Opinion
No. 1549 C.D. 2013
05-23-2014
Christopher Iwanicki, Appellant v. State of Pennsylvania
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Christopher Iwanicki (Iwanicki), pro se, appeals from the Mercer County Common Pleas Court's (trial court) May 31, 2013 orders granting the State of Pennsylvania's (State) Petition to Strike Default Judgments, and dismissing Iwanicki's action; denying Iwanicki's Motion to Quash the State's Petition to Strike and/or Open Default Judgments, and Motion to Quash State counsel's entry of appearance; and denying Iwanicki's Motion for Judicial Misconduct, Retaliation, and Disqualification. There are essentially four issues before this Court: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting the State's Petition to Strike Default Judgments; (2) whether the trial court erred in dismissing Iwanicki's case it its entirety; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying Iwanicki's Motions to Quash the State's Petition to Strike and/or Open Default Judgments, and its counsel's entry of appearance, and (4) whether the trial court erred in dismissing Iwanicki's Motion for Judicial Misconduct, Retaliation, and Disqualification.
Iwanicki also includes in his brief's "ORDER(S) IN QUESTION," the trial court's July 1, 2013 and July 17, 2013 orders denying his requests for the May 31, 2013 hearing transcripts. Appellant Br. at 2. He maintained that the hearing transcripts contained evidence. However, those orders were issued after Iwanicki filed his Notice of Appeal and are, therefore, not before this Court. This Court takes notice, however, that the requests were denied because there were no notes of testimony taken because the hearing consisted solely of oral argument.
The issues as phrased by Iwanicki are difficult to decipher and have little relevance to the content of the orders he appeals. Specifically, Iwanicki's Statement of Questions included:
1.) Did the Lower Court allow a Third-Party without Legal Standing to commit Officious Intermeddling, Intervene, and re-open a Default Judgment to defeat [Iwanicki's] Commercial Tort, under Federal Merchant Law?Appellant Br. at 3. Hence, this Court will address the above-cited issues.
2.) Did Third-Party Officious Intermeddler Declare and Concede that he de facto and de jure, did not represent the State of Pennsylvania, and has no knowledge of how the instant matter appeared on his desk, as evidenced by Transcripts[] of the Rule to Show Cause Hearing, May 31, 2013?
3.) Did the Lower Court utilize a Jurisdictional Rule to undermine Federal Law, to dissociate itself from Federal Law because of disagreement with its content or refusal to recognize the Superior authority of its source?
4.) Did the Lower Court deny a VALID SECURED PARTY, his rights and Due Process under the Federal Merchant Law . . . ?
Iwanicki is an inmate incarcerated at State Correctional Institution - Retreat. Iwanicki filed a complaint with the Mercer County Prothonotary (Prothonotary) on December 19, 2012. On December 28, 2012, the Mercer County Sheriff (Sheriff) attempted to serve the complaint on the State by certified mail at Main Capitol Building, Harrisburg, PA 17120. It was returned and marked "insufficient address" on January 4, 2013. Docket Entries at 2. On January 15, 2013, the Sheriff re-served the complaint by certified mail on the State c/o Thomas Wayne Corbett, Jr. (Governor) at 225 Main Capitol Building, Harrisburg, PA 17120. The receipt card was signed on January 17, 2013, "SIGNATURE NOT LEGIBLE." Id.
On February 7, 2013, Iwanicki served a 10-day notice of intent to seek default judgment for failure to plead or defend against his complaint. On February 19, 2013, Iwanicki petitioned the trial court for default judgment, which the Prothonotary entered that same date. On February 27, 2013, Iwanicki petitioned for a second default judgment, which the Prothonotary entered that day. On March 28, 2013, Vincent Mazeski, Esquire, Assistant Counsel for the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Assistant Counsel) entered his appearance for the State and filed a Petition to Strike and/or Open the Default Judgments. On April 5, 2013, Iwanicki filed a motion to quash the entry of appearance, and the Petition to Strike and/or Open the Default Judgments.
