concluded that the duty imposed by the statutes bears a rational relationship to the accomplishment of the state purpose of relieving the public treasury and that the statutes do not arbitrarily charge one class of society for the cost of public assistance. (10 Cal.3d at pp. 502-507, 111 Cal.Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840.)
In re Ricky H. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 513, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204, upheld a statute requiring parents to reimburse the state for the costs of counsel in juvenile proceedings. Pointing out that legal assistance essential to protect and preserve the minor's constitutional rights comes within the parental support obligation, the court concluded that imposition of parental liability for counsel fees cannot be characterized as arbitrary or a denial of equal protection. (2 Cal.3d at p. 518 et seq, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204.)
Similarly, medical treatment of a minor's physical injuries and care of a mentally retarded minor come within the parent's support obligation, and statutes providing for parental liability to reimburse governmental agencies providing such treatment and care have been upheld against claims of denial of equal protection. (In re Dudley (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 401, 404 et seq., 48 Cal.Rptr. 790; County of Alameda v. Kaiser (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 815, 817-818, 48 Cal.Rptr. 343.)
However, relative responsibility statutes have been invalidated when the government charges were not for support which the relative refused or failed to provide but for the cost of maintaining public institutions for public benefit.
"A statute obviously violates the equal protection clause if it selects one particular class of persons for a species of taxation and no rational basis supports such classification. [Citations.] Such a concept for the state's taking of a free man's property manifestly denies him equal protection of the law." (Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1964) 60 Cal.2d 716, 722-723, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720 [remanded 380 U.S. 194, 85 S.Ct. 871, 13 L.Ed.2d 753; subsequent opn. 62 Cal.2d 586, 43 Cal.Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321]; see Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Com. (1916) 239 U.S. 478, 484-485, 36 S.Ct. 204, 206, 60 L.Ed. 392; Norwood v. Baker (1898) 172 U.S. 269, 279 et seq., 19 S.Ct. 187, 190, 43 L.Ed. 443; Furey v. City of Sacramento (1979) 24 Cal.3d 862, 874-875, 157 Cal.Rptr. 684, 598 P.2d 844; Dawson v. Town of Los Altos Hills (1976) 16 Cal.3d 676, 684, 128 Cal.Rptr. 97, 547 P.2d 1377.) Such limitation on the government's ability to raise money has been traced to the Magna Carta and the Petition of Right. (See tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, Part III (1965) 17 Stan.L.Rev. 614, 643.) To charge the cost of operation of state functions conducted for public benefit to one class of society is arbitrary and violates the basic constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law. (Id., at p. 639.)
In accordance with this fundamental principle, it has been recognized that parents may not be charged for costs when adult children are incarcerated in prison or committed to state hospitals for the dangerous. Nor may adult children be charged for such incarceration or commitment of their parents. The cases have reasoned that when incarceration or commitment is for the protection of society, it is arbitrary to assess relatives for the expense. (Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d 716, 719-720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720; Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 247, 251 et seq., 28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22; Department of Mental Hygiene v. Bank of America (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 949, 950 et seq., 83 Cal.Rptr. 559.)
In Kirchner the court explained: "Recently in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 247 [28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22], the department, relying upon this same section 6650, attempted to collect from a father for the cost of care, support and maintenance in a state hospital for the mentally ill or insane of his son who had been charged with crime, but before trial of the criminal issue (and obviously without adjudication of that issue) had been found by the court to be insane and committed to such state hospital. We there held (pp. 255-256 [28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22] ) that '[t]he enactment and administration of laws providing for sequestration and treatment of persons in appropriate state institutions--subject of course, to the constitutional guaranties--who would endanger themselves or others if at large is a proper state function; being so, it follows that the expense of providing, operating and maintaining such institutions should (subject to reasonable exceptions against the inmate or his estate ) be borne by the state.' (Italics added.) We further held that recovery could not constitutionally be had against the father of the committed patient. This holding is dispositive of the issue before us. Whether the commitment is incidental to an alleged violation of penal statute, as in Hawley, or is essentially a civil commitment as in the instant case, the purposes of confinement and treatment or care in either case encompass the protection of society from the confined person, and his own protection and possible reclamation as a productive member of the body politic. Hence the cost of maintaining the state institution, including provision of adequate care for its inmates, cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class in the society; such assessment violates the equal protection clause." (Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 719-720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.)
Whatever the basis for other commitments by the juvenile court (see §§ 300, 601), the purposes of the confinement and treatment in commitments pursuant to section 602 include "the protection of society from the confined person." (Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.)
The basis of commitment under section 602 is criminal conduct. The section provides: "Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on age is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court."
