Opinion
NO. 03-17-00350-CV
08-29-2017
J. G. and J. C., Appellants v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY, 395TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 16-0072-CPS395 , HONORABLE RYAN D. LARSON, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a final order, based on jury findings, terminating the parental rights of J.G. and J.C. to their child, J.A.C. Counsel for J.G. and J.C. have each filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief, concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. Each brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. J.G. and J.C. were each provided with a copy of their respective counsel's brief and advised of their right to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has been filed.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also Taylor v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646-47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying Anders procedure in appeal from termination of parental rights).
See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 646-47.
The primary basis for the Department's termination suit against J.G. and J.C. was their admitted ongoing drug use. J.G. testified that she had begun using methamphetamine in 2011 (at the time she voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to her first child), that she had used methamphetamine on multiple occasions while she was pregnant with J.A.C., and that she had continued using methamphetamine while the current case was ongoing. Additionally, there was evidence presented that J.G. had failed to comply with the provisions of her court-ordered service plan, including failing to submit to drug tests, failing to maintain safe and stable housing, and failing to remain drug-free.
J.C. testified that he first used methamphetamine in 2014 and that since then, he has continued to use methamphetamine "every so often." His last positive test for methamphetamine was in May 2017, shortly before trial. J.C. further testified that he had smoked marihuana weekly while the case was ongoing and had used cocaine when he was younger, although he claimed to have stopped using that particular drug in 2000. There was also evidence presented that J.C. was aware of J.G.'s methamphetamine addiction and had allowed her to use methamphetamine while she was pregnant with their child. Moreover, J.C. had also failed to comply with the terms of his court-ordered service plan.
While the case was ongoing, the Department had placed J.A.C. with foster parents, A.B. and M.B., who were also the adoptive parents of J.G.'s first child. M.B. testified that she and her husband had bonded with J.A.C. and that she hoped to adopt him as well. M.B. also testified that she had two biological children and that all four of the children in their household got along with each other. M.B. described herself as a "mama bear" who was "highly protective of all [her] kids," and she testified that her husband was similarly protective.
Based on the above and other evidence, the district court submitted to the jury, as alternative statutory grounds within broad-form termination issues, whether J.G. and J.C. had (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child; (3) failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child; and (4) used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the child, and either failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program or continued to abuse a controlled substance after completing a court-ordered program. In addition to these alternative statutory termination grounds, the broad-form termination question also submitted whether it was in the best interest of the child to terminate J.G.'s and J.C.'s parental rights. The jury found that J.G.'s and J.C.'s parental rights should be terminated and the district court rendered judgment accordingly. This appeal followed.
See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P).
See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
We have reviewed the record and counsels' briefs and agree that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. We affirm the district court's termination order. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by each counsel.
See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27-28 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). In P.M., the Texas Supreme Court held that the right to counsel in suits seeking the termination of parental rights extends to "all proceedings in [the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing of a petition for review." Id. at 27. Accordingly, each counsel's obligation to his client has not yet been discharged. See id. If either J.G. or J.C., after consulting with their respective counsel, desires to file a petition for review, that counsel should timely file with the Texas Supreme Court "a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief." Id at 28.
/s/_________
Bob Pemberton, Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Pemberton and Goodwin Affirmed Filed: August 29, 2017