Opinion
C. A. 1:22-1656-DCC-SVH
08-26-2022
Randle Jackson, Individually and as the Personal Representative for the Estate of Dashaun Simmons, Plaintiff, v. The South Carolina Department of Corrections, Captain Livingston, Anthony Howard Hall, and Captain Reese, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
The estate of a deceased inmate brings claims against the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and SCDC officers claiming the deceased was repeatedly attacked and eventually killed while in SCDC custody. Two of the officers seek dismissal of the claims asserted against them, arguing they are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Before the court is the third officer's motion to join in their request for dismissal.
Randle Jackson (“Plaintiff”), individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Dashaun Simmons (“Simmons”), originally filed this case on March 31, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas for Orangeburg County, South Carolina. The case was removed to this court on May 25, 2022. Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: (1) common law liability for negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness, (2) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, (3) violation of Simmons' First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (4) survival action pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-5-90. Plaintiff names as defendants SCDC, Captain Livingston (“Livingston”), Anthony Howard Hall (“Hall”), and Captain Reese (“Reese”).
This matter is before the court on Hall's motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 19]. Plaintiff filed a timely opposition to Hall's motion [ECF No. 26, see also ECF No. 28], and Hall filed a reply. [ECF No. 29]. Thus, the motion is ripe for disposition.
Livingston and Reese filed motions to dismiss on May 27, 2022. [See ECF Nos. 8, 9]. The undersigned issued a report and recommendation on June 17, 2022, recommending the district judge grant the motions to dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff's claims against them with prejudice as barred by the applicable statue of limitations. [See ECF No. 16]. That report and recommendation remains pending.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. Having carefully considered the record, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Hall's motion to dismiss.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In 2017, Simmons was an inmate in the Marion Unit of Broad River Correctional Institution (“BRCI”) in Richland County, South Carolina. [ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 9]. Plaintiff alleges that in late June or early July 2017, the Marion Unit was placed on lockdown following a riot between two rival gangs. Id. ¶ 10. A short time later, Simmons began to receive threats from fellow inmates that he reported to Reese and Livingston, requesting he be removed from Marion Unit for fear of serious injury if he stayed. Id.
Plaintiff states that neither Reese nor Livingston removed Simmons from Marion Unit, and Simmons thereafter was attacked by numerous inmates after an officer opened the cell door (“July 2017 attack”). Id. ¶ 11.Simmons ultimately suffered 23 stab wounds and a broken jaw. Id. Simmons was transferred to Perry Correctional Institution (“PCI”) approximately one week after he returned to BRCI from the hospital following the attack. Id. ¶ 12.
Plaintiff states Hall was the officer who opened the cell door. [ECF No. 12 at 1].
On September 9, 2018, Simmons' attorney, who also represents Plaintiff in the instant action, filed suit against SCDC in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina, asserting claims grounded in negligence concerning the July 2017 attack under case number 2018CP4004850, which remains pending. See Richland County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Richland/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (last visited on August 25, 2022).
The court takes judicial notice of Simmons' prior cases. See Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
In 2019, while housed in PCI, Simmons began receiving threats from a fellow inmate. [ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 14]. Simmons reported the threats to officers and told them that he was afraid he would be injured or killed if he was not moved away from the inmate. Id. Plaintiff alleges the officers did not protect Simmons and, as a result, Simmons was on the recreation yard when the inmate threatened to kill him. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. After returning to his cell, the inmate attacked Simmons, stabbing him, and biting his face (“2019 attack”). Id. ¶ 15. During the attack, Simmons was sent down a flight of stairs. Id.
Simmons received treatment for his injuries at the hospital and transferred back to BRCI three weeks later. Id. ¶ 16. Ninety days later, he was transferred out of BRCI to McCormick Correctional Institution (“MCI”). Id.
On January 2, 2020, Simmons' attorney filed suit against SCDC in the Court of Common Pleas for Greenville County, South Carolina, asserting claims grounded in negligence concerning the 2019 attack under case number 2020CP2300011, which remains pending. See Greenville County Public Index, https://www2.greenvillecounty.org/SCJD/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (last visited on August 25, 2022).
