Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-CV-74495-DT
June 30, 2000.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Tywan Lennell Iverson, a state prisoner currently confined at the Michigan Reformatory in Ionia, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He was convicted of assault with intent to murder, assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, and felony firearm following a jury trial in the Genesee County Circuit Court in 1996. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 25-40 years and 6-10 years imprisonment on the assault convictions and a consecutive term of two years imprisonment on the firearm conviction.
In his petition, Petitioner challenges the trial court's jury instructions on voluntary intoxication and the credibility of his testimony, as well as the admission of other acts evidence. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner's request for habeas relief is denied and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.
I. Background Facts
Petitioner's convictions stem from the shooting of his brother, Sam Atkinson, and his brother's friend, Claudia Keaton, during a dispute at their home in Flint, Michigan on January 28-29, 1996. The testimony presented at trial revealed that Petitioner, his girlfriend, Selina Trice, and Atkinson, attended a Super Bowl party at a mutual friend's house. Petitioner consumed beer, as well as brandy and cognac at the party. After returning home from the party, Petitioner and Trice got into an argument. Atkinson and Keaton left the house. When they returned, Petitioner and Trice were still upset and/or fighting. When Keaton attempted to use two telephones in the home, Petitioner yanked them out. When Keaton spoke to Trice, Petitioner "went off" and retrieved a gun from Trice's bedroom. Petitioner put the gun to Keaton's head and fired. Keaton began bleeding, ran to the bathroom, and locked the door. Petitioner fired four shots into the bathroom door. After a few minutes, Keaton open the door. Petitioner saw Keaton, pushed the door open, and fired another shot which hit her. At some point, Atkinson stated that he was going to call the police, but Petitioner shot him, injuring his spine. Petitioner fled the house, but returned a short while later and drove the victims to the hospital. Keaton was treated at the hospital for her injuries and released. Atkinson was paralyzed by his gunshot wound.
Petitioner testified in his own defense at trial. He recalled drinking beer and brandy before and during the Super Bowl party on the day of the shooting. He testified that he remembered returning home and fighting with Trice, but did not remember Atkinson and Keaton returning or the events of the shooting. After his argument with Trice, the next thing Petitioner remembered was driving to the hospital.
At the close of trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of assault with intent to murder, assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, and felony firearm. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 25-40 years and 6-10 years imprisonment on the assault convictions and a consecutive term of two years imprisonment on the weapons conviction.
II. Procedural History
Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal as of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals asserting the following claims:
I. The trial reversibly erred by instructing the jury that voluntary intoxication does not excuse the defendant if he commits the crime.
II. The trial court committed manifest injustice in its instructions to the jury regarding defendant's bias as a witness.
III. The trial court abused its discretion by overruling defendant's objection to testimony that he had "whooped" his girlfriend with a belt earlier on the day of the shootings.
IV. The sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing a disproportionately harsh sentence for assault with intent to murder.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions in an unpublished per curiam opinion. People v. Iverson, No. 200971 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 27, 1998). Petitioner's subsequent application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court was denied in a standard order. People v. Iverson, No. 113501 (Mich. May 25, 1999).
Petitioner filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus on September 15, 1999, asserting the following claims:
I. His conviction was obtained in violation of his 14th Amendment right to due process when the trial court instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication does not excuse the defendant if he commits the crime.
II. His conviction was obtained in violation of his 14th Amendment right to due process when the trial court subjected him to manifest injustice in its instructions to the jury regarding defendant's bias as a witness.
III. His conviction was obtained in violation of his 14th Amendment right to due process because the trial court abused its discretion by overruling defendant's objection to testimony that he had "whooped" his girlfriend with a belt earlier on the day of the shootings.
Respondent filed an answer to the petition on March 27, 2000, asserting that it should be denied for failure to properly exhaust state court remedies, based upon procedural default, and/or for lack of merit. Respondent submitted the necessary state court records on May 3, 2000.
