From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Jamison v. Jamison

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Feb 1, 2011
No. F058459 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2011)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County. No. M56299, Thomas L. Bender, Judge.

Gilmore, Wood, Vinnard & Magness and David M. Gilmore for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Dowling, Aaron & Keeler and Kenton J. Klassen for Defendants and Appellants.


OPINION

LEVY, Acting P.J.

The primary focus of this appeal and cross-appeal is whether the parties are entitled to interest on sums owed to each other as part of the partition of property that had been jointly owned. Brothers William O. Jamison and John O. Jamison, their mother Betty F. Jamison, and John’s sons Sean O. Jamison and Bryan O. Jamison, owned a several-thousand-acre ranch as tenants in common. Over a number of years, the property was divided both by in kind distribution and by private auction. John purchased the auctioned parcels from William. To equalize the in kind distribution, William was ordered to pay owelty to John. Also during this partition process, a portion of the property owned by John, William and Betty was condemned by the Minarets School District (Minarets).

John, Sean and Bryan were tragically killed in a car accident in September 2006 and their estates became parties to this action. Betty has also passed away. For purposes of clarity, these parties will be referred to by their first names in this opinion. No disrespect is intended.

In the appeal, John, Sean and Bryan, through Margaret Jamison as trustee and administrator of their estates (collectively referred to as John), argue that they are entitled to interest on the owelty amount. John further contends that William and Betty should pay him attorney fees for his efforts in negotiating the Minarets condemnation award under the equitable theory of restitution.

In the cross-appeal, Betty, through William as trustee of the Betty F. Jamison Trust, contends that she is entitled to interest on her share of the Minarets condemnation award that was held by John. The award had been divided up based on the ownership interests as set forth in an earlier settlement agreement. However, that agreement was later set aside resulting in Betty having a larger interest in the property. Nevertheless, John held on to Betty’s share of the condemnation award until he was ordered to return it to Betty. Similarly, William argues that he is entitled to interest on the money owed to him after John purchased William’s interest in the auctioned parcels.

As discussed below, John did not timely appeal the order denying his claim for interest on the owelty amount. Accordingly, that issue is not before us. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying John’s request for attorney fees. Additionally, the trial court did not err in denying Betty’s and William’s claims for interest. Therefore, the order appealed from will be affirmed in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

The parcels at issue in the consolidated partition actions were part of a cattle ranching operation that had been run by the family for decades. The family referred to this property as two ranches, the upper ranch and the lower ranch. The trial court entered an interlocutory judgment of partition ordering partition of the lower ranch in kind and the upper ranch by sale. Thereafter, proceedings were commenced to effectuate the partition. Additionally, portions of four of the parcels in the upper ranch were condemned by Minarets for the construction of a new high school.

The trial court ordered that the jointly owned upper ranch parcels would be first offered for sale to John and William with a minimum opening bid of 70 percent of the appraisal value. If after this private sale any parcels remained in joint ownership, they would be offered to the public. The sale was conducted before the trial court as an auction in May 2005 and John purchased all of William’s interest in the properties for $387,705.

By the time Minarets filed its condemnation action, John, William and Betty had entered into a settlement agreement pertaining to the condemned property. Under that agreement, John owned what had been Betty’s 49 percent interest in addition to his own 25.5 percent interest. William owned the remaining 25.5 percent interest. John, a licensed attorney, undertook the defense of the condemnation action. Following negotiations, Minarets agreed to compensation that was substantially more than the initial offer.

Thereafter, the court set aside this settlement. However, John did not return Betty’s share of the condemnation money and Betty went to trial to recover her share. The trial court entered judgment for Betty and ordered John to pay “the overpayment of condemnation proceeds, plus interest in the amount of $2,565.33 as the amount paid by the Minarets School District to John Jamison.” John repaid the principal amount of the overpayment as ordered.