On May 31, 2013, the trial court heard argument and, thereafter, granted the State's Petition to Strike the Default Judgments, and dismissed Iwanicki's action in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court also denied Iwanicki's Motion to Quash the State's Petition to Strike and/or Open Default Judgments, and its counsel's entry of appearance. In addition, the trial court dismissed Iwanicki's Motion for Judicial Misconduct, Retaliation, and Disqualification. Iwanicki appealed to the Superior Court which transferred the matter to this Court on September 9, 2013.
Our review of the grant or denial of a petition to strike a judgment is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or manifestly abused its discretion. Vogt v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 900 A.2d 912 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Iwanicki argues that the trial court erred in granting the State's Petition to Strike his default judgments. The State responds that the trial court properly granted its Petition to Strike because the Sherriff served Iwanicki's complaint by certified mail on the State in care of the Governor at 225 Main Capitol Building, Harrisburg, PA 17120. The State asserts that service was defective because Iwanicki failed to serve the complaint by hand-delivery at the Office of General Counsel, and failed to serve the Attorney General as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
To obtain relief from the entry of a default judgment, the law provides two distinct remedies. An aggrieved party may file a petition to strike a default judgment and/or a petition to open a default judgment . . . . A petition to strike operates as a demurrer to the record and does not involve the discretion of the court. As such, the court may only look to the facts of record at the time the judgment was entered to decide if the record supports the judgment. A petition to strike can only be granted if a fatal defect appears on the face of the record.Reaves v. Knauer, 979 A.2d 404, 409 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (citations omitted). Section 8523(b) of the act commonly referred to as the Pennsylvania Sovereign Immunity Act, requires that "[i]n actions against Commonwealth parties, service of process must be made at the principal office or local office of the Commonwealth agency being sued, and at the office of the Attorney General." Reaves, 979 A.2d at 410 (bold added).
Here, the docket entries do not reveal that service was made on the Attorney General, nor does Iwanicki claim that he did so. "This omission renders [Iwanicki's] service defective and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over [the State]. Without jurisdiction, the Prothonotary lacked power to enter a default judgment against [it]. This is a fatal defect appearing on the face of the record." Reaves, 979 A.2d at 410 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the State's Petition to Strike the default judgments.
Iwanicki next asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing Iwanicki's case it its entirety. The State rejoins that the Commonwealth Court has exclusive jurisdiction over actions against the Commonwealth; thus, the trial court properly dismissed Iwanicki's action for lack of jurisdiction.
Section 761(a) of the Judicial Code states: "The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings: (1) Against the Commonwealth government . . . ." 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a). We acknowledge that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213(f) requires a court that lacks jurisdiction to transfer an action to a court with proper jurisdiction rather than dismiss it. Pa.R.C.P. No. 213(f). However, our Supreme Court has held that: "In appropriate circumstances, a court may refuse, in the interest of judicial economy, to transfer a matter where that court determines that under no circumstances could the transferee tribunal grant the requested relief." Smock v. Commonwealth, 436 A.2d 615, 617 (Pa. 1981).
Here, the trial court dismissed Iwanicki's claim for being incoherent and meritless. The trial court stated: "Iwanicki claims that he has filed UCC liens on himself and, consequently, his rights to himself are superior to any other creditor's [sic], including the 'State of Pennsylvania,' and the state therefore cannot incarcerate him." Trial Ct. Op. at 1. Having reviewed Iwanicki's complaint, this Court agrees with the trial court that there are no circumstances under which relief could be granted. Iwanicki's complaint appears to be a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) filing of some sort but, as written, this Court cannot determine what relief Iwanicki is seeking or the grounds upon which he attempts to assert a cause of action. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed the claim.
To the extent Iwanicki's complaint is coherent, Iwanicki appears to aver that he is a secured party creditor, and is entitled to discharge. See Appellant Complaint. However, it is difficult to decipher in what context he seeks discharge or on what grounds.
Iwanicki next contends that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Quash the State's Petition to Strike and/or Open Default Judgment, and his Motion to Quash State's counsel's entry of appearance. Specifically, Iwanicki contends that Assistant Counsel did not have the authority to file an entry of appearance on behalf of the State and to file a Petition to Strike his default judgments. The State retorts that although it is the Attorney General's duty to represent the Commonwealth, the Attorney General may authorize the General Counsel to defend any particular litigation in her stead. The State further asserts that no party has standing to question the authority of the Commonwealth's legal representation.