III. Standard of Review
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996), govern this case because Petitioner filed this habeas petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
In Williams v. Taylor, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000), the United States Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of the correct standard of review under the AEDPA. According to the Supreme Court:
Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined the by Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.Id. at 1523 (O'Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court on this issue).
In evaluating a state court decision under the "unreasonable application" clause, the Supreme Court further stated that a federal habeas court "should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 1522. "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application' clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the phrase "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," refers only to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 1523. In determining what constitutes clearly established federal law, therefore, a federal habeas court is restricted to pertinent United States Supreme Court precedent.
Lastly, § 2254(e)(1) requires that this Court presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 2403 (1999).
IV. Analysis
A. Exhaustion
As an initial matter, Respondent contends that the instant petition should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state court remedies. A habeas petitioner must fairly present the substance of each federal constitutional claim in state court before raising a claim in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78 (1971). "A petitioner `fairly presents' his claim to the state courts by citing a provision of the Constitution, federal decisions using constitutional analysis, or state decisions employing constitutional analysis in similar fact patterns." Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1516 (6th Cir. 1993). A prisoner confined pursuant to a Michigan conviction must raise each habeas issue in the Michigan Court of Appeals and in the Michigan Supreme Court before seeking federal habeas corpus relief. Hafley v. Sowders, 902 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1990).
Although a district court generally must dismiss a habeas petition containing claims that have not been exhausted in state court, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982), the exhaustion rule is not a jurisdictional requirement. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (citing Granberty v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987)). A federal court may deny a habeas application, despite the failure to exhaust state court remedies, when the grounds for relief are without merit. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
Respondent contends that Petitioner's habeas application should be dismissed because he failed to present his habeas claims as federal constitutional issues before the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Court has considered Respondent's arguments, but declines to dismiss the petition on such a basis. Even if Petitioner's habeas claims have not been fully exhausted, this Court has the authority to deny those claims for lack merit. Id. The interests of comity and of judicial efficiency compel the Court to address the merits of those claims rather than dismiss the entire habeas application. See Martin v. Parker, 11 F.3d 613, 615 (6th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
B. Procedural Default of Jury Instruction Claims
Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court erred in instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication and on the credibility of his testimony as a witness. Respondent contends that Petitioner's jury instruction claims are barred by procedural default because Petitioner failed to object to the court's instructions at trial.
Petitioner objects to the following paragraph of the intoxication instruction, concerning general intent, which was given immediately following the intoxication instruction as it related to specific intent:
But you should know that [voluntary] intoxication, in itself, is not a defense in itself. It doesn't excuse the Defendant if he commits the crime. But the reason that we talk about the use of alcohol only relates to specific intent. And it's not proper to say well, I'm going to go on and drink as much as I can and then I won't be responsible for anything I do. The law doesn't allow that.
After instructing the jury on witness and police credibility, the trial court stated:
Now, let's talk about the position of the Defendant. The Defendant has testified in this case, as you do know. He ha[s] an absolute right to testify if he wants to.
Now, when he takes the stand, he takes the stand under the same rules as does anybody else. He's sworn to tell the truth. You subject his testimony to the same review as you would that of any other witness, including the fact that he does, obviously, have a direct interest in the outcome of this litigation or this lawsuit.
And that's a factor you may want to take into consideration in determining his testimony. You have an absolute right to do that.
Habeas relief may be precluded on claims that a petitioner has not presented to the state courts in accordance with the state's procedural rules. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Couch v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1991). In Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court explained that a petitioner's procedural default in the state courts will preclude federal habeas review if the last state court rendering a judgment in the case rested its judgment on the procedural default. 433 U.S. at 85.
In such a case, a federal court must determine not only whether a petitioner has failed to comply with state procedures, but also whether the state court relied on the procedural default or, alternatively, chose to waive the procedural bar. "A procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case "clearly and expressly' states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263-64 (1989). The last explained state court judgment should be used to make this determination. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-05 (1991). If the last state judgment is a silent or unexplained denial, it is presumed that the last reviewing court relied upon the last reasoned opinion. Id.