For the lower ranch, the court entered an interlocutory judgment of partition dividing the property in kind. The court then proceeded to a hearing on the issue of owelty to correct any imbalances in the distribution. In December 2005, the court entered an interlocutory judgment ordering William to pay John, as owelty, approximately $1.4 million. The court further ordered that William was entitled to receive as a credit the principal sum of $387,705, plus any interest that had accrued on any sums deposited with the court. This offset represented the amount due from John to William for John’s purchase of the upper ranch parcels. Both parties appealed and this court affirmed the judgment. (Jamison v. Jamison (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 714.)

After this court’s opinion was filed, a series of motions relating to the unresolved issues were heard. On August 29, 2008, the parties met and, with the trial court’s assistance, attempted to reach an agreement on their various claims for interest on the amounts that were due. Although unable to reach an agreement on interest, the parties exchanged all of the deeds necessary to complete the land transfers for the upper and lower ranches as required by the two interlocutory judgments of partition. In addition, the principal amounts due on the owelty from William to John on the lower ranch and on the sale from John to William on the upper ranch were exchanged.

The parties then filed briefs on a variety of issues. John claimed he was entitled to interest on the owelty amount from the date the court entered the order. William argued he was due interest on the amount John owed him on the upper ranch sale. Betty sought additional interest from John on the delay in her receipt of her share of the condemnation compensation. Additionally, John asserted that he was entitled to be compensated for the legal work he did on the condemnation action that benefitted Betty and William on the ground that otherwise Betty and William would be unjustly enriched.

On October 23, 2008, the trial court filed an order on John’s claim for interest on the owelty award. The court concluded that John was not entitled to prejudgment interest because owelty is not damages but, rather is compensation to correct an inequality in values that result from a division of property. The court further concluded that, even if owelty is considered damages, no interest accrued because the unequal division did not exist until the deeds were transferred on August 29, at which time the owelty was paid.

On June 12, 2009, the court filed an order on the remaining issues before it. The court ruled that John was not entitled to contribution from Betty and William for his services as an attorney in the Minarets case. The court further ruled that Betty was not entitled to interest on the condemnation proceeds and that John did not owe William interest on the money John paid to William following the partition sale.

John appealed from the June 12, 2009 order. William and Betty filed a cross-appeal from the same order.

DISCUSSION

1. John’s appeal.

a. The issue of whether John is entitled to interest on the owelty award is not before this court.

John contends that he is entitled to prejudgment interest on the owelty amount from December 15, 2005, when the award was liquidated, until August 29, 2008, when the award was paid. According to John, because the “right to recover” was “vested in him, on a particular day, ” interest is due under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a).

The trial court ruled on this issue in its order filed on October 23, 2008. John did not appeal from that order. Rather, John appealed from the June 12, 2009 order. Thus, the appeal is limited to issues relating to that order. (Unilogic, Inc. v. Bourroughs Corp. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 612, 625.) The June 12 order did not consider whether John is entitled to interest on the owelty award. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review that issue. (Ibid.)

John counters that neither the October 23, 2008, nor the June 12, 2009, orders are appealable because there is no final judgment in the partition action and therefore the appeal and cross-appeal are premature. However, contrary to John’s position, both of these orders are appealable. As we held in the nonpublished portion of Jamison v. Jamison, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 714, the underlying owelty determination was appealable as an order made after an appealable interlocutory judgment, i.e., the interlocutory judgment of partition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2).) Similarly, an order relating to an attempt to obtain interest on the appealable owelty determination is an appealable order. (Redevelopment Agency v. Goodman (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 424, 429.)

b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied John’s request for contribution for his services as an attorney.

As discussed above, when John represented himself in the Minarets condemnation action, he believed that he had a 74.5 percent interest in the property at issue based on a settlement agreement that gave John what had been Betty’s 49 percent interest. William owned the remaining 25.5 percent interest. At the time of filing the action, Minarets offered $616,500 as compensation. However, Minarets actually paid $916,460. John alleges that in defending the action, he performed legal services totaling $60,000.

Thereafter, the court set aside the settlement agreement. John was ordered to pay Betty 49 percent of the condemnation compensation representing her interest in the property. Thus, Betty received 49 percent of the $916,460 paid by Minarets. According to John, Betty received $147,000 more than she would have received without his negotiation efforts and, similarly, William received an additional $76,500. Therefore, John argues, Betty and William were unjustly enriched and should pay restitution to John in the amount of their shares of the attorney fees, i.e., 49 percent and 25.5 percent of $60,000 respectively.

