Opinion
# 2017-032-004 Claim No. 122453
04-20-2017
PEDDIE JENKINS v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Peddie Jenkins, Pro Se Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, NYS Attorney General By: Glenn C. King, Assistant Attorney General, Of Counsel
Synopsis
Following a trial, claim alleging malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, unlawful imprisonment, and various violations of the Federal and State Constitutions is dismissed.
Case information
| UID: | 2017-032-004 |
| Claimant(s): | PEDDIE JENKINS |
| Claimant short name: | JENKINS |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 122453 |
| Motion number(s): | |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | JUDITH A. HARD |
| Claimant's attorney: | Peddie Jenkins, Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, NYS Attorney General By: Glenn C. King, Assistant Attorney General, Of Counsel |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | April 20, 2017 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
By Verified Claim filed on March 1, 2013, claimant commenced the instant action sounding in malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, unlawful imprisonment, and various violations of the Federal and State Constitutions. The claim alleges that two parole officers with the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) falsely identified claimant as a drug dealer, and that their identification led to his subsequent indictment and prosecution for the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (see Penal Law § 220.39), which charge was later dismissed. Following joinder of issue and the exchange of discovery, a trial on the issue of defendant's liability was held at the Court of Claims in Albany, New York on November 14, 2016. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that claimant failed to prove his claim by a preponderance of the credible evidence and, accordingly, dismisses the action in its entirety.
FACTS
Claimant was the first witness to testify in support of his claim. He stated that, in January 2012, the Washington County Drug Task Force commenced an investigation targeting claimant for his alleged involvement in a drug trade. Claimant alleges that said investigation "was, in part, based upon and/or motivated by the ill feelings of parole officers Mario Torres and Scott Hurteau" (Claim ¶ 9 [g]), under whose supervision claimant had been placed following his incarceration arising from unrelated charges (T: 44-45). Claimant further alleges that, in the course of the investigation, the Washington County District Attorney's Office was led to believe that, on February 10, 2012, claimant sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant (hereinafter "the CI"). Claimant offered into evidence the transcript of his criminal trial, which was held in Washington County on December 4, 2012, and where claimant was accused of knowingly and unlawfully possessing cocaine with the intent to sell it (see Penal Law § 220.39) (Exhibit 3, p. 3). Claimant testified that, during the pendency of the criminal trial, he spent five months and two weeks in the county jail, was strip searched, handcuffed, and obligated to attend numerous court dates, and ultimately lost his wood-cutting business (T: 19). Upon cross-examination, claimant conceded that neither Torres nor Hurteau testified at the grand jury proceeding, and that Hurteau did not testify at the criminal trial (T: 46-47). Claimant further conceded that the CI testified against him at the criminal trial, stating that he bought $200 worth of crack cocaine from claimant at his home on February 10, 2012 (T: 47).
All references preceded by "T" are to the trial transcript.
Scott Gillis, a Detective with the Hudson Falls Police Department, testified at claimant's criminal trial (Exhibit 3, p. 8). Gillis stated that he organized a controlled buy between claimant and the CI, who told Gillis that he would lead law enforcement to claimant in exchange for a reduction in charges that were pending against him. Gillis stated that, on February 10, 2012, he was in one of two cars containing law enforcement officers who observed the CI approach claimant's residence to make the buy. Gillis testified that he saw claimant, who was in the backyard of the residence, get on a four-wheeler and drive up to the house, and stated that he took photographs of claimant from a considerable distance away and listened to the CI's interaction inside the house through a wired recording device (Exhibit 4). Gillis testified that he observed the CI go into claimant's house and that, shortly after claimant entered the house, the CI came out with two individually bagged pieces of crack cocaine.
Gillis explained that a controlled buy is a drug deal organized by law enforcement, where a CI is sent to buy the product from a targeted individual and returns to the officers with said product (Exhibit 3, p. 11). --------
Claimant called Mario Torres as the second witness for his claim. Torres stated that he served as claimant's parole officer for approximately two years and was asked to assist the Drug Task Force in identifying claimant during the controlled buy on February 10, 2012. Torres maintained, however, that he was not aware that claimant was suspected of being a drug dealer or even that a controlled buy was taking place until that date. Torres stated that, upon arriving at claimant's residence, he observed three men and a child in the backyard of claimant's house and, when asked, he identified claimant as the person who got off the four-wheeler and headed toward the house. He testified that it was possible that he misidentified claimant at that time but that, if he was mistaken, the misidentification was not intentional. Torres stated that he wrote a reference letter for claimant to assist him with obtaining a license to run his wood-cutting business, and that, in his opinion, claimant had properly adhered to the terms of his parole. Torres expressly denied having any ill will toward claimant. When asked on redirect examination whether he had told claimant, "they're going to give you 25 to life, they['re] just waiting to catch you," Torres denied ever making such a statement (T: 76).