Section 202 as amended in 1976 and 1977 establishes the purposes of commitment, stating that protection of the public must be considered with the minor's welfare. That section reads: "(a) The purpose of this chapter is to secure for each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court such care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the state; to protect the public from criminal conduct by minors; to impose on the minor a sense of responsibility for his own acts; to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents only when necessary for his welfare or for the safety and protection of the public; and, when the minor is removed from his own family, to secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents. This chapter shall be liberally construed to carry out these purposes. [p] (b) The purpose of this chapter also includes the protection of the public from the consequences of criminal activity, and to such purpose probation officers, peace officers, and juvenile courts shall take into account such protection of the public in their determinations under this chapter." (Italics added.)
The purpose of juvenile commitment proceedings "to protect the public from criminal conduct by minors" (§ 202) rehabilitation, and treatment (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 531-532, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549; In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557, 567, 121 Cal.Rptr. 817, 536 P.2d 65) brings the commitment squarely within the rule of Kirchner. "[T]he purposes of confinement and treatment or care ... encompass the protection of society from the confined person, and his own protection and possible reclamation as a productive member of the body politic. Hence the cost of maintaining the state institution, including provision of adequate care for its inmates, cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class in the society; such assessment violates the equal protection clause." (60 Cal.2d at p. 720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.)
While it is true that section 602 proceedings are not technically criminal and commitment of a juvenile under the section is not for the purpose of punishment or a conviction (§ 203; In re Eric J., supra, 25 Cal.3d 522, 531-532, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549; In re Aline D., supra, 14 Cal.3d 557, 567, 121 Cal.Rptr. 817, 536 P.2d 65), it is apparent from Kirchner and Hawley that these are not determinative factors. Kirchner involved commitment of a mentally ill person who was neither charged nor convicted of crime; although in Hawley the child was charged with crime, the criminal proceedings were suspended at the time of commitment, there was no conviction, and confinement was not for the purpose of punishment. As was true in Kirchner and Hawley, commitment under section 602 is not for the purpose of providing support and maintenance for the committed person but for the purpose of protecting society.
The county seeks to distinguish Kirchner and Hawley on the ground that the obligation to support a minor child is a common law obligation whereas the obligation to support an adult child or parent is a statutory obligation. However, the duty to reimburse for support and maintenance imposed by section 903 goes beyond the common law duty codified in Civil Code section 207. Under the latter code section the liability of parents to reimburse third parties who provide support applies only where a parent "neglects" to provide support, and there is no liability when the child abandons the parent without cause. (Civ.Code, § 208.) Section 602 commitments are not based on a refusal or failure to provide support. Ordinarily the parents are willing to provide support, but the state by taking custody has deprived them of the opportunity to provide the ordinary support of their child.
In seeking reimbursement of expenses incurred in section 602 commitments, the county is not seeking recovery of expenditures for support of the minor, but expenses for confinement for the protection of society. Although parents of children committed under section 602 are thereby relieved of their ordinary burden of support, the reimbursement provision of section 903 is not based on such burden but upon the governmental cost of confinement. And it is apparent from the reimbursement sought in the instant case that the charges were not limited to the reasonable cost of support in a home but included confinement costs.
Moreover, common law and statutory origin furnishes no basis for the urged distinction because the statutory duty to provide support for needy parents and adult children has existed for so long. As pointed out in Swoap v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d 490, 111 Cal.Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840, it "is abundantly clear that children have generally been subject to a duty to support poor parents for a very long time, indeed. It is true, as stated in Kirchner and Boss, that there was no such duty at common law. Nevertheless, the duty is deep rooted and of venerable ancestry; it can be traced back over almost four centuries to the year 1601, when it emerged as part and parcel of the Elizabethan Poor Law. (43 Eliz. 1, ch. 2, § vi (1601).) 11 Professor tenBroek has clearly demonstrated that 'legal liability of relatives [imposed by the Elizabethan Poor Law] was designed to indemnify the public and to minimize its costs in relieving the poor.' (tenBroek, supra, 16 Stan.L.Rev. 257, 283.)
"This duty, codified in California in 1872 as section 206 of the Civil Code in language remarkably similar to the Elizabethan Poor Law, has existed unchanged until the recent 1971 amendment. (See fn. 4, ante.) The purpose of such legislation is identical to that underlying the Elizabethan Poor Law: 'It has been stated that the "main purpose of the statutes seems to be to protect the public from the burden of supporting people who have children able to support them." (Duffy v. Yordi, supra, 149 Cal. at p. 142 [citation].)' (Gluckman v. Gaines (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 52, 54 .)" (10 Cal.3d at pp. 502-503, 111 Cal.Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840.)