On June 2, 2020, Simmons' attorney also filed a complaint against Hall, Reese, and Livingston concerning the July 2017 attack in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina. However, that case was removed to this court and dismissed without prejudice for Simmons' failure to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his federal causes of action prior to filing suit. See Jackson v. Hall, C/A No. 1:20-CV-03036-DCC, 2022 WL 92615, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 10, 2022) (“Simmons I”).
Plaintiff alleges that at some point, both Hall and Reese were criminally charged in connection with their conduct involving Simmons and another inmate, respectively. [ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 20-21; see also Simmons v. Hall, C/A No. 1:20-3036-DCC-SVH, 2020 WL 6918329, at *1 (D.S.C. Nov. 23, 2020) (“According to Hall's motion, on September 18, 2017, Hall was arrested and charged with Misconduct in Office and Accessory Before the Fact of Attempted Murder. Hall's motion indicates the arrest warrants similarly allege he unlocked Plaintiff's cell door and allowed two other inmates to enter Plaintiff's cell and stab him multiple times.”) (citations omitted)); Lawton v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., C/A No. 2:20-01527-DCC, 2022 WL 484638, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2022) (noting Reese was charged with assault and battery in the third degree and misconduct in office involving another inmate))].
While Simmons I was pending, Plaintiff alleges that on November 3, 2020, Simmons again was attacked in his cell and was assaulted and stabbed by two inmates (“2020 attack”). [ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 22]. After Simmons was found with s stab wound in his back, he was rushed to the hospital, where he later died. Id. On November 17, 2020, a member of Simmons' family called his attorneys to inform them that Simmons had again been attacked while in SCDC custody and had died as a result. Id. Plaintiff alleges that SCDC did not inform Simmons' attorneys of his death and has not provided any information about his death. Id.
Plaintiff filed the instant suit on March 31, 2022, asserting claims based on the July 2017 attack, 2019 attack, and 2020 attack.
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is “not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint.” Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244. Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support the legal conclusion.” Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001).
B. Analysis
The arguments Plaintiffs presents as to Hall are the same he argued in response to the motions to dismiss filed by Livingston and Reese. [Compare ECF No. 12 with ECF No. 13 with ECF No. 26; see also ECF No. 29 at 2 (“All three responses filed by Plaintiff are identical in all material respects. The court has already rejected the same arguments made by Plaintiff in issuing the previous Report and Recommendation.”)].
There is no federal statute of limitation for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the analogous state law statute of limitations for personal injury applies. See Owens v Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989) (“Because § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions, . . . a State's personal injury statute of limitations should be applied to all § 1983 claims.”). “A state's limitations and tolling rules are to be followed unless doing so defeat[s] either § 1983's chief goals of compensation and deterrence or its subsidiary goals of uniformity and federalism.” Battle v. Ledford, 912 F.3d 708, 713 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
“In South Carolina, the general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury claims is codified at S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5), which provides that the statute of limitations is three years for ‘an action for assault, battery, or any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not enumerated by law ....'” Williams v. City of Sumter Police Dep't, C/A No. 3:09-2486, 2011 WL 723148, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2011); see also Hamilton v. Middleton, C/A No. 4:02-1952-23, 2003 WL 23851098, at *4 (D.S.C. June 20, 2003), aff'd, 81 Fed.Appx. 770 (4th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff filed the currently-pending federal claims against Defendants on March 31, 2022. Applying a three-year statute of limitations, Plaintiff may only proceed with those claims or allegations that accrued on March 31, 2019, or later. In other words, any act or omission that occurred prior to March 31, 2019, is time-barred. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims concerning the July 2017 attack are barred by the applicable statute of limitation.
Plaintiff clarifies in briefing, and Defendants do not dispute, that the 2019 attack occurred in April 2019. [See ECF No. 26 at 2].
Hall further argues that because he has not been alleged to have been involved in the incidents in 2019 or 2020, any claims based on these incidents should also be dismissed. [See ECF No. 19 at 3-4]. A review of the complaint confirms that Hall is not alleged to have been involved in the 2019 attack or the 2020 attack. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant his motion to dismiss in full, dismissing him from this action.
The undersigned has addressed Plaintiff's additional arguments concerning equitable tolling and estoppel in the previously-issued report and recommendation concerning Reese and Livingston's motions to dismiss, which need not be reiterated here, but are incorporated by reference. [See ECF No. 16 at 8-11].
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Hall's motion to dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff's claims against him with prejudice as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. [ECF No. 19].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).