Opinion
CASE NO. 02-CV-71809-DT
February 11, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. Introduction
This is a habeas case under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Keyon Jackson ("Petitioner") is a state prisoner at the Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan serving concurrent terms of 20 to 40 years imprisonment for assault with intent to rob while armed, four counts of armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery and bank robbery and a consecutive term of two years imprisonment for possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. Petitioner has filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming that he is being held in violation of his constitutional rights because the trial court violated his right of confrontation by limiting his cross-examination of a prosecution witness. Respondent, through the Michigan Attorney General's office, has filed a response contending that Petitioner's claim should be denied for lack merit. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
II. Procedural History
Following a jury trial in the Saginaw County Circuit Court in 1998, Petitioner was convicted and sentenced as set forth above. Petitioner then filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals, asserting that the trial court reversibly erred in severely limiting and undercutting the defense cross-examination of a key prosecution witness about his pending felony charges. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentence in a per curiam decision. People v. Jackson, No. 216971, 2000 WL 33415007 (Mich.Ct.App. Aug. 4, 2000) (unpublished). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court raising the same claims, which was denied. People v. Jackson, 463 Mich. 996, 625 N.W.2d 784 (2001).
Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus with the United States Court of Appeals for the Western District on April 19, 2002 raising the same claim presented to the state courts on direct review of his convictions and the matter was subsequently transferred to this Court. Respondent filed an answer to the petition on November 14, 2002 asserting that it should be denied for lack of merit.
III. Facts
Petitioner's convictions stem from the robbery of Linda Earle, Jay Carlson, Michael Jerome, Wayne Farren, and Scott Lewis at Carlson's house in Saginaw, Michigan on January 14, 1998. The material facts leading to Petitioner's convictions, as gleaned from the record, are as follows:
Earle, Carlson, Jerome, Farren, and Lewis were at Carlson's house on the evening of January 14, 1998 when Petitioner, Abel Pena, and an unidentified third man came over shortly before midnight. They socialized for a period of time before Petitioner, Pena, and the other man left. A short time later, four armed and masked males entered the house, frisked everyone, and then demanded money and other items. They took money, pagers, a Sony Playstation console, and some video games. One of them struck Ms. Earle with a shotgun because she did not have any money, which caused her to require more than 20 stitches. The robbers hit or pushed the others as well, but those men suffered no injuries.
Ms. Earle testified that she got a good look at the first man who entered and recognized his eyes and voice as those of Petitioner whom she had just met that evening. She described Petitioner as wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt and a dark blue bandanna. She thought all four men were about the same size and wore dark clothing. She did not see which of the men struck her with the shotgun. Ms. Earle admitted that she did not tell police that she recognized any of the perpetrators when she was interviewed at the hospital following the robbery, but said that she gave the information to police later that day.
Carlson testified that he had known Petitioner for a few weeks before the robbery and said that the robbery occurred in a matter of minutes. He testified that three of the men wore blue bandannas and one had his shirt pulled over his face, but could not identify the perpetrators.
Jerome testified that he had met Abel Pena previously, but did not know Petitioner or the other man who had stopped by Carlson's house on the night of the robbery. Jerome testified that he smoked marijuana with Pena and Petitioner before the robbery. Jerome said that the robbers demanded money and drugs. He described them as black or hispanic, but could not identify them. He testified that two wore bandanas and one covered his face his shirt. He could not recall what the fourth person had done to hide his face.
Farren testified that Petitioner was wearing a blue and gold University of Michigan jacket when he came to Carlson's house with Pena. He also said that Petitioner had a distinctive gold teeth in the front of his mouth. Farren had previously seen Petitioner at the convenience store where Farren worked. Farren admitted drinking beer on the night of the robbery, but denied smoking marijuana. Farren said that two of the robbers had their shirts pulled up over their faces and that Petitioner wore a blue bandanna over his face. He recognized Petitioner's face and gold teeth when the bandanna slipped down as Petitioner was taking the Sony Playstation. Farren also claimed that he recognized Petitioners s voice and said that Petitioner was wearing the same Michigan jacket that he had worn earlier in the evening. Farren also testified that Petitioner hit him in the back of the head with a gun. On cross-examination, Farren admitted that he had criminal charges pending against him in another case for which he could face a number of years imprisonment. He explained that while no specific promises had been made, the prosecutor told him that they would consider his cooperation in the instant case in resolving his pending charges. The court refused to allow defense counsel to elicit the specific nature of the charges against Farren, which included attempted murder, felonious assault, and felony firearm.
Lewis testified that he knew Petitioner and Pena prior to the robbery. He said that all four robbers were wearing bandannas when they entered the house and demanded money and drugs. Lewis said that Petitioner was wearing a dark blue sweatshirt and that he recognized him as one of the robbers because Petitioner's bandanna fell down while he was taking things. Lewis believed that Petitioner was the person who struck Ms. Earle. He said that Petitioner was carrying the shotgun and other items when he left the house and went down the street. Lewis also claimed that he later saw Petitioner at Pena's house, but was impeached with his prior inconsistent testimony. He admitted that he had talked with the other victims about Petitioner being one of the perpetrators prior to trial.