The trial court ruled that John was not entitled to contribution from Betty and William for his services as an attorney for several reasons. The court noted that John acted as his own attorney and did not expend money for his own services in the action. The court further concluded that it would be difficult to determine if John acted for the common benefit of the parties or just his own benefit. Finally, the court found that John did not provide evidence to support the quantity and quality of his work on the case.

In general, the costs of a partition are apportioned among the parties in proportion to their interests. (Code Civ. Proc., § 874.040.) Such costs include “[r]easonable attorney’s fees incurred or paid by a party for the common benefit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 874.010, subd. (a).) However, an attorney party who represents him or herself and performs legal services that are for the common benefit of the cotenants is not entitled to contribution for such services from the other parties to the action. (Muller v. Martin (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 431, 437.) Both legally and generally, the term “attorney’s fees” means “the consideration that a litigant actually pays or becomes liable to pay in exchange for legal representation. An attorney litigating in propria persona pays no such compensation.” (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 280.)

John acknowledges the above rule but asserts that it is inapplicable here. John argues that he is not seeking attorney fees but, rather, restitution based on Betty and William having been unjustly enriched due to his legal work and skill. In other words, he is requesting equitable relief.

Equity has its origin in the necessity for there to be exceptions to the application of rules of law in those cases where the law would create injustice. (Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 770.) “‘“It has always been the pride of courts of equity that they will so mold and adjust their decrees as to award substantial justice according to the requirements of the varying complications that may be presented to them for adjudication.”’” (Ibid.) When a court exercises its equitable powers, the judgment or order is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1256.)

Thus on appeal, the order is presumed correct. The reviewing court will not substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of its discretionary power unless a clear abuse is shown and it appears there has been a miscarriage of justice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331.) Discretion is abused whenever the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) This standard measures whether, given the established evidence, the act of the lower court falls within the permissible range of options set by the legal criteria. (Dorman v. DWLC Corp. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1808, 1815.) Moreover, the burden is on the appellant to establish an abuse of discretion. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 331.)

Here, it cannot be said that the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason when it refused to order Betty and William to pay John for his legal services. Although he was required to spend time, John did not incur any debt for legal representation. Thus, contribution is not required to right an injustice. Further, John did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claim. Accordingly, John has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for attorney fees.

2. Betty and William’s cross-appeal.

a. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Betty’s request for interest.

As discussed above, in May 2002, following the parties’ receipt of the Minarets condemnation award, the settlement agreement pertaining to a portion of that condemned property was set aside. Thus, the 49 percent interest that had belonged to John pursuant to that agreement reverted to Betty. On March 10, 2003, following a trial on Betty’s claim for a constructive trust, the court filed a statement of decision ordering John to pay Betty the net overpayment of condemnation proceeds, interest on those proceeds paid by Minarets, and interest at the legal rate from the date the transactions regarding the specific parcels were set aside. Betty’s counsel was directed to prepare the judgment.

Thereafter, the court ordered Betty’s counsel to prepare the judgment as previously ordered but with certain modifications. The judgment was to specify that Betty be reimbursed the interest paid by Minarets in the amount of $2,563.33. Further, interest was not to accrue on any portion of the judgment after April 1, 2003, and the payment made by John in the sum of $235,999 was to be allocated to the principal portion of the judgment. The judgment, filed June 13, 2003, stated “Betty O. Jamison shall have judgment against John O. Jamison for the overpayment of condemnation proceeds, plus interest in the amount of $2,565.33 as the amount paid by the Minarets School District to John Jamison.” The court reserved jurisdiction over “any benefits either party received while in possession of the other parties property interests” and costs.

In ruling on the reserved issues, the trial court held that, in the interest of equity, John was not required to pay Betty interest related to the Minarets property. The court reasoned that: (1) the issue was resolved when the contract was rescinded; (2) John paid what he was required to pay; and (3) “John’s efforts benefitted Betty in the amount of condemnation compensation.” Since the court exercised its equitable powers, we review this ruling under the abuse of discretion standard. (City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1256.)