As in Swoap, the long tradition of law and history of societal custom of a duty to support poor adult children and parents must be deemed the substantial equivalent of the common law duty to support minor children. The duties may not be distinguished in terms of the state's right to reimbursement. On the one hand the state, in accordance with Swoap, may obtain reimbursement for support allowances paid to or for minors. On the other hand the common law duty to support minor children does not authorize the state to recover the costs of confinement imposed for the protection of society and the minor and his rehabilitation. Under Kirchner those costs may not be recovered when an adult is confined for the protection of society, and they may not be recovered when minors are placed in custody for the protection of society.
It is urged that while the county may not recover the costs of confinement and treatment, it should be permitted to recover costs incurred in supporting and maintaining the juvenile based on the parental common law duty and cases upholding responsible relative statutes in other situations. Even assuming that it is economically feasible to segregate the types of costs borne by the institutions and to allocate in a reasonable manner a portion of the costs to each juvenile, we must reject the proposed allocation for the following reasons. The allocation would be equally possible in the Kirchner and Hawley situations, but neither case permitted the allocation, and the allocation would involve partial repudiation of well-settled principles of law. As pointed out above, the section 903 reimbursement goes beyond the parental duty of reimbursement imposed by section 207 because there is no reason to believe that absent commitment the parents would refuse or fail to provide the support themselves. The purpose of the section 602 commitment is to exercise control over the juvenile for the benefit of society. The state's purpose is not to provide support and maintenance as was true in Swoap v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d 49, 111 Cal.Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840 (welfare payments), In re Ricky H., supra, 2 Cal.3d 513, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204 (attorney services), and In re Dudley, supra, 239 Cal.App.2d 401, 48 Cal.Rptr. 790 (medical care).
Our conclusion that the county may not recover its costs does not mean that parents will be unjustly enriched. One of the greatest misfortunes a parent may suffer is the incarceration of offspring for crime. To imply that the avoidance of support obligation balances or exceeds such misfortune would betray a misguided sense of values. Incarcerating the child, the state neither intends nor provides benefits to the parents. The state's purpose and the benefits provided are for society generally.
Rejecting equal protection challenges, three Court of Appeal decisions have upheld the right of the county to obtain reimbursement from the parents of a minor committed under section 602. (In re Steven S. (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 683, 685-687, 176 Cal.Rptr. 195; In re Shaieb (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 553, 556 et seq, 58 Cal.Rptr. 631; County of Alameda v. Espinoza (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 541-544, 52 Cal.Rptr. 480.) The cases sought to distinguish Kirchner and Hawley on the grounds that the purpose of commitment is substantially different from the purpose of commitment of an adult and that the obligation of a parent to support a minor child is a common law obligation, not a statutory one. However, neither reason warrants a distinction. As demonstrated above, the purpose of the juvenile commitment under section 602 includes protection of the public, rehabilitation, and treatment--the same purposes involved in Kirchner and Hawley --and the statutory duty to support needy parents and adult children has existed for so long as to preclude distinction based on common law and statutory origin. Insofar as contrary to the views expressed above, In re Steven S., supra, 122 Cal.App.3d 683, 176 Cal.Rptr. 195, In re Shaieb, supra, 250 Cal.App.2d 553, 58 Cal.Rptr. 631, and County of Alameda v. Espinoza, supra, 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 52 Cal.Rptr. 480, are disapproved.
The order appealed from is reversed.
BIRD, C.J., and MOSK and NEWMAN, JJ., concur.
KAUS, Justice, concurring and dissenting.
While I concur in the judgment, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Welfare and Institutions Code section 903 is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires parental reimbursement for the "care, support and maintenance" of minors in custody after being declared wards of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. In my view, the controlling authorities establish that parents may properly be charged for the support of their children in state and county institutions so long as those charges do not exceed the costs which the parents are in any event under a preexisting duty to pay based on common law or statutory obligations. The record in this case, however, does not establish that the charges which the county seeks to impose are limited to those for which Jerald's father would otherwise be liable. Because I believe that such a showing is required to support an order under section 903, I would reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on this issue.
The majority bases its holding entirely on Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1964) 60 Cal.2d 716, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720. Later cases have clearly and consistently established, however, that Kirchner does not apply where the person on whom the state seeks to impose liability owed a preexisting duty of support to the recipient of the state's services.
I begin with a brief analysis of Kirchner and the cases which have distinguished it based on this preexisting duty. In Kirchner, the California Department of Mental Hygiene, acting pursuant to former section 6650 (now § 7275) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, brought an action against the estate of the adult daughter of a mental patient to recover the cost of care, support, maintenance and medical attention which had been provided to the parent-patient in a state mental institution. The administratrix of the daughter's estate challenged "the right of a state to statutorily impose liability upon, and collect from, one adult for the cost of supporting another adult ...." (60 Cal.2d, at p. 718, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720; italics added; fn. omitted.) We held that: "Whether the commitment is incidental to an alleged violation of a penal statute, as in Hawley, or is essentially a civil commitment as in the instant case, the purposes of confinement and treatment or care in either case encompass the protection of society from the confined person, and his own protection and possible reclamation as a productive member of the body politic. Hence the cost of maintaining the state institution, including provision of adequate care for its inmates, cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class in the society; such assessment violates the equal protection clause." (Id., at p. 720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720; italics added.)
