Summary
reversing and remanding order for involuntary treatment because trial court deviated from express requirement of section 397.6957
Summary of this case from J.W. v. R.W.Opinion
Case No. 5D19-739
04-17-2020
J.C., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Oscar H. Eaton, Jr., Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of Conflict Regional Counsel, Casselberry, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General and Barbara Jean Throne, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Oscar H. Eaton, Jr., Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of Conflict Regional Counsel, Casselberry, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General and Barbara Jean Throne, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM. J.C., an adult, appeals a final order for involuntary substance abuse treatment entered pursuant to section 397.697(1), Florida Statutes (2019). Concluding that the trial court failed to follow the governing statute, we reverse and remand for dismissal of the petition for involuntary substance abuse treatment.
The petitioner, S.C., sought involuntary assessment and stabilization for J.C., alleging in the petition that J.C. was abusing illegal substances. At an evidentiary hearing on the petition, the petitioner called at least one witness. However, because the hearing was not recorded or transcribed, the content of any testimony is unknown. Ultimately, finding that J.C. met the statutory criteria, the trial court entered an order requiring J.C. to undergo assessment and stabilization.
The trial court's minutes include notes about that hearing, including that J.C. "voluntarily agree[d] to the petition for assessment and/or stabilization."
J.C. complied with the trial court's order and underwent a full assessment, including controlled substance testing which revealed the presence of antidepressants and opiates. The clinician who conducted the assessment generated a written report recommending residential treatment.
Following the assessment, the petitioner filed a petition seeking involuntary treatment for J.C. The court set a hearing on the petition and appointed counsel to represent J.C. The petitioner did not appear at the hearing. Based on the petitioner's absence, J.C.'s counsel argued that the petition should be dismissed as the petitioner was not available to present a case. The court disagreed, instead finding that it had jurisdiction over J.C. and could proceed without the petitioner. The trial court then called the clinician as a witness and proceeded to question him. Consistent with the report, the clinician recommended residential treatment for J.C. and—at the trial court's request—suggested a specific residential treatment facility suitable for J.C. After J.C.'s counsel cross-examined the clinician and presented legal argument, the trial court entered an order for involuntary residential treatment. This appeal follows.
The clinician's report was not entered into evidence.
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J.C. asks us to consider whether the trial court violated the Marchman Act in granting the petition for involuntary services when the petitioner failed to appear and present evidence supporting the petition. This question presents an issue of law and is, thus, subject to de novo review. See Sea Vault Partners, LLC v. Bermello, Ajamil & Partners, Inc., 274 So. 3d 473, 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (citing Pino v. Bank of N.Y., 121 So. 3d 23, 31 (Fla. 2013) ).
Under Florida's Marchman Act, an involuntary treatment case begins with the filing of a petition. See § 397.693, Fla. Stat. (2019). Upon the filing of a petition, the court must schedule a hearing, provide notice of the hearing to the respondent and others, and determine if an attorney will be appointed for the respondent. See § 397.6955(1)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2019). The statute governing hearings on petitions for involuntary treatment explicitly places the burden of proof on the petitioner to establish the requirements for involuntary treatment by clear and convincing evidence. See § 397.6957(2), Fla. Stat. (2019).
At the hearing in question, the trial court called the sole witness and examined him, thereby developing the testimony on which it would rely in granting the petition for involuntary treatment. In doing so, the court failed to follow the applicable statute by essentially functioning as the absent petitioner. See id. The State does not dispute the court's role in developing the testimony at the hearing; rather, it argues that the error was harmless because sufficient evidence supported the court's ruling. The State alludes to the evidence from the first hearing as well as the report generated by the clinician. We reject the State's argument for two reasons. First, the record does not contain a transcript of the initial hearing, and we cannot simply assume that the evidence at the second hearing paralleled the evidence at the prior hearing. Nor does the applicable statute suggest that testimony from a prior hearing would be sufficient to establish the proof required for involuntary treatment. Second, the State's harmless error argument misapprehends J.C.'s argument. J.C. does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Instead, J.C. asserts that the petitioner was relieved of the statutory burden of proof stemming from the court's role in developing the evidence at the second hearing in the petitioner's absence. Had the trial court granted J.C.'s ore tenus motion to dismiss at the onset of that hearing, the sole witness would not have given the testimony on which the court relied in granting the petition for involuntary treatment. Accordingly, the State's harmless error argument lacks merit. See Special v. W. Boca Med. Ctr., 160 So. 3d 1251, 1256–57 (Fla. 2014).
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the order committing J.C. for involuntary substance abuse treatment and remand the case to the trial court. Upon remand, the trial court shall dismiss the petition.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
WALLIS, GROSSHANS and SASSO, JJ., concur.