Opinion
01-23-00639-CV
07-02-2024
CHRISTY LYNN IVY-PHILLIPS, Appellant v. MELODY ROYALL, AS SUCCESSOR INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT EUGENE MILLER, AND TRUSTEE OF THE CHRISTY LYNN IVY-PHILLIPS TRUST, Appellee
On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 2 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 408098
Panel consists of Hightower, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Veronica Rivas-Molloy, Justice.
This appeal arises from a dispute between Appellant Christy Lynn Ivy-Phillips and Appellee Melody Royall, as Successor Independent Executor of the Estate of Robert Eugene Miller and Trustee of the Christy Lynn Ivy-Phillips Trust, over the distribution of assets from Ivy-Phillips's trust. Ivy-Phillips filed a letter with the probate court asking the court to order Royall to distribute the remainder of the trust's assets to her. Ivy-Phillips appeals from the trial court's order sustaining Royall's amended special exceptions challenging the sufficiency of Ivy-Phillip's pleading and dismissing Ivy-Phillip's claims with prejudice.
Because there is no final judgment and an order sustaining special exceptions is not an appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss Ivy-Phillips's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Background
Robert Eugene Miller's Last Will and Testament created a contingent trust for his daughter Ivy-Phillips. Miller's will was probated following his death in 2011, and in 2017, Royall was appointed as Successor Executor of Miller's estate, and she became Successor Trustee of Ivy-Phillips's trust.
Under the terms of Miller's will, Ivy-Philips became eligible for full distribution of her trust in April 2021, when her youngest child turned thirty-years. The will stated that Ivy-Philips was entitled to full distribution of her trust only "if, in the Trustee's discretion, [Ivy-Phillips was] not Incapacitated at that time." After Royall failed to distribute the remainder of Ivy-Phillips's trust to Ivy-Phillips in 2021, Ivy-Philips filed in the probate court a pro se "Letter to Judge in Notice of Demand" asking the court to order Royall to distribute the remainder of the assets in Ivy-Phillips's trust to her. In February 2022, Royall filed an original answer and special exceptions challenging the sufficiency of Ivy-Phillips's letter to the court, which Ivy-Phillips considers her petition. On April 4, 2022, the trial court heard Royall's special exceptions, but rather than ruling on the special exceptions, the judge advised Ivy-Phillips's counsel to "clean up" her pleadings. Ivy-Phillips, however, did not file any amended pleadings.
The term "incapacitated" is broadly defined in Miller's will.
Although Ivy-Phillips filed the letter pro se, she later retained counsel to represent her in the probate matter.
Royall filed two subsequent requests asking the trial court to rule on her special exceptions. Then, on June 30, 2023, Royall filed amended special exceptions, and a request for declaratory judgment asking the court to interpret the will's trust provisions. Royall also filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment on July 5, 2023, challenging what she understood to be Ivy-Phillips's claims.
On July 31, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Royall's amended special exceptions and motion for no-evidence summary judgment. After hearing arguments from counsel regarding Royall's amended special exceptions, the trial court judge instructed Royall's counsel to submit an order dismissing Ivy-Phillips's claims, and stated, "I will sign that order once you get it finalized and filed into the court." With regard to her no-evidence summary judgment motion, Royall argued that because her motion challenged Ivy-Phillips's claims and the court dismissed those claims with prejudice, the no evidence motion for summary judgment was moot.
The court did not expressly rule on Royall's no-evidence summary judgment motion.
Although the hearing had been noticed only for Royall's special exceptions and motion for no-evidence summary judgment, the trial court also heard arguments on Royall's request for declaratory judgment. After hearing from Royall's and Ivy-Phillips's counsel on the matter, the trial judge stated that she was not comfortable making the requested declarations because the trust language was neither vague nor ambiguous. The trial court asked Royall's counsel whether the request for declaratory judgment had been filed in response to the order issued by the previous trial court judge ordering Ivy-Phillips to meet with Royall so that Royall could assess whether Ivy-Phillips was incapacitated and thus ineligible for distribution of the remaining assets in her trust. Royall's counsel confirmed that the request for declaratory judgment was filed in response to the trial court's prior order because the order limited the type of questions Royall could ask Ivy-Phillips and thus improperly limited Royall's role in the assessment of Ivy-Phillips's capacity. According to Royall's counsel, "the parameters in that signed order basically construed the will and tied [Royall's] hands."