While the Kirchner court spoke in the foregoing passage in broad terms, it clearly did not intend to bar the state from seeking reimbursement for its expenditures in all cases. It distinguished Guardianship of Thrasher (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 768, 234 P.2d 230, which had held that the husband of an incompetent committed to a state mental hospital was under the duty to support her there even though she had an estate of her own, on the ground that "the basic obligation and relevant status of the husband arose from the marriage contract ...." (Italics in original; 60 Cal.2d at p. 719, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.) The court also emphasized language in Hawley suggesting that inmates themselves could be charged for the reasonable cost of their maintenance in state institutions. " 'The enactment and administration of laws providing for sequestration and treatment of persons in appropriate state institutions--subject of course, to the constitutional guaranties--who would endanger themselves or others if at large is a proper state function; being so, it follows that the expense of providing, operating and maintaining such institutions should (subject to reasonable exceptions against the inmate or his estate ) be borne by the state.' " (Id., at pp. 719-720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720; italics in original.)
Less than two years later, the Court of Appeal considered a case similar in many respects to the present one. In In re Dudley (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 401, 408-409, 48 Cal.Rptr. 790, the state sought to charge a mother for the care of her "mentally deficient" daughter. Holding that such charges were proper, the Dudley court explained that while the statutory provisions challenged in Kirchner purported to impose liability, the provision challenged there "merely prescribe[d] a procedure to enforce what liability for support may otherwise exist." (239 Cal.App.2d, at p. 408, 48 Cal.Rptr. 790.) "In Kirchner the court rejected the attempt to shift the cost of the maintenance of the patient from the state and the patient's estate to a relative who except for the arbitrary statute was in no other manner liable for the support of the patient. Herein, on the other hand, the parent, prior to the commitment, was subject to the expense of such care, support, and maintenance as she furnished her daughter." (Id., at p. 412, 48 Cal.Rptr. 790.)
On at least three occasions in recent years, we have distinguished Kirchner on the ground that the relative whom the state sought to charge had a preexisting duty to support the person on whom the state had expended its resources. In In re Ricky H. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 513, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204 we upheld the validity of Welfare and Institutions Code section 903.1, which required parents of minors committed to Youth Authority institutions to reimburse the county for the cost of legal services during juvenile court proceedings. We distinguished Kirchner and Hawley as follows: "Hawley involved the liability of a father for the care of his insane adult son, who had been charged with the murder of his mother, and Kirchner involved the liability of a daughter for the care of her mentally ill mother. Neither case concerned the discharge of common law support obligations, since 'At common law there was no liability on a child to support parents, or on parents to support an adult child. [Citations.]' (Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d 716, 718, fn. 4, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.) [p] The instant case, on the other hand, presents questions regarding the extent of the parents' obligation to support their minor children, an obligation which did exist at common law." (In re Ricky H., supra, 2 Cal.2d at p. 520, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204.) Citing with obvious approval a number of cases upholding relative responsibility statutes after Kirchner, including two cases upholding the statute at issue here, we concluded that the disputed statute was "merely declarative of the parents' preexisting obligation to provide reasonable and necessary support to their minor children, and to reimburse third persons providing that support upon the parents' failure to do so. (See Civ.Code, §§ 207, 248.) Consequently, the imposition of liability for counsel fees under section 903.1 cannot be characterized as arbitrary or a denial of equal protection of the laws." (Id., at p. 521, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204.)
In County of San Mateo v. Boss (1971) 3 Cal.3d 962, 92 Cal.Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654 (disapproved on other grounds in Swoap v. Superior Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 490, 111 Cal.Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840), which barred the state from seeking reimbursement from an adult child for the costs of providing his parent's welfare benefits under the Old Age Security Law, we noted that the Kirchner court had recognized that "the costs of such care could, consistently with equal protection, be charged to those persons who had a preexisting duty to support the recipient of the care. ( [Kirchner ], 60 Cal.2d at p. 719, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.) In a line of decisions since Kirchner imposition of liability upon the estate of the recipient of welfare, upon the recipient's spouse, and, where the recipient was a minor, upon his parents, has been upheld as constitutional. In each of these cases, it was found that the person upon whom liability was imposed owed a preexisting duty of support to the recipient of the public assistance. Since the state discharges that duty of support to the extent it provides welfare assistance, it may reasonably seek reimbursement from those whose duty it discharges." (3 Cal.3d at pp. 967-968, 92 Cal.Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654; fns. omitted.)