A transcript of the pre-trial deposition of Hurteau, who was unavailable to testify at trial, was offered into evidence by the defense (Exhibit A). In the deposition, Hurteau stated that, on February 10, 2012, he was in the second car dispatched by the Drug Task Force to claimant's residence for purposes of observing the controlled buy. He stated that he did not know much about claimant prior to that day, but that he had no knowledge of claimant ever using or selling drugs. Hurteau explained that he "was solely there in case something were to go bad during the course of a drug sale" (Exhibit A, p. 23). Hurteau explained that the car he was in pulled into a driveway just past claimant's house and that he could not see claimant's house from the car, nor hear what was being said on the recording device. He stated that, when the CI left claimant's house, he drove his vehicle past the car in which Hurteau was sitting, and he saw the CI hand the alleged drugs to another officer.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, to the extent that the instant claim may be read to allege violations of claimant's rights under the Federal Constitution (Claim ¶¶ 8, 19, 26), this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim, as it must be brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 and may not be maintained in the Court of Claims, given that the State is not a "person" for purposes of the statute (see Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172, 185 [1996]; Zagarella v State of New York, 149 AD2d 503, 504 [2d Dept 1989]; Ohnmacht v State of New York, 14 Misc3d 1231 [A], at *2 [Ct Cl 2007]). Further, to the extent that claimant alleges that the actions of defendant's employees and/or agents violated his rights under the State Constitution (Claim ¶¶ 8, 19, 26), such a claim must also be dismissed. While it is true that, when certain requirements are met, a violation of the State Constitution may give rise to a private cause of action in the Court of Claims (see e.g. Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d at 195-196), where "constitutional tort allegations may be analogized to an existing common-law tort[s] for which there are adequate alternate remedies," a private cause of action will not be available (Augat v State of New York, 244 AD2d 835, 837 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 814 [1998]; see Waxter v State of New York, 33 AD3d 1180, 1181 [3d Dept 2006]). As claimant here clearly has a potential alternative remedy in his claims for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, and unlawful imprisonment, his cause of action sounding in a constitutional tort must therefore be dismissed (see Ifill v State of New York, 46 Misc 3d 1228 [A], 2013 NY Slip Op 52338 [U], *7 [Ct Cl 2013]).
Turning then to the claim of malicious prosecution, claimant was required to show " 'that a criminal proceeding was commenced, that it was terminated in favor of the accused, that it lacked probable cause, and that the proceeding was brought out of actual malice' " (Krzyzak v Schaefer, 52 AD3d 979, 980 [3d Dept 2008], quoting Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 84 [2001]; see Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 457 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). As the first two elements of this cause of action are not disputed, defendant's liability in this case turns upon whether defendant lacked probable cause to commence a criminal proceeding against claimant and whether said proceeding was brought out of actual malice.
"In the context of a . . . malicious prosecution claim, '[p]robable cause consists of such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances to believe [claimant] guilty' " (Mahoney v State of New York, 147 AD3d 1289, 1291 [3d Dept 2017], quoting Colon v City of New York, 60 NY2d 78, 82 [1983]). "[W]here, as here, an arrest warrant has been issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, there is 'a presumption that the arrest was [made] on probable cause' " (Mahoney v State of New York, 147 AD3d at 1291, quoting Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d at 458). Additionally, " '[o]nce a suspect has been indicted, . . . the law holds that the Grand Jury action creates a presumption of probable cause' " (De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d 742, 761 [2016], quoting Colon v City of New York, 60 NY2d at 82). Nevertheless, a claimant "may show malice and overcome the presumption of probable cause with proof that the defendant falsified evidence in bad faith and that, without the falsified evidence, the authorities' suspicion of the [claimant] would not have fully ripened into probable cause" (De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d at 761). "The presumption may also be overcome by a showing that the [officers] failed to make further inquiry when a reasonable person would have done so and that failure may be evidence of lack of probable cause to arrest" (Haynes v City of New York, 29 AD3d 521, 523 [2d Dept 2006] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Colon v City of New York, 60 NY2d at 82). "Malice may be shown by proof that probable cause was lacking or that the conduct was reckless or grossly negligent" (Haynes v City of New York, 29 AD3d at 523; see Hernandez v State of New York, 228 AD2d 902, 904 [3d Dept 1996]).
Here, the Court finds that claimant failed to provide sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of probable cause, which attached by claimant's lawful arrest and subsequent indictment by the Grand Jury. Other than his own conclusory allegations, claimant did not provide any proof that Hurteau or Torres withheld facts from or falsified evidence before the Grand Jury or the District Attorney, or that they "failed to make further inquiry" into the investigation of claimant "when a reasonable person would have done so" (Haynes v City of New York, 29 AD3d at 523; see Collins v State of New York, UID No. 2016-015-138 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., June 16, 2016]). Moreover, the Court is not persuaded that malice was a motive in the actions taken by either Torres or Hurteau. Indeed, Torres' in-court testimony and the deposition testimony of Hurteau both reflect that the officers were acting as public servants assisting the local police department in its endeavor to combat drug activity in Washington County. Claimant did not establish that there was an egregious deviation from procedure, nor that either officer exhibited any ill feelings toward claimant or possessed any motive other than to ensure that justice was served (see Nardelli v Stamberg, 44 NY2d 500, 503 [1978]; Abdul-Wahhab v State of New York, UID No. 2012-032-004 [Ct Cl, Hard, J., June 18, 2012]). Accordingly, the Court finds that claimant failed to meet the "heavy burden" of establishing his claim of malicious prosecution for the charge of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Mahoney v State of New York, 147 AD3d at 1295 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Smith-Hunter v Harvey, 95 NY2d 191, 195 [2000]).