After hearing additional arguments from Ivy-Phillips's counsel on Royall's request for declaratory judgment, the court stated, "I'm going to take this under advisement as far as the dec[laratory] judgment." The court stated, "My concern is that the Court is overreaching into what is extremely clear in the document, in the trust document. That's where I'm concerned. . . . It is a valid document and it's a very clear document. And my consternation is that the Court shouldn't be rewriting it, interpreting it, etcetera. And that's where I'm at today." In response, Royall's counsel stated that based on the court's comments, "the cleanest way to do it [was] to completely set aside the [prior court] order dated June 15th of 2022," and the trial judge agreed with counsel's proposed approach. The court then entertained arguments from counsel regarding the prior judge's order limiting the scope of Royall's assessment of Ivy-Phillips's capacity. Afterwards, the court discussed Royall's request for declaratory judgment:
Court: Well, Mr. Robinson [Ivy-Phillips's counsel], I've taken your comments previously about that matter [involving the declaratory judgment]. Again, I don't feel that the dec judgment is proper. I do feel that the trust is very clear in its writing.
Smith: Then I just need that order to set aside [the prior order limiting Royall's role in the assessment] and I will file such a motion. Because that -- that order [from the previous judge] is an abuse of discretion. And if it's not set aside, then I think at this point in time we wouldn't have any choice but to take it up now that this case is resolved.
Court: Okay. All right. If there is not anything else, you are all excused.
Smith: May we submit an order setting aside [previous judge's order]?
Court: You may submit anything you wish.
Smith: I meant for your consideration. I didn't say you have ruled.
Court: Absolutely. Correct.
On the day of the hearing, the trial court signed an order sustaining Royall's amended special exceptions and dismissing Ivy-Phillips's claims with prejudice. The order did not expressly dispose of Royall's request for declaratory judgment or address the prior judge's order limiting the parameters of Royall's assessment of Ivy-Phillips's capacity.
On August 18, 2023, Royall filed a post-hearing memorandum in support of her request for declaratory judgment in which Royall stated that the court had sustained her special exceptions during the July 31, 2023 hearing and "recessed as to matters relating to Ms. Royall's Request for Declaratory Judgment, inquiring whether any ruling on such action would be an advisory opinion." Royall argued that a declaratory judgment was appropriate because there was a justiciable controversy between her and Ivy-Phillips concerning the scope of Royall's authority to assess Ivy-Phillips's capacity and its corresponding right to withhold distribution of trust assets to Ivy-Phillips, which Royall argued the requested declaratory judgment would resolve. See Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995) (stating declaratory judgment "is appropriate only if a justiciable controversy exists as to the rights and status of the parties and the controversy will be resolved by the declaration sought").
On August 28, 2023, Ivy-Phillips objected to Royall's request for declaratory judgment arguing, among other things, that the requested declarations contravened the clear and unambiguous language in the trust provisions. Ivy-Phillips did not dispute Royall's assertion that during the hearing on July 31, 2023, the trial court "recessed as to matters relating to Ms. Royall's Request for Declaratory Judgment." Two days after filing her objections, Ivy-Phillips filed her notice of appeal in this case. To date, the trial court has not signed an order expressly ruling on Royall's request for declaratory judgment.
Jurisdiction
In her motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Royall argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over Ivy-Phillips's appeal because there is no final judgment, and an order sustaining special exceptions is not an appealable interlocutory order. According to Royall, the order sustaining her special exceptions and dismissing Ivy-Phillips's claims with prejudice is not final because it does not dispose of Royall's request for declaratory judgment. Royall argues that although the trial court considered her request for declaratory judgment during the hearing, the trial court has not ruled on the matter.
Ivy-Phillips argues that the trial court's order sustaining Royall's special exceptions and dismissing Ivy-Phillips's claims with prejudice is final because the order "resulted in all of [Ivy-Phillips's] claims being resolved as dismissed," and the trial court's statements during the July 31, 2023 hearing demonstrate that the court denied Royall's request for declaratory judgment.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments. Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020). A judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal only if it (1) actually disposes of all claims and parties before the court, regardless of its language or (2) states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192-93 (Tex. 2001); see also Patel v. Nations Renovations, LLC, 661 S.W.3d 151, 154 (Tex. 2023). "If there is any doubt as to a judgment's finality, the question must be resolved by determining the trial court's intention as gathered from the language of the entire order and the record as a whole, aided on occasion by the conduct of the parties." Vaughn v. Drennon, 324 S.W.3d 560, 563 (Tex. 2010) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 203). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., 603 S.W.3d at 390.
Interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, which is a limited exception to the general rule, permits appellate courts to review certain trial court rulings even when the case remains pending before the trial court. See id. We have jurisdiction over an appeal of an interlocutory order, however, only if there is a statute authorizing an appeal of the order. See id.; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014 (authorizing appeals from certain interlocutory orders); id. § 15.003(b) (permitting interlocutory appeal of certain venue determinations). An order sustaining special exceptions is not subject to review by interlocutory appeal. See Saucedo v. El Paso Children's Hosp. Corp., 677 S.W.3d 62, 68 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2023, no pet.) (holding rulings on special exceptions not subject to interlocutory appeal); Nguyen v. Aventus Ins. Co., No. 14-18-00720-CV, 2018 WL 5261141, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 23, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding orders sustaining special exceptions are interlocutory in nature and not appealable before final judgment).