This reasoning was recognized and approved in Swoap v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d 490, 498, 111 Cal.Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840. "Kirchner does not stand for the proposition that recovery by public agencies under responsible relatives statutes is in all instances violative of equal protection of the laws; on the contrary, recovery may be constitutionally required from persons 'otherwise legally responsible' or having a 'preexisting duty to support' the recipient of public aid or assistance."
In sum, the cases following Kirchner establish that there is no constitutional violation when a "relative responsibility" statute is merely declarative of a preexisting duty of support. There can be no doubt that parents subject to charges under section 903 are under such a preexisting duty. This obligation existed at common law (see 32 Cal.Jur.3d, Family Law, § 286, pp. 325-326; In re Guardianship of Ceas (1901) 134 Cal. 114, 66 P. 187; In re Ricky H., supra, 2 Cal.3d 513, 520, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204) and has been codified. (See Civ.Code, §§ 196, 206, 246, 248, 4700 et seq.; 32 Cal.Jur.3d, Family Law, § 286, pp. 325-326; see also Goodman, Rights and Obligations of Child Support (1975) 7 Sw.U.L.Rev. 36, 37.) Parents are also liable to third parties for support when they neglect to provide it (Civ.Code, § 207); and "[i]n any proceeding where there is at issue the support of a minor child, the court may order either or both parents to pay any amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the child." (Civ.Code, § 4700, subd. (a).)
To the extent that section 903 only mirrors this support obligation, its validity is not called into question by the Kirchner court's equal protection analysis. While "[a] statute obviously violates the equal protection clause if it selects one particular class of persons for a species of taxation and no rational basis supports such classification" (Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 722, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720), a statute that merely restates a duty owed equally by all parents just as obviously poses no equal protection problem. As the New York Court of Appeal noted, rejecting an equal protection challenge to a statute similar to the one at issue: "Certainly, it constitutes no 'invidious discrimination' to require the parents of juvenile offenders to continue their duty of support if institutional treatment is indicated and directed. (Matter of Jesmer v. Dundon (1971) 29 N.Y.2d 5, 11 [323 N.Y.S.2d 417, 271 N.E.2d 905, 57 A.L.R.3d 629, 635] app. dism.404 U.S. 953, 92 S.Ct. 324, 30 L.Ed.2d 270.)
That parents have been deprived of custody while a child is in a state institution is not decisive. It is well settled that parents' duty of support continues notwithstanding their lack of custody (Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 947, 126 Cal.Rptr. 805, 544 P.2d 941; Svoboda v. Superior Court (1923) 190 Cal. 727, 214 P. 440; In re Carboni (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 605, 609-612, 116 P.2d 453; 32 Cal.Jur.3d, Family Law, § 288, pp. 329-330). Nor does commitment to a state institution sever the parent/child relationship or constitute abandonment of the relationship by the child. (Cf. Civ.Code, § 208.) "[T]he basic philosophy of the juvenile court recognizes that the normal relationship of parent and child should not be disturbed except to insure protection of the public and the welfare of the child; that where interference with that relationship is necessary and warranted it should not extend beyond what is necessary to effect the necessary corrective measures; and that such measures as are taken should be directed to the restoration of a normal parent-child relationship." (Alameda v. Espinoza (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 548, 52 Cal.Rptr. 480.)
The foregoing discussion does not end our inquiry, however. While parents owe a preexisting duty to children for their support and maintenance--and the state may enforce this obligation--they may not be charged, consistent with the rationale of Kirchner, for other expenses associated with their child's confinement. As the majority notes, recent amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code section 202 clearly establish that the purpose of section 602 commitments encompasses "the protection of society from the confined person." (Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.) The costs of incarceration, supervision, and treatment are therefore properly assigned to the state. No preexisting duty justifies imposing them on parents.
Here, the county has attempted to charge Jerald's father $265 a month for juvenile hall and boys' ranch custody for periods prior to September 1980, $33 a day for 33 days in juvenile hall, and $25 a month after Jerald's commitment to California Youth Authority. From the record, we cannot determine whether the county's charges include only the costs for which Jerald's father would have been liable as the parent of a minor or whether they also include expenditures for incarceration and treatment. The majority maintains, with no apparent support, that "it is apparent from the reimbursement sought in the instant case that the charges were not limited to the reasonable cost of support in a home but include confinement costs." (Ante, p. 570 of 187 Cal.Rptr., at p. 753 of 654 P.2d.) The dissent, on the other hand, places the burden on the parents to prove that the costs are unreasonable: "Nowhere does the record reflect that any portion of these costs exceeds the reasonable cost of care, support and maintenance during the minor's commitment." (Ante, p. 571 of 187 Cal.Rptr., at p. 754 of 654 P.2d.)