Petitioner presented an alibi defense at trial. His friend Diane Babcock testified that Petitioner came to her house with his cousin Demetrious Pollard at 10:30 or 11:00 p.m. on January 14, 1998 and played cards with some other people in her dining room while she watched television in the living room. Babcock said that she did not see him leave and that he was sleeping on the couch the following morning. Charlotte Braun, who lived upstairs from Babcock and described herself as Petitioner's friend, corroborated Babcock's testimony.
Abel Pena testified that he, Petitioner, and Pollard stopped by Carlson's house on November 14, 1998 and smoked marijuana with Carlson before leaving to go to Pena's house. Pena said that Petitioner and Pollard left around 10:00 p.m. to go to a girl's house. Pena said that he went back to Carlson's house around 11:00 or 11:30 p.m., but no one was home. He learned about the robbery later when police came to his house.
Petitioner testified on his own behalf at trial. He recalled going to Carlson's house with Pollard and Pena for a short period of time on January 14, 1998 and smoking marijuana there before returning to Pena's house around 9:30 p.m. He and Pollard then left and went to Babcock's house at 10:00 or 10:30 p.m. where they remained until the next morning. He denied committing the robbery and claimed that he suffered from a hand wound which prevented him from even holding a glass of water at the time of the robbery. Petitioner said that he turned himself in to police when he learned from Pena that the police were looking for him in connection with the robbery.
At the close of trial, the jury convicted Petitioner of assault with intent to rob while armed, four counts of armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
IV. Analysis A. Standard of Review
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., govern this case because Petitioner filed his habeas petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the United States Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of the correct standard of review under the AEDPA. According to the Court:
Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.Id. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court on this issue).
In evaluating a state court decision under the "unreasonable application" clause, the Supreme Court further stated that a federal habeas court "should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 411. "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s `unreasonable application' clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the phrase "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. In determining what constitutes clearly established federal law, therefore, a federal habeas court must look to pertinent United States Supreme Court precedent.
Lastly, § 2254(e)(1) requires that this Court presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).
B. Confrontation Claim
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because he was denied his right to effectively cross-examine a prosecution witness about his pending criminal charges. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. "The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1973). "Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness's story to test the witness's perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit the witness." Id. at 314.
The right of cross-examination, however, is not absolute. "[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see also Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 329-30 (6th Cir. 1998).
Relying upon Davis and related case law, the Michigan Court of Appeals considered Petitioner's claim and found it to be without merit, stating in relevant part:
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's limitation of his cross-examination of identification witness Wayne Farren about Farren's pending felony charges. There is no merit to this issue. Defendant was able to establish through cross-examination that Farren — who was facing a number of criminal charges, including attempted murder — had discussed the possibility of favorable treatment in his own case in exchange for his testimony, that he was rebuffed in terms of any specific promise, but that the prosecutor indicated that his testimony against defendant may be helpful to him. Defendant was also able to establish that Farren was in custody on several charges that could subject him to incarceration for a number of years. Although defendant was prevented from questioning Farren about whether he would be subjected to life in prison, defendant was able to show why the witness might have been biased or lacked impartiality. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting defendant's cross-examination. The trial court did, however, make a comment in the presence of the jury, during the context of an evidentiary ruling, suggesting that the charges against Farren could be trespass or drunk driving. Even though the comment was made during an evidentiary ruling, Hartsuff, supra at 350, we agree that it was inappropriate.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the circumstances of this case. People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 774; 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). Defendant was able to produce a record from which he argued vigorously that Farren was an interested witness, even if the extent of that interest was not fully exposed to the jury. Moreover, two other eyewitnesses also identified defendant, and Farren testified at the preliminary examination, before he had pending charges, that he was "very certain" about his identification of defendant. Defendant and his alibi witnesses were not found credible by the jury even in light of substantial inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution s witnesses.Jackson, 2000 WL 33415007 at *1-2.
Having reviewed the record, this Court concludes that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision is neither contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application thereof. First, the trial court did not violate Petitioner's right to confront witness Farren by limiting cross-examination into his pending criminal charges. Although defense counsel was not allowed in inquire into the specific nature of Farren's charges, counsel was able to elicit that Farren faced charges which subjected him to a prison term of a number of years. Additionally, Farren acknowledged that he was informed that the prosecutor in his case would consider his cooperation in Petitioner's case in resolving his pending charges. Thus, the jury was well aware of Farren's motivation and potential for bias in testifying against Petitioner at trial.
Second, even assuming that the trial court erred in restricting cross-examination or in implying that Farren faced minor charges when making its evidentiary ruling, such error was harmless. For purposes of federal habeas review, a constitutional error that implicates trial procedures is considered harmless if it did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); see also O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 445 (1995) (habeas court should grant petition if it has "grave doubt" about whether trial error had substantial and injurious effect or influence upon jury's verdict). As noted by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the jury was well aware of Farren's motivation for testifying against Petitioner and there was significant evidence of Petitioner's guilt of the charged offenses even without Farren's testimony. Both Earle and Lewis identified Petitioner as one of the perpetrators of the robbery. The trial court's conduct did not have a substantial or injurious effect or influence upon the jury's verdict. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claim raised in his petition. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED and the case is DISMISSED.