Claimant's remaining causes of action do not require extended discussion. "[A] claim of false arrest or imprisonment requires that [claimant] 'establish that the defendant intended to confine [him], that [he] was conscious of the confinement and did not consent to the confinement, and that the confinement was not otherwise privileged' " (Krzyzak v Schaefer, 52 AD3d at 980, quoting Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d at 85; see Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d at 456). It is well settled that "the existence of probable cause to arrest, which is the dispositive issue herein, constitutes a complete defense to the claims of false arrest and unlawful imprisonment" (Marrero v City of New York, 33 AD3d 556, 557 [1st Dept 2006]; see Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d at 85; Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d at 457; Lewis v Caputo, 95 AD3d 262, 268-269 [1st Dept 2012], revd on other grounds 20 NY3d 906 [2012]; Strange v County of Westchester, 29 AD3d 676, 676 [2d Dept 2006]; Molina v City of New York, 28 AD3d 372, 372 [1st Dept 2006]). Accordingly, in light of the Court's finding that claimant failed to overcome the presumption of probable cause, his claim of false imprisonment must therefore be dismissed (see Marrero v City of New York, 33 AD3d at 557; Molina v City of New York, 28 AD3d at 372).
With respect to the cause of action sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress, such claims are generally barred against the State as a matter of public policy (see Brown v State of New York, 125 AD2d 750, 752 [3d Dept 1986], appeal dismissed 70 NY2d 747 [1987]). In any event, "[e]ven if such a claim exists here, [claimant has] not [shown] that the State's conduct was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency" (Augat v State of New York, 244 AD2d 835, 837 [3d Dept 1997] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 303 [1983]). Also without merit is claimant's claim for abuse of process, "since it is plain that [claimant] is unable to demonstrate that process was utilized against him, without excuse or justification, to obtain a collateral objective" (Molina v City of New York, 28 AD3d at 373; see Rosen v Hanrahan, 2 AD3d 352, 353 [1st Dept 2003]).
The Court notes that, even if claimant was successful in proving any or all of the above causes of action, the claim would nonetheless be dismissed because the discretionary actions taken by defendant's employees are protected by the doctrine of governmental immunity. It has long been "recognized that a 'governmental entity's conduct may fall along a continuum of responsibility to individuals and society deriving from its governmental and proprietary functions' " (Sebastian v State of New York, 93 NY2d 790, 793 [1999], quoting Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506, 511-512 [1984]). "At one end of the continuum lie purely governmental functions undertaken for the protection and safety of the public pursuant to the general police powers. . . . On the opposite periphery lie proprietary functions in which governmental activities essentially substitute for or supplement traditionally private enterprises" (Sebastian v State of New York, 93 NY2d at 793 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Purely governmental functions, including police and fire protection, generally do not subject a municipal defendant to liability absent a special duty (see Valdez v City of New York, 18 NY3d 69, 75 [2011]). Moreover, "[t]he professional judgment rule insulates a municipality from liability for its employees' performance of their duties where the . . . conduct involves the exercise of professional judgment such as electing one among many acceptable methods of carrying out tasks, or making tactical decisions" (Johnson v City of New York, 15 NY3d 676, 680 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
Here, the Court finds that Torres' and Hurteau's identification of claimant is insulated by the professional judgment rule inasmuch as the officers made the discretionary determination of identifying claimant in the course of their professional duties. Notably, "[t]he decision whether to stop and apprehend an individual acting in a suspicious manner or to observe said individual for a period of time is a discretionary decision for the officer and cannot be held hostage to 'second-guessing' after the fact" (Rodriguez v City of New York, 189 AD2d 166, 177 [1st Dept 1993]; see McCormack v City of New York, 80 NY2d 808, 811 [1992]; Mon v City of New York, 78 NY2d 309, 313 [1991]; Keselman v City of New York, 95 AD3d 1278, 1279-1280 [2nd Dept 2012]). While the jury may have determined that the officers' identification to be mistaken, as evidenced by its dismissal of the criminal charge against claimant, such determination does not dissolve the governmental immunity by which the officers' actions are protected (see Keselman v City of New York, 95 AD3d at 1279-1280; Rodriguez v City of New York, 189 AD2d at 177).
In view of the foregoing, the Court, upon review of the documentary evidence, oral testimony, and observance of the demeanor of the witnesses, dismisses the claim in its entirety. All motions not heretofore addressed are denied.
Let judgment be entered accordingly.
April 20, 2017
Albany, New York
JUDITH A. HARD
Judge of the Court of Claims