I respectfully submit that neither position is satisfactory. While the dissent correctly notes that the record does not demonstrate that the charges exceeded the reasonable costs of care, the sharp variations in the bills from the different institutions suggest that the charges may not always have been limited to basic support costs. Surely $33 a day is well beyond what most parents would pay to support their child at home. On the other hand, $25 a month seems more than reasonable and does not suggest that the state has charged for confinement costs.
In my view, the governmental entity concerned should bear the burden of demonstrating that its charges are limited to basic support costs because it alone is in a position to assess its various costs and present them to the court. Here, the county has made no showing that the costs it seeks to impose are limited to the support of the child, as opposed to the costs of confining, supervising and rehabilitating the child. It should be barred from collecting the "reimbursement" it seeks until such a showing is made.
This conclusion does not require us to invalidate section 903. While the majority argues that "the reimbursement provision of section 903 is not based on [the parents' ordinary burden of support] but upon the governmental cost of confinement" (ante, p. 571 of 187 Cal.Rptr., at p. 754 of 654 P.2d), nothing in the statute or elsewhere in the Welfare and Institutions Code suggests that the cost of confinement should or must be included as an element of the minor's "care, support, and maintenance in any county institution." (§ 903.) Indeed, section 914 suggests just the opposite: "As used in this article, 'expense for support and maintenance' includes the reasonable value of any medical services furnished ... and the reasonable value of support of the ward or dependent child ...." From this language we may certainly infer that the Legislature did not intend the statutory support obligation to include the costs of incarceration, treatment, and so on. In view of our obligation to interpret the statute constitutionally where possible, we should not lean over backwards to render it unconstitutional.
I am aware that the expense of care and maintenance for minors confined in juvenile facilities may be a difficult burden for many families. It is no secret that families affected by these charges are often poor. But the courts and Legislature have provided significant protections to insure that the burden is not too onerous or disproportionate. Welfare and Institutions Code section 905 permits juvenile courts to reduce or cancel the amount owed by responsible relatives if they are unable to pay. Section 914 limits the amount charged to the "reasonable value" of the ward's support and medical care. Finally, Kirchner and Hawley prevent the state from charging more than the reasonable costs of basic support, excluding costs associated with confinement and treatment.
In Hawley, we explained that "[t]he mere fact that innocent persons are relatives of an accused or convicted person does not deprive them of their fundamental rights or constitute a lawful basis for a statute or judgment whereby their property may be taken to pay the costs of prosecuting, detaining, or otherwise treating the accused." (Id., 59 Cal.2d at p. 256, 28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22; italics in original.) However, the mere fact that a minor has committed a crime should not open the door for a parent to foist his duty of support entirely upon the state. The approach I suggest would preserve both of these policies.
I would reverse the order appealed from and remand for a hearing to determine whether the charges the state seeks to impose are limited to the reasonable costs of support in the state institution excluding the costs of incarceration, treatment and supervision.
REYNOSO, J., concurs.
RICHARDSON, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority improvidently strikes down section 903 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to the extent that it requires parents to reimburse the cost of the "care, support, and maintenance" of their minor child while he was committed to the California Youth Authority (YA) pursuant to juvenile court order. The majority mistakenly assumes that section 903 requires reimbursement of "the cost of maintaining public institutions for public benefit" (ante, p. 564 of 187 Cal.Rptr., at p. 747 of 654 P.2d), rather than the minor's support costs for which his parents are otherwise legally responsible (see Civ.Code, §§ 196, 196a, 206, 207, 242, 248). Consistent with several prior cases which are summarily disapproved by the majority, I would hold that section 903 is entirely valid, based, as it is, upon the parents' preexisting common law obligation to support their minor child wherever he resides. The majority invalidates section 903 without any discussion whatever of the recognized legitimate interests which this provision promotes.
Every California appellate court which has considered the issue has sustained the validity of section 903 as applied to juvenile court commitments. (In re Steven S. (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 683, 687, 176 Cal.Rptr. 195; In re Shaieb (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 553, 557-558, 58 Cal.Rptr. 631; County of Alameda v. Espinoza (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 541-544, 52 Cal.Rptr. 480.) Even more significant is the fact, not mentioned by the majority, that we ourselves have previously cited and discussed with obvious approval the rule of the foregoing cases. (In re Ricky H. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 513, 520-521, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204.)
In Ricky H., Justice Burke, for a unanimous court, carefully reviewed and firmly rejected the contention that section 903.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code was invalid in requiring parents of a minor committed to YA to reimburse the county for the cost of legal services provided during the juvenile court proceedings. There, as here, the claim was made that the reimbursement provision was void under Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1964) 60 Cal.2d 716, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720, and Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 247, 28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22.