"A trial court renders judgment orally when it announces rendition as a present act and not as an intention to render judgment in the future." See State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 788 (Tex. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). The words used by the trial court must clearly indicate the court's intent to render judgment at the time the words are expressed. See Inwood Forest Cmty. Improvement Ass'n v. Arce, 485 S.W.3d 65, 71 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (citing S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1995)).
B. Analysis
The parties do not dispute that the trial court's order disposed of Ivy-Phillips's claims, and thus the only issue presented is whether the order also disposed of Royall's request for declaratory judgment. Ivy-Phillips argues that the trial court "made an excruciatingly clear and explicit decision" on Royall's request for declaratory judgment when the trial judge stated she had considered Ivy-Phillips's counsel's arguments regarding the declaratory judgment claim and she did not "feel that the dec[claratory] judgment [was] proper."
The record reflects that the trial court made several relevant statements regarding Royall's request for declaratory judgment. After initially hearing arguments from counsel, the trial judge stated that she was not comfortable making the requested declarations because the trust language was neither vague nor ambiguous. The trial court then heard additional arguments from Ivy-Phillips's counsel regarding Royall's request for declaratory judgment, after which the court expressly stated that she was going to take the request for declaratory judgment "under advisement." The court further stated:
My concern is that the Court is overreaching into what is extremely clear in the document, in the trust document. That's where I'm concerned. . . . It is a valid document and it's a very clear document.
And my consternation is that the Court shouldn't be rewriting it, interpreting it, etcetera. And that's where I'm at today.
Later during the hearing, the court told Ivy-Phillips's counsel that she had taken into consideration his previous arguments about the declaratory judgment, and "Again, I don't feel that the dec judgment is proper. I do feel that the trust is very clear in its writing." Royall's responded to the court's concerns stating, "Then I just need that order to set aside [the prior court order limiting Royall's role in the assessment] and I will file such a motion." Royall's counsel requested permission to submit an order setting aside the prior judge's order limiting the scope of Royall's assessment and she clarified that she wanted to submit the proposed order for the court's consideration. The court responded, "Absolutely. Correct."
At most, the trial court's statement that she did not "feel that the dec[claratory] judgment is proper" reflects the trial court's inclination to deny Royall's request for declaratory judgment. But the court's statement, standing alone, does not clearly indicate that the court intended to render judgment on Royall's declaratory judgment claim when she made the statement. See Inwood Forest Cmty. Improvement Ass'n, 485 S.W.3d at 71 (stating court orally renders judgment only when court's words clearly indicate court's intent to render judgment at that time). Furthermore, the record as a whole, including the court's express statement that she was taking Royall's request for declaratory judgment under advisement, also indicates that the trial court did not intend to render judgment on Royall's declaratory judgment at any point during the July 31, 2023 hearing. See Vaughn, 324 S.W.3d at 563 (stating that when assessing whether judgment is final, courts consider judgment's language, and entire record "aided on occasion by the conduct of the parties"). Royall's filing of a post-hearing memorandum in support of her request for declaratory judgment and Ivy-Phillips's response to the memorandum also indicates that the July 31, 2023 order did not dispose of Royall's request for declaratory judgment. See id. The record thus does not reflect that the trial court orally rendered judgment on Royall's request for declaratory judgment during the hearing.
While the trial court's July 31, 2023 order sustaining Royall's special exceptions and dismissing Ivy-Phillips's claims with prejudice disposed of Ivy-Phillips's claims, the order did not expressly dispose of Royall's request for declaratory judgment. The order also does not state that it is a final order, include a Mother Hubbard clause, or clearly and unequivocally state that the order disposes of all claims and all parties. Because the order sustaining Royall's special exceptions and dismissing Ivy-Phillips's claims with prejudice neither disposes of all claims and all parties nor clearly and unequivocally state that it disposes of all claims and all parties, the order does not constitute a final and appealable judgment. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192-93 (stating judgment final only if order actually disposes of all claims and parties, or states with unmistakable clarity that judgment is final as to all claims and all parties); see also Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 154. And the order sustaining Royall's special exceptions is not subject to review by interlocutory appeal. See Saucedo, 677 S.W.3d at 68 (holding rulings on special exceptions not subject to interlocutory appeal); Nguyen, 2018 WL 5261141, at *1 (same).
Because the order sustaining Royall's special exceptions does not constitute a final judgment and the order is not subject to review by interlocutory appeal, we do not have jurisdiction over Ivy-Phillips's appeal. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192- 93; Saucedo, 677 S.W.3d at 68; Nguyen, 2018 WL 5261141, at *1.
Conclusion
We grant Royall's motion to dismiss. We dismiss Ivy-Phillips's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.