Here, the Michigan Court of Appeals rendered the last reasoned opinion discussing the jury instruction issues. In dismissing Petitioner's challenges to those jury instructions, the Court of Appeals relied upon a state procedural bar — Petitioner's failure to object to the instructions at trial. People v. Iverson, No. 200971, *1-3 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 27, 1998). The failure to make a contemporaneous objection is a recognized and firmly-established independent and adequate state law ground for refusing to review trial errors. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991). Moreover, a state court does not waive a procedural default by looking beyond the default to determine if there are circumstances warranting review on the merits. Paprocki v. Foltz, 869 F.2d 281, 285 (6th Cir. 1989). Nor does a state court fail to sufficiently rely upon a procedural default by ruling on the merits in the alternative. See McBee v. Abramajys, 929 F.2d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 1991). In this case, the Michigan Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's jury instruction claims based upon procedural default — his failure to object to those instructions at trial.
A state prisoner who fails to comply with a state's procedural rules waives the right to federal habeas review absent a showing of cause for noncompliance and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation, or a showing of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753; Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 784-85 (6th Cir. 1996). In this case, Petitioner neither alleges nor establishes cause for his failure to object to the jury instructions at trial. The Court need not address the issue of prejudice when a petitioner fails to establish cause to excuse a procedural default. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986); Long v. McKeen, 722 F.2d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1983). Further, Petitioner has not established that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred in this case. The testimony presented at trial, particularly that of the victims, established Petitioner's guilt of the charged offenses. Petitioner's jury instruction claims are thus barred by procedural default and do not warrant habeas relief.
C. Admission of Other Acts Evidence
Lastly, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court erred in admitting "other acts" evidence at trial. It is well-established that alleged trial court errors in the application of state procedure or evidentiary law, particularly regarding the admissibility of evidence, are generally not cognizable as grounds for federal habeas relief. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Serra v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 4 F.3d 1348, 1354 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Olsen v. McFaul, 843 F.2d 918, 933 (6th Cir. 1988) (such claims are almost always rejected as grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus). Instead, questions concerning the admissibility of evidence, as well as its probative or prejudicial value, are properly left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547, 555 (6th Cir. 1979). Only where the admission of the disputed evidence rendered the trial "so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal rights" may it provide grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus. Clemmons v. Sowders, 34 F.3d 352, 356 (6th Cir. 1994).
Over defense objection, Samuel Atkinson testified that Petitioner had "whooped" Selina Trice with a belt earlier on the day of the shootings.
Petitioner alleges that his due process rights were violated because the trial court admitted testimony that he had hit Selina Trice with a belt on the day of the shootings. The Michigan Court of Appeals considered this claim as a matter of state law and concluded that it was properly admitted as evidence relevant to Petitioner's motive, intent, and state of mind at the time of the shootings because it helped to explain the events leading to the shooting. People v. Iverson, No. 200971, *4 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 27, 1998). This Court agrees that the trial court did not err in admitting the challenged testimony. Moreover, even if the trial court erred as a matter of state law, the admission of the "other acts" evidence did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.
Lastly, even if the Court were to find that admission of the "other acts" evidence was an error of constitutional magnitude, Petitioner would still not be entitled to relief. For purposes of federal habeas review, a constitutional error that implicates trial procedures is deemed harmless unless it had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993), see also O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 445 (1995) (habeas court should grant petition if it has "grave doubt" about whether trial error had a substantial and injuries effect or influence upon jury's verdict). A petitioner must establish actual prejudice to warrant habeas relief. Clemmons, 34 F.3d at 357-58 (habeas petitioner did not demonstrate actual prejudice despite the erroneous admission of an unsigned statement at trial, the failure to admit proffered handwriting samples, and the admission of previous convictions). Given the other evidence presented at trial which supported the jury's verdict, particularly the victims' eyewitness testimony, Petitioner cannot establish that he was actually prejudiced by the admission of the "other acts" evidence. Petitioner is thus not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, this Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claims presented. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's request for habeas relief is DENIED and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
DATED: 30 June 2000.