We first observed in Ricky H. that provisions such as sections 903 and 903.1 are clothed with a presumption of constitutionality and must be upheld unless their invalidity clearly, positively and unmistakably appears. (2 Cal.3d at p. 519, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204.) Next, we noted that providing legal services for the minor was intended primarily to safeguard his rights rather than to protect society generally. (Pp. 519-520, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204.) We then discussed the legal significance of the parents' common law support obligations. As our language is both applicable to, and fully dispositive of, the issue before us, I quote Justice Burke's discussion at some length:
"... Hawley involved the liability of a father for the care of his insane adult son, who had been charged with the murder of his mother, and Kirchner involved the liability of a daughter for the care of her mentally ill mother. Neither case concerned the discharge of common law support obligations, since 'At common law there was no liability on a child to support parents, or on parents to support an adult child. [Citations.]' (Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d 716, 718, fn. 4, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.)
"The instant case, on the other hand, presents questions regarding the extent of the parents' obligation to support their minor children, an obligation which did exist at common law. (See Civ.Code, §§ 196, 206, 207, 246, 248; 37 Cal.Jur.2d, Parent and Child, § 19, p. 165; 39 Am.Jur., Parent and Child, § 35, pp. 630-631.)
"Several recent cases have distinguished Hawley and Kirchner on the ground that those cases did not involve common law support obligations. (In re Shaieb, 250 Cal.App.2d 553, 557-558 [parent-minor child]; Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kolts, 247 Cal.App.2d 154, 157, 163 [husband-wife]; Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. O'Connor, 246 Cal.App.2d 24, 27-29 [husband-wife]; County of Alameda v. Espinoza, supra, 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 541-544 [parent-minor child]; In re Dudley, 239 Cal.App.2d 401, 408-409 [parent-minor child]; County of Alameda v. Kaiser, supra, 238 Cal.App.2d 815, 818 [parent-minor child].) The Espinoza and Shaieb cases, supra, upheld the validity of section 903 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which obligates the parents, spouse, or other person liable for the minor's support, to reimburse the county for the cost of supporting the minor in county facilities pursuant to juvenile court law.
"Therefore, if the expenses incurred in procuring counsel to represent the minor in juvenile court proceedings are properly chargeable to the parents as an element of their preexisting support obligation, the reasoning of the foregoing cases should apply, and section 903.1 should be upheld.
"...
"... We conclude that section 903.1 is merely declarative of the parents' preexisting obligation to provide reasonable and necessary support to their minor children, and to reimburse third persons providing that support upon the parents' failure to do so. (See Civ.Code, §§ 207, 248.) Consequently, the imposition of liability for counsel fees under section 903.1 cannot be characterized as arbitrary or a denial of equal protection of the laws.
"...
"Moreover, it is apparent that the reimbursement provision is reasonably necessary to accomplish valid legislative purposes. First, reimbursement obviously assists the various counties in meeting the increasing cost of providing appointed counsel for indigent juveniles .... To invalidate the reimbursement provision could endanger the entire juvenile court program.
"Secondly, section 903.1 helps promote the substantive aims underlying that program by encouraging parents and children alike to avoid further acts of delinquency. As stated in County of Alameda v. Espinoza, supra, 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 547, 52 Cal.Rptr. 480, which upheld Welfare and Institutions Code section 903, requiring parents and other responsible relatives to reimburse the county for the cost of supporting juveniles committed to county facilities, 'It is not facetious to state that making a parent aware of his obligation to support his child commensurate with his ability may affect his desire to make a change in conditions which will enable the child to accomplish a better adjustment under the parental roof.' The court noted that the alternative of relieving the parent of all responsibility is hardly conducive of future parental cooperation in any corrective program with which it is expected that the parents will assist.
"Thus, we conclude that there is no merit to petitioner's contention that section 903.1 unreasonably or arbitrarily denies him or his parents equal protection of the laws." (2 Cal.3d Pp. 520-523, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204, italics added.)
Incredibly, the majority herein fails even to discuss the foregoing analysis from Ricky H. which, I submit, is controlling here. The parents of a minor child, having a preexisting common law and statutory duty to support him, reasonably may be required to contribute a portion of his support costs incurred while committed to YA. As Justice Sims aptly pointed out in Espinoza, supra, the minor is confined for the dual purpose of protecting the public and rehabilitating the child. "[T]he potential benefits from the rehabilitating process and the fact that [the parent] would otherwise be relieved of an obligation inherent in the parent-child relationship furnish considerations which render his contributions proper despite the incidental benefit to the public at large." (Italics added, 243 Cal.App.2d at p. 548, 52 Cal.Rptr. 480.)
