Opinion
A21-1184
02-22-2022
Shantha Jayapathy, Appellant, v. Paul Schnell, Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections, Respondent.
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CV-21-480
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge. [*]
ORDER OPINION
Michelle A. Larkin, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Shantha Jayapathy is incarcerated in a Minnesota correctional facility. She suffers from medical conditions and asserts that those conditions "make her more susceptible to the coronavirus." The Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections may place an offender on conditional medical release prior to the offender's release date "if the offender suffers from a grave illness or medical condition and the release poses no threat to the public." Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 8 (2020). Respondent Paul Schnell, Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections, approved Jayapathy for a conditional medical release but later revoked it because Jayapathy could not find suitable housing in a timely manner.
2. Jayapathy filed a civil-rights action against the commissioner, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) and Minn. Stat. § 555.01 (2020). Her request for relief was based on an assertion that the commissioner's revocation of her conditional medical release violated her constitutional right to substantive due process. She requested a declaration that the commissioner violated her rights under the Minnesota and United States Constitutions and an order declaring her "eligible for conditional medical release."
Section 1983 allows a citizen to sue "[e]very person" who deprives the citizen of a federal constitutional right under color of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
Section 555.01 is part of Minnesota's declaratory judgment statute, and it permits courts to "declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Minn. Stat. § 555.01. "[A] complaint requesting declaratory relief must present a substantive cause of action that would be cognizable in a nondeclaratory suit." Weavewood, Inc. v. S & P Home Invs., LLC, 821 N.W.2d 576, 579 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
3. The commissioner moved to dismiss the complaint under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The commissioner argued, in part, that Jayapathy's section 1983 claim was barred under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Those cases established the "favorable termination rule," which requires prisoners to prevail in a habeas corpus action before bringing a section 1983 claim that attacks the duration of the prisoner's incarceration. Husten v. Schnell, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2021 WL 5872280, at *4 (Minn.App. Dec. 13, 2021), petition for rev. filed (Minn. Jan. 11, 2022). The Supreme Court described the rule in Wilkinson v. Dotson, stating that a prisoner in state custody cannot use a section 1983 claim "to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement" but must instead "seek federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief)." 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court established the rule to prevent parallel litigation over, and collateral attacks on, the validity of a conviction. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484-87 (discussing rule in the context of a section 1983 damages claim).
4. The district court granted the commissioner's motion and dismissed Jayapathy's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court reasoned that Jayapathy's section 1983 claim was barred under the favorable termination rule and otherwise deficient. Jayapathy appealed.
5. Subsequently, this court held, in Husten, that the favorable termination rule applies to actions filed in state court. 2021 WL 5872280, at *1. Jayapathy acknowledges that Husten "presented the exact same issue that is presented in this case." Thus, she moved to stay this appeal pending a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Husten. This court denied the motion to stay but struck the matter from the oral argument calendar at Jayapathy's request.
6. We review de novo a district court's decision on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and limit our review to whether the complaint sets forth legally sufficient claims for relief. Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. 2008). We consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accept those facts as true, and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. "A claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader's theory, to grant the relief demanded." Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 2014).
7. Jayapathy argues that the favorable termination rule does not bar her section 1983 claim because the rule is based on federalism and is therefore inapplicable to claims brought in state court. As Jayapathy acknowledges, this court rejected that argument in Husten.
8. Jayapathy also argues that the favorable termination rule is inapplicable because she is not seeking immediate release, but merely a declaration that she is "eligible for potential release." She relies on Wilkinson, in which the Supreme Court held that prisoners could bring section 1983 claims seeking new parole hearings, despite the favorable termination rule, because the claims did not attack the duration of their incarceration. 544 U.S. at 77, 82. The Supreme Court reasoned, "[b]ecause neither prisoner's claim would necessarily spell speedier release, neither lies at the core of habeas corpus." Id. at 82 (quotation omitted).
9. The state responds that "if Jayapathy's action were successful, the district court would require the [c]ommissioner to reverse his decision, the [c]ommissioner's approval for Jayapathy's early release would be reinstated, she would be released from prison before her supervised release date, and the length of her confinement would thus be reduced." We agree with the state's assessment of Jayapathy's request for relief. Jayapathy challenges the duration of her confinement, and the favorable termination rule therefore applies.
10. Even if Jayapathy's section 1983 claim is not precluded under the favorable termination rule, it is deficient. The essential elements of a constitutional claim under section 1983 are that the defendant acted under color of state law and that the alleged wrongful conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected federal right. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); L.L. Nelson Enters., Inc. v. County of St. Louis, 673 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 2012). Jayapathy's request for relief is based on alleged violations of her right to substantive due process under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, which prohibit the government from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. The due process protections under both constitutions are identical. Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Minn. 1988).
11. The substantive component of the right to due process protects an individual from "certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." State v. Hill, 871 N.W.2d 900, 906 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). "In the context of executive action, . . . substantive due process prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Caselaw is unclear regarding whether conscience-shocking conduct is required for a viable substantive due process claim. For example, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Supreme Court indicated that an executive action must shock the conscience. 523 U.S. 833, 846-49 (1998). But in Chavez v. Martinez, the Supreme Court indicated that a claim may also be premised on an infringement of fundamental liberty interests. 538 U.S. 760, 774-75 (2003); see also Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2008) (discussing "two strands of the substantive due process doctrine"). For purposes of this appeal, we address both "strands" of substantive due process.
12. Jayapathy asserts that she has a fundamental right to life and implies that if she is not released under a conditional medical release she will die in prison. We agree with Jayapathy's assertion that the right to life is fundamental. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring due process to deprive a person of life); Lewis, 523 U.S. at 837 (involving substantive due process right-to-life claim). But Jayapathy's complaint does not allege facts indicating that she is at risk of imminent death if she is not granted a conditional medical release. Instead, she asserts that her "underlying medical condition puts her at considerable risk of harm."
13. Even if Jayapathy is at considerable risk of harm, that circumstance does not give rise to a fundamental or inherent right to early release. "There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence" because the criminal conviction "extinguished that liberty right." Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). A conditional medical release is entirely discretionary. See Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 8 (stating that the commissioner "may" order an offender released); Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2020) (stating that the use of the word "may" in a Minnesota statute indicates that the action is permissive, not mandatory); Kemp v. Kemp, 608 N.W.2d 916, 920 (Minn.App. 2000) ("Because the word 'may' is defined as 'permissive,' a district court has discretion to set the effective date of a . . . modification."). The commissioner's discretionary decision to revoke Jayapathy's conditional medical release does not infringe on an established liberty interest. Nor does it shock the conscience. See Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 487 (Minn. 2006) (stating that "[o]nly the most extreme instances of governmental misconduct" satisfy the conscience-shocking substantive-due-process standard).
14. In sum, Jayapathy's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted based on a substantive-due-process violation. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Jayapathy, no evidence could be produced, consistent with her stated claim, to grant the relief demanded. See Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 603.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's judgment is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.