Betty contends that in addition to the $235,999 she received from John, she is entitled to interest and profits on her share of the condemnation proceeds at the legal rate of 10 percent. In support of her position, Betty notes that when a sale between John and William was rescinded, William was ordered to return the purchase price to John plus 10 percent interest. According to Betty, she is only requesting that she receive what John did in a like circumstance. Betty submits that equity dictates that any profits or gain that John received from holding her condemnation proceeds be awarded to her.

Again, the trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason when it refused to award Betty interest on the condemnation proceeds. First, the court determined that John had paid what the judgment required him to pay. The court then noted that Betty had benefitted from John’s efforts, i.e., she received an award that was considerably larger than the initial offer. Under these circumstances the trial court reasonably concluded that, on balance, equity did not require John to pay interest to Betty. Accordingly, Betty has not established that the trial court abused its discretion.

b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that William is not entitled to interest.

As outlined above, the trial court ordered the partition of certain upper ranch parcels jointly owned by John and William to be by private sale. In May 2005, John purchased all of William’s interest in the properties for $387,705.

John was ordered to deposit this sales price with the court. Claiming there were disputed offsets, John deposited only $207,930. When the court reached its owelty decision in December 2005 and ordered William to pay John approximately $1.4 million, the court also stated that William was “entitled to receive as a credit the principle sum of $387,705.00, plus any interest that has accrued on any sums deposited with the court which represents the amount of compensation due from [John] to [William] for the acquisition of the defendant William Jamison’s interest in other properties subject to this partition action.” When William did not pay the owelty amount, John withdrew these funds from the court.

William was credited with this purchase price on August 29, 2008. At the same time, William completed the transfer of the deeds to John.

On the reserved issues, William argued that he was entitled to interest on the full purchase price from June 2005 until August 29, 2008. William asserted the transaction was a common sale and thus must be treated as though John had financed a house or a car. William also relied on the rescinded sale between John and William where William was ordered to return the purchase price to John plus 10 percent interest. According to William, judicial estoppel required that he be treated the same as John and thus was owed interest from the date of the transfer of the subject parcels. William noted that the court now had the ability to resolve the issues between William and John equitably.

The trial court concluded that John did not owe William interest on the partition sale. The court reasoned that: (1) when William paid interest to John it was to restore the parties to their original positions following the rescission of a contract as opposed to an equitable partition; (2) the partition by sale was part of a larger partition action and the net obligations were not known until the entire action was concluded; (3) the partition by sale was not completed for most of the parcels until the deeds were transferred on August 29, 2008; and (4) the money owed from a partition by sale should be treated the same as owelty.

William sought an equitable resolution of this issue. Accordingly, we review the trial court’s decision under the abuse of discretion standard. (City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1256.)

William argues that the court ordered partition sale took those parcels out of the partition action and therefore the sale amount is not owelty. Accordingly, William argues, the trial court erred in denying his request for interest in this purchase situation. William explains that, while he received nothing in the owelty situation until August 29, 2008, when the parties exchanged deeds and money, John bought William’s interests in the auctioned properties on or before June 21, 2005, but did not pay for them.

However, the trial court determined that the partition sale was not completed for most of the parcels until the deeds were transferred on August 29, 2008. Thus, as with the owelty, the property generally changed hands at the same time as the money. In contrast, money and property had changed hands before the contract between John and William was rescinded.

Moreover, the trial court correctly refused to distinguish between the various methods used to partition the ranch property. The partition by sale was simply one component of the whole. Further, as noted by the trial court, the net obligations of the parties were not known until the entire partition was concluded.

Under these circumstances, the trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason when it refused to award William interest on the partition sale. William has not established that the trial court abused its discretion.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.

WE CONCUR: DAWSON, J., KANE, J.


Summaries of

Jamison v. Jamison

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Feb 1, 2011
No. F058459 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2011)
Case details for

Jamison v. Jamison

Case Details

Full title:JOHN O. JAMISON et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. WILLIAM O. JAMISON…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fifth District

Date published: Feb 1, 2011

Citations

No. F058459 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2011)