The majority speculates that the reimbursement sought here was "not limited to the reasonable cost of support in a home but included confinement costs." (Ante, p. 571 of 187 Cal.Rptr., at p. 754 of 654 P.2d.) The record indicates that although the minor's two-month confinement at juvenile hall and a boy's ranch were charged at a rate of $265 per month, and a subsequent one-month stay at juvenile hall at a rate of $33 per day, the longterm YA commitment is assessed at $25 monthly. Nowhere does the record reflect that any portion of these costs exceeds the reasonable cost of care, support and maintenance during the minor's commitment. As the order itself recites, reimbursement is ordered "for the cost of the care of the minor ...."
In addition to consistency and the salutary effect of following our own recent precedent, we should uphold section 903 for at least three other compelling reasons:
1. The provision is merely declarative of the parents' preexisting support obligations.
2. The provision is both fair and necessary to help defray increasing costs of juvenile commitment programs.
3. The provision is promotive of family cooperation in the minor's rehabilitation efforts.
I would affirm the reimbursement order. --------------- 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 Jerald was born out of wedlock in 1965, and appellant was adjudicated the father in 1967 and was ordered to pay $50 per month child support. The support order has not been modified. Appellant is married, and he and his wife have children. 3 Although the record is not clear, the $25 charge by the county while the child is committed to the Youth Authority is apparently an attempt by the county to recover the $25 it must pay to the state for each month that the child is committed to the Youth Authority. (§ 912.) If so, it would seem that the cost is a confinement rather than support cost. 4 Recently the Court of Appeal acknowledged the "widely held belief" that under current practices juvenile court proceedings under section 602 are in reality criminal proceedings, and that the claim that such proceedings are for the protection of the minor is "pure fiction." (In re Gregory K. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 164, 168, 165 Cal.Rptr. 35.) 11 '[The parents, grandparents, and the children of] everie poore olde blind lame and impotente person, or other poore person not able to worke, beinge of a sufficient abilitie, shall at their owne Chardges releive and maintain everie suche poore person, in that manner and accordinge to that rate, as by the Justices of the Peace of that Countie where suche sufficient persons dwell, or the greater number of them, at their general Quarter-Sessions shalbe assessed; upon paine that everie one of them shall forfeite twenty shillings for everie monthe which they shall faile therein.' (Fn. omitted.) (tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, Part I (1964) 16 Stan.L.Rev. 257, 283.)" 1 Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kolts (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 154, 157, 163 (husband-wife); Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. O'Connor (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 24, 27-29 (husband-wife); In re Dudley, supra, 239 Cal.App.2d 401, 408-409 (parent-minor child); County of Alameda v. Kaiser (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 815, 818, 48 Cal.Rptr. 343 (parent-minor child). 2 County of Alameda v. Espinoza (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 52 Cal.Rptr. 480; In re Shaieb (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 553, 58 Cal.Rptr. 631; see footnote 5, post. 3 "The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle of natural law; an obligation ... laid on them not only by nature itself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world: for they would be in the highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only gave their children life, that they might afterwards see them perish. By begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation, to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved." (1 Blackstone, Commentaries, 447.) 4 Appellant in Dundon, supra, was the mother of a 14-year-old boy, who after admitting his participation in a burglary, was found by the family court to be a "juvenile delinquent." The court ordered the mother to contribute to his support while institutionalized at the Berkshire Farm for Boys, pursuant to a statute requiring that the "person having the duty ... to support ... pay to the court such sum as will cover in whole or in part the support of such child." The appellate court rejected the equal protection argument raised here in a single sentence: "[A]ppellant manifestly has no real ground for complaint simply because her responsibility for the support of her child continues while he is at Berkshire Farm." (29 N.Y.2d at p. 9, 323 N.Y.S.2d 417, 271 N.E.2d 905.) 5 As the majority notes, three previous cases have upheld the validity of section 903: County of Alameda v. Espinoza, supra, 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 52 Cal.Rptr. 480, In re Shaieb (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 553, 58 Cal.Rptr. 631, and In re Steven S. (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 683, 176 Cal.Rptr. 195. All three have based their conclusions on the preexisting duty owed by the parents. However, none of the cases expressly limits the state's right to seek reimbursement to those costs for which parents are otherwise responsible. As explained, the preexisting duty rationale is limited. To the extent that these cases suggest the state may charge parents for the costs of incarceration and treatment, I would disapprove them. 6 The precise extent of the parents' obligations under common law and statute varies according to the means of the parents. (Singer v. Singer (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 807, 813, 87 Cal.Rptr. 42.) While, at common law, the parents were responsible only for "necessaries," the obligation has expanded. Civil Code section 196a now requires parents to give a child "support and education suitable to his circumstances." This suggests parents are responsible, at the very least, for the costs of food, clothing, shelter, medicine and education but that, beyond the necessities, the county may not charge parents for a level of care greater than that which the child would have received in the home.