Section 204(c) of the Commonwealth Attorneys Act (Act) provides: "The Attorney General shall represent the Commonwealth and all Commonwealth agencies . . . in any action brought by or against the Commonwealth or its agencies . . . ." 71 P.S. § 732-204(c). However, Section 301 of the Act established
Act of October 15, 1980, P.L. 950, as amended, 71 P.S. §§ 732-101 - 732-506.
the Office of General Counsel which shall be headed by a General Counsel appointed by the Governor to serve at his pleasure who shall be the legal advisor to the Governor and who shall:71 P.S. § 732-301.
(1) Appoint deputy general counsel, and appoint for the operation of each executive agency such chief counsel and assistant counsel as are necessary for the operation of each executive agency.
(2) Supervise, coordinate and administer the legal services provided by the deputy general counsel, and the chief counsel and assistant counsel for each executive agency.
. . . .
(6) Initiate appropriate proceedings or defend the Commonwealth or any executive agency when an action or matter has been referred to the Attorney General and the Attorney General refuses or fails to initiate appropriate proceedings or defend the Commonwealth or executive agency.
Notwithstanding, Section 103 of the Act provides: "No party to an action, other than a Commonwealth agency . . . shall have standing to question the authority of the legal representation of the agency." 71 P.S. § 732-103. Our Supreme Court has held:
[T]he language of Section 103 [of the Act] is clear and unambiguous and thus provides a clear indication of the General Assembly's intent. The obvious interpretation of Section 103 [of the Act] is that no party to an action, other than the Commonwealth agency involved in the action itself, may challenge the authority of the agency's legal representation. . . . And, in any event, if we were to indulge in a digression into the purpose of the provision, we note that it is perfectly logical to conclude that the General Assembly fully intended the broad effect of the actual words chosen: i.e., that, in addressing the authority of Commonwealth attorneys, it intended that no party but the affected agency should be heard to complain about so fundamental an executive matter as the identity of the lawyers representing Commonwealth entities.Commonwealth v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., 8 A.3d 267, 276 (Pa. 2010). Thus, "[p]ursuant to the plain language of Section 103 [of the Act], [Iwanicki], as a party to the action other than the Commonwealth party, cannot be heard to challenge [Assistant Counsel's] authority to represent the Commonwealth party." Id. at 276. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Iwanicki's Motion to Quash the State's Petition to Strike and/or Open Default Judgment, and his Motion to Quash the State's counsel's entry of appearance.
Janssen argued that the Commonwealth itself was also a party and Section 103 of the Act only applied to Commonwealth agencies; however, the Court rejected that argument as well. See Janssen.
Lastly, Iwanicki argues that the trial court erred in denying his Motion for Judicial Misconduct, Retaliation, and Disqualification. The trial court determined that Iwanicki's Motion was moot since it dismissed his action for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court further concluded that if the Motion was not moot, it is denied for improper filing or service. Finally, the trial court ruled that if it is determined there was proper filing or service, "[Iwanicki's M]otion is without merit and patently frivolous and is DENIED." Trial Court May 31, 2013 Order. After thorough review, we agree with the trial court that Iwanicki's Motion is without merit and patently frivolous.
There is no record evidence to determine whether Iwanicki's Motion was properly filed or served. --------
Iwanicki's Motion, to the extent it is coherent, avers that the trial court committed judicial misconduct by not granting his Motion to Quash the entry of appearance of Assistant Counsel in this matter. As Iwanicki's Motion appears to state the same grounds (i.e., Assistant Counsel does not have authority to represent the State) and seeks the same relief (i.e., the validity of his default judgments) as his previous motions, the trial court properly denied his Motion for Judicial Misconduct, Retaliation, and Disqualification.
For all of the above reasons, the trial court's orders are affirmed. PER CURIAM
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of May, 2014, the Mercer County Common Pleas Court's May 31, 2013 orders are affirmed.