Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3973-12T3
08-26-2014
JAMES JAYA, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
James Jaya, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alex J. Zowin, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Nugent and Carroll. On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections. James Jaya, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alex J. Zowin, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Inmate James Jaya appeals a December 20, 2012 determination, after administrative proceedings, by an assistant superintendent of the Department of Corrections (DOC), upholding an adjudication that he committed prohibited act *.005, threatening another with bodily harm or with any offense against his or her person or his or her property, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). He contends that the adjudication was not based on sufficient evidence and that his due process rights were violated when his request for a polygraph examination was denied. We disagree and affirm.
Prohibited acts preceded by an asterisk (*) are considered the most serious and result in the most severe sanctions. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-5.1.
Jaya is incarcerated at East Jersey State Prison. At the time relevant to this appeal, he was incarcerated at South Woods State Prison.
On December 13, 2012, Senior Corrections Officer (SCO) J. Seitzinger reported that Jaya approached him and requested to take a shower. Seitzinger denied the request, explaining to Jaya that the recreation period was about to end. According to Seitzinger, Jaya then threatened to put something in Seitzinger's food in the Officers' Dining Room (ODR). Since Jaya worked in the prison kitchen, Seitzinger considered this a threat to his health and safety that Jaya was capable of carrying out.
Following an investigation, Jaya was served with notice of the disciplinary charges on December 14, 2012. The charges were referred to a hearing officer, and Jaya was provided the assistance of counsel substitute. At a hearing on the charges on December 17, 2012, Jaya requested confrontation with Seitzinger, which was granted, as well as a polygraph examination. The hearing officer then postponed the hearing due to these requests. Jaya's request for a polygraph examination was administratively denied on December 18, 2012, with the explanation that "there [were] no issues of credibility in regards to the reporting officer or through investigation that was conducted by the disciplinary [s]ergeant," and "there were no findings of new evidence pertaining to this issue."
At the hearing on December 19, 2012, Jaya pled not guilty. Essentially he contended that the charged conduct did not occur, that he never had issue with Seitzinger before, and that he was being mindful of his behavior as he recently attended a parole hearing. He identified two witnesses, although both declined to give statements supporting his version of the events. After reviewing the evidence, the hearing officer found that the charge had merit, as no discrepancies were found during confrontation, no evidence was offered to discredit the staff reports, and Jaya had the means to carry out the threat since he worked in the prison kitchen.
The hearing officer sanctioned Jaya with ten days' detention, 120 days' administrative detention, and 120 days' loss of commutation time. Jaya appealed the decision, asserting that the guilty finding was not based on substantial evidence. Assistant Superintendent Martinez upheld the decision of the hearing officer and the imposition of the sanctions. It is from that decision that Jaya now appeals, renewing his claim of innocence, and contending that his request for a polygraph examination was improperly denied.
Based upon our review of the record, we reject as without merit Jaya's arguments that the hearing officer's determination was not based upon substantial credible evidence in the record. We have carefully considered Jaya's contentions in light of the applicable law and find that none of them has sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following comments.
Our role in reviewing an agency decision is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). Our function is to determine whether the administrative action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 18, 23 (App. Div. 2005). "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 219 (2006).
The DOC has "broad discretionary powers" to promulgate regulations aimed at maintaining security and order inside correctional facilities. Jenkins v. Fauver, 108 N.J. 239, 252 (1987). Furthermore, as we have previously noted, "[p]risons are dangerous places, and the courts must afford appropriate deference and flexibility to administrators trying to manage this volatile environment." Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J. Super. 576, 584 (App. Div. 1999).
Prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full spectrum of rights due to a criminal defendant does not apply. See Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975). Nonetheless, prisoners are entitled to certain limited due process protections. Ibid. These protections include written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing, an impartial tribunal which may consist of personnel from the central office staff, a limited right to call witnesses, the assistance of counsel substitute, and a right to a written statement of evidence relied upon and the reasons for the sanctions imposed. Id. at 525-33; see also McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 193-96 (1995). After reviewing the record, we are convinced that Jaya was afforded all these recognized rights that an inmate facing disciplinary charges was entitled to receive.
"A finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing shall be based upon substantial evidence that the inmate has committed a prohibited act." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a). Substantial evidence means "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961). We are satisfied that the record contains sufficient and substantial evidence that amply supports the agency's findings. Although Jaya sought, and was granted, the right to confront Seitzinger, the hearing officer found no discrepancies in Seitzinger's account of events. Jaya also had the right to call witnesses, yet they failed to support his claim of innocence. Further, the hearing officer's report denoted that her decision was based on consideration of all the evidence, and she specifically found that Jaya had the means to carry out the threat that Seitzinger had reported.
Jaya also claims that he had a right to a polygraph examination. We disagree. The initial decision whether to subject an inmate to a polygraph examination rests with the prison administrator in instances "[w]hen there are issues of credibility regarding serious incidents or allegations which may result in a disciplinary charge; or . . . [a]s part of a reinvestigation of a disciplinary charge." N.J.A.C. 10A:3-7.1(a). A polygraph examination "is clearly not required on every occasion that an inmate denies a disciplinary charge against him." Ramirez, supra, 382 N.J. Super. at 23-24. Only when "denial of the examination would compromise the fundamental fairness of the disciplinary process" should the request be granted. Id. at 20. Fundamental fairness may be implicated when there is evidence of "inconsistencies in the [correction officer's] statements or some other extrinsic evidence involving credibility, whether documentary or testimonial, such as a statement by another inmate or staff member on the inmate's behalf." Id. at 24.
We find no serious question of credibility or denial of fundamental fairness that gave Jaya a right to a polygraph examination. Although granted confrontation, Jaya is unable to specifically identify any inconsistencies in Seitzinger's statements. Nor can he point to any contrary report by the investigating sergeant or the two inmates he identified as witnesses.
Because the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings of the DOC, we must defer. Stallworth, supra, 208 N.J. at 194-95. Thus, we find that the agency's decision was not arbitrary or capricious.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION