Opinion
C. A. 1:22-1656-DCC-SVH
06-17-2022
Randle Jackson, Individually and as the Personal Representative for the Estate of Dashaun Simmons, Plaintiff, v. The South Carolina Department of Corrections, Captain Livingston, Anthony Howard Hall, and Captain Reese, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
The estate of a deceased inmate brings claims against the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and SCDC officers claiming the deceased was repeatedly attacked and eventually killed while in SCDC custody. Two of the officers seek dismissal of the claims asserted against them, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations has run, barring Plaintiff's claims.
Randle Jackson (“Plaintiff”), individually and as the personal representative for the estate of Dashaun Simmons (“Simmons”), originally filed this case on March 31, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas for Orangeburg County, South Carolina. The case was removed to this court on May 25, 2022. Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: (1) common law liability for negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness, (2) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, (3) violation of Simmons' First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (4) survival action pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-5-90. Plaintiff names as defendants SCDC, Captain Livingston (“Livingston”), Anthony Howard Hall (“Hall”), and Captain Reese (“Reese”).
This matter is before the court on the motions to dismiss filed by Livingston and Reese. [ECF Nos. 7, 8]. Having been fully briefed [ECF Nos. 12-15], the motions are ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. Having carefully considered the record, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Livingston and Reese's motions to dismiss.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In 2017, Simmons was an inmate in the Marion Unit of Broad River Correctional Institution (“BRCI”) in Richland County, South Carolina. [ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 9]. Plaintiff alleges that in late June or early July 2017, the Marion Unit was placed on lockdown following a riot between two rival gangs. Id. ¶ 10. A short time later, Simmons began to receive threats from fellow inmates that he reported to Reese and Livingston, requesting he be removed from Marion Unit for fear of serious injury if he stayed. Id.
Plaintiff states that neither Reese nor Livingston removed Simmons from Marion Unit, and Simmons thereafter was attacked by numerous attackers after an officer opened the cell door (“July 2017 attack”). Id. ¶ 11.Simmons ultimately suffered 23 stab wounds and a broken jaw. Id. Simmons was transferred to Perry Correctional Institution (“PCI”) approximately one week after he returned to BRCI from the hospital following the attack. Id. ¶ 12.
Plaintiff states Hall was the officer who opened the cell door. [ECF No. 12 at 1].
On September 9, 2018, Simmons' attorney, who also represents Plaintiff in the instant action, filed suit against SCDC in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina, asserting claims grounded in negligence concerning the July 2017 attack under case number 2018CP4004850, which remains pending. See Richland County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Richland/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (last visited on June 16, 2022).
The court takes judicial notice of Simmons' prior cases. See Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
In 2019, while housed in PCI, Simmons began receiving threats from a fellow inmate. [ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 14]. Simmons reported the threats to officers and told them that he was afraid he would be injured or killed if he was not moved away from this inmate. Id. Plaintiff alleges the officers did not protect Simmons and, as a result, Simmons was on the recreation yard when the inmate in question threatened to kill him. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. After returning to his cell, the inmate attacked Simmons, stabbing him, and biting his face (“2019 attack”). Id. ¶ 15. During the attack, Simmons was sent down a flight of stairs. Id.
Simmons received treatment for his injuries at the hospital, and three weeks later was transferred back to BRCI. Id. ¶ 16. Ninety days later, he was transferred out of BRCI to McCormick Correctional Institution (“MCI”). Id.
On January 2, 2020, Simmons' attorney filed suit against SCDC in the Court of Common Pleas for Greenville County, South Carolina, asserting claims grounded in negligence concerning the 2019 attack under case number 2020CP2300011, which remains pending. See Greenville County Public Index, https://www2.greenvillecounty.org/SCJD/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (last visited on June 17, 2022).
On June 2, 2020, Simmons' attorney also filed a complaint against Hall, Reese, and Livingston concerning the July 2017 attack in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina. However, that case was removed to this court and dismissed without prejudice for Simmons' failure to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his federal causes of action prior to filing suit. See Jackson v. Hall, C/A No. 1:20-CV-03036-DCC, 2022 WL 92615, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 10, 2022) (“Simmons I”).
Plaintiff alleges that at some point, both Hall and Reese have been criminally charged in connection with their conduct involving Simmons and another inmate, respectively. [ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 20-21; see also Simmons v. Hall, C/A No. 1:20-3036-DCC-SVH, 2020 WL 6918329, at *1 (D.S.C. Nov. 23, 2020) (“According to Hall's motion, on September 18, 2017, Hall was arrested and charged with Misconduct in Office and Accessory Before the Fact of Attempted Murder. Hall's motion indicates the arrest warrants similarly allege he unlocked Plaintiff's cell door and allowed two other inmates to enter Plaintiff's cell and stab him multiple times.”) (citations omitted)); Lawton v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., C/A No. 2:20-01527-DCC, 2022 WL 484638, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2022) (noting Reese was charged with assault and battery in the third degree and misconduct in office involving another inmate))].
While Simmons I was pending, Plaintiff alleges that on November 3, 2020, Simmons again was attacked in his cell and was assaulted and stabbed by two inmates (“2020 attack”). [ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 22]. After Simmons was found with the stab wound in his back, he was rushed to the hospital, where he later died from his injuries. Id. On November 17, 2020, a member of Simmons' family called his attorneys to inform them that Simmons had again been attacked while in SCDC custody and had died because of his injuries. Id. Plaintiff alleges that SCDC did not inform Simmons' attorneys of his death and has not provided any information about his death. Id.
Plaintiff filed the instant suit on March 31, 2022, and he asserts claims based on the July 2017 attack, 2019 attack, and 2020 attack.
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is “not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint.” Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244. Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support the legal conclusion.” Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001).
B. Analysis
There is no federal statute of limitation for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the analogous state law statute of limitations for personal injury applies. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989) (“Because § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions, . . . a State's personal injury statute of limitations should be applied to all § 1983 claims.”). “A state's limitations and tolling rules are to be followed unless doing so defeat[s] either § 1983's chief goals of compensation and deterrence or its subsidiary goals of uniformity and federalism.” Battle v. Ledford, 912 F.3d 708, 713 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
“In South Carolina, the general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury claims is codified at S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5), which provides that the statute of limitations is three years for ‘an action for assault, battery, or any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not enumerated by law ....'” Williams v. City of Sumter Police Dep't, C/A No. 3:09-2486, 2011 WL 723148, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2011); see also Hamilton v. Middleton, C/A No. 4:02-1952-23, 2003 WL 23851098, at *4 (D.S.C. June 20, 2003), aff'd, 81 Fed.Appx. 770 (4th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff filed the currently-pending federal claims against Defendants on March 31, 2022. Applying a three-year statute of limitations, Plaintiff may only proceed with those claims or allegations that accrued on March 31, 2019, or later. In other words, any act or omission that occurred prior to March 31, 2019, is time-barred. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims concerning the July 2017 attack allegedly involved Livingston and Reese is barred by the applicable statute of limitation.
Plaintiff clarifies in briefing, and Defendants do not dispute, that the 2019 attack occurred in April 2019. [See ECF No. 12 at 2].
Plaintiff does not dispute that the claims based on the 2017 attack are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. However, Plaintiff argues the court should apply the equitable tolling doctrine and Livingston and Reese should be estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense. [See ECF Nos. 12, 13]. As to the former argument, Plaintiff asserts that “the judicially created doctrine of equitable tolling may be applied ‘in order to serve the ends of justice where technical forfeitures would unjustly prevent a trial on the merits.'” [ECF No. 12 at 5 (citing Hooper v. Ebenezer Senior Services and Rehabilitation Center, 687 S.E.2d 29 (S.C. 2009)), ECF No. 13 at 5 (same)].
Plaintiff further argues that “the application of equitable tolling is necessary to prevent an unconscionable and grossly unjust result,” noting that Simmons I was timely filed and that multiple delays occurred in that action due to Hall's seeking to stay the action pending resolution of his criminal charges, Simmons' death and the need to appoint a personal representative, and Defendants' failure to properly respond to discovery requests. [ECF No. 12 at 8-9, ECF No. 13 at 8-9].
The primary difficulty with Plaintiff's argument, however, is that the delays referenced occurred after the applicable statute of limitations had run. Plaintiff is correct that Simmons timely filed suit against Defendants in Simmons I on June 2, 2020, weeks before the statute of limitations was to run on claims based on the July 2017 attack. However, Simmons I was removed to this court on August 24, 2020, after the statute of limitations for claims based on the July 2017 attack had run, and prior to the filing of Hall's motion to stay in late October 2020, Simmons' death in November 2020, and the referenced discovery disputes. Although Plaintiff discusses the above in addition to other alleged delaying misconduct by Defendants that occurred during the pendency of Simmons I, Plaintiff does not point to any conduct that occurred prior to the running of the applicable statute of limitations. [See, e.g., ECF No. 12 at 9].
Although Plaintiff briefly states that “Counsel for SCDC moved for a stay of 2018-CP-40-04850,” [ECF No. 12 at 9], and the record for that case indicates the motion to stay was filed in 2019, see Richland County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Richland/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (last visited on June 16, 2022), it is unclear how SCDC's motion to stay filed in a separate case in state court supports Plaintiff's argument that equitable tolling should apply here.
Although Plaintiff argues otherwise, the issue before the court is not one of “technical forfeiture [that] would unjustly prevent a trial on the merits,” where he would suffer a gross injustice “due to circumstances external to the party's own conduct.” Id. at 10 (citing Hooper, 687 S.E.2d at 31). Instead, here, Simmons filed suit, including allegations concerning the July 2017 attack, weeks before the statute of limitations related to that attack was to run. That suit was dismissed without prejudice because Simmons failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit on March 22, 2022, over four years after the relevant alleged events occurred. See, e.g., Hyman v. City Of Gastonia, 466 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting “without prejudice” dismissal “permits a plaintiff to refile the complaint as if it had never been filed . . . [it] does not, however, give the [plaintiff] a right to refile without the consequences of time defenses, such as the statute of limitations”) (citing Mendez v. Elliot, 45 F.3d 75, 76 (4th Cir. 1995)).
For similar reasons, Plaintiff's estoppel argument also does not apply where, as he stated, a “defendant may be estopped from claiming a statute of limitations defense if ‘the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute has been induced by the defendant's conduct.'” Id. (citing Vines v. Self Memorial Hosp., 443 S.E.2d 909, 911 (S.C. 1994)). In relation to this argument, both parties discuss Rink v. Richland Mem'l Hosp., 422 S.E.2d 747, 749 (S.C. 1992), in which the South Carolina Supreme Court stated:
It is well settled in South Carolina that when an action is dismissed without prejudice, the statute of limitations will bar a subsequent suit if the statute runs in the interim. Davis v. Lunceford, 287 S.C. 242, 335 S.E.2d 798 (1985). Equitable estoppel may prevent the defense of statute of limitations. Dillon County School Dist. Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 286 S.C. 207, 332 S.E.2d 555 (Ct.App.1985). In Mende v. Conway Hosp., Inc., 304 S.C. 313, 404 S.E.2d 33 (1991), this Court held that a defendant was estopped from claiming the defense of statute of limitations when he consented to plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal and the statute had run prior to the granting of the dismissal. The present case is distinguishable from Mende
because here the statute had not run when Rink moved for a dismissal and Hospital objected to the dismissal.
Generally, equitable estoppel applies when the plaintiff has been induced or relies on the defendant's conduct or promises that a settlement will be made and does not file suit until the statute of limitations has run. E.g., Clements v. Greenville County, 246 S.C. 20, 142 S.E.2d 212 (1965). This is not the situation in the present case.
Although Plaintiff argues otherwise, the present case is also distinguishable from Mende in that Plaintiff points to no action taken by Defendants prior to the running of the applicable statute of limitations upon which he alleges he relied.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Livingston and Reese's motions to dismiss, holding as time-barred Plaintiff's claims against them based on the July 2017 attack.
One issue remains: Both Livingston and Reese argue that because Plaintiff alleges they were involved in the July 2017 attack, but not any other attack, all claims brought by Plaintiff against them should be dismissed. [See ECF No. 7-1 at 1, 3 (moving to dismiss with prejudice all claims brought against her by Plaintiff, stating “Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Defendant Livingston involve events that occurred in June and July of 2017”); ECF No. 8 at 5 (arguing that because “Plaintiff does not specifically allege any tortious behavior attributable to Defendant Reese for the incidents alleged at Perry Correctional Institution or McCormick Correctional in the Complaint,” Plaintiff's claims concerning the 2019 attack and 2020 attack must also be dismissed against him for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted)]. Plaintiff does not address this issue [see ECF Nos. 12, 13], and a review of the complaint confirms that Livingston and Reese are not alleged to have been involved in the 2019 attack or the 2020 attack. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Livingston and Reese's motions to dismiss, dismissing them from this action.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Livingston and Reese's motions to dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff's claims against them with prejudice as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. [ECF Nos. 7, 8].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).